concurring: I write separately only to opine that I would decide this case based on the fact that Roose’s 1978 burglary conviction was not a “person” felony; thus, his conviction of an aggravated weapons violation was improper. As recognized by my colleagues, Kansas law made no distinction between “person” and “nonperson” felonies in 1978, and we should not attempt to mold a prior conviction into something it was not.
K.S.A. 21-4202(a)(2) clearly requires as an element of the crime that the defendant have been convicted “of a person felony pursuant to Kansas laws.” Roose’s 1978 burglary conviction was no such animal. Notwithstanding that we may examine the evidence underlying such a conviction and make such a determination for criminal history purposes, here the nature of the previous crime is an element of the crime charged, and the defendant is entitled to a favorable interpretation of the statute under the rule of lenity. See State v. Zeit, 39 Kan. App. 2d 364, Syl. ¶ 3, 180 P.3d 1068 (2008).
*443With due respect to my colleagues, I would reverse the conviction on this ground rather than the analysis employed by the majority.