concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority opinion with respect to issues III and IV but write separately to voice my dissent regarding the constitutionality of N.C. Gen. Stat. § lD-25(b).
The dispositive issues are whether: (I)(A) there is a constitutionally protected right to a jury trial on the issue of punitive damages in tort actions for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, negligence and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress; if so, (B) a legislatively imposed limitation on punitive damages impermissibly infringes on this right to a jury trial; (II) the legislatively imposed limitation on punitive damages violates the due process clause of article I, section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution; and (III) the jury award of $11.5 million in punitive damages per plaintiff is excessive under the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution.
I
A
Constitutional Right to Jury Trial on Punitive Damages
The North Carolina Constitution provides in article I, section 25 that “[i]n all controversies at law respecting property, the ancient mode of trial by jury is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and shall remain sacred and inviolable.” N.C. Const, art. I, § 25. In construing this provision, our courts have held there is a constitutional right to a jury trial only in cases involving a cause of action (including a remedy) recognized at the time of the adoption of the 1868 North Carolina Constitution1 and where there existed, either at common law or by statute at that time, a right to a jury trial in such instances. Kiser v. Kiser, 325 N.C. 502, 507, 385 S.E.2d 487, 490 (1989); Groves v. Ware, 182 N.C. 553, 558, 109 S.E. 568, 571 (1921).
I acknowledge some of our Supreme Court cases have employed the “in all controversies ... respecting property” language of article I, section 25 in a manner that suggests the constitutional right to a jury depends on the existence of a claim involving “property.” See Belk’s Dep’t Store, Inc. v. Guilford County, 222 N.C. 441, 447, 23 S.E.2d 897, 902 (1943) (valuation of land for taxation purposes “does not affect any right in the property”); Smith v. Campbell, 10 N.C. 595, 597 (1825) (debt is not property). Some recent cases have made reference to the *692“property” test as an element in determining a party’s right to a jury trial without utilizing it. See State v. Simpson, 325 N.C. 514, 517-18, 385 S.E.2d 329, 331-32 (1989). I have not found any case since 1943 in which our appellate courts have determined a party was or was not entitled to a jury trial on the basis the claim did or did not “respect[] property.” In several instances where it appears obvious the claims were “respecting property,” the court did not reach the issue. See, e.g., Kiser, 325 N.C. at 507-08, 385 S.E.2d at 490 (analysis of right to jury trial in equitable distribution proceeding); Kaperonis v. Highway Comm’n, 260 N.C. 587, 595-96, 133 S.E.2d 464, 470-71 (1963) (analysis of right to jury trial in condemnation proceeding). Furthermore, in cases where the claim obviously did not involve a property question, the appellate court discussed only the question of whether the claim was in existence prior to April 1868. See, e.g., In re Clark, 303 N.C. 592, 607, 281 S.E.2d 47, 57 (1981) (analysis of right to jury trial in termination of parental rights proceeding); In re Taylor, 25 N.C. App. 642, 643-44, 215 S.E.2d 789, 790 (1975) (analysis of right to jury trial in mental health commitment proceeding). Thus, the “in all controversies . . . respecting property” language giving rise to the right to a jury trial has evolved into the single test of whether this right existed prior to April 1868. To hold otherwise would eradicate the constitutional right to a jury trial in those actions where the right was recognized prior to April 1868 simply because the cause of action is found not to involve a property interest.2
It may, of course, be the case that the “respecting property” prong has remained in effect all along but required no consideration because our courts have construed the phrase “in all controversies . . . respecting property” liberally so as to “include all the old forms of action at common law.” 2 McIntosh, North Carolina Practice and Procedure § 1432, at 3 (2d ed. 1956) (“the term, ‘in all controversies respecting property,’ . . . would seem to include all the old forms of action at common law”); see also Kiser, 325 N.C. at 505 n.1, 385 S.E.2d at 488 n.1 (“all issues of fact in causes of action existing [in 1868] would be entitled to be tried by jury”). Our society’s .notion of property has evolved greatly since our Supreme Court rendered its decision in Smith v. Campbell in 1825 on which the majority relies. See Smith v. Campbell, 10 N.C. 595 (1825). For instance, the idea expressed in Smith “that property must necessarily mean dominion over things ha[s] given way to a more expanded view.” *6931 Valuation and Distribution of Marital Property § 18.02[1], at 18-8 to 18-9 (2002) [hereinafter Valuation and Distribution]; Smith, 10 N.C. at 597. Property has since been regarded as “a bundle of rights, not over things, but pertaining to any valuable interest.” Valuation and Distribution at 18-9. Apparently, what is property “bears heavily upon the sociological climate of the times.” Id. at 18-12.
