¶ 39. (concurring). I *650agree with the mandate to remand this case to the circuit court for the resolution of disputed facts. I also applaud the court's reaffirmation of Forest County v. Goode, 219 Wis. 2d 654, 579 N.W.2d 715 (1998). But I disagree with some of the court's analysis and its conclusion that "a municipality cannot be estopped from asserting a violation of its zoning ordinance in court." Majority op., ¶ 25. As a legal proposition, the quoted statement is too broad, and it sends the wrong message to local governments.
¶ 40. This case involves zoning. There are many different scenarios in which zoning issues may be litigated. They range from a private property owner's suit against a municipality for its refusal to issue a needed permit to a municipality's suit to raze a building that violates a zoning ordinance.
¶ 41. A municipality that wishes to enforce a zoning ordinance may become involved in litigation as either a plaintiff or a defendant. But, according to the majority, the party status of the municipality makes a big difference in the outcome of the dispute.
¶ 42. In this case, Brown County and the Village of Hobart had extensive dealings over a period of six months. The Village Board was cooperative and reassuring, and the County acted in reliance on its representations and official actions. Then the Village changed its position and ordered its clerk to deny the County a sewer permit number for a building permit. By the time the Village changed its position, the County had incurred approximately $130,000 in engineering fees and it had awarded a contract to build the transfer station. The contract provided that construction was to commence no later than October 14, 2002. The County began construction without receiving building permits, arguably in violation of the Village's zoning ordinance.
*651¶ 43. In theory, the County could have waited and sought a declaratory judgment against the Village on the zoning question or a writ of mandamus on the building permits. However, its failure on a declaratory judgment would have hurt the County's position, and mandamus may not have been a viable remedy. See Beres v. New Berlin, 34 Wis. 2d 229, 231-32, 148 N.W.2d 653 (1967). Taking the time to seek a conditional use permit from Village officials and then appealing their refusal to a board of adjustment, would not have been a fruitful option for the County in terms of either timing or result.
¶ 44. Fortunately, the Village brought an enforcement action. In this litigation the County was the defendant and it was entitled to raise all defenses that are authorized in Goode ("Equitable defenses, such as laches, estoppel, or unclean hands should... be weighed in appropriate cases."). Goode, 219 Wis. 2d at 681-82 (emphasis added).
¶ 45. In its decision, the court of appeals said: "We conclude that when considering whether to issue an injunction for a zoning violation, a circuit court can apply equitable estoppel to bar a municipality from enforcing a zoning ordinance." Vill. of Hobart v. Brown County, 2004 WI App 66, ¶ 2, 271 Wis. 2d 268, 678 N.W.2d 402 (emphasis added). "[Ejquitable estoppel can he a basis upon which the trial court refuses to grant injunctive relief for a zoning violation." Id., ¶ 16.
¶ 46. I agree with this conclusion but am not certain where the majority stands. Even if the majority agrees with the court of appeals, it is forcing a landowner like Brown County to violate the zoning ordinance before it can obtain equitable relief. This strikes me not only as risky for the landowner hut also nonsensical as a principle of law.
*652¶ 47. What I do not understand, given the court of appeals' conclusion about equitable estoppel as a defense, is why that court cited City of Milwaukee v. Leavitt, 31 Wis. 2d 72, 76, 142 N.W.2d 169 (1966), to the effect that "While municipal and other government units are not wholly immune from application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel, this court is firmly committed to the principle that estoppel 'will not lie against a municipality so as to bar it from enforcing an ordinance enacted pursuant to the police power." Vill. of Hobart, 271 Wis. 2d 268, ¶ 25 (emphasis added).
¶ 48. This quote comes from a case in which a city was revoking the defendant's occupancy permit. This quote comes from a final enforcement action. This quote is simply inconsistent with Goode and with the use of equitable estoppel in a zoning enforcement action.1
¶ 49. The majority not only affirms the quote but also adds that "If we allow the estoppel doctrine to hinder the government's exercise of its police power, we will be 'expos [ing] a significant number of persons to a risk the legislature has determined to be contrary to their safety, welfare, health or morals.' This is particu*653larly true in the context of zoning." Majority op., ¶ 29 (internal citation omitted). This language is not consistent with Goode.
¶ 50. On the facts of this case, the County is being penalized for consulting with its corporation counsel and following his advice. What was the County supposed to do? If the County had surrendered to the Village on the transfer station and sued the Village for money damages, it would not have solved the solid waste problem that precipitated this situation.
¶ 51. If the County had immediately sought a mandamus action to secure building permits, it should have been able to invoke equitable estoppel so that the Village could not assert its zoning ordinance as a defense. Of course, the County would have had to prove its case. However, I see nothing in the majority opinion that suggests that this option is a possibility.
¶ 52. The bottom line is this: If local officials act irresponsibly, leading on landowners (including counties) and then pulling the rug out from under them, there ought to be a way for the landowners to obtain relief without first violating the zoning ordinance. Equitable estoppel, with stringent requirements to obtain it, strikes me as a reasonable solution.
¶ 53. Because the majority opinion is internally inconsistent and undermines the rule in Goode, I respectfully concur.
¶ 54. I am authorized to state that Justice JON E WILCOX and Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this opinion.
Moreover, the facts in City of Milwaukee v. Leavitt are markedly different from the facts in this case. In Leavitt, the court held that "erroneous acts of municipal officers do not afford a basis to estop the municipality from enforcing its ordinances enacted pursuant to the police power." Leavitt, 31 Wis. 2d 72, 76-77, 142 N.W.2d 169 (1966) (emphasis added). In this case, the County relied not only on the acts of individual officers, but also on the acts of the highest municipal body, the Village Board. See majority op., ¶¶ 5-7. Individual municipal officers may act roguishly. The Village Board's imprimatur lends an added sense of credence to individual officers' representations.