NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 20 2023
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARK KLAMRZYNSKI, No. 22-16752
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01327-MHB
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MARICOPA COUNTY COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT, a jural entity; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Michelle H. Burns, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Argued September 15, 2023
Arizona State U Phoenix
Before: HURWITZ, BUMATAY, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.
Mark Klamrzysnki appeals a district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of the Maricopa County Community College District (“the
District”) on Klamrzynski’s claims that the District violated the Americans with
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”).1
We review district court decisions granting summary judgment de novo.
Sjazer v. City of L.A., 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011). We apply the same standard
as the district court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Adcock v. Chrysler
Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). We also follow the
familiar McDonnell Douglas framework to resolve Klamrzynski’s claims. Curley
v. City of N. Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing McDonell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973)). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and affirm.
1. Klamrzynski argues the district court should have applied the “motivating
factor standard” from Head v. Glacier Northwest, Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1063–68 (9th
Cir. 2005) to his claims. But we have already held that Head is no longer good law.
Murray v. Mayo Clinic, 934 F.3d 1101, 1102 (9th Cir. 2019). While Klamrzynski
contends that a later panel cannot overrule Head, a three-judge panel can treat the
decision of a prior panel as abrogated when “an intervening Supreme Court decision
undermines an existing precedent of the Ninth Circuit, and both cases are closely on
point.” Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002)
(simplified). That’s what happened here. Murray, 934 F.3d at 1104–05. And we’re
1
ACRA claims are resolved under the same framework and standard as ADA
claims, so we frame our analysis in terms of the ADA. See Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad
Copper Corp., 119 F.3d 756, 762 (9th Cir. 1997).
2
bound by Murray’s determination that Head is no longer good law.
2. Klamrzynski next contends the district court erred in finding that his non-
professional emails constituted “a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the
District’s adverse employment decision. See EEOC v. Boeing, 577 F.3d 1044, 1049
(9th Cir. 2009) (simplified). We disagree. Discourteous conduct can be “a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for nonrenewal. See Bradley v. Harcourt,
Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding “behavior not in
accordance with customary business practices” constituted a nondiscriminatory
reason for adverse action in the Title VII context). Because the District only needed
to present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, its production of
the emails satisfies this requirement. See Texas Dep’t of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 256–57 (1981).
3. Klamrzynski failed to produce “specific and substantial” evidence that the
District’s proffered reason for nonrenewal was merely a pretext for discrimination.
See Boeing, 577 F.3d at 1049. The only evidence Klamrzynski produced to show
pretext was the timing of his heart attack in relation to the District’s nonrenewal
decision. By itself, temporal proximity is insufficient to show pretext. Hashimoto
v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 680 (9th Cir. 1997). And there’s no other evidence in the
record supporting the conclusion that the District’s explanation for the nonrenewal
decision was pretextual.
3
The district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
4