dissenting:
¶ 35 On July 10, 1998, this Court unanimously held in In re Young, 961 P.2d 918 (Utah 1998),1 that Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-27(l)(a) and (b) violated the separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution, Article V, section 1. Those two subsections authorized the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House to appoint members of the Legislature to the Judicial Conduct Commission. After Young was handed down, various legislators threatened to initiate retaliatory action against the judiciary by asserting even greater legislative control over discipline and retention of judges. Four members of the Court now embrace the exact opposite position from that which they took in the initial Young opinion. They now hold that it is constitutional for legislators to appoint members of, and to sit on, the Judicial Conduct Commission.
¶ 36 The response to the July 10 opinion was extraordinary. Some asserted that the Judicial Conduct Commission had in effect been put out of business and that the en*593forcement of judicial discipline had been ended.
¶ 37 In addition, some asserted that many interbranch governmental commissions were now unlawfully constituted insofar as their members were appointed from various departments of the government. A careful reading of the July 10 opinion does not support their assertions. The frenzy of the moment was exacerbated by threats from the Legislature to take retaliatory measures against the judiciary.
¶ 38 In an effort to calm the waters, the Judicial Conduct Commission filed a petition for rehearing, asking that this Court declare that the sections it held unconstitutional, Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-27(l)(a) and (b), were severable and that the Commission could continue to operate. The July 10 opinion clearly declared only two subsections of section 78-7-27(1) unconstitutional, and it is patently clear that absolutely nothing in the opinion suggested that the Commission could not continue to sanction. On the basis of long-established case law, it is clear that the unconstitutional provisions are severable from the remainder of section 78-7-27 and that the remaining provisions can operate to give effect to the legislative intent. See, e.g., Stewart v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 885 P.2d 759, 779 (Utah 1994).2
¶39 Judge Young and the Commission are the only parties to the dispute before this Court. The Commission has not asked for any modification of this Court’s opinion, much less a withdrawal of it. Nor has the Commission asked for any other relief of any kind from this Court. In short, the Commission has full authority and has had since our opinion of July 10, 1998, to continue to pursue its extraordinarily important work in the area of judicial discipline. That work certainly can and should go forward with the same dedication and intensity as it has in the past.
¶ 40 Governor Michael Leavitt and Attorney General Jan Graham filed a joint amicus brief urging this Court to amend Young to declare that the provisions held unconstitutional in Young are severable from the remaining provisions, thus allowing the Commission to continue functioning. In addition, the Governor and the Attorney General requested that the Court amend Young to provide guidance to state lawmakers and others who have concerns regarding the constitutionality of other boards and commissions whose members are appointed from the various branches of government.
¶41 The Utah Judicial Council and the Administrative Office of the Courts also filed a joint amicus brief urging that the Court establish a standard that would clarify when judges may serve on boards formed by other branches of government and when judicial committee positions may be occupied by members of other government branches. More generally, these bodies ask the Court to devise a framework or process by which the three branches of government can evaluate the constitutionality of “dozens of existing mixed boards.” That request must be denied because it asks for an advisory opinion.
¶ 42 The four legislators who served on the Commission when Young issued also filed an amicus brief and sought to intervene as parties. This Court denied that motion, holding that they are not proper parties. Despite that fact, and in patent disregard of fundamental rules of procedure generally and in violation of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, they ask that this Court vacate its unanimous opinion in Young and issue an opinion to the exact opposite of what our July 10 opinion held. Although the legislators are nonparties to this case, and al-
*594though neither the Governor, the Attorney General, the Judicial Conduct Commission, nor the Judicial Council has so requested, the four legislators ask that we not only vacate the July 10 opinion but that we also issue a new opinion that “accurately reflects” a so-called “compromise” that led to the 1984 rewrite of Article VIII of the Utah Constitution. They urge the Court to consider the “historical” evidence that legislators had functioned as members of the Commission prior to 1984 and that some members of the Legislature thought they would continue to so function after the amendment. The legislators also refer to language in the voter’s information pamphlet that explained the various provisions in the proposal submitted to the electorate that was later adopted as Article VIII of the Constitution. The legislators argue that such evidence reflected “the clear intent to preserve the ability of legislators to appoint and serve on the Judicial Conduct Commission.” Incredibly, the majority of this Court grants the request of these non-parties and ignores the positions of the Conduct Commission, the Governor, the Attorney General, and the Judicial Council. The “new information” that is asserted is not properly before the Court but, more importantly, simply cannot legitimately override the plain, clear language of the Constitution.
¶ 43 The short answer to the legislators’ argument is that Article V, section 1 makes explicit that no person charged with the exercise of a legislative power may exercise power that belongs to another one of the departments of government “except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted,” that is, in the Constitution itself.
¶ 44 Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution states:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 45 It is beyond cavil that Article VIII, section 13 does not “expressly” direct or permit legislators to exercise a judicial power. This the majority concedes. However, the majority asserts that legislators sat on the Commission before the 1984 amendment, and relies on statements by Representative James Moss on the floor of the House and the voter information pamphlet to support its view that legislative appointment to and service on the Commission are not functions “appertaining to” the other branches, thus avoiding the Separation of Powers Clause entirely. Such statements cannot legitimately be used to override the plain language of the Constitution.
