dissenting.
Our state constitution provides, in relevant part, that “no local *487or special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by an existing general law. . . Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV (a) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983. In my opinion, OCGA § 36-36-50 is a general law which limits annexation, whether by the municipality or the General Assembly, to contiguous areas. It follows that Ga. L. 1984, p. 5109, as a special law which annexes non-contiguous areas into the City of Fort Oglethorpe, is unconstitutional. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The intent of Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV is to insure that, after the General Assembly has entered a field by enacting a general law, that field then is reserved exclusively to general legislation and is not open to special or local laws. City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, 193 Ga. 618, 623 (1) (19 SE2d 508) (1942). “What the constitution seeks to do is to prevent the creation of special laws giving any one community any more rights or privileges than another. . . DeJarnette v. Hosp. Auth. of Albany, 195 Ga. 189, 202 (4) (23 SE2d 716) (1942). OCGA § 36-36-50 provides:
It is declared to be the intention of the General Assembly in enacting this article to provide a method for annexing to municipal corporations areas which meet the legislative standards established by Code Section 36-36-54. This article is not intended to affect or restrict the present authority of the General Assembly to legislate regarding the annexation of any area contiguous to any municipal corporation in this state, nor to limit in any way the authority of the General Assembly to provide alternative methods for extending municipal boundaries. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.) It is clear that this general law does not preclude the General Assembly from annexing areas into a municipality by local legislation. Ballentine v. Willingham, 237 Ga. 60 (1) (226 SE2d 593) (1976). The question is, however, whether OCGA § 36-36-50 precludes the annexation of non-contiguous areas into a municipality by local legislation. OCGA § 36-36-50 serves as a preclusion on the annexation of non-contiguous areas into a municipality by local legislation, if that statute constitutes a public policy determination that only contiguous areas may be annexed into a municipality.
The majority holds that OCGA § 36-36-50 cannot be construed as a preclusion on the General Assembly’s power to annex non-contiguous property into a municipality. However, the statute provides only that the authority granted to municipalities to annex contiguous areas does not divest the General Assembly of its power to do likewise. If the General Assembly considered its power to annex to be plenary, then there would be no necessity for the General Assembly *488to specify that its power to annex contiguous areas would be unaffected by OCGA § 36-36-50. The General Assembly would simply have stated that enactment of OCGA § 36-36-50 would not affect or restrict its plenary authority to legislate with regard to municipal annexation. It cannot be presumed that the General Assembly intended that the word “contiguous” as employed in OCGA § 36-36-50 be without meaning. Houston v. Lowes of Savannah, 235 Ga. 201, 203 (219 SE2d 115) (1975). While it is true that OCGA § 36-36-50 is merely a statement of the purpose of Art. VI of Title 36, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV of our constitution
Decided February 3, 1997. Minor, Bell & Neal, Stephen B. Farrow, for appellant. John O. Wiggins, for appellees. Walter E. Sumner, David G. Archer, James F. Grubiak, Ellis, Easterlin, Peagler, Gatewood & Skipper, James M. Skipper, Jr., Brinson, Askew, Berry, Seigler, Richardson & Davis, Robert M. Brinson, James D. Blitch TV, amici curiae.embraces every field and subject which has been covered, though superficially, by a general law. If such a law is not exhaustive and fails to reach every minute element of the subject dealt with, the remedy, and the only constitutional remedy for a more exhaustive legislative treatment, is by amendment of the general law by a general enactment.
City of Atlanta v. Hudgins, supra at 623 (1). OCGA § 36-36-50 covers the field or subject of annexation by the General Assembly and intimates that only contiguous areas are to be annexed. Accordingly, I believe that OCGA § 36-36-50 should be construed as a general law limiting the General Assembly to annexation of contiguous areas into municipalities by local laws. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s declaration that Ga. L. 1984, p. 5109 is an unconstitutional local law in contravention of OCGA § 36-36-50.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.