dissenting:
I dissent.
Defendant was tried and convicted of possession of a stolen motor vehicle on the theory of accountability. Thus, the sole focus of our inquiry should be whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction. In my view, the evidence adduced at trial undeniably established that defendant and his companion were engaged in a common criminal design to possess and use this stolen vehicle in furtherance of their shoplifting and drug purchases and use.
Defendant admitted that he remained in the vehicle long after he had knowledge of facts that would have led a reasonable person to conclude that the car was stolen. Indeed, the majority concludes that the evidence was more than sufficient to prove that defendant knew the car was stolen. Thus, defendant was present during the commission of the crime and was well aware that possession of this vehicle was unlawful. In addition, defendant and his companion were in the car together for an extended period, using it to shoplift food items from supermarkets, to sell those items, and to purchase and to use the proceeds to purchase and smoke rock cocaine. It is undisputed that defendant never reported the crime, nor did he oppose, disapprove, or attempt to withdraw from the enterprise. Moreover, defendant fled from the scene when he and his companion were unable to outrun the police in the vehicle.
An accused may be deemed accountable for acts performed by another pursuant to a common plan or purpose. People v. Furby, 138 Ill. 2d 434, 456, 563 N.E.2d 421 (1990). Under this rule, where two or more people engage in a common criminal design, any acts in furtherance thereof committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the common design and all are accountable for those acts. People v. Martin, 271 Ill. App. 3d 346, 351, 648 N.E.2d 992 (1995). A common purpose or design may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the perpetration of the unlawful conduct (People v. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d 131, 141, 646 N.E.2d 567 (1995); People v. Reid, 136 Ill. 2d 27, 62, 554 N.E.2d 174 (1990)), and evidence that a defendant voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on illegal activity with the knowledge of its design supports an inference that he shared the common purpose (People v. Perez, 108 Ill. 2d 70, 82-83, 483 N.E.2d 250 (1985)).
In deciding defendant’s legal accountability, the trial court could properly consider evidence that defendant was present during the commission of the offense, did not oppose or disapprove of it, maintained a close affiliation with the driver of the stolen vehicle, failed to report the crime, and fled the scene when the police finally stopped them. See Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d at 141; Reid, 136 Ill. 2d at 62.
Based upon this evidence, I would affirm the defendant’s conviction.