dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion concludes that Norton tendered “insufficient” evidence to support a finding that the road running through Holcomb’s property was used continuously by the Marble Company for 20 years so as to entitle him to a prescriptive easement as the successor in interest of the Marble Company. I disagree.
As set forth in the majority opinion, Norton’s own 2006 affidavit sets forth (1) that Norton (who was 55, having been born in 1951) grew up and lived his entire life near the properties in question, thus establishing his personal knowledge of the use of the roadway in question; (2) that he was very familiar with the roadway in question; (3) that he “personally knew that this Marble Company Road had always been used as the means of access to such land”; (4) that based on his personal observations, the Marble Company and its representatives had continually used the roadway as the access road to the property until it was sold to him in 2003; and (5) that since his purchase, he had so used the roadway himself on a continuous basis. Norton also produced aerial maps showing the markings of the roadway over 50 years to back up his testimony. Thus, we have direct evidence that the road was continuously used for over 20 years by the Marble Company and its representatives (and then by the successor-in-interest Norton), and thus an issue of fact was created as to this matter.
I disagree with the majority’s discounting this concise testimony as conclusory and unsupported by substantiating fact or circumstances. It is true that, as stated in Keene v. Herstam,33 “an affidavit which is conclusory and is unsupported by substantiating fact or circumstances is insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Here, however, as in Keene, supra, the affiant Norton set forth substantiating facts and circumstances; he gave direct testimony that over his lifetime he had observed the continuous use of the road by the Marble Company and its representatives and that he had so used the road himself to access the Marble Company land. Norton may not have listed each day and time when such occurred, but such *89is not required, as specific detail goes to the weight, not the competence of the testimony. See McLean v. Clark34 (“That it does not sufficiently go into details; that it is general; that the witness states, as facts, which other parts of the testimony show he was mistaken in, or did not know that these or like objections may be charged against it, are objections to its weight and not to its competency”).
Decided March 29, 2007 Reconsideration denied April 13, 2007 William A. Neel, Jr., for appellant. Downey & Cleveland, George L. Welborn, Elizabeth H. Brabham, for appellee.Significantly, when Holcomb took Norton’s deposition, Holcomb carefully avoided asking for the specifics of Norton’s observations. See McLean, supra (“True, he might, when questioned, go into greater detail, and it is the power of the other side to push the inquiry into those details”). We should hardly reward Holcomb for her coyness by now saying that insufficient specifics have been identified to substantiate Norton’s clear testimony.
The question therefore is whether we can simply ignore Norton’s testimony of his personal observations of continuous use and the 50-year-old aerial maps which showed such usage. The majority concludes that we can. I disagree. “Affidavit testimony must speak for itself. On summary judgment it is inappropriate for this Court to weigh evidence or determine its credibility.” (Punctuation omitted.) Walden v. Burke.35 To reject this testimony on the basis that Norton has given insufficient details is a classic case of weighing testimony.
This is a summary judgment case. We must construe the record, including all inferences, in favor of the nonmovant Norton. In this context, I cannot say that Norton has produced insufficient evidence of continuous use. Accordingly, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews and Presiding Judge Smith join in this dissent.
Keene v. Herstam, 225 Ga. App. 115, 117 (1) (483 SE2d 335) (1997).
McLean v. Clark, 47 Ga. 24, 67 (1) (1872).
Walden v. Burke, 282 Ga. App. 154, 156 (2) (637 SE2d 859) (2006).