Plaintiff, Suzanne Conti (“Conti”), appeals the order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granting summary judgment in favor Defendant, American Axle & Manufacturing, Inc. (“American Axle” or “AAM”), as to Conti’s employment discrimination and retaliation claims asserted under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2101, et seq. (2008), and the Federal Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. *902§ 206(d). Conti also challenges the district court’s order denying her request to depose American Axle Co-Founder, Chairman, and CEO Richard Dauch (“Dauch”). Finally, Conti challenges the district court’s order permitting her former counsel in this action, Sommers Schwartz PC, to withdraw as counsel over her objection and initiate a lien against any damages Conti may recover in this action.
For the following reasons, we hereby REVERSE the judgment of the district court regarding Conti’s request to depose CEO Dauch, VACATE the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of American Axle, and VACATE the district court’s judgment affirming the magistrate judge’s denial of Conti’s motion for declaratory judgment regarding her dispute with Sommers Schwartz PC.
I. BACKGROUND
American Axle is a multi-national corporation, headquartered in Michigan, specializing in manufacturing automobile parts. In this action, Conti, a female executive at American Axle, asserts claims of gender discrimination and retaliation against her employer.
Conti joined AAM in 1997 as a Salaried Executive in Training (“SEIT”), becoming Commodity Manager in the Procurement department. In 2003, Abdallah Shanti (“Shanti”), then-Vice President of Procurement, promoted Conti to co-Director of Indirect Material Strategic Sourcing. In that position, Conti was a peer to co-Director Larry Earhart (“Earhart”). Until Conti’s promotion, Earhart had been acting as the lone Director of that department since 2001, and was Conti’s direct supervisor. A few months after Conti’s promotion, in June 2003, Conti and Earhart both were “transferred” out of the department and into new positions. Earhart was transferred to a non-executive position in the Quality Development department, while Conti was transferred to the New Model Launch division of the Materials Department. Although Conti retained her co-Director salary, she was demoted back to an SEIT position, a title she had not held since she first joined AAM. After her demotion and transfer, Conti reported directly to Mike Pannucci (“Pannucci”), Director of New Model Launch at that time. In January of 2004, after Pannucci vacated the Director position, Conti was promoted to the vacant position, but was given the title of “Manager” rather than “Director.”
In her complaint, Conti claims that she has hit a “glass ceiling” at American Axle, and that her experience is a direct product of the company’s gender-biased promotion and pay practices. Conti complains that she has not received the same salary increases or the same opportunity for advancement and training as her male counterparts. In particular, Conti alleges that she was promoted to the co-Director position only after American Axle promoted a less-qualified male, Earhart, nearly two years before her. She also asserts that, although she received approximately the same salary as Earhart, he was promoted to a higher salary “band” which afforded him the opportunity to receive larger executive bonuses. In addition, Conti alleges that her promotion to Manager rather than Director of the New Model Launch division was discriminatory because she received a lower title and less pay than her immediate male predecessor, Pannucci, despite the fact that she performs essentially the same work. According to Conti, she was treated unequally because of her sex, and also as retaliation for her decision to testify against the company’s interests in a deposition in a prior discrimination suit also arising out of gender-biased hiring practices at American Axle. Conti further claims that American Axle’s discriminatory employment practices are a reflection of the discriminatory attitudes of its CEO.
*903Conti also challenges the district court’s decision to deny her request to depose Dauch, AAM’s Co-Founder, Chairman, and CEO. During discovery, Conti timely noticed the deposition of Dauch. AAM, however, moved for a protective order to strike the deposition notice. While this motion was pending, the discovery period closed. On January 17, 2007, the district court entered an order extending the discovery period for the limited purpose of permitting Conti to serve written interrogatories on Dauch. On March 16, 2007, 2007 WL 850998, the magistrate judge denied AAM’s motion for reconsideration and reaffirmed its order. The district court subsequently affirmed that judgment. J.A. 986-89.
After Dauch answered the interrogatories served by Conti, Conti again sought to depose Dauch, and AAM again sought a protective order. When the magistrate judge finally ruled on the issue on June 27, 2007, it dismissed AAM’s request for a protective order “without decision” because, by that time, Conti’s counsel had withdrawn from the case and thus she was unrepresented. That order expressly anticipated that, after Conti’s new counsel entered an appearance, “it is likely that a new scheduling order will be entered.” J.A. 1097.
Although the Dauch deposition issue was pending, the discovery period had closed and thus American Axle moved for summary judgment. When Conti’s new counsel eventually entered an appearance, the court lifted the stay and set a response deadline with respect to AAM’s motion for summary judgment. Conti’s new counsel thereafter filed an “Emergency Motion for Extension of Dates,” seeking to extend the discovery period so that newly entered counsel would have an opportunity to renew Conti’s request to depose Dauch. On September 20, 2007, the magistrate judge rejected that request. Conti’s new counsel then moved the court for leave to “extend/re-open discovery,” essentially seeking to renew Conti’s request to pursue the Dauch deposition. J.A. 1426-36. AAM again opposed Conti’s request, but not on the grounds that a protective order was warranted, but rather because the motion for leave to reopen amounted to an improper motion for reconsideration of the court’s September 20, 2007 order. J.A. 1437-61.
On October 25, 2007, well over a year after Conti originally sought to depose Dauch, the magistrate judge denied Con-ti’s request to re-open discovery in order to depose Dauch. Despite the fact that the court’s January 17, 2007 order expressly anticipated that Conti’s substitute counsel might renew Conti’s request to depose Dauch, and notwithstanding that the court never granted AAM’s motion for a protective order, J.A. 1097-98, the magistrate judge reaffirmed its September 20, 2007 order denying Cont’s request to reopen discovery, The district court affirmed the magistrate judge’s procedural approach and denial of Conti’s motion to reopen discovery in order to depose Dauch. J.A. 2508-10.
After briefing on AAM’s summary judgment motion was completed, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of American Axle, denying Conti relief on all claims.
This timely appeal followed.
II. CONTI’S DISCOVERY CLAIM
“The scope of discovery is, of course, within the broad discretion of the trial court.... An order denying further discovery will be grounds for reversal only if it was an abuse of discretion resulting in substantial prejudice.” Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, the decision to issue a protective order is left to “the *904broad discretion of the district court in managing the case.” Lewelling v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus, Inc., 879 F.2d 212, 218 (6th Cir.1989).
