dissenting.
Because I believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Steven D. Puckett’s (“defendant”) motion for attorney’s fees against Stella M. Holt (“plaintiff mother”), I respectfully dissent.
I.
On 11 November 2005, the Guilford County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“plaintiff agency”) filed a complaint seeking to *699establish paternity and current support, as well as to recover past paid public assistance from defendant for a juvenile whom plaintiff mother claimed was fathered by defendant. On 10 August 2006, defendant requested a paternity test be performed, and on 12 August 2006, he filed a response denying paternity and counterclaiming for attorney’s fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-13.6. The paternity test excluded defendant as the father, and the case was voluntarily dismissed by plaintiff agency on 28 November 2006. On 27 March 2007, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees, ordering that plaintiff mother pay $750.00 of his more than $2,000.00 in accumulated attorney’s fees. Plaintiff agency appeals on behalf of plaintiff mother.
II.
The majority holds that an award of attorney’s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21(10) is inequitable, as there is no showing the plaintiff mother acted in bad faith in naming defendant as the father. However, because as the majority notes there is no precedent in this or any other jurisdiction addressing such a claim, plaintiff agency can cite to no law that requires bad faith be shown before such costs may be awarded.
The majority argues that the spirit of the laws governing child support enforcement as well as principles of equity forbid the trial court from holding plaintiff mother responsible for the attorney’s fees incurred by defendant in defending her false claim of paternity. I disagree.
A. Party in interest
The majority makes much of the fact that the real party in interest in this case is in fact plaintiff agency, not plaintiff mother. While it is certainly true that any monetary recovery would go to plaintiff agency, the majority does not explain how this fact deprives the trial court of authority to grant defendant’s motion as to her. Plaintiff mother is a named plaintiff in every document in the record on appeal, and obviously the reason defendant became involved in the case.3 I have found no law to suggest that, because a named party is *700not the real “party in interest,” that party is immune from orders by the trial court.
Further, the law does not support the majority’s dire prediction of fines and jail time for plaintiff mother had she not named defendant as the father of her child. Per statute, a parent may be found in contempt if she “fails or refuses” to aid in the search for a missing parent. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 110-131(a) (2007). Settle v. Beasley, 309 N.C. 616, 308 S.E.2d 288 (1983), the case much cited by the majority, describes this as “cooperating] with the county in its efforts to get support from the father of the child.” Id. at 619, 308 S.E.2d at 289. Nothing in our statutes, our case law, or the record indicates that plaintiff mother was in danger of imminent criminal sanctions and therefore forced to name someone — anyone—as the potential father to enable plaintiff agency to pursue a man wholly innocent of any involvement in this case. I would note further that neither of the two duties imposed on plaintiff mother by statute and common law — to aid in the search for the missing father and cooperate with the county in obtaining support from the father once identified — are furthered by the provision of untruthful information as to the potential father.
Finally, I fail to see how the stated purpose of Article 9 — “to provide for the financial support of dependent children” — affects the issue before this Court: Whether plaintiff mother should be held responsible for $750.00 of defendant’s attorney’s fees. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 110-128 (2007). Plaintiff mother has been receiving financial support for her child from plaintiff agency, and nothing in the record suggests she will lose that support regardless of the outcome of this appeal.
B. Principles of equity
Before discussing how the principles of equity apply to this case, I first note that the awarding of attorney’s fees in this case was in the discretion of the trial court. That discretion includes consideration not only of what is equitable under the specific circumstances of each case, but also the parties’ ability to pay any judgment against them. The fact that plaintiff mother receives child support should not make her immune from an order by the trial court to pay $750.00 of defendant’s attorney’s fees—less than half the total costs he incurred—in defending himself from plaintiff mother’s false accusations.