Thus, today, plaintiffs’ tort claims, including their prayer for punitive damages would be considered “property” within the meaning of article I, section 25 as they derive from injuries to the person. “ ‘Where an injury has occurred for which the injured party has a cause of action, such cause of action is a vested property right.’ ” Lamb v. Wedgewood S. Corp., 308 N.C. 419, 442, 302 S.E.2d 868, 881 (1983) (quoting Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 366 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1978)). Furthermore, because “every man has a property in his own person,” John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 17 (T. Peardon ed., 1952), injury to a person is injury to property and the constitutionally protected right to a jury trial attaches.
The claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not recognized in this State until 1979, see Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 196, 254 S.E.2d 611, 621-22 (1979), and thus Plaintiffs have no constitutional right to a jury trial on this claim. Claims for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and negligence, however, were in existence prior to April 1868. See Arrington v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R. Co., 51 N.C. 68 (1858) (negligence); Bradley v. Morris, 44 N.C. 395 (1853) (malicious prosecution); Sawyer v. Jarvis, 35 N.C. 179 (1851) (false imprisonment). Prior to 1868, the right to have a jury assess punitive damages also existed for each of these claims. See Bradley, 44 N.C. at 397; Sawyer, 35 N.C. at 181; see also Gilreath v. Allen, 32 N.C. 67, 69 (1849) (punitive damages permitted in any tort action upon showing of “circumstances of aggravation”). Thus, a constitutional right to a jury trial exists in this State on a party’s claim for punitive damages arising from any tort recognized in North Carolina prior to April 1868 in which there are genuine issues of fact showing “aggravating factors” as outlined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1D-I5(a).3
*694Consequently, I reject K-Mart’s argument that a legislative limitation on punitive damages awards is within the sole province of the legislature and does not implicate a party’s right to a jury trial under article I, section 25. It may be that the legislature can eliminate punitive damages as a remedy in North Carolina. See Osborn v. Leach, 135 N.C. 628, 47 S.E. 811 (1904) (upholding legislative elimination of punitive damages in libel cases where no aggravating circumstances exist).4 The answer to that question, however, is more involved than the majority suggests and lies within the meaning of article I, section 18 of the North Carolina Constitution (open courts provision), see id. at 631, 47 S.E.2d at 812, and article I, section 19 (law of the land provision), see Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 461, 329 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1985) (due process clause prohibits arbitrary legislation), not article I, section 25. If the legislature permits an award of punitive damages, the article I, section 25 right to a jury trial necessarily attaches and any limitation on the amount of damages rests with the jury and the trial court.5 See Worthy v. Shields, 90 N.C. 192, 196 (1884) (“jury verdict cannot be disregarded”). To hold otherwise would constitute an impermissible interference with the jury’s absolute right to determine a plaintiff’s entitlement to punitive damages and the amount of those damages.
B
Infringement of Constitutional Right to Jury Trial
Fundamental rights include those either explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the state or federal constitution, see Comer v. Ammons, 135 N.C. App. 531, 539, 522 S.E.2d 77, 82 (1999); In re Buck, *695350 N.C. 621, 626, 516 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1999) (“fundamental right to trial by jury ... is guaranteed by our Constitution”), or those that are deeply rooted in the traditions of our people, State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 349, 364, 226 S.E.2d 353, 365 (1976). As the right to a jury trial on punitive damages is guaranteed by our state constitution, see N.C. Const, art. I, § 25, and is firmly rooted in the traditions of our people, see, e.g., Bradley, 44 N.C. at 397, the right to a jury trial on punitive damages is a fundamental right. Because this fundamental right is not absolute, it can be invaded upon enactment of a statute that is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 123 L. Ed. 2d 1, 16 (1993); see Department of Transp. v. Rowe, 353 N.C. 671, 676, 549 S.E.2d 203, 208 (2001) (strict scrutiny triggered by infringement of fundamental right), cert. denied, — U.S. —, -, L. Ed. 2d -, 70 U.S.L.W. 3395 (2002). The party asserting the constitutionality of a statute that invades a fundamental right has the burden of demonstrating its constitutionality. Rowe, 353 N.C. at 675, 549 S.E.2d at 207; Dixon v. Peters, 63 N.C. App. 592, 598, 306 S.E.2d 477, 481 (1983).
