(dissenting).
I dissent in the belief an affirmance is clearly demanded by our holding in State ex rel. Turner v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 186 N.W.2d 141 (Iowa 1971) (hereinafter Highway Commission). And I am convinced the majority rejects the sounder view of item veto as a limited legislative function given the executive branch of state government as a developed part of an over-all scheme of checks and balances. In all respect, I submit it offends both the rule of stare decisis and the promise of better and more effective state government to seize on dictum in Highway Commission in order to retreat from its clear holding. Regrettably we thereby readopt a 19th century view of separation of state governmental powers which is wholly inadequate for the current needs of effective government.1
I.Item veto should be interpreted in the light of the obvious and simple truth that no branch of government can function in any capacity without expenditure of public funds.2 Therefore under the better view an item veto power is given at least in part to provide for carefully limited executive participation in appropriation matters. Under the majority view the item veto is rendered quite meaningless.
It need not be so. ' In spite of the majority attempts to distinguish them, cases from other states recognize the logic supporting our holding in Highway Commission. State ex rel. Brown v. Ferguson, 32 Ohio St.2d 245, 291 N.E.2d 434 (1972); Dickson v. Saiz, 62 N.M. 227, 308 P.2d 205 (1957); Green v. Rawls, 122 So.2d 10 (Fla.1960); State ex rel. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Henry, 218 Wis. 302, 260 N.W. 486. In Highway Commission we clearly established the following principles:
1. An “item” in an appropriation measure is the same as a “part” or “parts” thereof.
2. Although it can be exercised only in appropriation bills it is not limited to matters therein which appropriate money.
3. That which is vetoed must be a complete legislative idea, conceptually if not grammatically, which is capable of standing alone as legislation. Fractionalized concepts such as the word “not” do not qualify.
4. That which remains must constitute complete and workable legislation. There must be no “scar tissue.”
*7165. While we are committed to the liberal view to preserve the purpose of the item veto amendment, the authority granted the Governor thereby is not without limit. Plaintiffs have suggested in argument examples reductio ad absurdum in which item veto power might be exceeded. Such examples would amount to deceit or trickery by which a governor would change an appropriation measure for personal gain or selfish interest. Such examples however are presented in the arguments and not in the facts before us.
II. Our holding in Highway Commission stands before centuries of constitutional principles on separation of governmental powers. The parties do not dispute these underlying principles. But it is appropriate to mention them because of their crucial bearing upon the question presented.
The Iowa Constitution, in common with the constitutions of all 50 states, generates a scheme of government modeled after the federal system. Item veto power, given to 43 of the governors in the United States in appropriation matters, is more extensive than that accorded the President under Article I, § 7 of the United States Constitution. The President must approve or disapprove an appropriation bill in its entirety. H. Black, Constitutional Law, § 67 (Third Ed. 1910); Muyskens, Item Veto Amendment to the Iowa Constitution, 18 Drake L.Rev. 245. However the concept of executive veto, as envisioned in the Iowa Constitution, was borrowed from the federal plan. For that reason we can look to the development of the somewhat more limited presidential veto power in order to more fully understand plaintiffs’ challenge.
The delegates to the federal constitutional convention perceived executive veto of legislation as a part of a system of checks and balances. The idea was borrowed from the constitutions of the states under the Articles of Confederation. The Federalist Number 73 (Hamilton). Our system of checks and balances is, in turn, an adjunct of the concept of separation of powers. It is the cornerstone and genius of our form of government: “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” The Federalist, Number 47 (Madison). The concept was perhaps first envisioned by Montesquieu and was claimed to exist under the English Constitution. Blackstone’s Commentaries Bk. I, chapter 2, § 2. The result is commonly thought to be “ * * * a form of government more peculiarly adapted to the nature of the human animal than anything devised before or since.” Forrest McDonald, E Pluribus Unum — The Formation of the American Republic 1776-1790 (1965).
The separation of powers concept permeates all ideas and rules which relate to the American system of government. It is directly and expressly inscribed in the Iowa Constitution:
“The powers of the government of Iowa shall be divided into three separate departments — the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial: and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any function appertaining to either of the others, except in cases hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.” Art. Ill, § 1.
Second in importance only to the concept which separates the powers of government among three co-equal branches of government is a corollary which ultimately should control the disposition of this appeal. Of practical necessity the three branches, by a system of checks and balances, should “be so far connected and blended as to give each a constitutional control over the others * * The Federalist, Number 48 (Madison). Executive veto proceeds from this practical necessity.
Another fundamental truth bears on the submission. Enshrined in the Declaration of Independence is the belief all just governmental power is derived “from the con*717sent of the governed.” This belief was even then considered to be of ancient origin. Sabine & Thorson, A History of Political Theory (Fourth Ed. 1973), page 201. The principle had been previously stated:
“The powers of kings and magistrates is nothing else, but what is only derivative, transferred and committed to them in trust from the people, to the common good of them all, in whom the power yet remains fundamentally, and cannot be taken from them without a violation of their natural birthright.” Works of John Milton, Volume V, page 10.
Authority for an item veto is undergirded by these principles. A healthy tension between, and obvious need for accommodation among, the three branches of government results from the powers separately conferred upon them. Such powers do not in fact belong to any branch, either under the federal system or in any state system modeled after it. This suit should not be considered a struggle for personal power. It is important to remember the powers exercised by any branch of our government remain with the people.