Nevertheless, although the district court has discretion in managing discovery, “[t]he scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is traditionally quite broad.” Lewis, 135 F.3d at 402. As the Supreme Court has instructed, because “discovery itself is designed to help define and clarify the issue,” the limits set forth in Rule 26 must be “construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380, 57 L.Ed.2d 253 (1978). The operative test in determining whether discovery on a particular matter is permissible is “whether the line of interrogation is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Mellon v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 424 F.2d 499, 501 (6th Cir.1970).
AAM argues that Conti should not be permitted to depose Dauch because he was not personally involved in and did not have personal knowledge of the employment decisions at issue here, and that the information Conti seeks was available through other deponents. According to AAM, Dauch “has not been involved in any significant decision pertaining to [Conti’s] employment,” and “Conti never reported to Mr. Dauch and Mr. Dauch never supervised her work.” J.A. 34. In response, Conti points to record evidence showing that Dauch hired her, interacted with her regularly, and likely was aware of her decision to testify against the company’s interests in a deposition in another discrimination suit. Conti also claims that the record shows that Dauch likely was involved in or had knowledge of the particular employment decisions at issue here, namely Conti’s 2003 demotion and her 2004 “promotion” to manager, as opposed to director, of the New Model Launch division. Finally, Conti alleges that she should be permitted to question Dauch regarding his writings evincing his gender-biased attitudes, as well as the role that his management style has played in her stalled advancement at the company.
Although the record supports AAM’s claim that Conti never reported directly to Dauch, it does not support its broader suggestion that Dauch has not been involved in decisions relating to Conti’s employment. For instance, Conti claims that AAM demoted her as retaliation for her protected activity related to her decision to testify “truthfully” but against the company’s interests in a prior discrimination suit brought against the company. The district court rejected this argument on the grounds that Conti had failed to demonstrate that her direct superiors were aware of her decision to provide deposition testimony that would have been adverse to the company. But the record suggests otherwise. According to Conti, she informed in-house counsel for American Axle that Roy Langenbach, her former boss, instructed her not to hire two female applicants, whom Conti judged to be “very capable candidates,” because “one was a mother [and another] one was overweight.” 1 J.A. 98. Although it is unclear *905whether Shanti, her direct supervisor at the time, was aware of Conti’s intentions, the record suggests that Dauch was aware of this information. In his response to Conti’s written interrogatories, Dauch acknowledged that he “retained trial counsel reports to AAM staff counsel,” and received “periodic reports on litigation matters” from AAM’s staff counsel. J.A. 1494. From this, it follows that he would have been aware of Conti’s decision to testify against the company’s interests.
As to this particular issue, AAM argues that the denial of Conti’s discovery request was proper because, “while Mr. Dauch received periodic updates on litigation matters, there is no evidence that he received any specific information regarding Conti’s alleged discussions with counsel.” Def. Br. at 41. But that argument seems to put the cart before the horse inasmuch as deposing Dauch is necessary to determine precisely what information was relayed to him by AAM’s staff counsel. As the record stands, there is no dispute that Dauch received updates regarding pending litigation, and everyone agrees that Conti made clear her intention to testify against the company’s interest in a scheduled deposition in a pending lawsuit. Shortly thereafter, the case was settled, and a few months later Conti was demoted. Although the factual record currently may be insufficient to support a claim of retaliation, see West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 Mich. 177, 665 N.W.2d 468, 473 (2003) (“Something more than a temporal connection between protected conduct and an adverse employment action is required to show causation where discrimination-based retaliation is claimed.”), it is more than sufficient to support further discovery.
That is especially true considering that, contrary to AAM’s portrayal of Dauch as an aloof, hands-off CEO, significant record evidence attests to Dauch’s personal involvement in and control over all aspects of his company. For example, Conti points to a 2006 article characterizing Dauch as “run[ning] his empire like a front-line general, relying on a mixture of fear and respect.” J.A. 79. Deposition testimony from AAM executives confirms that characterization. See J.A. 114-18. For instance, at least one AAM executive testified that Dauch personally identified “goals and objectives” for his executives. J.A. 116. Moreover, Earhart, who was Conti’s direct supervisor before her promotion to the co-Director position in 2003, admitted that his performance reviews of Conti were influenced by the “pressure of that relationship,” presumably referring to Dauch’s involvement in Conti’s career. J.A. 115.
Such testimony casts serious doubt on the dissent’s contention that Dauch’s overarching influence and management style had “no real bearing on decisions about Conti.” Dissenting Op. at 921. In fact, Conti testified that her supervisors informed her that certain employment decisions related to this suit “came from the very top.” J.A. 95. In support of that claim, Conti points to her daily notes from March 2004 which indicate that she was told that “the only one who [can change her bonus percentage] is ‘the old man’ Dick Dauch.” J.A. 129. Like the district court, the dissent simply ignores this record evidence.
Our conclusion also finds support in the fact that Dauch played a direct role in the decision to hire Conti in 1997. Even American Axle does not dispute Dauch’s personal involvement in Conti’s hiring. Although the district court acknowledged this fact, it failed to recognize the significance of this evidence. Obviously, the fact Dauch played a direct role in Conti’s hiring does not conclusively show that he was involved in any of the adverse employment decisions at issue here, many of which *906occurred several years later. Nevertheless, Dauch’s personal involvement in Con-ti’s hiring does directly contradict his statement that he has “no independent or unique knowledge of employment decisions made with respect to Ms. Conti’s employment with AAM.” It also casts serious doubt on AAM’s portrayal of Dauch as aloof and uninvolved in employment decisions. Indeed, Dauch himself acknowledges that he “was informed of’ and “approved” employment decisions relating to Conti. J.A. 1495.
Downplaying these statements, AAM repeatedly insists that Dauch was only marginally aware of issues related to Conti’s employment status because, as AAM puts it, Dauch is “the highest ranking official” at “a company employing more than 10,000 employees in nine countries worldwide.” J.A. 34. But Conti and Dauch were not separated geographically, as both worked at AAM’s corporate headquarters in Michigan. And although AAM is a large company, only one direct supervisor separated Conti from Dauch. Moreover, the record suggests that the two interacted on numerous occasions, and perhaps frequently. Despite AAM’s claims to the contrary, the record thus suggests that Dauch likely has knowledge that is directly relevant to Con-ti’s claims.
At the very least, Dauch will be able to testify as to why he hired Conti and initially supported her advancement, a topic directly relevant to AAM’s claims that Conti was less qualified for promotion than some of her male peers. Like the district court, the dissent entirely ignores the relevance of this line of questioning, an issue about which Dauch undoubtedly has personal knowledge.