In discussing how plaintiff mother’s rights were assigned to plaintiff agency via subrogation—an equitable doctrine—the majority cites to the following description of equity: “ ‘[T]he doing of complete, *701essential and perfect justice between all the parties without regard to form, and its object is the prevention of injustice.’ ” Jeffreys v. Hocutt, 195 N.C. 339, 342, 142 S.E. 226, 227 (1928) (citation omitted). The majority later states that the fact there “is no showing in the record” that plaintiff mother named defendant “maliciously, fraudulently, or in bad faith” and that defendant was not actually the father of the child at issue is, essentially, irrelevant to our inquiries. I cannot reconcile these two statements logically.
First, the record contains evidence from which the trial court could have inferred that plaintiff mother acted in bad faith in naming defendant. In his affidavit, filed on 8 September 2006, defendant testified after being duly sworn to this effect:
1. I am a citizen and resident of the State of Florida.
2. I was served with a Summons and Complaint in this action by certified [mail] on or about May 30, 2006.
3. I have never resided in High Point, North Carolina.
4. I am not now and never have been acquainted with [plaintiff mother].
5. I did not engage in an act of sexual intercourse within the State of North Carolina which could have resulted in the conception of the minor child who is the subject of this action.
6. I deny that I am the natural father of the child.
7. I request that the court order that the parties and child submit to genetic marker testing to establish that I am not the father of the minor child.
As noted above, that genetic marker testing established that defendant could not be the father of the minor child at issue.
In its order awarding attorney’s fees to defendant, filed 27 March 2007, the trial court made the following findings of fact:
1. Plaintiff [agency] filed the instant action for child support on behalf of [plaintiff mother on] or about November 17, 2005, alleging that Defendant is the biological father of the minor child [name redacted].
2. Defendant timely filed a motion to dismiss and an answer denying the allegations of the complaint and requesting paternity testing.
*7023. Defendant further filed an Affidavit alleging that he has never resided in High Point, North Carolina; that he is not now and never has been acquainted with [plaintiff mother]; that he did not engage in an act of sexual intercourse within the State of North Carolina which could have resulted in the conception of the minor child who is the subject of this action; and that he is [not] the natural father of the child.
4. Thereafter, the parties and the minor child submitted to paternity testing. The results of the genetic marker test confirm that Defendant is not the father of the minor child.
5. The underlying action was voluntarily dismissed by [plaintiff agency] upon receipt of the test results.
6. Defendant is a resident of the State of Florida and was forced to retain counsel to defend him in this matter.
7. To date, Defendant has incurred attorney’s fees in the amount of $2,018.75 in defense of Plaintiff[ mother’s] claims.
8. Defendant is an interested party, acting in good faith, who is without the means to defray the costs of defending this action.
9. [Plaintiff mother] should share in the expenses incurred by Defendant.
The record reflects no evidence that plaintiff mother had a good faith basis for naming defendant. Clearly, the trial court believed defendant had no relationship with plaintiff mother, a finding that would justify an award of attorney’s fees.
Surely the principles of equity—" ‘the doing of complete, essential and perfect justice between all the parties without regard to form, and its object is the prevention of injustice,’ ” Jeffreys, 195 N.C. at 342, 142 S.E. at 228 (citation omitted; emphasis added)—apply to defendant as well as to plaintiff mother. Defendant was, on no apparent basis, haled into court in a foreign state to be held responsible for a child that had no relation to him and forced to incur thousands of dollars in legal fees defending an entirely spurious action. It is surprising, therefore, that in all the majority’s consideration of fairness to plaintiff mother, no mention of defendant’s position is made.
I do not believe that the principles of equity required the trial court to ignore plaintiff mother’s role in this suit, nor this Court to find that the trial court abused its discretion in doing so.
*703III.
Because I believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding reasonable attorney’s fees against plaintiff mother, I would affirm.
. I note also that no party argued to this Court that plaintiff agency might be held responsible for attorney’s fees, as the majority suggests. Further, there was nothing to prohibit plaintiff agency from contacting defendant when plaintiff mother named him as the father and instigating paternity testing at that time before filing an action against him.