dissenting.
The majority concludes that the “residuary clause”1 in the parties’ agreed decree of divorce irreconcilably conflicts with an earlier part of the decree that allocates property to relator Wade White. The majority holds, therefore, that the stipulation is ineffective, that implementing it violates section 9.007 of the family code,2 and that it must be struck. Because the parties’ bargained-for contractual agreement may be construed in a way that gives effect to all of its provisions, that fulfills the intent of the parties as expressed in the agreement, and that complies with the family code, I respectfully dissent.
Section 5 of the parties’ agreed decree states in part, “The Court finds that the parties have entered into a written agreement. ... To the extent permitted by law, the parties stipulate the agreement is enforceable as a contract.” The parties’ decree, therefore, is a contract that can be enforced through contractual remedies. See In re Green, 221 S.W.3d 645, 648-49 (Tex.2007) (orig. proceeding); McGoodwin v. McGoodwin, 671 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Tex.1984) (op. on reh’g); see also Spradley v. Hutchison, 787 S.W.2d 214, 218 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ denied) (explaining that a “property settlement agreement approved by a divorce court and incorporated into a decree of divorce is treated as a contract, and its legal force and meaning are governed by the law of contracts”). In fact, the terms of the decree arose from the parties’ mediated settlement agreement, which the parties executed two months before the trial court signed the decree. The mediated settlement agreement included the stipulation and further included a representation that each party had made a “fair and reasonable disclosure to the other of the property ... set forth in their respective” inventories. The decree itself, which each party approved as to both form and substance, expressed that each party had read the decree and had “fully” understood its contents.
Furthermore, the law of contracts requires us to
ascertain the true intent of the parties as expressed in the instrument. In doing so, we must examine and consider the entire contract in an effort to harmonize and give effect to all provisions so that none are rendered meaningless. Contractual provisions should be considered with reference to the entire instrument; no single provision should control. Words in a contract must carry their ordinary, generally accepted meanings unless the contract itself shows that the terms have been used in a technical or different sense. In construing a contract, we may not rewrite it nor add to its language.
Doe v. Tex. Ass’n of Sch. Bds., Inc., 283 S.W.3d 451, 458 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied) (emphasis added) (cita*809tions omitted). Also, we must weigh that parties to a contract
are considered masters of their own choices. They are entitled to select what terms and provisions to include in a contract before executing it. And, in so choosing, each is entitled to rely upon the words selected to demarcate their respective obligations and rights. In short, the parties strike the deal they choose to strike and, thus, voluntarily bind themselves in the manner they choose. And, that is why parties are bound by their agreement as written.
Cross Timbers Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp., 22 S.W.3d 24, 26 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (emphasis added).
The majority’s opinion discards these principles. The plain meaning of the stipulation that the parties chose is that “any asset” of the parties that was “not disclosed or undervalued” in the parties’ inventories is awarded “to the party not in possession or control of the asset.” [Emphasis added.] Because the items described in section 18.a of the agreement, under the heading “Property to WADE LLOYD WHITE,” are unquestionably assets of the parties, they must be subject to the requirements of the parties’ clear stipulation.
It is true that section 18.a states that the items contained within the section are awarded to Wade as his “sole and separate property” and that Deborah is “divested of all right, title, interest, and claim in and to that property.” In a normal case — one that does not have a clause with the language of the stipulation in this case — it would be clear that the property in section 18.a would belong to Wade. But our task requires us to construe and give effect to the whole contract, not just section 18.a. See Doe, 283 S.W.3d at 458; see also In re Serv. Corp. Int’l, 355 S.W.3d 655, 661 (Tex.2011) (orig. proceeding) (“No single provision taken alone will be given controlling effect; rather, all the provisions must be considered with reference to the whole instrument.”).
