At issue in this case is whether “Lucky 8 Line” machines are exempt from the provisions of S.C. Code Ann. § 12-21-2710 (Supp. 1993).1 The Magistrate held the machines in violation of the statute and ordered their destruction. The Circuit Court reversed the Magistrate’s finding and the State appeals.
We reverse.
A review of the essential facts reveals that “Lucky 8 Line” is a coin-operated machine with a video display designed to simulate a slot machine. The player inserts money and presses a button. A computer program causes the screens to roll and randomly stop, displaying words and symbols. Certain combinations of symbols earn the player an additional turn. The player has absolutely no control over the combination of words or symbols appearing on the video screen.
The applicable statute, § 12-21-2710, provides, in part:
It is unlawful for any person to keep on his premises or operate or permit to be kept on his premises or operated within this State any vending or slot machine, punch *399board, pull board,... or other device pertaining to games of chance of whatever name or kind, . . . but the provisions of this section do not extend to coin-operated non-payout pin tables, in-line pin games, and video games with free play feature____
The Statute exempts three specific types of machines: (1) coin-operated nonpayout pin tables, (2) in-line pin games or (3) video games with free-play feature. The “Lucky 8 Line” machine is clearly a slot máchine. State v. DeAngelis, 257 S.C. 44, 183 S.E. (2d) 906 (1971). In DeAngelis, we recognized that such machines, requiring no skill, were not exempted under the predecessor statute. Respondents assert that inclusion of the phrase “video games with free play feature” in the 1982 amendment to the statute, 1982 Acts No. 466,2 now renders the “Lucky 8 Line” machines exempt. We disagree.
It is well established that, in interpreting a statute, our sole function is to determine and give effect to the intention of the legislature, with reference to the meaning of the language used and the subject matter and purpose of the statute. State v. Ramsey, 311 S.C. 555, 430 S.E. (2d) 511 (1993). Words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute’s operation. State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 403 S.E. (2d) 660 (1991).
Here, the General Assembly has declared slot machines unlawful. Respondents’ construction of the statute equating the slot machines in question with a “video game with free play feature” is untenable.
Respondents rely upon this Court’s opinion in Powell v. Red Carpet Lounge, 280 S.C. 142, 311 S.E. (2d) 719 (1984), to reach a contrary result. Reliance on Powell is misplaced. In Powell, the predecessor statute, § 52-15-10, exempted “coin-operated nonpayout pin tables with free play feature,” whereas a criminal statute, § 16-19-60 exempted “coin-operated nonpayout machines with free play feature.” Construing the statutes in pari materia, the Court equated the coin-operated poker machines in question with coin-operated pin tables, to declare them legal. The Powell Court noted, additionally, that a 1982 *400amendment to § 52-15-10 exempting video games with free-play feature clearly rendered the coin-operated video poker machines legal.
Exemption of the machines in Powell does not exempt any and all coin-operated nonpayout machines and all video games with free-play feature. To the contrary, the legislature has specifically declared slot machines illegal in the same paragraph in which it' has declared “video games with free play feature” exempt. S.C. Code § 12-21-2710. Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the meaning of general words (video games), may be restricted by words of specification which precede them (slot machines) on the theory that, had the legislature intended the general words be used in their unrestricted sense, there would have been no mention of the particular class. State v. Patterson, 261 S.C. 362, 200 S.E. (2d) 68 (1973).
The Lucky 8 slot machines are clearly prohibited by § 12-21-2710; accordingly, the judgment below is
Reversed.
Moore, J., and George T. Gregory, Jr., Acting Associate Justice, concur. Finney, and Toal, JJ., dissenting in separate opinion.We express no opinion as to the impact of 1993 Act No. 164. The 1993 Act was not raised prior to oral argument and we decline to consider it.
The state was formerly codified as S.C. Code Ann. § 52-15-10 (1976). It was rewritten and recodified as § 12-21-2710.1986 Act No. 308, § 4.