At issue in this appeal is whether disabling depression and anxiety resulting from job stress and manifesting itself in dizziness, weakness, and palpitations may form the basis of a compensable workers’ compensation claim.
Appellant had been employed by Georgia Southwestern College as a housekeeper for 15 years when, in January of 1983, the College contracted with ARA Environmental Services, Inc., to provide cleaning services to the institution. Appellant stayed on as an employee for *662ARA. However, instead of being responsible for cleaning only one dormitory, her crew of three became responsible for cleaning at first four and later two dormitories. This increase in her workload was very stressful for the appellant, and on May 24, 1983, while performing her usual duties, she became nauseous and faint. She was later treated at a hospital emergency room for dizziness, weakness, and palpitations and was diagnosed as suffering from depression and anxiety, probably related to her job.
The administrative law judge (ALJ) and the Full Board found that appellant was “suffering from depression with anxiety manifesting themselves in psychosomatic physical complaints which are related to the claimant’s reaction to the increased volume of work she performed as an employee. . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) The ALJ, the Full Board, and the superior court all denied compensation, relying on this court’s decision in Hanson Buick, Inc. v. Chatham, 163 Ga. App. 127, 129 (292 SE2d 428) (1982), that “to be compensable[,] psychological injury or disease must result ‘naturally and unavoidably’ . . . from some discernible physical occurrence.”
In Hanson Buick, Inc. v. Chatham, supra at 129, we noted that this court has approved as compensable, “in some limited cases, physical injury or disease attributable to psychic or emotional stimulus ([cit.]); and psychic or emotional trauma attributable to physical injury ([cits.]). But we have specifically and expressly denied compensation for psychic trauma precipitated by psychic stimulus [(cits.)]. . . .” In the instant case, there is at least some evidence to support the finding made below that appellant’s physical complaints are psychosomatic and that they were precipitated by a psychic or emotional stimulus. Based upon that finding, the superior court correctly affirmed the denial of appellant’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Hanson Buick, supra; Brady v. Royal Mfg. Co., 117 Ga. App. 312 (160 SE2d 424) (1968).
The ruling in Ga. Bureau of Investigation v. Worthington, 149 Ga. App. 628 (255 SE2d 99) (1979), upon which appellant relies, does not require a different result in the case now before us. In Worthington, the condition of the claimant which caused his total disability was physical. Although this court’s opinion in Worthington merely refers to the fact that the claimant experienced “blurred vision, a headache, and impairment of speech and movement,” the record in that case reveals that the Board found that the claimant was clearly physically disabled. The diagnosis made by the physicians who saw the claimant in Worthington varied from cerebral vascular accident (stroke) to episodic vertigo. The issue in Worthington was not whether the claimant’s physical disability was compensable if work-related, but whether it was work-related. Our judgment affirming the Board’s determination that the “claimant’s work did contribute to *663. . . his current disability” was based upon the any evidence rule. In contrast to Worthington, the instant case and Hanson Buick involve not disability arising from some discernible physical occurrence, but instead psychic disability resulting from purely psychological injury. As previously noted, disabilities of that type are not compensable under the workers’ compensation law as enacted and applied in Georgia.
Judgment affirmed.
Deen, P. J., McMurray, P. J., Birdsong, P. J., Sognier and Pope, JJ., concur. Banke, C. J., and Beasley, J., concur specially. Benham, J., dissents.