with whom RABINOWITZ, Chief Justice, joins, dissenting.
I believe the trial court abused its discretion in this case; that the court’s decision to award sole custody to Constance Holl was based on an impermissible factor;1 and that the court improperly weighed other factors in making its determination. See Julsen v. Julsen, 741 P.2d 642, 649 (Alaska 1987); McClain v. McClain, 716 P.2d 381, 384 (Alaska 1986).
In his oral findings of fact, Judge Michal-ski suggests that the decision not to award shared custody at least partially rested on his opinion that greater stability is achieved for children, in general, when a single parent has custody. See Majority Op. at 381. He stated that
it’s important, I think, for children to have a place. To be constantly buffeted back and forth is not wholesome, no matter how much it may be done, and that equality of time together is not the cross upon which children should be crucified. They need to have stability, a sense of place, along with a meaningful relationship with both parents.
Id. This statement demonstrates a specific bias, contrary to the presumption favoring shared custody,2 which is sufficient to war*384rant a remand for reconsideration. Johnson, 564 P.2d at 76; Carle, 503 P.2d at 1055.
The lack of sufficient evidence that shared custody should not be preferred, however, leads me to believe that we should reverse. The trial court weighed its findings of fact against the recommendation of the court custody investigator, Yeo-tis, and a record of over two years of successful joint custody which even Constance had found agreeable.3 Giving proper weight to the presumption in favor of shared custody, the trial court erred by denying shared custody on this record.
The majority lists six “incidents of noncooperation.” Majority Op. at 381. These incidents suggest non-cooperation related to the divorce proceedings, not child rearing. While evidence of non-cooperation that is unrelated to child rearing can be relevant, the degree of relevancy depends upon the inference that such non-cooperation would extend to the welfare of the children.4 In the case at bar, there is no indication that the parents had failed to cooperate in regard to decisions regarding the children’s upbringing. Roger actually exhibited a willingness to defer to Constance on important issues. Yeotis confirmed the ability of the parents to cooperate with regard to the children.
The trial court also mentions, in its Findings of Fact on Remand, a potential danger of emotional and physical abuse by Roger towards his children. If the court was convinced of its conclusions concerning abuse, it would have favored restricting Roger’s unsupervised physical custody of the children. Instead, Judge Michalski stated that he would be agreeable to equal physical custody, even though, following the court’s reasoning, physical custody of the father could create undue concern for the children’s emotional or physical welfare.5 The court’s broad endorsement of physical custody by Roger, demonstrates that the court did not consider there to be an actual threat to the children. Without such a threat, it was clearly erroneous to weigh this factor against Roger.6
For the above reasons, I would reverse the custody decree and remand with directions to fashion a joint custody arrangement.
. See Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71, 76 (Alaska 1977) (tender years doctrine); Carle v. Carle, 503 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Alaska 1972) (benefit of assimilation into dominant culture).
. See An Act Relating to Child Custody, ch. 88, § 1(a), SLA 1982:
(a) The legislature finds that it is generally desirable to assure a minor child frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage and that it is in the public interest to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing. While actual physical custody may not be practical or appropriate in all cases, it is the intent of the legislature that both parents have the opportunity to guide and nurture their child and to meet the needs of the child on an equal footing beyond the considerations of support or actual custody.
Id. (emphasis added); Bell v. Bell, 794 P.2d 97, 99 (Alaska 1990) (legislative intent "favors joint legal custody, regardless of the physical custody arrangement”). AS 25.20.090(3) requires that the court consider "the stability of the home environment likely to be offered by each parent.” Judge Michalski’s preference towards single parent custody also runs contrary to this statutory mandate.
. Constance went on to state that "Roger has— in all fairness, he has spent a lot of time with the boys in this past year and done a lot, and they have adjusted to his home more, and — and we are reaching that point. So, as long as we are in the same community, I like the equal time.”
. See AS 25.24.150(d) ("[i]n awarding custody the court may consider only those factors that directly affect the well-being of the child"); see also In re Moore’s Marriage, 531 P.2d 995, 997 (Colo.1975) (mother living with man to whom she was not married was imposition of courts own standard, and was not conduct relating to the welfare of the children).
. The court stated that “if the parties are able to work it out so that it continues to be one week and one week, that is a certain kind of parent wisdom that they may have the right to exercise over their children."
.The record contains only two examples of what allegedly is the use of excessive force against the children. The first was that Roger had used a belt to discipline one of the children. The second, that Roger had pushed one of the children to the ground.
Neither of these examples, taken alone, establishes that Roger is a danger to the children or even that he disciplines them too harshly. Beyond this, the conduct found relevant to the trial court relates more to problems in the spousal relationship than to problems between the father and his children.