The issue in this case is whether plaintiff-employee’s allegation that he was discharged as a result of an absence from work because of a work-related injury constitutes a cause of action as a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
We hold that plaintiff has not pleaded a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doc-, trine and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, Clifford v Cactus Drilling Corp, 109 Mich App 776; 312 NW2d 380 (1981), and reinstate the trial court’s order of summary judgment in favor of defendant. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to address the question whether this action is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, MCL 418.131; MSA 17.237(131).
The facts of this case are adequately stated in the dissenting opinion of Judge R. B. Burns in the Court of Appeals:
"Plaintiff alleged that defendant fired him for missing work. Plaintiff further alleged that defendant had no right to so fire him since his absence from work was due to a disability arising from a work-related injury for which he had received workers’ compensation benefits.
"The record reveals that plaintiff was injured on the job on December 20, 1977. He received workers’ compensation benefits for a period of five weeks. He returned to work, but a recurrence of the pain caused by the injury forced him to call in sick on February 14, 1978. He was fired the next day. Plaintiff commenced suit, and defendant moved for summary judgment on *360the ground that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The motion was granted by the trial court.”
The employment-at-will doctrine was recently restated by this Court in Suchodolski v Michigan Consolidated Gas Co, 412 Mich 692, 694-695; 316 NW2d 710 (1982): "In general, in the absence of a contractual basis for holding otherwise, either party to an employment contract for an indefinite term may terminate it at any time for any, or no, reason”. The Court went on to explain that exceptions have been engrafted onto the rule on the basis of "the principle that some grounds for discharging an employee are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable”. One such exception was established by the Court of Appeals in Sventko v Kroger Co, 69 Mich App 644; 245 NW2d 151 (1976). In Sventko, the plaintiff alleged that she was discharged solely in retaliation for her filing of a workers’ compensation claim. The Court held that a retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workers’ compensation claim is in contravention of public policy and as such constitutes an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.
We cannot agree, however, that an employee’s protection from discharge in retaliation for filing a workers’ compensation claim necessarily includes protection from discharge because of an absence from work because of a work-related injury.
Certainly an employer’s power to discharge an employee at will should not prevail when that power is exercised to prevent an employee from asserting his statutory rights under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. The case before us presented no evidence or reason to infer that plaintiff’s statutorily conferred right to. claim workers’ disability compensation benefits was *361chilled in any way. Plaintiff made no claim that he was deprived of his legal rights under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act. Plaintiff did not allege that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a claim for compensation. Plaintiff alleged that he was fired because he missed work because of a work-related injury for which he had already received workers’ disability compensation benefits. Plaintiff has stated that he has no further claim.
Reversed.
Levin, Ryan, Brickley, Cavanagh, and Boyle, JJ., concurred with Kavanagh, J.