ON REHEARING.
McFADDEN, Justice.In Appellants’ petition for rehearing it is contended that S.L.1957, Chapter 81 is void and unconstitutional as having an inadequate title as required by Idaho Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 16, which provides :
“Every act shall embrace but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title; but if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be embraced in the title.”
Appellants’ contention is based on the following statement in the .foregoing opinion :
“Though the 1957 act here involved amends IC § 54-901, the statutory definition of the term ‘practice of dentistry,’ the actual effect of the.amendment is not to redefine ‘practice of dentistry’, but to redefine ‘mechanical work upon inert matter in a dental laboratory,’ a statutory exception to the prohibition of practice of dentistry by persons not properly licensed.”
The pertinent portion of the act and title reads:
“Chapter 81
AN ACT
“AMENDING SECTION 54-901 IDAHO CODE DEFINING THE PRACTICE OF DENTISTRY; AMENDING 54-909 IDAHO CODE RELATING TO THE TERM OF OFFICE OF DENTAL EXAMINERS ; AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY.
“Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho:
“Section 1. That Section 54 — 901 Idaho Code be, and the same is hereby, amended to read as follows: * *
*183This is an amendment to a previous act, and the title is sufficient, as it refers by-number to the section being amended and is germane to the subject of the original act. State v. Jones, 9 Idaho 693, 75 P. 819; Settlers’ Irrigation District v. Settlers’ Canal Company, 14 Idaho 504, 94 P. 829; In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 P. 665; First Security Bank of Idaho v. Fremont County, 55 Idaho 76, 37 P.2d 1101; State v. Taylor, 58 Idaho 656, 78 P.2d 125; Hammond et al. v. Bingham et al., 83 Idaho 314, 362 P.2d 1078. That the amendment also pertains to an exception to the general definition of the “practice of dentistry” is of no consequence for the legislators were fully advised by the title as to what was to be accomplished. Appellants’ contention in this regard is without merit.
It is contended that the present opinion creates confusion in view of the language employed in Berry v. Summers, 76 Idaho 446, 283 P.2d 1093, insofar as that opinion permitted appellants to take impressions within, or fit relined dentures within the patient’s mouth. No language can be found in that opinion to that effect.
The 1957 amendment recognizes the field of activity of the dental technician or mechanic in performing his services on prosthetic appliances, and in dealing directly with the user or wearer. However, this amendment, while again recognizing that the practice of dentistry must be done only by those whose training has qualified them to be admitted to practice the profession of dentistry, has limited the services of the technician or mechanic to work on prosthetic appliances which does not require the presence, aid, assistance or cooperation of the user. Such addition to the definition of what constitutes the practice of dentistry pertains to the presence, aid, assistance or cooperation of the user while performing the service on the prosthetic device itself. It cannot be said that it would prohibit the technician from conducting the normal business transactions with his customer or user of the appliance, or from prohibiting the technician from having the user try the device after the technician has serviced it and again having further services performed on it. It is the examining within the mouth, fitting within the mouth, or taking of impression within the mouth of the user that is proscribed by the 1957 Act.
The field of the dental technician or mechanic ever since 1907 has been recognized in this State as being limited to the performance of mechanical work upon inert matter. (See: S.L.1907, S.B. 36, Sec. 6, pg. 549; R.C. & C.L. Sec. 1360 wherein the practice of dentistry stated: “This act shall not be construed to prohibit an unlicensed person from performing mechanical work upon inert matter in a dental *184office or laboratory * * ' This provision was repealed with other portions of the act of 1907, by S.L.1919, Ch. 60, (Chap. 91 C.S. § 2116 et seq.) which in defining dentistry did not contain the exception for dental technicians; S.L.1921, ch. 255, Sec. 11, amended C.S. § 2134 by again excluding “an unlicensed person from performing merely mechanical work upon inert matter in a dental laboratory” from the operation of the chapter dealing with practice of dentistry; I.C.A.1932, § 53-1321. This was the law until 1949, when S.L. 1949, Ch. 102 repealed the previous dental law, and the present law was adopted.)
The present enactment cannot be said to enlarge the field of practice of the dental technician or mechanic, and at no time have they been permitted to work upon, examine, diagnose, or prescribe, on living tissue of the patient.
The contention again urgently presented by appellants that all issues in this action became res adjudicata by the decision in Berry v. Summers, supra, has again been examined and found to be without merit.
The foregoing is added to the original opinion to which we adhere.
SMITH, C. J., and TAYLOR, KNUDSON and McQUADE, JJ., concur.