dissenting:
I believe that the majority has written out of the statute at issue a crucial clause that materially affects who is and who is not entitled to unemployment benefits. Because we are not vested with the authority to rewrite legislation, or to excise portions of existing statutory law, I respectfully dissent.
This case arises out of a labor dispute between the parties. The defendants are six striking workers whose employment was terminated by their employer, the plaintiff, prior to the strike’s end. Following that termination, the defendants sought unemployment benefits. Principally at issue is whether the defendants are eligible for unemployment benefits as a matter of law, given a provision in the applicable statute disqualifying striking workers from receiving unemployment benefits. I believe they are not.
Underlying Facts
In June 1994, members of the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America commenced a strike against Caterpillar, Inc. (Caterpillar), at its manufacturing plant in Mossville, Illinois. That strike would last until December 1995. In anticipation of the strike, Caterpillar disseminated a letter to its employees entitled “Rules of Conduct for Striking Employees” (Rules of Conduct), wherein certain conduct on the part of any striking worker was articulated as grounds for discharge. During the course of the strike, Caterpillar discharged or indefinitely suspended six employees (the defendants) for various acts which it believed were in violation of the Rules of Conduct. The defendants thereafter initiated these proceedings.
Legal Eligibility for Benefits Under Section 604
The Unemployment Insurance Act (Act) was enacted to provide support to unemployed Illinois workers and their families during periods of involuntary unemployment. 820 ILCS 405/100 (West 1996). See also American Steel Foundries v. Gordon, 404 Ill. 174, 181, 88 N.E.2d 465, 468 (1949). An unemployed person may receive benefits if: (1) he meets .the eligibility requirements of section 500 of the Act (820 ILCS 405/500 (West 1996)); and (2) is not otherwise subject to any exemption specified by the Act. Illinois courts construe the Act liberally to favor awarding benefits, but establishing eligibility nevertheless remains ultimately with the claimant. Nichols v. Department of Employment Security, 218 Ill. App. 3d 803, 809, 578 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (1991).
Here, the defendants meet the first requirement for benefits, as they fall within the eligibility requirements of section 500. However, they fail the second requirement, because they are indeed subject to an exemption set forth in the Act. Specifically, the defendants are disqualified under section 604 because they were involved in a labor dispute at the time they were discharged/suspended.
The principle behind section 604, which is commonly referred to as the “labor dispute disqualification,” is that the state will not favor one party over another in a labor dispute by payment of compensation. Ross v. Department of Employment Security, 201 Ill. App. 3d 474, 477-78, 559 N.E.2d 100, 102 (1990). Section 604 evinces the legislature’s desire to remain neutral in the collective bargaining process. Golab v. Department of Employment Security, 281 Ill. App. 3d 108, 114, 666 N.E.2d 347, 352 (1996). Without this exception, the employer would be put in the position of subsidizing the strike by means of its compulsory contributions to the unemployment insurance fund. Highway Drivers, Dockmen, Spotters, Rampmen, Meat Packing House & Allied Products Drivers & Helpers, Office Workers & Miscellaneous Employees Union, Local No. 710 v. Ward, 201 Ill. App. 3d 534, 541, 559 N.E.2d 158, 163 (1990).
Section 604 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n individual shall be ineligible for benefits for any week with respect to which it is found that his total or partial unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last employed.” (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1996). The crux of this case lies with what the General Assembly meant when it excluded fired workers from receiving benefits for unemployment due to a work stoppage at the place where each of those workers “was last employed.”
Unfortunately, the majority’s construction of the phrase renders it meaningless. As set forth in more detail below, there no longer exists a single factual scenario which could put that phrase into play.
The majority does not meet this challenge with its citation to Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 688 N.E.2d 90 (1997), which simply harmonized two sections of the Act addressing who was a claimant’s last employer. In Bridgestone, the claimants were workers who went on strike at their second to last place of employment. Those workers then obtained employment elsewhere but were terminated less than 30 days into their subsequent employment. Because benefits are charged to the last employer of more than 30 days under section 1502.1(E) of the Act (820 ILCS 405/1502.1(E) (West 1994)), the second to last employer was charged. In Bridgestone, the supreme court simply pointed out that section 604 does not have a similar 30-day minimum period in defining the “last employer”; thus, the claimants were not on strike at the place where they were last employed. While this created, under an unusual set of circumstances, a dichotomy concerning a claimant’s “last employer,” the supreme court applied the sections as they were written and allowed the dichotomy to stand.
