dissenting:
I would affirm the Circuit Court of Greenbrier County in refusing to grant the injunction prayed for in the injunction proceeding and would grant the writ prayed for in the mandamus proceeding in these consolidated cases.
The same question involved in these cases was also involved in the case of Meisel v. Tri-State Airport Authority, 135 W. Va. 528, 64 S. E. 2d 32, and this Court, in 1951, held that the Act setting up the TriState Airport Authority in the Meisel case was not unconstitutional. The specific question involved in the Meisel case was whether the Act creating the TriState Airport Authority, which was a special Act, violated the provisions of Article YI, Section 39, of the Constitution of West Virginia, which provides that in no case shall a special Act be passed where a general law would be proper and could be made applicable to the case. In the case at bar, as in the Meisel case, federal funds are involved except that in the instant case the federal funds to be used are much larger and the question as to whether or not the Act was unconstitutional under the provisions of Article YI, Section 39, of the West Virginia Constitution, was answered in the Meisel case, wherein it was stated: "The answer to this question lies in the proposition that the grant of Federal funds for airport construction requires a local sponsor authorized to enter into agreements with the Civil Aeronautics Administration, and with the State Board of Aeronautics.” If this was the reason, which the Court clearly indicated as a basis for holding that such an act was not uncon*497stitutional as being a special act, then it would apply with the same force and effect to the case at bar, because I am unable to distinguish the Meisel case from the instant case. The Meisel case involved a special act and the case at bar involves a special act. Federal funds were involved in the Meisel case and Federal funds are involved in the present case.
The general law applying to all counties in West Virginia with regard to airports, Chapter 8, Article 11, was in effect at the time the Meisel case was decided and is still in effect and apparently the special act in each case was used to implement the general law contained in Chapter 8, Article 11, and Chapter 8, Article 4a, Section 1 of the Code of West Virginia. No doubt the Federal Government would not grant funds to all counties to build airport under airport authorities as was done in the Meisel case and the case at bar, as well as many other counties under a special act, such as Harrison, Ohio, etc. Then, too, the financial condition of many of the counties of West Virginia would preclude and the terrain would not be suitable for such airports.
The only difference in the Meisel case from the case at bar is that two counties and three municipalities were involved in the airport authority in that case, but only one county is involved in the airport authority in the case at bar. It is contended that a general law could be passed by the legislature making the formation of airport authorities applicable to all counties in the state, which may be true, but it is also true that a general law could be passed by the legislature making the formation of airport authorities applicable to all municipalities and counties in the state which would cover the Meisel case in the same manner as it would in the instant case.
This Court has also held in the case of Kanawha County Public Library v. County Court of Kanawha County, 143 W. Va. 385, 102 S. E. 2d 712, that a special act setting up the Kanawha County Public Library did *498not violate the provisions of Article VI, Section 39 of the Constitution of West Virginia. See also the many cases cited therein to the same effect.
It is also true that a general act could have been passed by the legislature granting all governmental units in West Virginia the right to establish county libraries, but all counties in West Virginia perhaps would not want a county library, and because of financial conditions and other reasons would be unable to establish a library. It was held in that case that as a general rule the legislature must determine, before passing such a law, whether or not a general law can be made applicable to the case and it cited the case of South Morgantown v. Morgantown, 49 W. Va. 729, 40 S. E. 15, in the fifth point of the syllabus, as follows: "Courts will not hold an act of the legislature to be contrary to the Constitution without great caution and unless it be manifestly and beyond doubt unconstitutional.” It would appear that because of the division of this Court in connection with this case that there is some doubt as to the Act in question being unconstitutional. Then, too, when the Act is held to be unconstitutional in the case at bar it would appear that the special act establishing airports in Harrison County, Kanawha County, Mingo County, Ohio County, Fayette County, and others, will also be unconstitutional although some of the airports have been completed and in use for years. This may create other difficult situations.
It may be true, as stated by the majority opinion, that Section 14 of Chapter 62, Acts of the Legislature, 1966, creating the authority, is of doubtful constitutionality, but that depends largely on how it will be administered rather than on its specific wording, and the record does not show proper information upon which to decide that issue; but 1 am of the opinion that this Section 14 is severable under the provisions of Section 20 of the Act and that the Meisel case is also authority for this proposition in which case the *499following language taken from point 5, syllabus, in the case of Prichard v. DeVan, Mayor, 114 W. Va. 509, 172 S. E. 711, was stated: “ ‘ When a part of an Act is invalid hut the remainder reflects the legislative intent and is complete in itself, then the remainder will he upheld ’ ”, * * * . This merely means that Greenbrier County cannot use taxes to pay off the long-term bonds of the Airport Authority, either directly or indirectly under the guise of paying rent, without complying with the provisions of Sections 7 and 8 of Article X of the Constitution of West Virginia when such provisions are applicable. If that were to be attempted under Section 14 the section would have to be held invalid. The Airport Authority, under the remaining provision of the Act would have to pay off the bonds and the interest thereon from the proceeds of the operation of the airport.
From the contents of this dissenting opinion it can be seen that if this Court would overrule the Meisel case I would perhaps not have dissented from the majority opinion, because in that event this Court would have been consistent in applying the law uniformly in such cases. It would appear that the decision in the Meisel case and the decision in this case merely tend for confusion and create a situation where the bench and bar in this State do not know how to interpret the law in advocating and disposing of cases wherein a question involving such authorities is concerned.
I am authorized to say that Judge Browning concurs in this dissenting opinion.