dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. As I understand appellant’s joinder argument, she contends that the charges were improperly consolidated for trial. I agree, and would reverse on this ground.
The general rule is that the trial judge has discretion to order separate charges to be tried together over the defendant’s objection where the offenses charged “are of the same general nature, involving connected transactions closely related in kind, place and character....”1 State v. Sullivan, 277 *380S.C. 35, 43, 282 S.E.2d 838, 843 (1981); cf., State v. Evans, 112 S.C. 43, 99 S.E. 751 (1919) (no abuse of discretion in trial judge’s denial of defendants’ motion to try two murder charges together). Once a court determines that charges may properly be joined, it must then consider whether it should decline to consolidate the claims in order to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Id. (joinder is improper where the defendant can demonstrate that his substantive rights would be violated by such a procedure); see also State v. Smith, 322 S.C. 107, 470 S.E.2d 364 (1996); State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974); McCrary v. State, 249 S.C. 14, 152 S.E.2d 235 (1967). As we have long recognized, “Circumstances might arise which would render a uniting of several counts unjust to the defendant.” City of Greenville v. Chapman, 210 S.C. 157, 162, 41 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1947). Even where joinder is permissible, the trial court must be mindful of protecting the defendant’s right to a fair trial because “[b]y the multiplication of distinct charges, the prisoner may be confounded in his defense, or prejudiced in his challenges, or the attention of the jury may be distracted.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
In this case, the first issue is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in finding a relationship sufficient to permit the State to try appellant on three charges at a single trial: the homicide of Parker Colson on January 4, 1993; the injury to Asher Maier discovered on June 23,1993; and the homicide of Ashlan Daniel on September 9, 1993. In my opinion, while these charges are of the same general nature, they do not involve “connected transactions closely related in kind, place and character” as these terms are defined by our case law. Crimes which do not arise out of a “single chain of circumstances” and which require “different evidence for proof’ “clearly fail[ ] to meet the requirements for consolidation.” State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 23, 339 S.E.2d 692, 693 (1986) (reversing where charges of rape and murder of one victim, rape and murder of a second victim the next day, and attempted robbery and assaults on the day after were consolidated for trial). I would hold the trial judge committed reversible error in allowing these three charges to be tried together over *381appellant’s objection, as they did not arise out of a single chain of circumstances and required different proof.2 Id.
I would reverse appellant’s convictions and remand the matter for further proceedings.
. I disagree with the majority that the test for joinder is the same as the standard for admitting prior bad act evidence under State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923)/Rule 404(b), SCRE.
. Even if I were to find these charges were sufficiently connected so as to be subject to consolidation, I would hold that joinder should have been denied in order to protect appellant’s right to a fair trial. City of Greenville v. Chapman, supra.