¶46 The central holding of the majority opinion is that the powers exercised by the Commission are not “judicial” in nature and therefore not subject to Article V, section 1. The argument is not only contrary to long-established authority but, more importantly, seriously subverts Article V, section 1 and the independence of judges that Article V, section 1 secures. Judicial discipline— whether by way of impeachment3 or otherwise — is the exercise of a judicial power. The 1896 Utah Constitution explicitly recognized that the Senate, when acting in the most extreme kind of judicial discipline— impeachment — exercised judicial power. See Utah Const, art. VIII, § 1 (1896). In re Handley’s Estate stated: “The senate, while sitting as a court of impeachment, has judicial authority, so far as necessary, to try such issues. Otherwise the constitution has not entrusted any part of the judicial power of the state to the legislature.” 15 Utah 212, 219, 49 P. 829, 830-31 (1897). The principle function of the Commission, its sole purpose, is judicial discipline. By definition, the Commission therefore performs a function “appertaining to” the judicial branch under Article V, section 1. The majority’s proposition *595that the Commission does not exercise a function that “appertains to” the judicial branch is simply wrong. As this Court stated in Young:
The Judicial Conduct Commission plays a highly important, albeit not a determinative, role in the administration of judicial discipline by investigating and conducting confidential hearings regarding complaints against justices and judges. Consequently, the Commission exercises a type of judicial authority and operates within the judicial branch.
Original op. ¶ 84. We also pointed out in Young that other jurisdictions “have also held judicial conduct commissions with similar authority to be within the judicial branch.” Id. ¶ 85 (citing Whitehead v. Nevada Comm’n on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 878 P.2d 913 (1994) (holding executive branch prosecution of disciplinary charges against judge before commission violated separation of powers clause in Nevada Constitution)).
¶47 The majority denigrates the important judicial function served by the Commission. The majority seeks to relegate the Commission to nothing more than a fact-finding “group” whose function approximates that of a gatekeeper to this Court, where the real adjudication occurs. The Court states, “The Judicial Conduct Commission’s relationship to the Supreme Court in matters of judicial discipline is preliminary and advisory, as it was under the preceding statutory regime.” Maj. op. ¶24 (emphasis added). That flatly misstates and mischaracterizes the role and function of the Commission. Justice Zimmerman, the author of In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853 (Utah 1996), stated therein that the Commission is not merely a fact-finding “group” that submits suggestions to this Court but that the. Commission functions in a way analogous to that of a district court deciding attorney disciplinary matters. See id. at 863. Worthen stated: “The Constitution provides that upon ‘complaint[ ] against any justice or judge’ the Commission is assigned the responsibility of performing an investigation, considering the evidence at a hearing, and thereafter, entering an order of sanctions.” Id. at 862 (quoting Utah Const, art. VIII, § 13). In identifying an appropriate standard for reviewing Commission orders, Justice Zimmerman stated that the standard we adopt “should not make the Commission a mere factotum, lacking real power and without a significant role to play in the judicial discipline process.” Id. at 862-63. We deemed it appropriate to review Commission determinations much as we do decisions relating to attorney discipline matters. Incorporating this standard into the context of reviewing Commission decisions, we stated:
We will not. overturn the Commission’s findings of fact unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or plainly in error, but we reserve the right to draw inferences from the .basic facts which may differ from the Commission’s inferences and grant no deference to the Commission’s ultimate decision as to what constitutes an appropriate sanction.
Id. at 865.
¶ 48 Indeed, Worthen rejected the approach of some states that require the Court to engage in de novo review of both fact and law. Worthen acknowledged that some may argue that we should review, “de novo on the record,” both legal and factual conclusions of the Commission, but expressly rejected such arguments. Our reason for doing so is instructive because it belies the majority’s characterization of the Commission’s role as merely preliminary and advisory.
Although a standard of no deference on factual questions could be made to harmonize with the language of the constitutional provision [creating the Commission], such a reading would not be consistent with the structural relationship of the Commission to this court. First, there is nothing in the constitution that suggests the Commission is to function as a mere evidence collector for this court. Yet that would be precisely its function if we refused it any deference on questions of fact. The constitution and the legislation implementing its directives clearly contemplate that the Commission will have a significant role to play in gathering evidence of judicial misconduct, making determinations of fact, and recommending sanctions to *596this court. By granting some measure of deference to the Commission’s findings of fact, we will be honoring that role.
Id. at 864 (emphasis added). Indeed, we said that de novo review of the Commission’s factual findings would “demean the role of the Commission in the judicial discipline process.” Id. at 865.
Long history has taught the judiciary that the forum which hears conflicting evidence has a superior capability to resolve factual questions, particularly where witness demeanor is concerned. There is no reason to ignore that teaching only when dealing with judicial discipline. Moreover, it can be argued that the political function of a judicial conduct commission — -to lend neutral credibility to the handling of allegations of misconduct against judges while assuring that judges are subjected to effective and measured discipline, where necessary — requires that the Commission’s actions be reviewed by a court with some deference.
Id. (citation omitted).
