dissenting in part
and concurring in part.
[¶ 12] I respectfully dissent from Part IIA and paragraph 8 of Part IIB and concur in the remainder of the majority opinion. I would reverse the order and amended judgment modifying Timothy Meyer’s spousal support obligation from $800 per month to $300 per month and remand for further proceedings. I believe the trial court- clearly erred in its application of the law.
[¶ 13] Timothy Meyer and Diane Meyer were divorced in February 1998 pursuant to a stipulated settlement. The stipulated settlement provided that Timothy Meyer would pay Diane Meyer $800 per month in spousal support for ten years after the sale of the marital home. After incurring a reduction in income, Timothy Meyer moved to terminate or reduce his spousal support obligation. The trial court *278granted his motion and reduced his spousal support obligation from $800 per month to $300 per month.
[¶ 14] A trial court’s determination concerning spousal support is treated as a finding of fact which we will not reverse on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Shields v. Shields, 2003 ND 16, ¶ 6, 656 N.W.2d 712. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if, although there is some evidence to support it, on the entire evidence we are left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made.” Id. In Toni v. Toni, this Court emphasized that it encourages “spousal support awards based on agreements between the divorcing parties, and noted those agreements ‘should be changed only with great reluctance by the trial court.’ ” 2001 ND 193, ¶ 11, 636 N.W.2d 396 (quoting Huffman v. Huffman, mi N.W.2d 594, 597 (N.D.1991)).
I
[¶ 15] Timothy Meyer, the party who sought modification of his spousal support obligation, bore the burden of showing a material change of circumstances warranting or justifying a modification. Schmalle v. Schmalle, 1998 ND 201, ¶12, 586 N.W.2d 677. In Wheeler v. Wheeler, this Court explained the standard for a material change of circumstances:
To modify spousal support, circumstances must have changed materially. Slight, or even moderate, changes in the parties’ relative incomes are not necessarily material. “Material change” means something which substantially affects the financial abilities or needs of a party.
419 N.W.2d 923, 925 (N.D.1988) (internal citations omitted).
[¶ 16] We stated in Schmalle, “the reasons for changes in income must be examined as well as the extent the changes were contemplated by the parties at the time of the initial decree or a subsequent modification.” 1998 ND 201, ¶ 12, 586 N.W.2d 677. The divorce decree in Schmalle was based on a stipulated agreement. Id. at ¶ 2. In Schmalle, our Court recognized that the alleged change of circumstances cannot constitute a material change of circumstances if they “were reasonably contemplated by the parties when the initial decree was entered.” Id. at ¶ 14. In addition, this Court has repeatedly stated that “[a] trial court cannot ‘consider issues of property division and spousal support separately in a vacuum, but must examine those issues together.’ ” Sommer v. Sommer, 2001 ND 191, ¶ 16, 636 N.W.2d 423 (quoting Ketelsen v. Ketelsen, 1999 ND 148, ¶6, 598 N.W.2d 185). Therefore, spousal support and property division are intertwined. The trial court must consider the obligor’s assets as well as income in determining his financial ability to pay.
[¶ 17] The trial court erred in applying the law applicable to modifications of spousal support obligations. The record establishes that Timothy Meyer stipulated to paying $800 per month in spousal support even though he was considering a reduction of his income and that he agreed to the stipulated divorce settlement to avoid a trial highlighting his marital infidelity. The majority emphasizes the fact that, after the divorce, Timothy Meyer did not voluntarily reduce his income. Regardless of whether the reduction in income was voluntary or involuntary, Timothy Meyer and Diane Meyer contemplated a reduction in Timothy Meyer’s income when agreeing to his spousal support obligation of $800 per month and to a division of their marital property.
[¶ 18] In Schmitz v. Schmitz, we said that a circumstance that was contemplated *279and known at the time of the judgment cannot be a material change of circumstances. 1998 ND 203, ¶9, 586 N.W.2d 490 (stating “[cjhanges in the parties’ financial conditions which were in fact considered by the court in the original divorce judgment do not constitute a material change of circumstances warranting a modification of spousal support”). In the present case, there is no dispute that the parties contemplated a reduction in Timothy Meyer’s income when they entered into their stipulation for spousal support. To disregard this undisputed evidence will discourage, not encourage, settlements. Our Court’s policy of encouraging parties to settle these matters must be promoted by requiring adherence to the judgment when the evidence is undisputed that the alleged material change of circumstances was contemplated by the parties at the time of entry of judgment.