Taken together, this record evidence casts serious doubt on the district court’s conclusion that Dauch was not aware of and played no role in any decision relevant to this action. Contrary to AAM’s characterization of Dauch as aloof and uninvolved, a characterization that the dissent uncritically accepts, the record instead suggests that Dauch played an active and direct role in at least ceratin employment decisions. In our opinion, the district court abused its discretion by precluding Conti from deposing Dauch as to whether the particular employment decisions at issue here fell within that category.
The dissent contends that this evidence, even taken cumulatively, shows only that “further discovery might provide a more thorough record,” but falls short of showing that “the district court abused its discretion to the point of causing substantial prejudice.” Dissenting Op. at 921. We disagree. The record demonstrates that Dauch likely was aware of Conti’s decision to testify against the company, and that the adverse employment decisions at issue here likely “came from the very top.” Although the record at this point shows only that Dauch’s involvement was likely, that is only because the district court improperly precluded Conti from deposing Dauch on these issues.
The cases on which AAM relies are not to the contrary as most involve corporate officers who had little if any interaction with the employees bringing claims against the company. For instance, in Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363 (6th Cir.1998), this Court affirmed the district court’s decision to allow only a limited deposition of the President and Chief Operating Officer of Pitney Bowes, and denied deposition of its CEO. Id. at 366. In that case, however, we found that the record did not show that these officers “even knew that [the plaintiff] had been terminated, much less that they in some way caused it.” Id. at 367. Nevertheless, even on that thinnest of records, we found that limited discovery of one of the officers was appropriate, reasoning that the district *907court’s approach was “a reasonable way to balance Bush’s right to discovery with the need to prevent ‘fishing expeditions.’ ” Id. (emphasis added). In light of the far more significant evidence suggesting Dauch’s knowledge of decisions relating to Conti’s employment at AAM, we conclude that the balance of interests suggests that reasonable discovery should have been permitted here.
The cases on which the dissent relies are equally inapposite. For example, the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Thomas v. IBM, 48 F.3d 478 (10th Cir.1995), sheds very little light on the issue we confront here. In addition to the same lack-of-knowledge claim raised by Dauch and AAM here, the defendant in Thomas also argued that a protective order was warranted because plaintiffs discovery request (1) violated the court’s local discovery rules, (2) the plaintiff failed to depose any other IBM personnel, including direct supervisors, and (3) the deposition would have imposed a “severe hardship” on the intended deponent, IBM’s Chairman of the Board. Id. at 483-84. None of those three significant factors is present in this case. To the contrary, as the record demonstrates, Conti provided more than ample notice of her intent to depose Dauch, attempting to ascertain Dauch’s availability for deposition as early as April of 2006, and maintaining communication with defense counsel on this issue throughout that summer. In fact, it was defense counsel who decided to seek a protective order at the eleventh hour, cancelling a deposition scheduled for September 29, 2006 with only a few days notice, and just before the close of discovery. Consequently, the fact that the discovery period closed before the court ruled on the discovery issue thus weighs against American Axle, not in its favor.2 Conti’s counsel also expressly agreed to depose other AAM employees first, thereby satisfying the second concern raised in Thomas. Finally, AAM’s motion for a protective order never provided any substantive basis for its repeated claim that this deposition would pose a hardship on Dauch. In fact, given that other executives at AAM who work alongside Dauch on a daily basis were able to make time to appear, it seems more than reasonable to conclude that Dauch could have been deposed without unreasonable inconvenience.
Unlike the dissent, we are not inclined to credit Dauch’s bald assertion that being deposed would present a substantial burden, especially when his deposition could provide information critical to Conti’s claims.3 To allow a defendant to avoid his discovery obligations,on such a thin basis frustrates the purpose of discovery, and runs counter to the Supreme Court’s explicit instruction that discovery privileges should be “construed broadly.” Oppenheimer Fund, 437 U.S. at 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947) (observing that discovery was intended so that “civil trials in the federal courts no longer need be carried on in the dark” by allowing “the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial”)).
Absent any substantive basis to support Dauch’s hardship claim, and in light of Dauch’s likely knowledge of information relevant to Conti’s claims, we find that the denial of Conti’s deposition request was an abuse of discretion. See Salter v. Upjohn *908Co., 593 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir.1979) (“It is very unusual for a court to prohibit the taking of a deposition altogether and absent extraordinary circumstances, such an order would likely be in error.”)- We therefore reverse the judgment of the district court as to this issue.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imports & Exports, Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 307-08 (6th Cir.2001). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
As the moving party, American Axle bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to at least one essential element of Conti’s claims. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If American Axle meets that burden, Conti must then present sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for her. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., All U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). This Court must determine “whether the evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In evaluating the evidence, the Court must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Thus, in reviewing the district court’s decision, we “must view the entire record in the light most favorable to” Conti. Fieger v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 542 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir.2008).
IV. CONTI’S ELCRA CLAIMS
Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex with respect to a term, condition, or privilege of employment.” M.C.L. 37.2202(l)(c). This provision includes “the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment....” Downey v. Charlevoix County Bd. of Rd. Comm’rs, 227 Mich.App. 621, 576 N.W.2d 712, 715-16 (1998).
Michigan courts have recognized that ELCRA claims generally are to be evaluated on summary disposition in the same manner as Title VTI claims, and that both state and federal precedents are relevant. See Harrison v. Olde Financial Corp., 225 Mich.App. 601, 572 N.W.2d 679, 681 (1997). Like Title VII, an ELCRA discrimination claim may be established by direct or indirect evidence. See Meagher v. Wayne State Univ., 222 Mich.App. 700, 565 N.W.2d 401, 410 (1997). Thus, in addition to being able to rely on direct proof of intentional discrimination, ELCRA plaintiffs also may rely on the indirect, burden-shifting approach sanctioned in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Meagher, 565 N.W.2d at 410.
Direct Proof
“The elements of a mixed motive ease are (1) the plaintiffs membership in a protected class, (2) an adverse employment action, (3) the defendant was predisposed to discriminating against members of the plaintiffs protected class, and (4) the defendant actually acted on that predisposition in visiting the adverse employment action on the plaintiff.” Wilcoxon v. 3M, 235 Mich.App. 347, 597 N.W.2d 250, 257 (1999). Direct evidence of intentional *909discrimination is “evidence that, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor.” Downey, 576 N.W.2d at 718; Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (6th Cir.1999). On this approach, a plaintiff must offer “credible, direct evidence of discriminatory animus.” Terbovitz v. Fiscal Court of Adair County, 825 F.2d 111, 114-15 (6th Cir.1987). “[0]nee the plaintiff has met the initial burden of proving that the illegal conduct ... was more likely than not a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in the defendant’s decision, the defendant has the opportunity to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision without consideration of the protected characteristic.” Harrison, 572 N.W.2d at 683.
