dissenting.
[¶ 28] As the majority opinion recognizes, the trial court’s “determination re*281garding a material change in circumstances warranting a modification of spousal support is a finding of fact and will not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.” Lohstreter v. Lohstreter, 2001 ND 45, ¶ 10, 623 N.W.2d 350. “While helpful, detailed findings of fact are not required for spousal support orders if we can satisfactorily determine the reasons for the court’s decision.” Mahoney v. Mahoney, 1997 ND 149, ¶24, 567 N.W.2d 206. We can do that on this record; therefore, I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 29] The majority concludes the trial court did not provide sufficient analysis regarding Diane Meyer’s current need for support or Timothy Meyer’s current ability to pay spousal support, and remands for the trial court to reconsider the amount of support awarded. By reviewing the record along with the trial court’s explanation for its decision to reduce the support obligation, we can readily discern the rationale for the result reached by the trial court. Consequently, a remand is not necessary.
[¶ 30] As the majority opinion recognizes, Timothy Meyer was earning $72,000 per year when the divorce decree was entered, and Diane Meyer was earning $22,000 per year, for a difference in incomes of $50,000. Now, Timothy Meyer is earning only $50,000 per year, and Diane Meyer is earning $32,000 per year, for a difference of $18,000. Consequently, the difference in income between these parties has narrowed by 64 percent since entry of the original decree. The trial court, recognizing the narrowed income gap constitutes a substantial change of circumstances, reduced Timothy Meyer’s support obligation by 62.5 percent. The math speaks for itself. The majority states that the trial court “must award support in an amount that is adequately proportional to the reduction in Timothy Meyer’s income.” That is precisely what the trial court has done. The evidentiary figures provide the basis and justification for the court’s reduction in support from $800 per month to $300 per month.
[¶ 31] The trial court has provided additional insight and explanation for its decision to reduce the support amount from $800 per month to $300 per month. The trial court reasoned that if the spousal support remained at the $800 per month level, Diane Meyer’s gross income would exceed Timothy Meyer’s gross income, and the court stated that the amended support obligation “is a balance between the greater burden of [Timothy Meyer] and the lesser need of [Diane Meyer].”
[¶ 32] Timothy Meyer’s reduction in income of 30.6 percent was an involuntary reduction caused by the sale of his business. Meanwhile, Diane Meyer has continued to improve her financial situation and has realized a 45 percent increase in her annual income. These substantial changes in the incomes of both parties support the trial court’s decision to reduce Timothy Meyer’s support obligation from $800 to $300 per month. The trial court has the authority to equitably balance the burden of an obligor against the needs of the obligee. Sommer v. Sommer, 2001 ND 191, ¶ 10, 636 N.W.2d 423. That is precisely what the trial court has done in this case. In my view, the trial court’s rebalancing of the parties’ abilities and needs is readily discerned by the record evidence and does not need additional clarification.
[¶ 33] Here, the trial court’s findings are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. The evidence contains specific numbers showing the changes in income of both parties between entry of the original decree and the present. The court, using these numbers, recognized that the support obligation must balance the needs and abilities of both parties. *282The trial court offered a cogent and reasonable explanation for its decision. That explanation is, in my view, adequate for this Court to understand the purpose and reasoning for the support amount awarded by the trial court. The remand for additional findings and explanation is neither necessary nor warranted, and for that reason I would affirm the judgment.
[¶ 34] DALE V. SANDSTROM