dissenting.
The late Justice Weltner suggested in a dissent in Bohannon v. J. C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 259 Ga. 162 (377 SE2d 853) (1989), that this Court could shape a remedy for those who failed to obey the dictate of OCGA § 33-7-11 (d), but a majority of this Court properly rejected that suggestion, holding that the formulation of exceptions to the statute “is a task that is better left to the legislature.” Bohan-non, supra at 163. Because the majority opinion in this case perpetuates the mistaken creation of such a remedy in U. S. Fidelity &c. Co. v. Reid, 268 Ga. 432, 434 (491 SE2d 50) (1997), I must dissent.
In Reid v. U. S. Fidelity &c. Co., 223 Ga. App. 204, 206 (477 SE2d 369) (1996), the Court of Appeals suggested that this Court’s opinions in Hobbs v. Arthur, 264 Ga. 359, 360 (444 SE2d 322) (1994), and Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kilgore, 265 Ga. 836, 838 (462 SE2d 713) (1995), “have created the exception called for by Justice Weltner in his dissent in Bohannon . . . .” Although the majority opinion in U S. Fidelity &c. Co. v. Reid, supra, did not address that statement, Presiding Justice Fletcher made the same point in his special concurrence, suggesting that this Court should resolve the conflict. While I am reluctant to reconsider a decision made so recently, I feel compelled to do so in this case:
[I]t has never been the doctrine of any court of last resort that the law is to be a refuge and safe asylum for all the errors that creep into it. Indeed, the mind, private or official, which closes down upon all the errors it embraces, refusing to eject them when exposed, is no longer fit for the pursuit of truth. Courts, like individuals, but with more caution and deliberation, must sometimes reconsider what has been already carefully considered; and rectify their own mistakes.
City of Atlanta v. First Presbyterian Church, 86 Ga. 730, 733 (13 SE 252) (1891).
It is necessary, therefore, to reexamine our holding in Reid. Our holding there was based in part on this Court’s decision in Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kilgore, supra, where we hypothesized, in a discussion of diligence in obtaining service on a UMC, that the Kilgores could have dismissed their action, refiled it within six months, and then served their UMC with the complaint in the renewal action. Since Kilgore was decided on the basis of diligence in obtaining service, the hypothetical statement in Kilgore was not necessary to the resolution of that case. Since the statement was not nec*615essary to the holding and was not supported by authority,3 it was obiter dictum (Davis v. State, 266 Ga. 212 (465 SE2d 438) (1996)), constituted no ruling on the issue (Veal v. Barber, 197 Ga. 555 (1) (30 SE2d 252) (1944)), and was not binding on this Court. Peacock v. Peacock, 196 Ga. 441, 449 (26 SE2d 608) (1943). Nonetheless, we cited Kilgore in Reid as authority for the proposition that “a plaintiff can wait to serve a UMC until he files a valid renewal suit after the running of the statute of limitation.” Id. at 434. Since the statement in Kilgore was plainly dicta, the portion of the rationale in Reid which depended on it is not viable.
The other ground for the decision in Reid was based on an analysis of the law pertaining to renewal actions and service issues in renewal actions. That analysis, involving as it does the rights of parties, ignores the real function of the statutory requirement of service on the UMC: “The service requirement of OCGA § 33-7-11 (d) should ... be read as a statutory prerequisite a plaintiff must fulfill in order to collect uninsured motorist benefits . . . .” Bohannon v. Futrell, 189 Ga. App. 340 (1) (375 SE2d 637) (1988). Since the purpose of the service requirement is to give the UMC notice of the potential for a claim against it, and not to make the UMC a party, there is no need to consider application of the renewal statute or whether the underlying suit was valid, voidable, or void. The only question to be answered in this and similar cases is whether the UMC has been served as though it were a party, which this Court determined in Bohannon to mean service within the period of limitation. If that service was made, the statutory prerequisite of notification has been satisfied and the UMC will be liable for any judgment obtained against an uninsured motorist. If the service was not made, the insured will have, in effect, waived the opportunity to recover under uninsured motorist coverage.
Reconsideration of the rationale of Reid leads me to the conclusion that we were in error in that case when we applied the law of renewal actions to the issue of service on UMCs. Accordingly, I would overrule U. S. Fidelity &c. Co. v. Reid, 268 Ga. 432, supra, insofar as it holds that the failure to serve a UMC within the applicable period of limitation may be remedied by dismissing the action and then serving the UMC.
The majority opinion in this case fails to accept the hard truth that Reid constituted an abandonment of the precedent of this Court in Bohannon. Worse, it entirely fails to address the fact that the holding in Reid was constructed of a combination of dicta and improper *616application of established law pertaining to renewal actions. The majority opinion fails to rebut the fact that Reid directly violates this Court’s holding in Bohannon that any exceptions to the notice requirement in OCGA § 33-7-11 (d) must be made by the legislature. Finally, the majority opinion’s suggestion that adhering to the state of the law established in Bohannon would overrule Granite State Ins. Co. v. Nord Bitumi U. S., 262 Ga. 502 (422 SE2d 191) (1992), is mistaken. This case involves statutory construction and appropriate deference to the legislative process and separation of powers; Granite State involved construction of contractual language as to which there was no Georgia authority, and in the process of which the language was construed most strongly against the drafter of it, a rule which has no counterpart in statutory interpretation. Because the controlling principles of the two cases derive from very different bodies of law, adhering to the law would neither overrule nor be inconsistent with Granite State. This Court should take this opportunity to undo the wrong it did in Reid.
Decided July 13, 1998 Reconsideration denied July 30,1998. Jolles & Slaby, Isaac S. Jolles, for appellant. Fulcher, Hagler, Reed, Hanks & Harper, Scott W. Kelly, Timothy S. Mirshak, for appellee.If we were to overrule Reid, as we should, the basic question presented by this case, whether a plaintiff who has not served the UMC prior to the running of the statute of limitation may dismiss the case, still having made no service on the UMC, then file a renewal action and obtain valid service on the UMC, would be answered in the negative. This Court held in Bohannon that OCGA § 33-7-11 requires that a UMC be served within the applicable period of limitation. That requirement was not met in this case. The Court of Appeals was correct, therefore, in affirming the trial court’s judgment in the UMC’s favor. Because the majority opinion has held otherwise, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice Sears joins in this dissent.
After the assertion in Reid concerning service on a UMC in a renewal action, there was a citation to Hobbs, supra, but that case did not involve a UMC and is not authority for how and when a UMC may be served.