III. It is important also to remember the item veto amendment was not worded so as to make it a second class provision of our constitution. The amendment was adopted by the people out of their desire to adjust the healthy tension between the legislative and executive branches of our state government. We can assume the people must have considered the tension to have theretofore been out of balance. No one disputes the “purse string power” of the legislature. But the power invested in any branch of government by our constitution is subject to other express provisions. Article III, § 1, Iowa Constitution. The item veto amendment is such an express provision and should not be rendered impotent on the claim its exercise infringes a right of another branch of government. The item veto provision is inscribed in the same constitution by which the people organize all three branches of government. This truth was even conceded by the Mississippi Court in Colbert v. State, 86 Miss. 769, 775, 39 So. 65, 66, quoted by the majority and which the majority characterizes as the “classic statement”: “ * * * without restriction or diminution except as provided by their Constitutions, * * *.” (Emphasis added).
In his veto messages the Governor expressed the view the legislature was in fact invading the province of the executive branch by what he considered misuse of purse string power. Executive decisions in the form of administration hiring policies, for example, were the subject of certain of the challenged vetoes. The majority summarily dismisses the Governor’s claim with the unsupported assertion the power is inherent in the legislature, but is limited at some line the opinion does not draw and which I cannot discern. The effect in this case is to subject internal operations of executive departments to control of another branch. The Governor’s claim points up the soundness of the holding in Highway Commission. With limited participation by the executive branch in such matters the Governor could assert the position of the executive branch. Such assertion. would of course be subject to override.
We need not and should not arrogate to ourselves any standing to pass upon the practical effectiveness of the ultimate power of the legislature to override a veto. Plaintiffs deny its effectiveness. The vote required to override executive veto is a part of our scheme of government. Its effectiveness is not for us to measure. But it is appropriate for us to observe a power exists in the legislature to override a veto, including an item veto, by a two-thirds vote. Under the 1974 amendment the power exists in the legislature to call itself into session for such a purpose. Article III, § 2, Iowa Constitution.
Ultimately all branches of government are checked by the final power in representative government. Each branch regularly answers and accounts for its doings to the people.
*718IV. Finally I believe the majority opinion is wrong in renouncing Highway Commission’s definition of separability. The trial court rightly described the proper rule:
“ * * * [T]he Governor’s power of item veto extends at least to provisions which are separable from an appropriation bill. Clearly, separability means that the vetoed provisions and the remainder of the bill contain ideas and concepts capable of standing on their own. The idea and concept of the provision which is vetoed must be in some manner complete in itself, as must the remainder of the bill. Viewed in this light, the yetoed provisions and the remainder of the bills here in question in each case contain two separate, and therefore separable, ideas. They contain appropriations for specified purposes, and directions that funds not be used for other specified purposes.”
I do not believe the Governor’s authority as recognized in Highway Commission should be barred by specific draftsmanship in drawing the bill. Specific draftsmanship is the practice of scrambling the words which express a complete and otherwise separable legislative idea throughout an appropriation bill. In determining separability the Governor should be able to look to legislative concepts and should not be denied the exercise of an item veto because an appropriation bill gathers together words which define separate concepts. Such concepts would be subject to executive veto if unattached to an appropriation bill. To hold specific draftsmanship an effective means of blocking the power of item veto throws out of balance the powers of the separate branches of government. It was for that reason we expressly adopted a statement in Highway Commission. We said:
“An excellent and exhaustive treatise on the item veto amendment to the Iowa Constitution is'found in Volume 18, Drake Law Review, at page 245. At page 250, the author was moved to observe,
“ "It would seem probable that should the Iowa Legislature attempt to coerce the Governor into approving a lump sum appropriation by combining purpose and amount, the court would interpret the term “item” liberally to preserve the purpose of the item veto amendment.”
“The observation of the author of the Law Review article above referred to was indeed prophetic. We do adopt such an interpretation of the term ‘item’, and conclude that section 5 of H.F. 823 was an item subject to gubernatorial item veto.” 186 N.W.2d at 152.
Our formal adoption of the liberal interpretation of the term “item” was clear enough at the time. We took the trouble to quote with approval extensively from State ex rel. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. Henry, supra, including the following:
“ ‘ * * * [Tjhere is nothing in that [constitutional] provision which warrants the inference or conclusion that the Governor’s power of partial veto was not intended to be as coextensive as the Legislature’s power to join and enact separable pieces of legislation in an appropriation bill. As the Legislature can do that in this state, there are reasons why the Governor should have a coextensive power of partial veto, to enable him to pass, in the exercise of his quasi legislative function, on each separable piece of legislation or law on its own merits. * * *.’ ” (Emphasis added). 186 N.W.2d at 152.
We should reject plaintiffs’ suggestion the single-subject provision of our constitution renders Henry inapplicable. Our single-subject provision operates in such a way as to subject our Governor to much the same difficulty in veto matters as existed in Wisconsin under Henry. Long v. Board of Supervisors, 258 Iowa 1278, 1285-1286, 142 N.W.2d 378, 382-383. This is not to say the single-subject provision is meaningless. It is however insufficient to protect a governor in veto matters to the extent of providing a basis to distinguish our rule from Wisconsin’s.
*719Under the majority opinion an item veto can be exercised only at sufferance of the legislature. The power to exercise it would arise only in the unlikely event an appropriation bill would be so carelessly drafted as to omit the litany which the majority holds converts a distinct legislative idea into a purpose or proviso. The check given by the people to the executive branch is thereby surrendered to the very branch the people intended to be checked.
I would affirm.
REYNOLDSON, J., joins this dissent.
. For discussion of ineffective state executives in the 19th century see generally Leslie Lipson, The American Governor from Figurehead to Leader (Chicago, 1939) pages 47-63; The Development of the American Constitution, Loren P. Beth (1971) pages 72-78.
. Cf. O’Coin’s Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester et al., 287 N.E.2d 608, 612 (Mass. 1972). A court as a branch of government has inherent power to obtain required goods and services, even in the absence of statute.