dissenting.
I dissent, as I cannot agree with the majority’s delineation of certain factual elements as “jury issues.” The opinion holds: “The determinative factor is the extent to which precautions have been taken to protect the victims from further injury. This presents a question of fact for a jury and summary judgment is inappropriate.” (Majority opinion, p. 495).
The essential factual elements in this matter are undisputed. Whether or not Collins was an “occupant” of a motorcycle, or a “pedestrian” are matters of law, inasmuch as it is undisputed that his body was lying on the pavement prior to Lovett’s approach.
If the court is to adopt a “neutral zone” interpretation, that, too, is a question of law. The facts are undisputed as to what Lovett did with his automobile, and as to the spatial relationship of his automobile and the body of Collins. Whether or not that created a “neutral zone” is a matter of law, and is a question that jurors would be singularly ill-equipped to answer.
On Motion for Reconsideration.
Clarke, Presiding Justice.Appellee argues that the Court of Appeals’ opinions in Johnson v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co., 177 Ga. App. 204 (338 SE2d 687) (1985), and Cole u. Allstate Ins. Co., 173 Ga. App. 454 (326 SE2d 817) (1985), dictated a different result. It contends that even if Lovett’s car did strike Collins, International Indemnity is not liable under OCGA § 33-34-1 et seq., because Lovett’s car was not the propelling vehicle. However, neither Cole nor Johnson dealt with the liability of the vehicle which was propelled into the injured party. In Cole the stationary vehicle was itself struck but the opinion does not indicate that it came into contact with the injured party. In Johnson the issue was the liability of the no-fault insurer of the vehicle which struck and propelled a second vehicle into the injured party. The court did not deal with the liability of the insurer of the stationary or propelled vehicle. We find now that where one vehicle is propelled by another vehicle into a third vehicle or pedestrian, both the propelling vehicle and the propelled vehicle have “struck” the third vehicle or pedestrian within the meaning of OCGA § 33-34-7. Therefore, the only *497question for a jury here is whether Lovett’s car struck Collins after Lovett’s car was struck.
Decided November 4, 1986 Reconsideration denied December 2, 1986. Martin & Johnson, Clarence L. Martin, for appellant. Gurley & Fowler, J. Loren Fowler, Michael L. Wetzel, for appellee.