¶49 The majority opinion is devoid of any meaningful analysis of the purpose that Article V, section 1 was intended to further. The central purpose of Article V is the preservation of the independence and integrity of the three branches or departments of government. As we stated in Young, Utah’s Separation of Powers Clause
preserves the sanctity of the judiciary and helps to ensure that the rule of law, and not political partisanship or transient ma-joritarian preferences, shall govern in our courts.... Adherence to the impartial rule of law, so crucial to our system of government, can only prevail if the judiciary is able to apply the rule of law free from partisan influence.
Original op. ¶ 76. Absent judicial independence,
the whole fundamental concept of a tripartite system of government with coequal and coordinate branches of government, as well as our deep-rooted tradition of limiting the powers of government by a written constitution, would be jeopardized, if not destroyed.
Matheson v. Ferry, 657 P.2d 240, 247 (Utah 1982) (Stewart, J., concurring) (Matheson II).
¶ 50 The separation of powers doctrine embodied in the United States Constitution also contemplates an independent judiciary. “In our country, the belief in the value of an independent federal judiciary is pervasive, even sacrosanct.” Honorable J. Clifford Wallace, Judicial Administration in a System of Independents: A Tribe with Only Chiefs, 1978 B.Y.U. L.Rev. 39, 40 (1978). “[N]o feature of our public institutional life is likely more essential to preserving a government of laws than an honorable and independent judiciary.” Peter M. Shane, WAo May Discipline or Remove Federal Judges? A Constitutional Analysis in I Research Papers of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline & Removal 1, 2 (1993) [hereinafter Shane, Judicial Discipline: A Constitutional Analysis].
¶ 51 Such sentiments most often relate to decisional independence, the “sine qua non of judicial independence.” Gordon Bermant & Russell R. Wheeler, Federal Judicial Independence Symposium: Federal Judges and the Judicial Branch: Their Independence and Accountability, 46 Mercer L.Rev. 835, 838 (1995). However, judicial independence, as protected by the doctrine of separation of powers, also requires “procedural and administrative independence” which “exist to serve decisional independence.” Id.
¶ 52 Administrative independence .refers to the power of the judiciary to review the conduct of its own members and impose disciplinary measures, where necessary, without the interference of the political branches. “Except perhaps for concerns surrounding the processes of judicial nomination and confirmation, no issues pertain more directly to the quality of judicial integrity and independence than the issues of judicial tenure, compensation, discipline and removal.” Shane, Judicial Discipline: A Constitutional Analysis, at 2 (emphasis added).
¶ 53 The doctrine of separation of powers provides a “decisive argument for the flat impermissibility of political mechanisms for judicial discipline other than impeachment.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
*597¶ 54 This Court has embraced that concept. In Salt Lake City v. Ohms, Justices Zimmerman and Durham stated, “Any attempt to place the exercise of the judicial power outside the control of the judiciary threatens ‘the fundamental integrity of the judicial branch.’ ” 881 P.2d 844, 867 (Utah 1994) (quoting In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 642 (Utah 1988)) (Zimmerman, J., and Durham, J., dissenting). Thus, critical to a Separation of Powers Clause inquiry is whether the statute at issue “compromises the essential independence of the judiciary.” Id. at 864 (Zimmerman, J., and Durham, J., dissenting) (internal quote omitted).
¶ 55 With these principles, and a more accurate description of the Commission’s relationship to this Court, in mind, I turn to the question of whether the participation of legislators on the Commission violates the doctrine of separation of powers under Article Y, section 1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-27 provides for legislative appointment to, and participation on, the Commission. If legislative involvement in the Commission could threaten the independence of the judiciary, that involvement constitutes a violation of the Separation of Powers Clause, because it compromises a fundamental interest protected by that provision. By definition, legislative members would be engaged in functions “appertaining to” the exclusive province of the judicial branch, and the statute authorizing the legislators to do so is unconstitutional.
¶ 56 The President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House appoint four of the ten members making up the Commission. Without doubt, the exercise of Commission disciplinary authority may be used against a judge whose views differ from those held by legislative members of the Commission. Likewise, legislative power to appoint four members of the Commission and legislative membership on the Commission may also create the appearance of undue political influence, whether or not that influence ever materializes. This potential alone may diminish independence of the judiciary in the eyes of a public that is expected to respect judicial opinions with which it may seriously disagree. Judicial integrity could be compromised if it becomes increasingly believed that judicial rulings are influenced by political forces.
¶ 57 In Young we stated, “Any attempt by the Legislature, therefore, to make judicial discipline subject to the influence of legislators could threaten the fundamental integrity of the judicial branch.” Original op. ¶ 86 (internal quotes omitted). We also pointed out that no branch of government should be allowed “even to embarrass another branch,” recognizing the deleterious impact of judicial decisions influenced by politics and the resulting diminished public esteem for the judiciary. Id. ¶ 87 (citing Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674, 681 (Utah 1982) (Matheson I) (Howe, J., concurring); State v. Shumaker, 200 Ind. 716, 164 N.E. 408, 409 (1928)).
The participation of members oí the legislative branch in the highly sensitive area of judicial discipline has the distinct possibility of embarrassing the judicial branch by interjecting the potential of partisan influence in the disciplinary process, with the potential effect of altering the thinking and actions of judges in cases over which they preside. Thus, even though the Commission’s recommended sanctions are not self-executing, a high barrier must insulate commission proceedings from any kind of partisan political influence.