To establish a case of intentional discrimination, Conti points to four items she contends are direct evidence of discrimination: (1) Dauch’s writings praising gender-biased management styles;4 (2) Dauch’s role as a decision-maker; (3) an alleged statement by Earhart in 2001 that Conti was not promoted to a Director position at that time because she “did not have a penis;” and (4) alleged statements from Conti’s prior supervisor, Roy Langenbach, instructing her not to hire a woman who was overweight or a woman who was a mother. Conti also offers statistical evidence showing that AAM has never had a female executive director or vice president, and that only a small percentage of its executives, all at the lowest salary bands, are female.5
The district court declined to consider evidence from Dauch’s “unsworn writings contained in a book intended for the general public as evidence in this matter of what occurred to Plaintiff while employed with Defendant.” J.A. 2515. As to Con-ti’s other evidence, the district court concluded that, even accepting these allegations as' true, they failed to support a “direct” showing of discrimination. J.A. 2520. In entering summary judgment in favor of AAM, the district court concluded that, although such evidence shows that “gender may have played a roll [sic] in the overall management and hiring decisions of Defendant,” it does not “‘require the conclusion’ that Plaintiffs gender was a motivating factor in employment decisions specifically affecting her.” J.A. 2520.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by the district court, we conclude that the record does not permit summary disposition at this time. To the extent that Con-ti’s claims rely on the role that Dauch and his allegedly biased management style played in her stalled advancement, summary judgment at this point would be premature given that Conti has yet to depose Dauch. Without question, information that Conti obtains during that deposition may be relevant to both her direct and indirect evidence claims.
But even setting aside our conclusion regarding the deposition issue, the district court’s grant of summary disposition was inappropriate. Conti testified that Ear*910hart expressly stated that Conti was passed over for a promotion based on her sex. J.A. 2142. If Conti had relied on this statement as evidence of Earhart’s discriminatory attitudes toward Conti, we may agree with the district court’s conclusion that such sentiments cannot support Conti’s claims because it is evident that Earhart played no role in any employment decisions affecting her, see Smith v. Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir.2000) (“Statements by nondecisionmakers ... [cannot] suffice to satisfy the plaintiffs burden ... of demonstrating animus.” (citations omitted)), and because Earhart’s sentiments cannot be imputed to Conti’s superiors, see Wilson v. Stroh Cos., Inc., 952 F.2d 942, 945-16 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that racial animus by plant manager could not be imputed to upper-level manager who made decision to terminate absent proof of a connection). But Conti does not rely on this statement to show Earhart’s animus, but rather to show his understanding of the motives of other executives who did make the decision not to promote Conti.
Taking Conti’s claim as true, as we must at this stage, this statement speaks directly to Conti’s claim that sex was a motivating factor in AAM’s decision not to promote her. Although AAM challenges whether Earhart ever made such a statement, and if he did, whether that statement is credible, that issue is precisely the type of disputed issue of fact that precludes summary judgment. See Harrison, 572 N.W.2d at 681 n. 5 (“The defendant’s employees in question deny making the comments, which, in turn, calls into question plaintiffs credibility. When credibility is at issue, summary disposition rarely is appropriate.”). The other direct evidence on which Conti relies is to the same effect. Taking all of this evidence together, we find it sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Although some of Conti’s claims do not relate to adverse employment actions directly affecting her, such a narrow reading of the case law is improper. Michigan courts have held that a plaintiff proceeding on a direct evidence theory must point to allegations that “ ‘require the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer’s actions.’ ” Sniecinski v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 469 Mich. 124, 666 N.W.2d 186, 192 (2003) (quoting Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (6th Cir.1999)). But that merely requires that the plaintiff show that “the defendant’s discriminatory animus was more likely than not a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in the decision,” or that defendant’s “discriminatory animus was causally related to the adverse decision.” Id. at 193 (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989)). The “requires the conclusion” standard does not imply that every allegation and every piece of evidence pertain directly to the adverse actions taken against the plaintiff. A direct evidence claim may be supported by more generalized evidence, so long as the evidence when taken as a whole requires the conclusion that the defendant’s discriminatory animus was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action. See Harrison, 572 N.W.2d at 683 (citing Kresnak v. City of Muskegon Heights, 956 F.Supp. 1327, 1335 (W.D.Mich.1997) (noting that negative statements and racial slurs are sufficient to establish a prima facie case and survive summary judgment even if those comments were not directed at or made about the plaintiff directly) (citing LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 380 (6th Cir.1993), and Talley v. Bravo Pitino Restaurant, Inc., 61 F.3d 1241, 1249 (6th Cir.1995))). As this Court has noted in a similar context, “[djiscriminatory statements may re-*911fleet a cumulative managerial attitude among the defendant-employer’s managers that has influenced the decisionmaking process for a considerable time. Thus, management’s consideration of an impermissible factor in one context may support the inference that the impermissible factor entered into the decisionmaking process in another context.” Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir.1998).
Because Conti’s allegations, when considered together and taken as true, raise a triable issue of fact as to whether her sex was a substantial motivating factor in the adverse actions taken against her, summary judgment is inappropriate.
Indirect Proof
In the alternative, Conti offers indirect evidence to support her mixed-motive claims. As in the direct evidence context, a plaintiff relying on indirect evidence still must make a prima facie showing of discrimination. To make an indirect “prima facie” case, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she suffered an adverse employment action, and that she did so “under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Wilcoxon, 597 N.W.2d at 257. The use of the term “pri-ma facie case” in this context, however, may be misleading inasmuch as this threshold showing “does not mean that the plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to allow the case to go to a jury, but rather that the plaintiff produced enough evidence to create a rebuttable presumption of ... discrimination.” Meagher, 565 N.W.2d at 410; see also Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981) (“The phrase ‘prima facie case’ not only may denote the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by courts to describe the plaintiffs burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue. McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent that in the Title VII context we use ‘prima facie case’ in the former sense.” (citation omitted)). In other words, a plaintiffs “prima facie” showing in this context “does not describe the plaintiffs burden of production, but merely establishes a rebuttable presumption.” Hazle v. Ford Motor Co., 464 Mich. 456, 628 N.W.2d 515, 521 (2001).
To survive summary judgment in this context, a plaintiff also must satisfy the additional burdens set out in McDonnell Douglas. See Hazle, 628 N.W.2d at 520-21. Under that familiar framework, “the court then examines whether the defendant has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. If that articulation is made, the court next considers whether the plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason offered by the defendant was a mere pretext for discrimination.” Harrison, 572 N.W.2d at 682 (internal citations omitted).
