I concur in the majority opinion; however, I write separately to address the discretionary immunity issue.3
In my view, discretionary immunity viability is equal to that of design immunity, neither is perpetual. See Wooten ex rel. Wooten v. S.C. Dep’t of Tramp., 333 S.C. 464, 467-68, 511 S.E.2d 355, 357 (1999) (affirming as modified the Court of Appeals’ holding that “design immunity is not perpetual. Once the Department of Transportation had notice of a hazardous condition, it was no longer immune from liability”).
Section 15-78-60(15) affords SCDOT discretionary immunity in the failure to initially place median barriers. This section provides, in pertinent part, that the governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from:
*588(15) absence, condition, or malfunction of any sign, signal, warning device, illumination device, guardrail, or median barrier unless the absence, condition, or malfunction is not corrected by the governmental entity responsible for its maintenance within a reasonable time after actual or constructive notice. Governmental entities are not liable for the removal or destruction of signs, signals, warning devices, guardrails, or median barriers by third parties except on failure of the political subdivision to correct them within a reasonable time after actual or constructive notice. Nothing in this item gives rise to liability arising from a failure of any governmental entity to initially place any of the above signs, signals, warning devices, guardrails, or median barriers when the failure is the result of a discretionary act of the governmental entity.
S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-60(15) (2005)(emphasis added).
“Discretionary immunity is contingent on proof the government entity, faced with alternatives, actually weighed competing considerations and made a conscious choice using accepted professional standards.” Wooten ex rel. Wooten v. S.C. Dep’t of Tmnsp., 333 S.C. 464, 468, 511 S.E.2d 355, 357 (1999).
The finite viability of discretionary immunity is evident in the statute itself. The statute uses the temporal word initially indicating that the immunity for the failure to initially place median barriers terminates after notice of a hazardous condition. In other words, SCDOT gets a free pass on the initial claim for damages occurring before SCDOT receives notice of a hazardous condition if it actually exercised discretion in failing to initially place median barriers. After notice, SCDOT is required to remedy the hazardous condition within a reasonable time.
I agree with the dissent that the exercise of discretion includes the right to be wrong but the right to be wrong is not perpetual. The SCDOT exercised discretion not to place median barriers when 1-77 was constructed and opened to traffic.4 SCDOT is entitled to immunity for that decision because it related to the initial placement of median barriers. Subsequent to the initial decision, SCDOT received notice of cross-over accidents and the existence of hazardous conditions. *589Once SCDOT was put on notice, the first sentence in section 15-78-60(15) required SCDOT to correct the condition within a reasonable time. See Steinke v. S.C. Dep’t of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 336 S.C. 373, 396, 520 S.E.2d 142, 154 (1999) (“While provisions establishing limitations upon and exemptions from liability of a governmental entity must be liberally construed to limit liability, we also must presume in construing a statute that the Legislature did not intend to perform a futile thing.”).
Section 15-78-60(15) does not grant discretionary immunity every time SCDOT attempts to correct a hazardous condition.
In the instant case, it was up to the jury to determine if SCDOT corrected the hazardous condition within a reasonable time as required by section 15-78-60(15).
I would affirm the trial court.
. SCDOT moved for a directed verdict and JNOV on the ground that it was entitled to design immunity and for discretionary immunity under section 15-78-60(15).
. SCDOT was entitled to both design and discretionary immunity at that time.