dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I disagree with the majority’s holding that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that Jerry F. had the requisite knowledge of Sara’s pregnancy during the pregnancy to support the termination of his parental rights under section 161.001(1)(H) of the Texas Family Code.1
The evidence shows the following:
• While Jerry F. and Sara were living together, Jerry F. took Sara to a pregnancy clinic in Tennessee because she said she was pregnant. Two of four pregnancy tests were positive.
• Jerry F. knew that Sara told his grandmother that she was pregnant while they lived with his grandmother.
• Jerry F. knew that Sara had called his father to tell him that she was pregnant and that the child was Jerry F.’s.
• Jerry F. testified that, in light of the fact that he and Sara lived together and had sex, he knew that Sara contended he was the father.
• Jerry F. knew that Sara was having a baby and knew that she was asking his father for money to help with expenses.
• Jerry F.’s father talked to Jerry F. about holding up his responsibility to help support Sara while Sara was pregnant.
• Sara contacted Jerry F. two weeks before delivery to ask him to sign away his rights to D.M.F.
I believe this is clear and convincing evidence that Jerry F. had knowledge that Sara was pregnant during the pregnancy and that the baby was his.
I agree with the majority that section 161.001(1)(H) requires that there be “clear and convincing” evidence of Jerry F.’s knowledge that Sara was pregnant with his child. But, I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the clear and convincing standard in this case was only met by direct evidence of such knowledge — Jerry F.’s DNA testing and his judicial admission of paternity. This assumes an elevated burden of proof for scienter that can never be met in most termination cases based on subsection (H).
Although the majority says they do not require direct evidence of knowledge, their analysis of the evidence in this case tells a different story. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence of Jerry F.’s knowledge, the majority has disregarded *136all of the clear and convincing circumstantial evidence of Jerry F.’s knowledge of the pregnancy prior to the DNA testing (as well as direct evidence of his knowledge from the two positive pregnancy tests) to reach the conclusion that there is no clear and convincing evidence of knowledge prior to the testing. In so doing, the majority is clearly equating the only evidence of knowledge that it believes meets the clear and convincing standard with direct evidence.
In addition, by disregarding the direct evidence of Jerry F.’s knowledge based on the two positive pregnancy tests and instead considering the contrary evidence of the two negative tests, the majority has misapplied the legal sufficiency review standard. In performing a legal sufficiency review, the appellate court must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable fact-finder could and disregard evidence contrary to the finding unless a reasonable fact-finder could not.2 In light of the entire record, we, therefore, must consider the favorable evidence of two positive pregnancy tests in determining whether Jerry F. had knowledge of the pregnancy because a reasonable fact-finder could not disregard that evidence. On the other hand, a reasonable fact-finder could disregard the contrary evidence of the two negative tests. The majority should have disregarded it, as well.
Furthermore, the majority conflates the legal standard for ascertaining whether an enforceable obligation to pay child support for an illegitimate child exists under subsection (F) of section 161.001(1), with the burden of proof and evidentiary standard for determining whether there is legally sufficient evidence that an alleged father has knowledge of the pregnancy under subsection (H). The majority contends that the following standard applies to knowledge of the pregnancy:
“In order for an enforceable obligation to exist requiring the support of an illegitimate child, there must be a court order, a judicial admission, or an unequivocal acknowledgment of paternity.” Djeto v. Tex. Dept. of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 928 S.W.2d 96, 98 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, no writ), [emphasis added]
This, however, is the standard for determining whether a parent has a duty to provide support for a child for the purpose of terminating the parent-child relationship under subsection (F).3 It plainly is not the standard for determining whether an alleged father has sufficient knowledge of a pregnancy to support termination under subsection (H).4 By construing the two subsections as answering the “same question,” the majority renders subsection (H) both redundant and meaningless.
*137Moreover, by requiring positive DNA testing or a judicial admission of paternity to satisfy the knowledge requirement of subsection (H), the majority emasculates one of the important public policy purposes of the statute — to encourage fathers and alleged fathers who possess the requisite knowledge of a pregnancy to provide the unwed mother adequate support and medical care during the pregnancy and through birth.5 The penalty for fathers who fail to provide such support during the pregnancy is loss of them parental rights to the child. Under the majority’s analysis, however, a father who possesses knowledge of the pregnancy can avoid this responsibility with impunity, and wait to assert his parental rights to the child until after the child is born. Consequently, few, if any, fathers or alleged fathers will be subject to having their parental rights terminated under subsection (H) for voluntarily failing to provide support to the mother of their child during her pregnancy.
The burden of proof applicable to subsection (H) is clear and convincing evidence.6 The evidentiary standard for reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence when the burden of proof is clear and convincing evidence is the heightened standard of review articulated in In re J.F.C.7 Under this heightened standard, the evidence in this case needed to be such that the factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Jerry F. had knowledge of Sara’s pregnancy during the pregnancy. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, and giving appropriate deference to the trial court’s conclusions and resolution of disputed facts,8 I believe the evidence in this case, both direct and circumstantial, that Jerry F. knew Sara was pregnant with his baby during her pregnancy is sufficient to meet this burden.
Because I believe there is clear and convincing evidence of Jerry F.’s knowledge of Sara’s pregnancy during all relevant time periods, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.
. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001 (1)(H) (Vernon 2008).
. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807, 827 (Tex.2005).
. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 161.001 (1)(F) (providing that court may terminate parent-child relationship where parent has "failed to support the child in accordance with the parent's ability during a period of one year ending within six months of the date of the filing of the petition").
. Oddly, the majority claims that I have "written out” subsection (H)’s knowledge requirement by requiring less than a judicial admission, court order, or unequivocal acknowledgment of paternity to prove knowledge of a pregnancy under subsection (H). But, it is the majority that has eviscerated the knowledge requirement of subsection (H), not me. By holding that knowledge of a pregnancy must be established by the same facts for proving the existence of an enforceable support obligation under subsection (F), the majority is requiring more than subsection (H) requires for proving such knowledge — clear and convincing evidence. See id. § 161.001(1 )(H).
. Id.
. Id. §§ 161.001, 161.206(a).
. 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002).
. Id. at 266. Contrary to the majority’s assertion that I have ignored evidence that may not favor the trial court’s findings, I have considered all of the evidence in the appropriate light and disregarded only the evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex.2005).