Andrew P. Hatch, a minor, suing through his father, Roddy J. Hatch, Jr., as next friend, and Roddy J. Hatch, Jr., individually, sued Michael O’Neill, a minor and three adults. *447It was alleged that Michael O’Neill placed a rock in a described powerful slingshot, deliberately aimed the slingshot at the head of Andrew P. Hatch, and fired the sling shot from a distance of approximately three feet, causing the rock to strike Andrew P. Hatch in the right eye, which resulted in the loss of the eye.
A motion for summary judgment was filed as to the minor, Michael O’Neill, on the ground that he was nine years of age at the time of the occurrence, and would not be liable for a tort under the provisions of Code § 105-1806.
The plaintiffs filled a response to the motion for summary judgment, asserting that Code § 105-1806 violates the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions, and also contending that such Code section does not protect a minor under the age of 13 from a suit for damages for a wilful tort.
The trial judge granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed Michael O’Neill as a party defendant. The appeal is from that judgment.
1. Code § 105-1806 provides: "Infancy is no defense to an action for a tort, provided the defendant has arrived at those years of discretion and accountability prescribed by this Code for criminal offenses.”
The appellants contend that this Code section, strictly contrued, does not prevent an action for tort against an infant under the age of criminal responsibility, and means only that a minor over the age of criminal accountability can not claim any lesser standard of care in its conduct than that of an adult. The appellants also contend that this Code section should be construed with Code § 105-204, which provides: "Due care in a child of tender years is such care as its capacity, mental and physical, fits it for exercising in the actual circumstances of the occasion and situation under investigation.”
Code § 105-1806, in identical language, appeared in the first Code of this state. Code of 1863, § 2996. At that time the age of criminal responsibility was 14, or before that age if the child knew the distinction between good and evil, but never under the age of 10. Code of 1863, §§ 4190, 4191. The present age of criminal responsibility is 13. Ga. L. 1968, pp. 1249, 1270 (Code Ann. § 26-701). In the Code of 1863, as in the present Code, the section which is now 105-1806 is in the Chapter listing defenses to torts.
Code § 105-204 first appeared in the Code of 1895 (§ 2901). It was codified from Western & A. R. v. Young, 81 Ga. 397 (2) (7 SE 912, 12 ASR 320), which announced a rule for the determination of the *448standard of care required of a child, when considering the question of contributory negligence of the child, in an action to recover damages for an injury to the child.
There is little case law in Georgia construing the meaning of Code § 105-1806. In Central R. v. Brinson, 70 Ga. 207 (5 d), this court held: "A person who is neither a lunatic, idiot nor insane, and who has arrived at fourteen years of age, or before that age, if such person knows the distinction between good and evil, is held responsible for crime; under ten years of age, he is not responsible; and he is equally responsible in cases of tort, provided he has reached those years of discretion and accountability prescribed by the Code for criminal offenses.” This statement indicates that tort liability coincides with criminal liability, but the case did not deal with an action for tort against a minor.
The Court of Appeals, in Brady v. Lewless, 124 Ga. App. 858 (186 SE2d 310), with two Judges dissenting, held that Code § 105-1806 means that a minor under the age of 13 is immune from suit for tort, and distinguished the rule as to the negligence of a child in an action for damages because of injuries to the child. Certiorari was denied by this court.
It is our opinion that the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the meaning of Code § 105-1806. Since this statute determines the policy of this state as to torts of minors under the age of criminal responsibility, it is immaterial what the rule is in other jurisdictions, or what the rule was at common law.
2. The appellants assert that Code § 105-1806 violates the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions in that it deprives them of a property right without due process of law by barring them from the recovery of lawful damages from the minor child, regardless of his culpability, wanton act, and negligence, and regardless of any standard of care which could be imposed upon a minor of his age under similar circumstances, the severity and permanance of the injury inflicted, his resources to pay damages, and any other fact or circumstance.
The question of the immunity of an infant who is under the age of criminal responsibility from liability for torts is a reasonable subject for regulation by the legislative branch of government, and it is not a denial of due process of law to provide that no cause of action exists for torts committed by infants of such age.
The trial judge did not err in granting the motion for summary judgment and dismissing Michael O’Neill as a defendant.
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur, except Gunter, Jordan and Ingram, JJ., who dissent.