Conti attempts to makes her “pri-ma facie” showing by pointing to the following alleged adverse employment actions: (1) unlike Earhart, she was not placed in salary band 15 when she was promoted to a co-Director position in 2003; (2) she was demoted in 2003; (3) she was not afforded the same training and advancement opportunities as male co-workers; and (4) she was paid less than her immediate male predecessor, Pannucci, when she took over the New Model Launch department. See Conti Br. at 34.
Reading the record in the light most favorable to Conti, these claims certainly demonstrate adverse employment actions that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. For instance, the record does show that AAM promoted Conti’s male co-worker, Earhart, to a vacant di*912rector position two years before Conti.6 The record also supports her claim that when she eventually was made a co-Director two years later, she was not elevated to a higher salary band as was Earhart when he was promoted. There also is no dispute that Conti was demoted back to an SEIT position in the summer of 2003, only a few months after her promotion. And the record also is clear that, in 2004 when Conti was promoted to head of the New Model Launch department, she was assigned the title of manager rather than director, a distinction which again precluded her from being eligible for higher executive bonuses. The record also is unequivocal that Conti did not receive the same salary as her immediate male predecessor upon her promotion. Each of these claims is sufficient to allege an adverse employment action. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998) (recognizing that a “tangible employment action” includes “a denial of a raise or a promotion”); Jordan v. City of Cleveland, 464 F.3d 584, 596 (6th Cir.2006) (“[D]enial of money would more than amply qualify as a materially adverse action to any reasonable employee for Title VII purposes.”); Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 565 (6th Cir.2000) (accepting that the denial of the proper pay increase with the plaintiffs promotion constituted an adverse employment action). Accordingly, Conti’s claims are sufficient to create a rebuttable presumption of unlawful discrimination.
Under McDonnell Douglas, the burden thus shifts to American Axle to demonstrate that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for these employment decisions. If AAM makes such a showing, Conti assumes the burden of showing pretext. Reviewing the record, we conclude that AAM has provided significant, nondiscriminatory reasons for these employment actions, but that Conti has introduced sufficient evidence to raise a material question of fact as to whether these justifications are merely pretext for unlawful discrimination.
As to Conti’s delayed promotion and eventual demotion, the company argues that Conti’s management style was abrasive and ineffectual, that her subordinates often complained, and that several of her subordinates either left her section or the company entirely. In response, however, Conti points out that many of these employment reviews are from 1997, see J.A. 354, while a 2000 review, the year immediately prior to Earhart’s promotion, indicates that Conti’s work generally was “commendable” or “competent,” J.A. 1649-51. Conti also points out that, if she was so incompetent, why was she promoted to a co-Director position in 2003, and then again promoted to a manager position in 2004. We cannot merely discount these positive performance reviews and Conti’s other rebuttal evidence, as the district court seems to have done, but instead must read this evidence in the light most favorable to Conti. At a minimum, these conflicting accounts of Conti’s performance raise a triable issue of fact as to whether AAM’s proffered justifications are pretex-tual, and thus summary judgment is inappropriate. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, *913106 S.Ct. 2505 (“[T]he judge’s function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”); Hazle, 628 N.W.2d at 522 n. 10 (making clear that, “in response to a motion for summary disposition [in the indirect evidence context], the nonmoving party’s obligation is only to show the existence of a ‘genuine issue as to any material fact’ ” as to the pretext element).
AAM also argues that Conti was not as qualified as many of the male executives to which she seeks to compare herself. Conti rejects that assertion. In comparison to Earhart, Conti claims that she was just as qualified for the promotion. The fact that AAM eventually promoted her to the same position as Earhart, making them co-Directors of the same department, seems to support that contention. In regards to Pannucci, Conti acknowledges that Pan-nucci had an engineering degree and plant management experience, but disputes whether these are relevant considerations for the head of the New Model Launch department. Again, the record does not provide an answer to this disputed question, and thus summary disposition is improper. Hazle, 628 N.W.2d at 522 (“[F]or purposes of a motion for summary disposition or directed verdict, a plaintiff need only create a question of material fact upon which reasonable minds could differ regarding whether discrimination was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.”).
Retaliation
Conti also alleges that these adverse employment actions were taken in retaliation for her protected conduct in the Van Zoest case. In order to show causation in a retaliatory discrimination ease, “plaintiff must show something more than merely a coincidence in time between protected activity and adverse employment action.” West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 Mich. 177, 665 N.W.2d 468, 472 (2003). “Something more than a temporal connection between protected conduct and an adverse employment action is required to show causation where discrimination-based retaliation is claimed.” Id.
The district court granted summary judgment on this issue because it found that, other than the fact that Conti was demoted a few months after her protected activity, Conti failed to produce any evidence affirmatively showing that her demotion, or any other adverse employment action, was related to her decision to testify about discriminatory hiring practices in the Van Zoest case. As the district court framed the issue, AAM is entitled to summary judgment essentially because Conti failed to show that Shanti, her direct supervisor at the time, was aware of her protected conduct.
As discussed above, however, the record does suggest that Dauch likely was aware of Conti’s protected activity and that he maintained a very hands-on management approach. Because Conti has not yet had the opportunity to depose Dauch on this matter, we conclude that it would be premature at this juncture to grant summary judgment as to her retaliation claim. We therefore vacate the judgment of the district court on this claim as well.
V. CONTI’S EQUAL PAY ACT CLAIM
The Equal Pay Act prohibits employers from paying an employee at a rate less than that paid to employees of the opposite sex for equal work. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). Thus, to establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination, Conti must show that “an employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes ‘for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are per*914formed under similar working conditions.’ ” Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)); Balmer v. HCA, 423 F.3d 606, 612 (6th Cir.2005). “‘Equal work’ does not require that the jobs be identical, but only that there exist ‘substantial equality of skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions.’ ” Buntin v. Breathitt County Bd. of Educ., 134 F.3d 796, 799 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting Odomes v. Nucare, Inc., 653 F.2d 246, 250 (6th Cir.1981)). Whether the work of two employees is substantially equal “must be resolved by an overall comparison of the work, not its individual segments.” Id. An EPA plaintiff may meet her prima facie burden by demonstrating a wage differential between herself and her predecessor. See Gandy v. Sullivan County, Tenn., 24 F.3d 861 (6th Cir.1994) (presuming that there was “substantial similarity” between plaintiff and her immediate male predecessor’s job).