Id.
¶ 58 In fact, the reasonable concern that the Commission may be used to encroach “upon the exercise of legitimate discretion by members of the judicial branch” led this Court in Worthen to review less deferentially the Commission’s factual findings in comparison with those of a trial court or an agency.
“We must therefore depart from our normal rule of deference to factfinding by trial courts and administrative agencies. We have a nondelegable responsibility, upon an appeal, to undertake a scrupulous and searching examination of the record to ascertain whether there was substantial evidence to support the council’s factual findings.”
Worthen, 926 P.2d at 864 (quoting In re Zoarski, 227 Conn. 784, 632 A.2d 1114, 1118 (1993)) (internal quote omitted). Other jurisdictions have expressed concern for the need *598to provide “a check on an errant commission.” Id. at 865. The concerns expressed in Worthen demonstrate that fears that judicial conduct commissions may be used to advance political ends to the detriment of judicial independence are not unfounded.
¶ 59 The majority is simply incorrect in the arguments it advances. It relies upon extrinsic evidence to construe Article VIII, section 13 of the Constitution and comes to the incorrect conclusion that legislators and voters intended legislative appointment to, and participation on, the Commission. Had they so intended, legislators and voters would have so stated, as Article V, section 1 requires. The separation of powers provision only permits exceptions that are “expressly directed or permitted ” by other provisions of the Constitution. Article VIII, section 13 does not provide any such express exception. The legislators can argue compromise at the Legislature'in the debate over the 1984 judicial article revision, the statutory history of the judicial qualifications commission prior to 1984 when it was an almost totally nonfunctioning entity,4 and information in voter pamphlets that proves nothing more than what the author of the pamphlet may have thought, but the beginning and the end of the argument is that Article VIII, section 13 does not expressly provide for legislative appointment and service on the Commission. Moreover, the majority’s effort to avoid these fundamental constitutional precepts by arguing that the Commission does not exercise judicial power is astonishing. That proposition is contrary to the Constitution, case law, and common sense.
¶ 60 This “new extrinsic evidence” cannot be used to contradict the plain language in both Article V, section 1, and Article VIII, section 13. “ ‘The rule which should be applied is that laws, and especially foundational laws such as our Constitution, should be interpreted and applied according to the plain import of their language as it would be understood by persons of ordinary intelligence and experience.’ ” Ohms, 881 P.2d at 850 n. 14 (quoting State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 938 (Utah 1975), disavowed on other grounds, State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 448 n. 4 (Utah 1983)) (citing University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, 4 Utah 2d 408, 295 P.2d 348, 361 (1956) (holding that if constitutional provision is clear “then extraneous or contemporaneous construction may not be resorted to”); Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 944 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s “sworn duty [is] to uphold the language of the constitution,” and it “shrinks from its duty” when it “refuses ... to enforce the plain and unambiguous meaning” of the constitution); Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989)).
¶ 61 According to Ohms, the reason for the rule prohibiting extraneous or contemporaneous construction of facially plain and unambiguous constitutional provisions is that the rule “prevents judges from ‘finding’ an ambiguity in even the most plain language of a constitutional or statutory provision as an excuse to search the legislative history in an attempt to justify an interpretation they prefer.” Ohms, 881 P.2d at 850 n. 14.
¶ 62 Just two years ago, in Worthen, we stated:
Here, as in other cases, “when faced with a question of statutory [or constitutional] construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute [or constitution].” Under our rules of statutory construction, we need not look beyond the plain language of this provision unless we find some ambiguity in it.... If we find the provision ambiguous, however, we then seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations ....
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*599Although our rules of constitutional construction are not always identical to our rules of statutory construction, our case law confirms that the starting place for analysis of a constitutional provision is the language of the provision itself.
Worthen, 926 P.2d at 866 (internal quotes and citations omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). In addition, various of our sister jurisdictions have stated that in interpreting a constitutional provision, resort to extrinsic evidence is prohibited unless the constitutional language is ambiguous. See McElhaney Cattle Co. v. Smith, 132 Ariz. 286, 645 P.2d 801, 805 (1982); In re Opinion of Justices, 575 A.2d 1186, 1189 (Del.1990); Marker v. State, 450 A.2d 397, 399 (Del. 1982); Florida League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So.2d 397, 400 (Fla.1992); Evans v. Andrus, 124 Idaho 6, 855 P.2d 467, 471 (1993); Louisiana Assoc. Gen. Cont., Inc. v. State, 669 So.2d 1185, 1196 (La.1996); Rice v. Connolly, 488 N.W.2d 241, 247 (Minn.1992); Scott v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 379, 443 S.E.2d 138, 141 (1994); Washington Economic Dev. Fin. Auth. v. Grimm, 119 Wash.2d 738, 837 P.2d 606, 612 (1992).
¶ 63 The plain language of Article Y, section 1 states that, except where “expressly directed or permitted,” no person in one department of Utah government can “exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others.” Article VIII, section 13 does not expressly direct or permit legislators to exercise judicial functions. The use of extrinsic evidence to avoid this plain language is improper.
