¶ 57. (dissenting). Part of the mission of this court is to protect the public from unethical attorneys. We owe no sympathy to attorneys who steal or otherwise betray their clients. These bad apples hurt people who have every right to trust them, and they reflect adversely on the integrity and standing of the bar. I take very seriously this court's duty to promote high ethical standards in the legal profession.
¶ 58. If I thought this case involved injury to the public or the legal profession, I would eagerly join the court's opinion. However, I see the case differently. Never have the molehills of unauthorized practice been elevated to such heights.
1 59. Attorney Webster's license to practice law in Wisconsin was suspended for two years beginning January 21, 1998. Now, almost four-and-a-half years after the onset of his suspension, Webster is denied reinstatement. He is demonized in the court's opinion and assessed the whopping sum of $9121.75 in costs.
¶ 60. A careful reading of the court's opinion will reveal the emergence of some potentially troublesome principles of law. The court is largely concerned with Webster's unauthorized practice of law while he was under suspension. It points indignantly to the use of some old office checks carrying the name "Oltman & Webster, Ltd., Attorneys at Law" to pay salaries and other bills during Webster's suspension, as well as the purchase of an ad in the local telephone book in *350anticipation of Webster's reinstatement. The referee relied on these peccadilloes as examples of Webster's unauthorized practice. The court writes cautiously that "these actions might not constitute practicing law," majority op. at ¶ 31, yet it condemns them as unethical. What is the court saying? In the wake of these pronouncements, what rights do partners in a small law firm have when another partner is suspended? Do they have to remove the partner's name from the firm during the partner's period of suspension? Are they forbidden to advertise the name of a firm that includes the name of a suspended partner?
¶ 61. A comparison of the court's opinion with the material in the record will show that a lot of information favorable to Attorney Webster has been left out. A lot of information that puts his errors in context has been left out. For instance, during his suspension, Webster appeared in four foreclosure actions in behalf of members of his family, always in a capacity other than attorney. Three of these cases are correctly denominated as the unauthorized practice of law based on the Life Science decision. Life Science Church v. Shawano Co., 221 Wis. 2d 331, 585 N.W.2d 625 (Ct. App. 1998). One case involving his children is disregarded as being different. It happens to be the one case commenced before the decision in the Life Science case.
¶ 62. More than two years ago, 13 members of the District 5 Professional Responsibility Committee (Committee) met in La Crosse to review Webster's application for reinstatement. Certain problems were identified. The Committee followed up with a careful investigation and issued a 19-page report. Ultimately, the Committee found that, in several respects, Webster "technically engaged in the unauthorized practice of law during the term of his suspension.... He did not *351intentionally violate the terms of his suspension and merely appeared as trustee on behalf of a family trust without knowledge of the Life Science decision."
¶ 63. The Committee's recommendation states in part:
Based on the conclusion that Mr. Webster was engaged in the practice of law, he has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence full compliance with the terms of the suspension order and the requirements of SCR 22.26. Therefore, the Committee cannot recommend reinstatement under the standard of SCR 22.28(6). However, like Petition of Eisenberg, the recommendation for denial of reinstatement should be modified on the grounds that the denial may work an unjustifiably harsh result.
The Committee is satisfied that Mr. Webster has the moral character to practice law within the standards expected of the bar and the administration of justice....
Mr. Webster has paid what the Committee considers to be a most serious penalty for his misconduct, in light of suspensions ordered for misconduct in other cases. As of the present time he has been suspended from the practice of law for 30 months. He will remain suspended until the Board makes it[s] recommendations to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court ultimately decides the matter. By that time Mr. Webster's suspension could approach or exceed three years and if his petition is denied, he will be precluded from again filing a petition for reinstatement for at least nine months following the denial. See, SCR 22.28(8).
In Petition of Eisenberg, the referee felt compelled to recommend a denial of reinstatement because of the petitioner's unauthorized practice of law. However he recommended that the denial might work [an] "unjus*352tifiably harsh" result by extending the term of the suspension for an inordinate period. The Supreme Court stated:
Eisenberg's failure to ascertain beforehand the legal effect of an appearance before the hearing examiner does not excuse his conduct. We feel, however, that a denial of reinstatement of his license to practice law... would be too severe.
The Committee recommends that the Board and Supreme Court adopt a similar rationale] in this case.... The Board and the court should consider the harshness of this sanction in concluding that the Petition for Reinstatement should be granted.
¶ 64. I agree with the recommendation of the District 5 Professional Responsibility Committee. In deference to the Committee's judgment, I respectfully dissent.