If Conti carries her burden, “the burden shifts to the employer to show that the differential is justified under one of the Act’s four exceptions.” Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 196, 94 S.Ct. 2223; Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806, 826 (6th Cir.2000). One of the Act’s four exceptions is a “general catchall provision,” Corning Glass, 417 U.S. at 196, 94 S.Ct. 2223, which precludes liability where the employer can show that the different payment to employees of opposite sexes “is made pursuant to ... a differential based on any other factor other than sex,” 29 U.S.C. 206(d)(l)(iv). Consequently, AAM is not liable under the EPA if it is able to demonstrate that the alleged wage differential is predicated on a factor other than sex. See Timmer v. Michigan Dept. of Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 843 (6th Cir.1997).
In moving for summary judgment, AAM argued that, at least in most instances, Conti earned a higher annual salary than her male counterparts. In those instances where Conti earned less, AAM argues that the difference in pay and/or title was based on factors other than her sex, pointing to the purportedly greater experience, education, and other qualifications of her male counterparts. In many respects, AAM’s argument is well taken. For instance, the record shows that Conti did earn more money than most of her male counterparts when she was hired into AAM as an SEIT in 1997. And the record also shows that Conti earned more money than Earhart when the two were co-Directors of Indirect Material Purchasing for the first half of 2003. Although Conti alleges that Earhart was promoted to salary band 15 in that position, AAM responds that Earhart was demoted to band 13 when Conti was made a co-director. AAM also points out that Conti earned significantly more money as the manager of New Model Launch than Satish Raheja, the prior male employee who held that position less than a year before Conti.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, AAM’s argument fails in one critical instance. When Conti was promoted to manager of the New Model Launch department, she received a significantly lower salary than her immediate male predecessor, Pannuc-ci. If the positions held by Conti and Pannucci were “substantially similar,” this difference alone is sufficient to establish a prima facie case under the EPA. See Buntin, 134 F.3d at 799 (“The plaintiff may meet her prima facie burden by demonstrating a wage differential between herself and her predecessor.”). At that point, the burden would fall on AAM to “prove” its claim that the difference in pay and title was based on legitimate factors other than sex. Id.
*915Primarily, AAM contends that Conti received less pay than Pannucci because, although she was promoted ostensibly to the position left vacant by Pannucci, she was given the title and responsibilities of a manager rather than a director. According to AAM, the difference in title reflects a critical distinction in the duties performed by Pannucci and Conti. But this Court consistently has recognized that the plaintiff is not required to demonstrate that the duties performed are “identical,” but only “that there exist ‘substantial equality of skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions.’ ” Buntin, 134 F.3d at 799 (quoting Odomes, 653 F.2d at 250). “Whether the work of two employees is substantially equal ‘must be resolved by an overall comparison of the work, not its individual segments.’ ” Id. (quoting Odomes, 653 F.2d at 250).
Applying that standard, we find that Conti has raised a material issue as to whether she performed substantially equal work for less pay. Conti testified that she was required to perform all of the duties previously assigned to her predecessor, as well as some additional responsibilities.7 Nevertheless, Conti received significantly less pay, and again was not eligible for the same executive bonuses. Although AAM argues that there is a significant difference in the responsibilities assigned to Pannucci and Conti in their respective positions, the only evidence to that effect comes from the self-serving testimony offered by Pannucci himself. AAM offers no other evidence to rebut Conti’s claim that she performed “substantially” the same functions as Pan-nucci.
Because the court was required to construe the record in the light most favorable to Conti at this stage, it was improper for the district court to credit Pannucci’s testimony over Conti’s without any other supporting evidence.8 In light of the competing claims as to this particular issue, we find that it was improper to grant summary judgment as to Conti’s retaliation claim. See Timmer, 104 F.3d at 844 (“[A]s *916with all affirmative defenses under the Act, the employer must prove that ‘sex provides no part of the basis for the wage differential [in order to prevail on summary judgment].’ ” (quoting Brennan v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 523 F.2d 1013, 1031 (6th Cir.1975) (emphasis in Timrrnr))). In our view, Conti has raised a prima facie case under the EPA with respect to her claim of unequal pay in this context, and the disputed issues of fact regarding the difference in responsibilities between her and Pannucci cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
VI. CONTI’S DISPUTE WITH SOMMERS SCHWARTZ
Conti also challenges the district court’s prior decision to permit her former counsel in this action, Sommers Schwartz PC, to withdraw and yet still file a lien against any damages she may recover in this action. In 2004, Conti retained the Sommers Schwartz firm to pursue her claims against AAM. Attorney Joseph Golden (“Golden”) served as lead counsel on Conti’s case. After acting as lead counsel for over 2 years, Golden resigned and left the firm effective February 14, 2007. Shortly thereafter, on April 4, 2007, Sommers Schwartz advised Conti via e-mail that it intended to withdraw as counsel, noting that the “sticking point” in continuing the relationship was “the question of [Conti’s] responsibility for ongoing anticipated file costs.” J.A. 1031. Conti responded via letter on April 5, 2007 that she did not consent or agree to the firm’s proposal to withdraw as counsel, and advising the firm that she intended to invoke her rights under the Retainer Agreement should the firm seek to withdraw.9 J.A. 984-85.
Over Conti’s objection, Sommers Schwartz filed a motion to withdraw alleging a complete “breakdown” in the attorney-client relationship. J.A. 1066-70. Although Sommers Schwartz’s motion advised the court that it had attempted to contact defense counsel, it did not inform the court that Conti had objected to its proposal to withdraw and it did not mention Conti’s letter of April 5, 2007. And although Sommers Schwartz’s motion advised the court that Golden continued to serve as counsel for Conti, Golden filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on April 24, 2007. Conti did not file a response to the motion.
On April 30, 2007, after the expiration of the time period for filing a response and after Golden filed his motion to withdraw, the court entered a “stipulated” order permitting Sommers Schwartz to withdraw as counsel. Although so titled, Conti plainly had not “stipulated” to the order. A week later, on May 8, 2007, Golden, despite having already filed his own motion to withdraw, filed a belated motion on Conti’s behalf opposing the court’s order. J.A. 968-78.
After Conti obtained replacement counsel, Sommers Schwartz asserted a lien for its costs and attorney fees against any damages Conti may recover in this action.*91710 On May 31, 2007, Conti’s new counsel filed a motion for declaratory judgment arguing that Sommers Schwartz was precluded under Paragraph 13 of the Retainer Agreement from asserting a lien for its outstanding costs because it withdrew from the case without Conti’s consent. Sommers Schwartz’s response argued that Conti’s “failure to file an objection to Som-mers Schwartz’s withdrawal motion represents her consent (or at a minimum her abandonment of any objection) to the relief ordered by this Court.” J.A. 1048. Som-mers Schwartz also argued that Paragraph 13 was void as a matter of public policy.
