concurring.
Woodson’s appeal is premised on his assertion that the entire chain of events flowed from Officer Carter’s approach of the Woodson vehicle. That approach, Woodson argues, was illegal under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because Officer Carter did not have any reasonable suspicion that Woodson was engaged in criminal activity. Although not addressed by the majority, this premise is flawed.
Woodson confuses a Terry investigatory stop with a police officer’s right to approach individuals and ask questions. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983); Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 191, 196-97, 413 S.E.2d 645, 648 (1992). In a Terry stop, the officer has the right to approach and detain individuals because he has a reasonable suspicion that they are engaging in some type of criminal activity. Here, Carter, like any police officer, had the right to approach a car parked on a public street for investigation purposes. Id.
Woodson is correct, however, that Carter’s subsequent action ordering the vehicle’s occupants to put their hands where he could see them, extends beyond mere inquiry. This demand was a show of authority reflecting Carter’s intent to stop, detain, or seize the occupants of the Woodson vehicle. At that point, the encounter was within the category of an investigatory stop under Terry. Nevertheless, whether Carter had the requisite reasonable suspicion to make this demand is relevant only if, in fact, Carter’s command constituted a seizure as Woodson contends. As concluded by the majority, Woodson was not seized until after he had reached for his gun. Carter’s actions were clearly justified at that point, and did not violate Woodson’s Fourth Amendment rights.
Woodson asserts that his conviction for obstruction of justice was improper because he had acted lawfully in the exercise of his right to resist an illegal arrest rather than to impede justice. This argument is also based on a flawed premise: that the only obstruction activity was Woodson’s resistance to an allegedly unlawful arrest. As discussed above, there was no arrest until after the obstructive act, i.e., Woodson grabbing for his gun, and, therefore, the subsequent arrest was not illegal. Furthermore, Woodson forfeited whatever right he had to resist arrest prior to this point, as noted by the majority, by his chosen method of resistance. Banner v. Commonwealth, 204 Va. 640, 647, 133 S.E.2d 305, 310 (1963).
*408As the Commonwealth argued, Carter was involved in the execution of a search warrant and, as part of that duty, he was entitled to question other persons in the vicinity regarding the known criminal activity at the house. Carter had a right to approach the parked vehicle in discharging his duties of investigation. Woodson’s actions in arming himself and “failing to cooperate” with that investigation support the jury’s finding that Woodson intended to, and did, impede Carter’s investigation.