The statue before this Court in this case, Section lD-25(b), places a legislative limitation on the amount of punitive damages a party may recover. See N.C.G.S. § lD-25(b) (1999) (“[p]unitive damages . . . shall not exceed three times the amount of compensatory damages or two hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), whichever is greater”). This statute requires the trial court, in some instances, to “reduce the [punitive damages] award,” id., and thus invades plaintiffs’ right to have the jury assess the amount of punitive damages. K-Mart, the proponent of the constitutionality of this statute, therefore has the burden of proving it was enacted to serve a compelling state interest and if so, that it was narrowly drawn to serve that interest. See Reno, 507 U.S. at 302, 123 L. Ed. 2d at 16; Rowe, 353 N.C. at 676, 549 S.E.2d at 208. In support of this burden, K-Mart argues the statute serves the best interest of the State by “preserving and promoting economic development in the State of North Carolina, as well as fostering [public] confidence in the civil litigation system.” Admittedly, encouraging economic development and ensuring public confidence in the judicial system are legitimate state interests. There is nothing, however, in this record to show the limits on punitive damages awards serve these goals or even if they did, that the interests served are compelling.6 Indeed, the reduction of punitive damages awarded by a *696jury after extensive deliberations could erode public confidence in our judicial system. Accordingly, the limitation on punitive damages awards, as set forth in section lD-25(b), is unconstitutional with respect to claims that were recognized in North Carolina prior to April 1868 where there also existed a right to have a jury assess punitive damages. As section lD-25(b) does not attempt to distinguish between those occasions where a party has a constitutional right to a jury trial on the determination of punitive damages and where there is no such right, the statute is overbroad and thus unconstitutional. See State v. Hines, 122 N.C. App. 545, 552, 471 S.E.2d 109, 114 (1996) (“a law is void on its face if it sweeps within its ambit not solely activity that is subject to governmental control, but also includes within its prohibition, the practice of a protected constitutional right”).
II
Substantive Due Process
The law of the land clause of the North Carolina Constitution provides in article I, section 19 that “[n]o person shall be ... in any manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.” N.C. Const, art. I, § 19. “Any exercise by the State of its police power is ... a deprivation of liberty.” In re Hospital, 282 N.C. 542, 550, 193 S.E.2d 729, 735 (1972). Every deprivation of liberty, however, does not constitute a violation of a person’s substantive due process rights granted under article I, section 19. A violation occurs only if the statute does not have “ ‘a rational, real, or substantial relation to the public health, morals, order, or safety, or the general welfare.’ ” Id. at 551, 193 S.E.2d at 735 (citation omitted). In other words, the statute must be “reasonably necessary to promote the accomplishment of a public good, or to prevent the infliction of public harm.” Id. This substantive due process right is the public’s guarantee against arbitrary legislation. Lowe, 313 N.C. at 461, 329 S.E.2d at 650.
Section lD-25(b), which places a limit on the amount of punitive damages a person may recover, is without question an exercise of the State’s police power. But the statute also constitutes a deprivation of liberty in that it denies a party a right, recognized at common law, to have a jury determine the amount of punitive damages. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 67 L. Ed. 1042, 1045 (1923) (defining liberty to include “those privileges long recognized at common law as *697essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men”). Accordingly, section lD-25(b) can be sustained against an article I, section 19 attack only if it has some rational or substantial relationship to the general welfare of this State.
K-Mart contends the general welfare of the State is served by this statute because it fosters and preserves economic development and encourages “[public] confidence in the civil litigation system.” As noted in section 1(B) of this opinion, K-Mart has offered nothing to show that section lD-25(b) serves either of these general purposes. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, have produced authority on the low incidence and general stability of punitive damages awards in North Carolina. Plaintiffs further provided affidavits by two legislators revealing there had been no evidence of a punitive damages crisis presented to the General Assembly at the time it adopted section lD-25(b). There is, thus, no “substantial relation” between section lD-25(b) and the asserted purposes for its enactment. See In re Hospital, 282 N.C. at 551, 193 S.E.2d at 735. Accordingly, section lD-25(b) violates article I, section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution because it arbitrarily denies a party the full and unconditional right to have a jury determine the amount of punitive damages.
Ill
Excessiveness of Punitive Damages Award
K-Mart contends that if this Court were to hold section lD-25(b) to be unconstitutional, the punitive damages award would, consistent with the federal Due Process Clause, have to be vacated and a new trial ordered or the award reduced.