¶ 64 In sum, the discipline of judges is a function that appertains to the judicial branch. Absent an express exception to the prohibitions of Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution, which has the effect of precluding legislative involvement in the Commission to the extent allowed under section 78-7-27, subsection 1(a) and 1(b) are unconstitutional. The majority and I both agree that Article VIII, section 13 contains no such express exception. Extrinsic evidence proffered by the four legislators formerly serving on the Commission cannot now be used to circumvent the plain language of the Separation of Powers Clause.
APPENDIX
July 10, 1998
STEWART, Justice:
¶ 65 The Judicial Conduct Commission proposed that a public reprimand be issued against Judge David S. Young for ex parte communications with an attorney for a party in a ease pending before Judge Young. Judge Young petitioned for review of the Commission’s findings and recommendation, asserting that the Commission’s findings were in error and that the Commission as constituted under Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-27(1) violates the Separation of Powers provision of the Utah Constitution. We hold that the Commission as currently constituted violates Article V, section 1 of the Constitution.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 66 Gannon v. Park City Board of Education, Case No. 940300027 CV., was filed by the parent of a student who was expelled from school for possession of a gun on school grounds, seeking reinstatement of the student in school. Judge Young was assigned the case during two different time periods. Before presiding over the case the second time, Judge Young had an ex parte communication with the attorney for the school district and allegedly threatened to award attorney fees to the plaintiffs and against the district' if the district attempted to undertake further punitive action against the student. The attorney fee issue was settled by the parties after Judge Young was reassigned the case. The school district alleged, however, that Judge Young had coerced the settlement through his threat of awarding attorney fees against the district. The district superintendent filed an official complaint with the Judicial Conduct Commission, accusing Judge Young of “direct extortion ... to secure an agreement from the [Park City] Board [of Education].”
¶ 67 The Commission scheduled a formal hearing. Judge Young moved to disqualify from participating in the panel all members of the Commission appointed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the *600House. The Commission denied the motion, and a formal hearing was conducted by a panel of six members of the Commission. Three of the six panel members were members of the Utah State Legislature. The Commission found that Judge Young had engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and recommended a public reprimand as the appropriate discipline. Judge Young filed objections to the Commission’s findings. The Commission denied these objections and certified the record to this Court.
¶ 68 Judge Young attacks numerous findings of fact by the Commission. In addition, he contends that the composition of the Judicial Conduct Commission violates principles of separation of powers established by Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution.
¶ 69 Article VIII, section 13 of the Utah Constitution requires this Court to review all proceedings conducted by the Judicial Conduct Commission and to approve any proposed sanction before a sanction may be imposed against a judge. See In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 862-63 (Utah 1996); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-30(5). The issue of whether the Judicial Conduct Commission is lawfully constituted under Article V, section 1 and Article VIII, section 13 raises an issue of law which requires no deference by this Court to the Commission’s rulings. See In re Worthen, 926 P.2d at 862-63.
¶ 70 The Legislature established the Judicial Conduct Commission pursuant to the terms of the Judicial Article of the Utah Constitution, Article VIII, section 13.1 This provision authorizes the Commission to investigate and conduct confidential hearings concerning complaints against judges. The Commission may recommend to this Court sanctions such as a reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or compulsory retirement of judges found to have engaged' in improper conduct.2
¶ 71 Section 13 also provides that the Legislature shall “provide for the composition and procedures of the Judicial Conduct Commission.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-27(1) provides:
The membership of the Judicial Conduct Commission established by Article VIII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution consists of:
(a) two members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the speaker of the House of Representatives for a two-year term, not more than one of whom may be of the same political party as the speaker;
(b) two members of the Senate to be appointed by the president of the Senate for a two-year term, not more than one of *601whom may be of the same political party as the president;
(e) three members from the board of commissioners of the Utah State Bar who shall be appointed by the board of commissioners of the Utah State Bar for a four-year term;
(d) two persons not members of the Utah State Bar, who shall be appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for four-year terms, not more than one of which may be of the same political party as the governor; and
(e) one judge of a trial court of record, to be selected by the Judicial Conduct Commission for a four-year term.
¶ 72 Judge Young contends that subsections (a) and (b) of section 78-7-27(1) violate Article V, section 1 of the Constitution. He submits two grounds for this challenge. He argues that (1) Article V, section 1 prohibits the Legislature from appointing members of the Judicial Conduct Commission and (2) Article V, section 1 bars individual legislators from sitting as members of the Commission. We address each ground in turn.
II. ARTICLE V, SECTION 1 AND THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMISSION
A. Constitutionality of the Power of the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate to Appoint Members of the Judicial Conduct Commission
¶ 73 Article V, section 1 provides:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others, except in cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
¶ 74 The doctrine of separation of powers has been viewed historically as an essential principle in the protection of individual rights and liberties and in the prevention of the abuse of governmental power. “The framers of [Utah’s] Constitution considered the principle embodied in Article Y, section 1 to be of such importance that they wrote that provision to prevent its erosion by implication, strained constructions, or any means which would have the effect of enfeebling that great, overarching principle of constitutional government.” Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674, 689-90 (Utah 1982) (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting) (Matheson I)3
¶ 76 Unlike the federal Constitution and the constitutions of many states, the Utah Constitution includes a written separation of powers provision, and that provision has a degree of specificity that is greater than is found in most state constitutions that have a separation of powers provision.4 Separation of powers in the federal system, for example, is mandated merely by implication from the general structure of the United States Constitution. As a result, the United States Supreme Court can be more flexible and less specific in establishing the federal doctrine’s outer boundaries. See Lawrence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 18, 19 (2d ed.1987) (noting greater latitude in current judicial interpretations of the doctrine since the late nineteenth century). By contrast, interpretations of the Utah doctrine by this Court must conform to the express language *602employed by the Constitution in Article Y, section 1 in delineating the principles that specify how the doctrine of separation of powers should be applied.
¶ 76 Article V, section 1 goes far beyond simply proscribing the exercise of the power of one branch by another.5 The Utah provision also prohibits officials in one branch from exercising powers properly belonging to another branch. Moreover, by requiring the separation of powers among the branches of government, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution itself, Article V, section 1 preserves the sanctity of the judiciary and helps to ensure that the rule of law, and not political partisanship or transient majoritari-an preferences, shall govern in our courts. The legislative and executive branches, both of which are staffed through popular elections, are naturally attuned to the volatile opinions of voters, evolving moral standards, and shifting economic forces. Adherence to the impartial rule of law, so crucial to our system of government, can prevail only if the judiciary is able to apply the rule of law free from partisan influence.
¶77 “[A] direct or indirect influence of either of the other branches over the judiciary through the' power of appointment, by itself or in conjunction with other powers, is coercive and undermines the independent functioning of the judiciary.” Matheson I, 641 P.2d at 681 (Howe, J., concurring). Without judicial independence,
the whole fundamental concept of a tripartite system of government with coequal and coordinate branches of government, as well as our deep-rooted tradition of limiting the powers of government by a written constitution, would be jeopardized, if not destroyed.
Matheson II, 657 P.2d at 247 (Stewart, J., concurring). Other provisions of the Constitution combine with and give specific effect to the doctrine underlying Article V to assure that the exercise of governmental power shall be based on the rule of law and not caprice. See Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”); id. § 11 (guaranteeing that “every person, for an injury done him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay”).
¶ 78 Article V, section 1 prohibits the officials of one branch of government from exercising those functions of government that properly belong to another branch. See Timpanogos Planning, 690 P.2d at 567. In addition, one branch may not delegate its functions or powers to another branch. See Salt-Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 848 (Utah 1994) (enumerating cases in which functions or powers were held to be nondele-gable). The essential function of the legislative branch of government, as a general proposition, “is to enact laws of general applicability, to provide normative standards of conduct for society and to provide for the organization and operation of the government.” Matheson I, 641 P.2d at 686 (Stewart, J., concurring and dissenting). More precisely, the Legislature “possesses all lawmaking power not denied it by the Utah or the United States Constitutions, [but] it does not possess all the powers of government.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also 16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 262 (1998).
¶ 79 Article VII of the Constitution vests in the executive branch the general power to appoint officers whose positions are established under the Constitution. See Rampton v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 383, 464 P.2d 378, 381 (1970); see also Matheson I, 641 P.2d at 678 (stating that the separation of powers provisions of Article V, section 1 protects the executive’s appointment power).6 In Ramp-*603ton, the Court stated that the issue to be decided was, “Can the Legislature reserve unto itself or confer upon its presiding officers, the power of appointment?” 464 P.2d at 380. That is also the precise issue in the instant case. Rampton held that a statute that authorized both the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House to appoint three members of the State Board of Higher Education violated Article V, section 1. Id. at 383. In Rampton, this Court quoted Opinion of the Justices, 302 Mass. 605, 19 N.E.2d 807 (1939):
We are of the opinion, however, that the power of appointing such members cannot be conferred by law upon the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, whether or not such members are required to be chosen from among the members of the Senate and of the House. “The power to appoint and the poiver to remove officers are in their nature executive powers.”
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 80 The principle on which Rampton was based governs here. Subsections (a) and (b) of Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-27(1) permit both the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate to appoint two members of the Judicial Conduct Commission. By vesting in these legislative officers the power to appoint officials exercising judicial power, the Legislature authorized a breach of the principle that one branch of government may not exercise the power of another branch absent a specific constitutional provision authorizing the exercise of such power.
¶ 81 The Commission argues that the language in Article VIII, section 13 of the Constitution, which provides that “[t]he Legislature by statute shall provide for the composition and procedures of the Judicial Conduct Commission,” specifically authorizes the Legislature to make appointments to the Commission. This Court has previously rejected that argument. See Matheson II, 657 P.2d at 245 (Stewart, J., stating majority view in “concurring” opinion); Rampton, 464 P.2d at 380; see also Matheson I, 641 P.2d at 680-81 (Howe, J., concurring). Indeed, this Court has specifically held that even when the Legislature is given the power by the Constitution “to provide by law” for the appointment of officials, that merely means that the Legislature has the power to provide for how appointments should be made, but not that the Legislature itself may make such appointments. Matheson II, 657 P.2d at 245 (Stewart, J., concurring). The power “to provide by law, for the appointment of officials does not include the power to make appointments to positions in the executive and judicial departments.” Id. Because Article VIII, section 13 does not “expressly direct!] or provide!]” for the Legislature or legislative officers to exercise the power of appointment to the Judicial Conduct Commission, that language of Article VIII, section 13 does not fall within the exception to Article V, section 1 that allows one government branch to exercise the powers of another. Consistent with what this Court held in Rampton, the Legislature may not “usurp any of the functions confided by the constitution to [another] department, such as the power to make appointments to office.” Rampton,.464 P.2d at 380 (quotations omitted); see also Matheson I, 641 P.2d 674 (Utah 1982).
B. Competence of Legislators to Sit as Members of the Judicial Conduct Commission
¶ 82 Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-27(l)(a) and (b), two members of the Judicial Conduct Commission are appointed from the House of Representatives and two members are appointed from the Senate. Judge Young argues that the Commission performs a judicial function and that § 78-7-27(l)(a) and (b), in providing that legislators may sit as members of the Commission, allows legislators to exercise both legislative and judicial functions contrary to the prohibition of Article V, section 1. We agree.
¶ 83 Article V, section 1 precludes legislators from serving as members of the Commission. Article V, section 1 provides that “no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the others.” (Em*604phasis added.) The language of this provision is plain and must be interpreted “as it would be understood by persons of ordinary intelligence and experience.” State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 938 (Utah 1975).
¶84 The Judicial Conduct Commission plays a highly important, albeit not a determinative, role in the administration of judicial discipline by investigating and conducting confidential hearings regarding complaints against justices and judges. Consequently, the Commission exercises a type of judicial authority and operates within the judicial branch of government. See 16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 260 (1998). Necessarily, the judicial branch has the power “ ‘necessary to protect [its] fundamental integrity’ ” and that power may not be delegated, except to judicial officers. Ohms, 881 P.2d at 849 (quoting In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 642 (Utah 1988)).
¶ 85 Indeed, it is the judicial article itself, Article VIII, section 13, that establishes the Judicial Conduct Commission and specifically recognizes the judicial nature of the powers the Commission is authorized to exercise by mandating that this Court review all Commission findings pertaining to recommended discipline of judges and by requiring that actual orders of discipline be entered by the Court, not the Commission. See Utah Const, art. VIII, § 13; In re Worthen, 926 P.2d at 863. Other jurisdictions have also held judicial conduct commissions with similar authority to be within the judicial branch. See Whitehead v. Nevada Comm. on Jud. Discipline, 110 Nev. 874, 878 P.2d 913 (1994) (holding that executive branch prosecution of disciplinary charges against a judge violated the separation of powers provision in the Nevada Constitution, a provision identical to Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution).7
¶ 86 Any attempt by the Legislature, therefore, to make judicial discipline subject to the influence of legislators could threaten “ ‘the fundamental integrity of the judicial branch.’ ” Ohms, 881 P.2d at 867 (Durham, J., and Zimmerman, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 642 (Utah 1988)); see id. at 850; see also Matheson I, 641 P.2d at 681 (Howe, J., concurring) (“[A] direct or indirect influence of either of the other branches over the judiciary ... is coercive and undermines the independent functioning of the judiciary.”); 16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 260 (1998); ABA Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline and Disability Retirement, Standard 2.1 (1978).
¶ 87 Moreover, no branch of government should be able to control or even to embarrass another branch. See Matheson I, 641 P.2d at 681 (Howe, J., concurring); State v. Shumaker, 200 Ind. 716, 164 N.E. 408, 409, 63 A.L.R. 218, 221 (1928). Of course any disciplinary sanction recommended against a judge will undoubtedly embarrass that judge. But that is not the point of the proposition that one branch of government should not be able to embarrass another branch. What is to be strictly protected from embarrassment in this case is the integrity of judicial discipline from any politically partisan influence, indeed, even the appearance of such an influence. The participation of members of the legislative branch in the highly sensitive area of judicial discipline has the distinct possibility of embarrassing the judicial branch by *605interjecting the potential of partisan influence in the disciplinary process, with the potential effect of altering the thinking and actions of judges in cases over which they preside. Thus, even though the Commission’s recommended sanctions are not self-executing, a high barrier must insulate commission proceedings from any kind of partisan political influence. Having made this point, we emphasize, however, that our reasoning rests solely on general policy considerations and not on the conduct of legislators who have heretofore sat on the Commission. It is constitutional policy with which we are concerned here, not personalities.
¶88 Finally, we note that one of the great constitutional checks and balances is the power of the Legislature to impeach judges and executive officials. See Utah Const, art. VI, §§ 17-19. However, the existence of the impeachment process does not in any way lessen the need for strict adherence to the dictates of Article V, section 1 as that provision applies to legislative participation in the composition and administration of the Judicial Conduct Commission.
II. .
¶ 89 We conclude that § 78-7-27(l)(a) and (b) violates Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution. Because the composition of the Commission was unconstitutional, the findings, conclusions, and order of the Commission are null and void.
¶ 90 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM and Justice RUSSON concur in Justice STEWART’S opinion.. The Court withdrew the July 10 opinion from official publication, pending the disposition of a petition for rehearing. The Court's July 10 opinion is appended to this opinion and will be cited as "Original op.”