I am not satisfied that the General Assembly’s purpose in incorporating the phrase “or was last employed” was simply to create inconsistent definitions of who was a claimant’s “last employer” when faced with this quirky factual scenario. Bridgestone is as much about section 1502.1 of the Act as it is about section 604 and does not shed light on what the phrase “or was last employed” means in the factual context facing the court today. We would do well to heed our supreme court in Bridgestone when, in remarking upon basic principles of statutory construction, it observed: “ ‘ “It is a primary rule in the interpretation and construction of statutes that the intention of the legislature should be ascertained and given effect. [Citations.] This is to be done primarily from a consideration of the legislative language itself, which affords the best means of its exposition, and if the legislative intent can be ascertained therefrom it must prevail and will be given effect without resorting to other aids for construction. [Citations.] There is no rule of construction which authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports.” [Citation.]’ ” Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 149, 688 N.E.2d 90, 94 (1997), quoting Illinois Power Co. v. Mahin, 72 Ill. 2d 189, 194, 381 N.E.2d 222, 224 (1978).
It is true that reviewing courts will also “give substantial weight and deference to an interpretation of an ambiguous statue by the agency charged with the administration and enforcement of the statute.” (Emphasis added.) Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 97-98, 606 N.E.2d 1111, 1121-22 (1992). This is because, inter alia, “[s]uch an interpretation expresses an informed source for ascertaining the legislative intent.” Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 98, 606 N.E.2d at 1121. It follows, however, that where an agency has interpreted a statute contrary to the plain meaning of the language used by the General Assembly, we will reverse it. The deference accorded to an agency is not so extensive as to render a reviewing court a “rubber stamp.” See, e.g., Dienes v. Holland, 64 Ill. App. 3d 109, 113-14, 380 N.E.2d 1156, 1160 (1978) (appellate court reversed the Director’s interpretation of section 604 when the Director failed to give application of the ordinary meaning of the words “or was last employed”).
The majority’s reasoning is that section 604 is inapplicable because the defendants were no longer unemployed due to the strike once they were discharged. Rather, they were unemployed because of the discharge. However, the defendants were discharged for violation of rules promulgated as a direct result of the strike itself. But for the work stoppage, no rules would have been necessary to control the actions of the striking workers and to pursue the safety of people at the strike location. But for the work stoppage, the defendants’ conduct would have violated no rules. Indeed, but for the work stoppage, there would not have been the conduct at issue, which was without exception related directly to the strike. Accordingly, any suspension or discharge for failure to abide by the rules is likewise “due to” the stoppage of work.
“[Statutory language itself gives the best indication of legislative intent.” Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d at 151, 688 N.E.2d at 94. Where possible, a statute will be construed so that no word, clause or sentence is rendered superfluous. Dunaway v. Department of Labor, 109 Ill. App. 3d 63, 68, 440 N.E.2d 231, 235 (1982), rev’d on other grounds, 99 Ill. 2d 417, 459 N.E.2d 1332 (1984). Section 604 disqualifies from receiving benefits a person who is unemployed due to a stoppage of work “at which he is or was last employed.” (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 405/604 (West 1996). The Act distinguishes between those workers who will have jobs waiting for them when the strike concludes and those who will not; in other words, those workers who remain employed from those who were fired during the strike. The Act then includes both types of workers in the category of workers ineligible for unemployment benefits. There is simply no other factual scenario to which one could apply the phrase “or was last employed.” The plain meaning of the language used by the General Assembly demonstrates an anticipation that workers fired as a result of a strike might apply for unemployment benefits during the strike and a determination that they should not be eligible for those benefits. By today’s ruling, our court has vetoed that decision.
I acknowledge that the second district has analyzed facts indistinguishable from those before this court and come to the same conclusion as the majority. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Doherty, 299 Ill. App. 3d 338, 701 N.E.2d 1163 (1998). I simply believe that analysis to be wrong.
I agree with the majority that the administrative procedure followed was incorrect but constituted harmless error. Because I believe the defendants are not eligible for benefits, I would not address whether the facts found in defendant Steagall’s case were against the manifest weight of the evidence. I would reverse the lower court’s decisions on the applicability of the Act to the defendants for the reasons stated above.