dissenting.
Petitioner argues and the majority’s opinion holds the Employment Security Commission’s (“the Commission”) findings of fact do not support its conclusion of law that petitioner was discharged for “substantial fault” and is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. I disagree and vote to affirm the superior court’s order upholding the Commission’s decision in favor of respondent-employer. I respectfully dissent.
I. Standard of Review
“[Findings of fact in an appeal from a decision of the . . . Commission are conclusive on both the superior court and this Court if supported by any competent evidence.” James v. Lemmons, 177 N.C. App. 509, 513, 629 S.E.2d 324, 328 (2006) (emphasis supplied) (citing Celis v. N.C. Employment Sec. Comm’n, 97 N.C. App. 636, 389 S.E.2d 434 (1990)). This Court determines “whether the facts as found by the [Commission] are supported by competent evidence and if so, whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.” Fair v. St. Joseph’s Hospital, Inc., 113 N.C. App. 159, 161, 437 S.E.2d 875, 876 (1993), disc. rev. denied, 336 N.C. 315, 445 S.E.2d 394 (1994).
II. Substantial Fault
Petitioner argues the Commission’s finding of fact number nine supports the conclusion that she was discharged through no fault of her own and that she is entitled to unemployment benefits. I disagree.
*276The Commission found that petitioner was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-14(2a), which provides in relevant part:
For a period of not less than four nor more than 13 weeks beginning with the first day of the first week during which or after the disqualifying act occurs with respect to which week an individual files a claim for benefits if it is determined by the Commission that such individual is, at the time the claim is filed, unemployed because he was discharged for substantial fault on his part connected with his work not rising to the level of misconduct. Substantial fault is defined to include those acts or omissions of employees over which they exercised reasonable control and which violate reasonable requirements of the job but shall not include (1) minor infractions of rules unless such infractions are repeated after a warning was received by the employee, (2) inadvertent mistakes made by the employee, nor (3) failures to perform work because of insufficient skill, ability, or equipment.
(Emphasis supplied).
The majority’s opinion holds that petitioner’s behavior cannot rise to the level of “substantial fault” because petitioner did not have “reasonable control” over the ability to conform to respondent-employer’s plant rules and regulations due to petitioner’s undescribed and undiagnosed “personal illness.” The majority’s opinion cites James v. Lemmons as the basis of its holding. 177 N.C. App. 509, 629 S.E.2d 324 (2006). In James, petitioner was terminated from her employment due to excessive absenteeism and a history of poor working relationships with co-workers. Id. at 511-12, 629 S.E.2d at 327. The petitioner in James would frequently miss work due to previously diagnosed mental illness and occasionally left to attend medical appointments. Id.
After reviewing petitioner’s claim for unemployment benefits, the Commission decided she was not disqualified and found that her “absences from work were due to her medical condition [i.e., bipolar disorder] and that, while she did not give Employer intimate details about her medical condition, she did provide doctor’s excuses for the time she missed from work.” Id. at 519, 629 S.E.2d at 331. The Commission concluded that petitioner “was not absent from work due to misconduct.” Id.
This Court affirmed the Commission’s decision and held “an employee does not have reasonable control over failing to attend work *277because of serious physical or mental illness." Id. at 520, 629 S.E.2d at 332 (emphasis supplied). This Court further stated, “there is no evidence that [petitioner] was medically capable of compliance.” Id.
The majority’s reliance on James is misplaced. The facts presented in this case are clearly distinguishable from the facts presented in James. Id. at 511-13, 629 S.E.2d at 327-28. Here, the only evidence petitioner presented regarding her “illness” was: (1) petitioner’s testimony that “this illness can make anything happen. Your head could start hurting. You can get sick, vomit, it’s just anything. It can trigger anything of your body[]” and (2) two vague letters dated after petitioner’s date of termination on 21 September 2005.
The first letter entered into evidence, dated 30 January 2006, is written by petitioner’s case manager, and states, “[petitioner] is living with an illness that may cause her to become sick at any time.” The second letter merely states that petitioner visits “for a regular checkup every 2-3 month [sic], every time she is seen by one of our doctors, we will give her a letter stating that she was here and has been seen by a physicianPetitioner failed to produce the physician notes or letter referred to in her second exhibit.
Further, no evidence was presented regarding the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s late arrival on 21 September 2005, other than petitioner’s statement that “[she] left [to take her lunch break] at twelve thirty-five . . . [and she] got back at . . . one-o-five” but “[she] didn’t come on the floor until fifteen minutes late [sic], and the reason why [she] was late because [sic] . . . [she] was in the bathroom . . . because [she] had got [sic] sick that day.” The record shows petitioner had exhausted her entire lunch break prior to returning to her workplace, and then used an additional fifteen minutes without informing her employer that she was “sick.”
The facts before us do not indicate that petitioner was an employee who did not have “reasonable control over failing to attend work because of serious physical or mental illness.” Id. at 520, 629 S.E.2d at 332 (emphasis supplied). No competent evidence shows that petitioner was medically incapable of compliance with respondent-employer’s plant rules and regulations or that she had previously informed her employer of her unspecified “illness.”
Additionally, respondent-employer presented evidence of three prior written warnings and four oral warnings relating to excessive breaks, tardiness, or poor work performance during the twelve *278months prior to termination. The third written warning is the only warning petitioner claims is linked to her “illness.” Despite the repeated written and oral warnings and petitioner’s awareness of respondent-employer’s policy regarding termination, petitioner failed to give respondent-employer any notice of her “illness” to excuse her actions or provide any medical excuse for her repeated absenteeism while employed.
The Commission’s findings of fact clearly support its conclusion that petitioner was discharged for “substantial fault.” To hold otherwise would subject the Commission and our Courts to a number of claims and appeals asserting unsubstantiated claims of “illness” with no medical evidence or excuse as a pretext to excuse employees noncompliance with employers’ rules and regulations in order to receive unemployment benefits.
III. Conclusion
No competent evidence shows petitioner’s repeated pattern of tardiness is due to “a serious physical or mental illness.” Id. The facts and holding in James are inapplicable to the facts before us. The Commission’s findings of fact support its conclusion that petitioner is disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 96-14(2a). I vote to affirm the superior court’s order. I respectfully dissent.