[¶ 19] The trial court and the majority opinion do not acknowledge that Timothy Meyer has voluntarily taken the reduction in his income. He did testify he applied for a manager position with Titan, but it was given to one of the former owners of Krider. He has only applied for one $24,000 a year job and has not attempted to find another job at his previous income level. Our Court has said that “earned income is not the sole consideration in determining a party’s ability to pay support. Rather, the court must consider a party’s net worth, including the extent of his assets and his earning ability as demonstrated by past income.” Schmitz v. Schmitz, 2001 ND 19, ¶ 10, 622 N.W.2d 176 (citations omitted); see also McDowell v. McDowell, 2001 ND 176, ¶ 13, 635 N.W.2d 139; Walker v. Walker, 2002 ND 187, ¶ 14, 653 N.W.2d 722.
[¶ 20] This Court has stated:
While it is true that the ‘change of circumstances’ necessary to warrant modification is one based primarily on a change in financial circumstances, ... it is also true that not every change in financial circumstances justifies a modification .... When the change is voluntary or self-induced, no modification is warranted because the obligor, by voluntarily placing herself or himself in a less financially secure position, is without clean hands and precluded from seeking equity. Even though the law never requires impossibilities, NDCC § 31 — 11— 05(22), one who voluntarily dissipates or reduces income is not protected either from the consequences of such conduct or by equitable maxims.
Wheeler v. Wheeler, 548 N.W.2d 27, 31 (N.D.1996) (quoting Koch v. Williams, 456 N.W.2d 299, 301 (N.D.1990)). Because the alleged change of circumstances was contemplated by the parties when they entered into the agreement to settle their spousal support and property division issues and because there is no evidence Timothy Meyer’s ability to earn is impaired, there is no material change of circumstances.
II
[¶ 21] Even if Timothy Meyer’s reduction in income is a change of circumstances, the trial court failed to make any findings that it “substantially affects the financial abilities or needs of a party.” Wheeler, 419 N.W.2d at 925. Timothy Meyer must establish more than just a change of circumstances. He must establish the change of circumstances was material. The financial ability of each party is a principal concern; however, the trier of fact must go beyond comparing the parties’ incomes. Penuel v. Penuel, 415 N.W.2d 497, 500 (N.D.1987). A trial court must consider the disadvantaged spouse’s needs and the supporting spouse’s ability to pay. Shields, 2003 ND 16, ¶ 10, 656 N.W.2d 712. Timothy Meyer must estab*280lish that his ability to pay his spousal support obligation has been affected by his change of circumstances in order to be material. See Id.
[¶ 22] When addressing whether Timothy Meyer’s change of circumstances warrants a modification, the trial court stated only that:
[i]n this case, Plaintiff has experienced a material and substantial reduction in income. Defendant has increased her income and assets since the divorce, but opines she must continue to save for retirement and pay off the mortgage on her home in order to be rehabilitated by the end of the ten-year period of spousal support. The Referee’s decision to lower the monthly spousal support from $800 per month to $800 per month is a balance between the greater burden of the Plaintiff and the lesser need of the Defendant, and is not clearly erroneous.
It is impossible to determine the basis for the trial court’s reduction of Timothy Meyer’s spousal support obligation because it did not provide any analysis of Diane Meyer’s needs or Timothy Meyer’s financial ability to continue paying $800 per month in spousal support.
[¶ 23] This Court has said, “[it] will not set aside the trial court’s determinations on property division or spousal support for failure to explicitly state the basis for its findings if that basis is reasonably discernible by deduction or inference.” Routledge v. Routledge, 377 N.W.2d 542, 545 n. 1 (N.D.1985) (citations omitted); see also Heinz v. Heinz, 2001 ND 147, ¶ 12, 632 N.W.2d 443. In this case, however, there is no analysis of Timothy Meyer’s assets, earning ability or needs. The trial court provides no discernible basis for reducing Timothy Meyer’s spousal support obligation, other than an income comparison and a conclusory statement that Diane Meyer has a “lesser need.”
III
[¶ 24] Finally, even if there was a material change of Timothy Meyer’s circumstances warranting a modification of his spousal support obligation, I would reverse and remand because the trial court provided no analysis explaining why $300 per month is an appropriate modification of Timothy Meyer’s spousal support obligation. The trial court arbitrarily chose $300 per month as Timothy Meyer’s monthly spousal support obligation.
[¶ 25] Timothy Meyer’s income has decreased from $72,000 per year1 to $50,000 per year or 30.6 percent. The trial court ordered his spousal support obligation reduced from $800 per month to $300 per month or 62.5 percent. The only alleged material change of circumstances is Timothy Meyer’s 30.6 percent reduction in income. It is impossible to determine from the trial court’s order its reasons for reducing his monthly spousal support obligation by double his actual percent decrease in his salary.
IV
[¶ 26] For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and concur. I would reverse the order and amended judgment reducing Timothy Meyer’s spousal support obligation from $800 per month to $300 per month and remand for further proceedings.
[¶ 27] MARY MUEHLEN MARING
. There is dispute as to whether Timothy Meyer's income at the time of divorce was $69,000 or $72,000. However, the trial court found his income to be $72,000.