We can give effect to the entire contract so that we render no provision meaningless. Harmonizing section 18.a with the stipulation, the parties’ contract, as of the date that the contract was signed, made the items in section 18.a (including the Republic ITS stock)3 Wade’s separate property forever, beyond being subjected to any claim by Deborah, as long as he had properly disclosed and had properly valued those items through his inventory that he submitted to Deborah before signing the contract. But if, before signing the contract, he had not properly disclosed or had not correctly valued the items listed in section 18.a that he possessed or controlled, the stipulation, as of the date the contract was signed, awarded those items to Deborah.4 Thus, contrary to the majority’s reasoning, section 18.a is not rendered “completely meaningless” through the implementation of the stipulation because section 18.a granted items to Wade as his separate property as long as he had correctly valued those items. See Majority Op. at 804. The decree did not award the “same assets to two different people,” see Majority Op. at 805, but it instead awarded the assets to one person in the event of one circumstance that had occurred before signing of the decree or the other person in the event of the opposite antecedent *810circumstance. We agree with Deborah, therefore, that section 18.a and the stipulation complement each other.
When the trial court’s decree and the parties’ contract are properly construed this way,5 it is evident that Deborah, through her motion to enforce the property division, has not asked the trial court to “amend, modify, or alter” the trial court’s original division of the property in its decree, which would be impermissible. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 9.007(a); Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex.2009) (“Attempting to obtain an order that alters or modifies a divorce decree’s property division is an impermissible collateral attack.”). Rather, by alleging that Wade undervalued property, Deborah is asking the trial court to implement the stipulation that resulted from the parties’ bargain and to enforce her ownership of the property subject to the stipulation as of the date of the decree. This is permissible.6 See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 9.002, .006-007; see also Spradley, 787 S.W.2d at 218 (stating that a trial court has inherent power to clarify or enforce its decree).
I believe that the majority’s disposition is based on its conclusion that Deborah is impermissibly seeking to amend a provision of the divorce decree. But it is actually the majority’s opinion that makes a “substantive change” to the decree and that alters the expressed intentions of the parties and of the trial court concerning the distribution of the parties’ assets. See Majority Op. at 803; Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 449 (Tex.2003).
For these reasons, I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Wade’s plea to the jurisdiction. I respectfully dissent to the majority’s conditional grant of Wade’s petition for writ of mandamus.
. The majority correctly explains that section 23 of the parties' agreed divorce decree is not a residuary clause as that term is traditionally understood. See Majority Op. at 804; Pearson v. Fillingim, 332 S.W.3d 361, 363 (Tex.2011) (explaining that residuary clauses typically divide property not explicitly mentioned to the decree). We will refer to section 23 as the parties’ stipulation for a type of breach of their agreement as described below.
. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 9.007 (West 2006).
. Deborah alleges that Wade "grossly undervalued" this stock.
. The stipulation states, "IT IS ORDERED ... that any asset of the parties that was not disclosed or undervalued ... is awarded to the party not in possession or control of the asset.”
. I believe that this is the proper construction of how section 18.a can and should be harmonized with the stipulation. At least, however, reasonable minds could disagree as to how these provisions affect each other. In that event, the parties’ contract would be ambiguous, the trial court would have jurisdiction to clarify it, and the parties could offer parol evidence to support their respective interpretations of the contract that they made. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 9.002, .006 (West 2006); DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., LLC v. Manuel, 362 S.W.3d 160, 179 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2012, no pet.); Murray v. Murray, 276 S.W.3d 138, 144 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism'd) ("[A] court that renders a divorce decree retains continuing subject-matter jurisdiction to clarify ... the decree’s property division.”).
. The majority cites Pearson, 332 S.W.3d at 363, as authority for its statement that the trial court could not hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of an asset’s value in an enforcement proceeding under sections 9.002 and 9.006. See Majority Op. at 806. The statute concerning enforcement proceedings does not preclude the presentation of new evidence. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 9.001(b)-(c) (West 2006) (explaining that suits to enforce are governed by the rules of civil procedure and shall proceed as in civil cases generally); In re Kalathil, No. 14 — 10— 00933-CV, 2010 WL 3872083, at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 5, 2010, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (stating that a party is entitled to pursue discovery in a section 9.006 proceeding).