. In addition to legislative members appointed from the House and the Senate, subsection (1) of section 78-7-27 provides that the membership of the Commission shall be composed of three members from the Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, two persons appointed by the Governor who are not members of the Bar, and one judge of a trial court of record "to be selected by the nonjudicial members of the Judicial Conduct Commission.” Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-27(l)(e). The judge of a trial court of record (and an alternate judge) can be selected by the remaining members of the Commission so as to give effect to the legislative intent and allow the Judicial Conduct Commission to act with the six members necessary under § 78-7-27(6) to constitute a quorum. Under that provision, "[a]ny action of a majority of the quorum constitutes the action of the Commission."
. The impeachment powers granted the Legislature, including the power to impeach a judicial officer, are embodied in Article VI, sections 17-20 of the Utah Constitution. While found in the legislative article, these sections are an express constitutional grant of judicial authority to the Legislature and form part of the checks and balances between governmental departments found in the Utah Constitution.
. As this Court noted in Worthen, the Judicial Conduct Commission, prior to 1985, was basically a nonfunctional entity. "Although the Commission has been in existence in one form or another for some twenty-three years, it has not been particularly visible. Its level of appropriations was initially very low, and as a consequence, it had to malte do with a one-person, part-time staff charged with all administrative functions.” 926 P.2d at 858. The Commission initially received only a $3,500 appropriation. In 1985, $12,000 was appropriated. Thereafter the Commission's annual appropriation ranged from $12,000 to $32,000 until July 1995. See id. at 858 n. 2.
. Article VIII, section 13 of the Utah Constitution provides:
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established which shall investigate and conduct confidential hearings regarding complaints against any justice or judge. Following its investigations and hearings, the Judicial Conduct Commission may order the reprimand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary retirement of any justice or judge for the following:
(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct in office;
(2) final conviction of a crime punishable as a felony under state or federal law;
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties;
(4) disability that seriously interferes with the performance of judicial duties; or
(5) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute.
Prior to the implementation of any commission order, the Supreme Court shall review the commission’s proceedings as to both law and fact. The court may also permit the introduction of additional evidence. After its review, the Supreme Court shall, as it finds just and proper, issue its order implementing, rejecting, or modifying the commission's order. The Legislature by statute shall provide for the composition and procedures of the Judicial Conduct Commission.
The judicial article was rewritten in 1984. 1984 Utah Laws S.J.R. 1. Prior to the revision, Article VIII did not provide for a judicial conduct commission. Rather, the former section 11 of Article VIII provided that judges could "be removed from office by the concurrent vote of both houses of the Legislature, each voting separately.” Utah Const, art. VIII, § 11 (1971).
. "[Wjhile the constitution speaks of the Commission’s entering an ’order,’ that term is a misnomer, ... because the Commission’s order has no effect whatsoever unless it is first reviewed by this court and this court determines to enforce it.” In re Worthen, 926 P.2d at 862.
. Matheson I held that a statute providing for the Legislature’s participation in nominating candidates for judicial office and requiring Senate approval of the Governor’s appointment of the candidate selected amounted to effective control by the Legislature and was therefore offensive to Article V, section 1. This case was followed by Matheson v. Ferry, 657 P.2d 240 (Utah 1982) (per curiam) (Matheson II), which held that senatorial confirmation of gubernatorial judicial appointments, in addition to judicial retention elections, violated the Utah Constitution. Matheson II preceded the 1984 revision to the judicial article of the Constitution. Article VIII, section 8 now expressly permits the Senate to confirm judges appointed to courts of record by the Governor.
. Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Maryland, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin do not expressly provide in their constitutions for a separation of powers among the three branches of government. See Timpanogos Planning & Water Mgt. Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy Dist., 690 P.2d 562, 565 n. 2 (Utah 1984).
. "[T]he doctrine of separation of powers is the control gate harnessing the reservoir of powers of a government which functions at the will of the people.” Timpanogos Planning, 690 P.2d at 565.
. The executive branch’s appointment power is not exclusive, however. Each branch of government possesses the inherent power to appoint its own "agents, clerks, and ministers engaged in the work pertaining to such branch of government.” Rampton, 464 P.2d at 383. "[F]or,” as stated in Rampton, “to allow the executive to appoint the officers necessary to the carrying out of the functions of an independent branch or division of government would prevent that division from being independent.” Id.
. In support of its position, the Commission cites In re Commission on Judicial Tenure & Discipline, 670 A.2d 1232 (R.I.1996). Some members of the Rhode Island Commission on Judicial Tenure and Discipline also served as members of the Rhode Island Legislature. The Rhode Island Supreme Court was evenly divided on the issue of whether the composition of the Commission violated the Rhode Island constitutional separation of powers provision. Given the equal division of the court on that critical issue, the court decided the case solely on the basis that the statute providing for the composition of the Commission was presumed to be constitutional. Therefore, this case does not support the Judicial Conduct Commission’s position in the instant case. Indeed, given the language of Article V, section 1 of the Utah Constitution that no person charged with exercising the powers of one department of government "shall exercise any functions appertaining to either of the other” departments, which does not appear in the Rhode Island constitutional separation of powers provision, there can be little doubt that the Rhode Island Supreme Court would have held that the Rhode Island Commission was illegally constituted had the Rhode Island Constitution contained language similar to the Utah provision.