I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I write separately because I would resolve the case on different grounds. Like the majority, I believe the court of appeals incorrectly determined that the evidence presented at trial entitled the defendant to a voluntary manslaughter charge. In my view, however, the concept of transferred intent has little relevance to the outcome of the instant case.
As this Court’s precedent provides, voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being in a sudden heat of *375passion upon sufficient legal provocation. State v. Walker, 324 S.C. 257, 260, 478 S.E.2d 280, 281 (1996). Voluntary manslaughter mitigates an otherwise felonious killing to manslaughter, and while the elements of passion and provocation need not be of such a degree so as to dethrone reason entirely, or shut out knowledge and volition, they must “be such as would naturally disturb the sway of reason, and render the mind of an ordinary person incapable of cool reflection, and produce what, according to human experience, may be called an uncontrollable impulse to do violence.” Id. (citing State v. Byrd, 323 S.C. 319, 474 S.E.2d 430 (1996)). When determining whether a defendant is entitled to a voluntary manslaughter charge, the court must view the facts in the defendant’s favor. Byrd, 323 S.C. at 321, 474 S.E.2d at 431.
The defendant’s own narrative is instructive. According to the defendant, the events leading up to the fatal shooting began with a minor altercation early in the evening between the defendant, his live-in girlfriend (from whom he was separated seven days earlier), and his girlfriend’s ex-brother-in-law. The defendant testified that he left the scene of the altercation, visited several other destinations, and eventually decided to attempt to reconcile with his girlfriend at her mother’s house at approximately 3:30 in the morning. The defendant believed it prudent to leave his car nearly two miles away from the house and approach the house from the rear, and as he approached the house, the defendant testified that he observed his girlfriend, his girlfriend’s sister, and the sister’s ex-husband outside the home. The defendant alleges that as he approached the trio, the sister’s ex-husband fired a weapon at him. According to the defendant, he used his own gun to return fire, and then retreated from the property while firing multiple times over his shoulder.
This factual scenario is completely void of any evidence remotely supporting a charge of voluntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter, by definition, requires a criminal intent to do harm to another. But according to the defendant’s story, he had no criminal intent whatsoever.
If, as he suggests, the defendant returned fire in a panic for his life, surely the defense of self-defense would be appropriate. Notably, this was charged by the trial court. Similarly, *376the trial court charged the jury on the law of involuntary manslaughter; perhaps because it was possible for the jury to believe that the defendant’s initial returning of fire was justified, but ultimately find that the defendant was criminally reckless in firing multiple times over his shoulder as he retreated. Without any evidence supporting the view that the defendant fired the fatal shots while under an “uncontrollable impulse to do violence,” the trial court properly declined to charge the law of voluntary manslaughter to the jury.4
In support of their holding that the defendant was entitled to a voluntary manslaughter charge, the court of appeals relied on this Court’s holding in State v. Penland, 275 S.C. 537, 540, 273 S.E.2d 765, 766 (1981). As the court of appeals noted, that case arguably stands for the proposition that a jury issue on the voluntary manslaughter element of heat of passion can be created in a case similar to the instant case.
Penland cannot be so broad. Read literally, the opinion seems to impermissibly blend the concept of voluntary manslaughter with the defense of self-defense. The opinion provides no substantial factual background for the case, and no description of the events leading up to the apparently fatal incident. To the extent Penland stands for the proposition that a person who simply defends himself while in fear for his life is entitled to a voluntary manslaughter charge, the case should be overruled.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the court of appeals’ decision and reinstate the defendant’s murder conviction.
Justice PLEICONES.I agree that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Childers’ motion to relieve his trial counsel, and therefore join that part of the majority’s opinion. I respectfully dissent, however, from that part of the decision *377which reverses the Court of Appeals’ holding that the trial judge committed reversible error in denying Childers’ request for a voluntary manslaughter charge.
The majority reverses the voluntary manslaughter holding, finding the Court of Appeals misapplied the doctrine of transferred intent. Aside from the fact that this issue is not before the Court,5 as explained below, this case represents a classic claim of transferred intent.
“Criminal liability is normally based upon the concurrence of two factors, ‘an evil meaning mind [and an] evil doing hand.’ ” United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980). Thus, in a homicide case, the law is concerned with the killer’s state of mind, not with the identity of the victim. State v. Fennell, 340 S.C. 266, 531 S.E.2d 512 (2000). As the Fennell court explained, “[A] defendant may be found guilty of murder or manslaughter in a case of bad or mistaken aim under the doctrine of transferred intent. In the classic case, the defendant intends to kill or seriously injure one person, but misses that person and mistakenly kills another.” Id. at 272, 531 S.E.2d at 515.
Thus, the critical question was Childers’ mental state at the time he shot. If there is evidence that he fired in the sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation, it matters not that his aim was poor. State v. Fennell, supra. Here, Childers testified that his sudden heat of passion was aroused when the victim’s former brother-in-law shot at him, and that in returning the fire, he mistakenly shot the victim. The majority misapplies the doctrine in order to find no voluntary manslaughter charge was warranted. See also e.g. State v. Gandy, 283 S.C. 571, 324 S.E.2d 65 (1984) overruled on other grounds Casey v. State, 305 S.C. 445, 409 S.E.2d 391 (1991); State v. McElveen, 280 S.C. 325, 313 S.E.2d 298 (1984).6
The sole issue before the Court on the State’s certiorari is *378Whether the Court of Appeals erred by finding the trial judge incorrectly denied Childers’ request for a voluntary manslaughter charge when the record shows there is no evidence of heat of passion?7
The State’s argument rests on its contention that Childers did not present evidence that he was “inflamed by passion” when he returned the brother-in-law’s fire. I disagree, and would hold that the jury could have found the “heat of passion” in Childers’ testimony that he fired back because he was scared and feared he would be shot at again.
For these reasons, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
MOORE, J., concurs.. Tellingly, the fatal shots consisted of two gunshot wounds to the victim's head. At trial, the State's medical expert testified that powder marks around both wounds suggested that the shots were administered at a close range. Though the implications of this evidence contradict the defendant's account of the events, we must believe the defendant when determining jury charges.
. The State did not challenge the Court of Appeals transferred intent holding on rehearing and consequently could not, and did not, seek certiorari to review that ruling. An unchallenged ruling by the Court of Appeals, even if erroneous, is the law of the case on certiorari. E.g., State v. Barroso, 328 S.C. 268, 493 S.E.2d 854 (1997).
. The majority relies on a case where the legal provocation of “A" was used by the defendant to justify his intentional shooting of "B," State v. *378Locklair, 341 S.C. 352, 535 S.E.2d 420 (2000), and one where there was simply no legal provocation. State v. Tucker, 324 S.C. 155, 478 S.E.2d 260 (1996). In contrast, here the State has conceded legal provocation.
. "State’s Brief of Petitioner” at page 2.