In Gore, the United States Supreme Court found the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to “prohibit[] a State from imposing a “ ‘grossly excessive” punishment on a tortfeasor.’ ” Gore, 517 U.S. at 562, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 818 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454, 125 L. Ed. 2d 366, 379 (1993) (citation omitted)). Whether the award is “grossly excessive” must be determined in the context of the State’s interest in punishing the tortfeasor and deterring any such future misconduct. Id. at 568, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 822. The Gore court specifically noted “[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice ... of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.” Id. at 574, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 826. In order to determine “fair notice,” three factors must be considered: (1) the *698degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, (2) the ratio between the punitive damages award and the harm done or the potential harm that could have occurred, and (3) available sanctions for comparable misconduct. Id. at 575, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 826. Appellate courts should apply a de novo standard of review in deciding whether a punitive damages award is unconstitutionally excessive. Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532 U.S. 424, 431, 149 L. Ed. 2d 674, 686-87 (2001). If excessive, the matter should be remanded to the trial court to determine an appropriate remedy, which may include a new trial or a reduction of the award after an independent determination by the trial judge. Gore, 517 U.S at 586, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 833.
The Gore court characterized the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct as “[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award” because punitive damages should reflect “ ‘the enormity of [the] offense.’ ” Id. at 575, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 826 (citation omitted). Aggravating factors associated with particularly reprehensible conduct include: malice, violence or a threat thereof, trickery and deceit, indifference to or reckless disregard for the health and safety of others, deliberate false statements, affirmative misconduct, concealment of evidence of improper motive, and even economic injury to a financially vulnerable party. Id. at 576, 579, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 826-27, 829.
The determination of the ratio between any actual or potential harm to the plaintiff and the amount of punitive damages is not meant as a simple mathematical formula by which punitive damages are automatically deemed excessive after a certain point. Id. at 582, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 830. One must establish “ ‘whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred.’ ” TXO, 509 U.S. at 460, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 381 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21, 113 L. Ed. 2d 1, 22 (1991)). In TXO, the United States Supreme Court, in upholding the trial court’s award, relied on the difference between the punitive damages award and the harm the victim could have suffered if the defendant’s tortious conduct had been successful: a 10 to 1 ratio. TXO, 509 U.S. at 462, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 382. The Gore court further noted:
[L]ow awards of compensatory damages may properly support a higher ratio than high compensatory awards, if, for example, a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of *699economic damages. A higher ratio may also be justified in cases in which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of noneconomic harm might have been difficult to determine.
Gore, 517 U.S. at 582, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 831.
The third factor analyzed for purposes of fair notice focuses on the difference between the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. Id. at 575, 583-85, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 826, 831. The reviewing court should “ ‘accord “substantial deference” to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at issue.’ ” Id. at 583, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 831 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 301, 106 L. Ed. 2d 219, 254 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). In cases where a punitive damages award is greatly in excess of a fine that could have been imposed by statute, such an award may still stand if “imprisonment was also authorized in the criminal context.” Id. at 583, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 831 (citing Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23, 113 L. Ed. 2d at 23). In considering whether a punitive damages award was justified on the ground that it serves to deter future misconduct, the reviewing court must also assess “whether less drastic remedies could be expected to achieve that goal.” Id. at 584, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 832.
In this case, most of the aggravating factors listed in Gore by which to determine the reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct are present. The jury found that Mr. Rhyne had been unlawfully detained by the use of a dangerous choke-hold. The detainment was a violent encounter that showed an indifference to or reckless disregard for the health and safety of plaintiffs. In addition, Roberts and Hoyle as agents of K-Mart engaged in affirmative misconduct by making deliberate false statements to the investigating police officers. Mr. Rhyne was also found to have been maliciously prosecuted, an act that goes to malice, trickery, and deceit. As a result, this case involved a high degree of reprehensibility as opposed to Gore, which only dealt with economic damages. See id. at 576, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 827.
As K-Mart points out, the jury awarded Mr. Rhyne $8,255.00 and Mrs. Rhyne $10,730.00 in compensatory damages but $11.5 million each in punitive damages. The ratio between the compensatory and punitive damages awards is 1,393:1 for Mr. Rhyne and 1,072:1 for Mrs. Rhyne. Even though this is a staggering ratio, the potential harm plaintiffs could have suffered must also be considered. See id. at 581, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 830; TXO, 509 U.S. at 460, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 381. *700According to the testimony of one of the police officers present on the scene on 29 April 1996, the hold Roberts used on Mr. Rhyne in order to detain him could have severely injured Mr. Rhyne’s spinal cord, potentially paralyzing him.
North Carolina courts have upheld jury verdicts ranging from $60,000.00 in compensatory damages, Hussey v. Seawell, 137 N.C. App. 172, 527 S.E.2d 90 (2000) (partial paralysis), to $100,000.00, Lowery v. