I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the conviction and hold that the trial court properly refused to charge both involuntary manslaughter and self-defense.
The majority finds that Petitioner was entitled to an involuntary manslaughter charge because there was evidence that Petitioner recklessly handled the gun and that Petitioner and the victim struggled over the gun. In my opinion, the evidence does not support these findings. According to Petitioner’s own testimony, the gun discharged after he retrieved it from the victim, while the gun was in his possession, and as he stumbled backwards. In my view, this testimony is not evidence that Petitioner recklessly handled the gun or that the gun fired during the struggle. Compare State v. White, 253 S.C. 475, 171 S.E.2d 712 (1969) (holding that the defendant’s testimony regarding the shooting provided sufficient evidence to warrant an inference that the victim’s death was caused by the negligent handling of a loaded pistol); Tisdale v. State, 378 *652S.C. 122, 662 S.E.2d 410 (2008) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 22 at 21) (finding that the defendant’s testimony that the gun discharged while he and the victim struggled over the gun supported an involuntary manslaughter charge). Rather, I believe that this testimony presents a standard example of accident, on which the trial court properly instructed the jury. See State v. Burma, 384 S.C. 256, 262, 513 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1999) (holding that a defendant is entitled to a charge on accident where there is evidence that he armed himself in self-defense but the shooting occurs accidentally); State v. Goodson, 312 S.C. 278, 280 440 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1994) (recognizing that for a homicide to be excusable on the ground of accident, it must be shown that the killing was unintentional, that the defendant was acting lawfully, and that due care was exercised in the handling of the weapon).8 Accordingly, I would hold that there is no evidence to support an involuntary manslaughter charge.
In my opinion, the majority also errs in holding that Petitioner was entitled to a self-defense charge. Even assuming that Petitioner reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger when the victim first confronted him with the gun due to the victim’s previous threats, Petitioner testified that he “jerked” the gun away from the victim, the victim was “crouched down” when she was shot, and that he did not intentionally pull the trigger. Thus, in my view, Petitioner was neither in imminent danger nor did he believe he was in imminent danger at the time he shot the victim. I would therefore hold that the trial court properly refused to charge self-defense. See State v. Bruno, 322 S.C. 534, 536, 473 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1996) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to a self-defense charge where he presented no evidence that he believed that he was in imminent danger when he shot the victim).
While I agree with the majority that a self-defense charge and involuntary manslaughter charge are not necessarily mutually exclusive, there must be some evidence in the record to support the charges, and in my opinion, no evidence in the record supports either charge in this case. For these reasons, *653I-would hold that the trial court properly refused to give an involuntary manslaughter charge and a self-defense charge.
. I agree with the majority insofar as I believe that Petitioner had the right to take the weapon away from the victim.