On June 25, 2007, the magistrate judge held a hearing on the issue. At the hearing, the magistrate judge expressly acknowledged that the “stipulated” order was entered in error “based on what [the court] saw as an unobjected to order.” J.A. 2593. Despite acknowledging this error, the magistrate judge nevertheless entered a written order approving the lien as to all costs incurred up until Sommers Schwartz withdrew as counsel. J.A. 1099. Critically, however, the order expressly set aside the issue of attorney fees for resolution at a later date. J.A. 1099. The order also rejected Conti’s objections under Paragraph 13, finding that that provision “is void as a matter of Michigan public policy.” J.A. 1103.
On Conti’s appeal, the district court approved the magistrate judge’s order, agreeing with Sommers Schwartz that Paragraph 13 of the Retainer Agreement did not apply because Conti had failed to object to the motion to withdraw. Critical to that ruling was the court’s determination that Conti “was represented by counsel when Sommers Schwartz filed its motion to withdraw.” J.A. 1263. Significantly, however, the court did not address any issues related to the magistrate judge’s determination that Paragraph 13 is void as a matter of public policy. Rather, the court determined only that, because Conti failed to file timely objections to Sommers Schwartz’s motion to withdraw, Paragraph 13 of the Retainer Agreement did not apply because Som-mers Schwartz did not withdraw “without the consent” of Conti. J.A. 1263.
Jurisdictional Considerations
Prior to oral argument, this Court requested that the parties submit supplemental briefs regarding this dispute addressing “both the finality of the magistrate judge’s order and the timeliness of the notice of appeal,” referring the parties to our decision in Gnesys, Inc. v. Greene, 437 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2005).11 The question underlying that request was whether Conti’s appeal from the district court’s July 27, 2007 order is untimely because, although it was filed within 30 days of the district court’s order granting AAM summary judgment, it was filed several months after the court entered its order on this distinct issue. After consideration, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider Conti’s appeal from the district court’s order denying her motion for declaratory judgment.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this Court has jurisdiction to consider appeals “from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States.” In determining whether a *918decision is “final” for purposes of § 1291, the Supreme Court has instructed that we consider whether the decision “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves the court nothing to do but execute the judgment.” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945). “When an action presents more than one claim for relief ... the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims ... only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (emphasis added). “Otherwise, any order ... that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Id. (emphasis added).
In this case, the magistrate judge’s June 27, 2007, 2007 WL 1839937, order denying Conti’s motion for declaratory judgment did not finally resolve the issue of Som-mers Schwartz’s entitlement to attorney fees. In fact, that order expressly “stayed” the issue of fees “in order to permit Ms. Conti to obtain new counsel and present any affidavit regarding the effect of [Sommers Schwartz’s] lien on the representation.” J.A. 1099. Because a magistrate judge’s order is not subject to appeal under § 1291, Conti appropriately appealed that order to the district court. See United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir.1981) (“Direct appeals from the magistrate judge’s findings are correctly denied, because only final orders of the district court are appealable pursuant to 29 U.S.C. [§ ] 1291.”).
On July 27, 2007, 2007 WL 2178419, the district court affirmed the magistrate judge’s resolution of the matter, also setting aside resolution of the dispute over attorney’s fees. J.A. 1263 (“Magistrate Judge Morgan is not in error in her decision to consider the issue of attorney fees at a later date.”). Because that order did not resolve all issues relating to that dispute, it is not a “final” order subject to appeal under § 1291.
Our prior decision in Gnesys is not to the contrary. In that case, we held that a notice of appeal was untimely because it was filed almost a year after the district court entered an order finding defendant in contempt and awarding plaintiff damages, even though it was filed within 30 days of the court’s entry of an order resolving disputed attorney fees that related to the previously entered damages award. Gnesys, 437 F.3d at 485. Relying on Budinich v. Beaton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 108 S.Ct. 1717, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988), we concluded that the claim for fees was “not part of the merits of the action,” and thus held that the dispute over fees did not preclude the order awarding of damages from effectively rendering a final decision. Gnesys, 437 F.3d at 486-87.
In this case, however, the facts are almost completely reversed. Rather than resolving the merits first and the fee dispute later, the court resolved Conti’s dispute with Sommers Schwartz as to costs first, prior to granting American Axle’s summary judgment motion. Because the district court had yet to enter an order resolving the merits of the action, the holding of Gnesys is inapposite. While Gnesys instructs that the dispute between Conti and Sommers Schwartz regarding costs and fees is separate from the merits of the underlying action, the fact that such an outstanding dispute does not toll the time for filing an appeal from an order that fully resolves the merits of the action simply does not speak to whether the resolution of that dispute constitutes a separate final order for purposes of § 1291.
*919Nor was the district court’s July 27, 2007 order subject to appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Although 28 U.S.C. § 1291 vests the Courts of Appeals with jurisdiction over appeals only from “final decisions” of the district courts, “a decision ‘final’ within the meaning of § 1291 does not necessarily mean the last order possible to be made in a case.” Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152, 85 S.Ct. 308, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964). A decision also is appealable if it falls within “that small class [of orders] which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). That “small class” of decisions includes orders granting or denying a claimed right that “cannot be effectively vindicated after the trial has occurred.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The requirements for bringing an appeal under Cohen’s collateral order doctrine “have been distilled down to three conditions: that an order ‘[1] conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’ ” Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006) (quoting Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993)).
The district court’s order thus was not subject to collateral appeal because it did not “conclusively determine” the dispute in question inasmuch as it specifically left the issue of attorney fees unresolved. Moreover, as Gnesys demonstrates, disputes as to costs and fees, although collateral to the underlying dispute, can still be “effectively vindicated after the trial has occurred.”
Merits Analysis
This Court reviews the district court’s decision to permit an attorney to withdraw for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438, 446 (6th Cir.2006). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applies the law, or uses an erroneous legal standard.” Tucker v. City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 461 (6th Cir.2005). This abuse of discretion standard applies even where a motion seeking substitute counsel is untimely. See United States v. Williams, 176 F.3d 301, 314 (6th Cir.1999). This Court reviews the district court’s conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Foster, 376 F.3d 577, 583 (6th Cir.2004).
Conti opposed the lien asserted by Som-mers Schwartz based on Paragraph 13 of the Retainer Agreement. Rejecting that argument, the district court concluded that that provision did not apply because Conti failed to object to Sommers Schwartz’s motion to withdraw. Critical to that ruling was the court’s finding that Conti was represented by counsel when Sommers Schwartz moved to withdraw. After reviewing the record, we now conclude that the district court’s conclusion was an abuse of discretion.
In permitting the Sommers Schwartz firm to withdraw as counsel, the district court and magistrate judge made several procedural errors and findings that are contrary to the record. Perhaps most notably, the magistrate judge entered a “stipulated” order granting the firm’s motion to withdraw despite the fact that Con-ti had not acknowledged in any way her consent to the motion. From the record, it is apparent that Conti bears no responsibility for this oversight. Despite receiving *920a letter from Conti unequivocally opposing its threat to withdraw as her counsel, Som-mers Schwartz nevertheless failed to inform the court of Conti’s position, failed to attach her letter, and submitted a proposed “stipulated” order. As a result, the magistrate judge entered that order completely unaware of Conti’s position, acknowledging as much at the hearing on this issue.
Although this mistake was brought to the district court’s attention, the district court nevertheless affirmed the magistrate judge’s order on the grounds that Conti failed to timely oppose the motion to withdraw. Apparently, the court concluded that Conti was not prejudiced by this oversight because she was represented by counsel at the time and therefore remained free to oppose Sommers Schwartz’s motion and correct the omission. But we have serious doubts about that conclusion. Although Golden was acting as lead counsel on Conti’s ease, he was her attorney only by virtue of the retainer agreement she signed with Sommers Schwartz, which Sommers Schwartz’s motion effectively was seeking to terminate. Moreover, Golden also submitted his own motion to withdraw prior to the magistrate judge entering its order granting Sommers Schwartz’s motion.
Because the district court overlooked these errors, we find its decision to be an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we vacate that judgment and remand to the district court for further consideration of the merits of Conti’s claims under Paragraph 13 of the Retainer Agreement.
VII.
For the reasons stated herein, we hereby REVERSE the judgment of the district court regarding Conti’s request to depose CEO Dauch, VACATE on all counts the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of American Axle, VACATE the district court’s judgment denying Conti’s motion for declaratory judgment regarding her dispute with Sommers Schwartz, and REMAND for further consideration in light of this opinion.
. Conti claims that, in 2003, she informed counsel for AAM that she intended to disclose Langenbach's statements during a deposition which was scheduled in a discrimination suit brought against AAM by a former employee, Terri Van Zoest (“Van Zoest”). Conti alleges that AAM retaliated against her for this protected conduct, claiming that her deposition in that case was cancelled and the suit settled almost immediately after AAM became aware of Conti's intention to testify about these alleged statements, and that she was demoted shortly thereafter.
. This is another issue which the district court improperly failed to consider, and further demonstrates that it abused its discretion in precluding Conti from deposing Dauch.
. Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, we analyze the prejudice element below in discussing how Dauch's deposition could provide information critical to particular claims raised by Conti.
. In particular, Conti focuses on Dauch's statement in a published book that German and Japanese management styles “can teach us a lesson,” while simultaneously acknowledging that women “[do] not get equal consideration or special deference in either.” J.A. 1687-89.
. The dissent challenges Conti's statistical evidence as "subjective,” and criticizes it for failing to "analyze any component of AAM's hiring process.” Dissenting Op. at 923. These criticisms, however, are misplaced, at least at this stage, because we are obliged to interpret the evidence in the light most favorable to Conti and to make all inferences in her favor.
. Confusingly, the dissent argues that "Earhart’s role as a Director prior to becoming co-Directors with Conti is not relevant to his later role as co-Director.” Dissenting Op. at 924. But that argument misses the point. While not relevant "to his later role as co-Director,” Earhart's promotion two years ahead of Conti certainly is relevant to determining whether AAM promoted a less-qualified male employee over Conti based on her sex. The dissent also ignores that, even when she finally was promoted to the same position as Earhart two years later, Conti was not promoted to the same salary band. Again, we must read this evidence in the light most favorable to Conti.
. As the dissent points out, in support of her claim that she assumed additional responsibilities over and above those performed by Pannucci, Conti “highlights that she handled Sarbanes-Oxley audits and IT system administration — duties Pannucci did not have— without the benefit of Pannucci’s two direct reports.” Dissenting Op. at 925. The dissent criticizes this claim on the ground that "Conti gives us no reason why audits and IT system administration should warrant a different pay scale.” Id. This criticism entirely misunderstands Conti’s argument. Conti obviously is not arguing that her work performing Sar-banes-Oxley audits and IT administration warrants a different pay scale, but rather that these additional tasks support her overarching claim that she performed "substantially similar” duties as Pannucci, and thus shows that she deserved to be paid at the same pay scale. It is revealing that the dissent refuses to accept Conti’s "bald allegations” that she performed these additional tasks — despite the fact that nothing in the record is to the contrary, and notwithstanding our obligation to make all inferences in Conti’s favor — and yet, at the same time, is more than willing to accept Dauch’s completely unsubstantiated claim that being deposed would impose a substantial hardship on him, when we owe no such deference to Dauch’s claims.
. In concluding that Conti fails to make her prima facie case, the dissent relies heavily on Pannucci’s testimony that Conti did not perform the same tasks as he did as Director of New Model Launch. See Dissenting Op. at 925-26. Conti, however, directly challenges that testimony, and in fact identifies a number of additional tasks that she was required to perform. Conti also points out that, unlike Pannucci, she did not have the benefit of two direct reports in running the New Model Launch department. While we agree that Pannucci’s testimony is relevant to Conti’s claim, and that a jury eventually could find it persuasive, it would be improper at this stage to credit Pannucci’s testimony over Conti’s. Again, as the non-moving party, Conti is entitled to have us read the evidence in the light most favorable to her position.
. In the Retainer Agreement entered into between Conti and Sommers Schwartz, J.A. 1073-76, the parties agreed that the "Firm shall retain a lien on any and all property provided to the Firm by Client to pursue his/her claims, including all personal papers, investigations paid for by Client and documents .... This lien shall remain in effect until all fees, expenses and court costs owing to the Firm are paid in full.” J.A. 1074. However, the Retainer Agreement also provided that the "Firm shall not substitute Client representation and/or their roles without Client consent. If representation and/or roles change without Client consent, this Agreement becomes null and void, and the Client will not [be] liable for any of the Firm’s expenses, court costs and/or fees. All liens will be cancelled and recorded by the Firm and all Client property including investigations and studies will be returned to the Client.” J.A. 1075.
. In its papers to this Court, Sommers Schwartz claims only that it is entitled to costs, expressly disavowing its claim regarding attorney fees.
. Although our request was directed generally to the counsel for all parties, the only parties with an actual interest in this dispute are Conti and Sommers Schwartz; American Axle has no stake in the outcome of this dispute. Accordingly, we strike the brief submitted by American Axle for lack of standing.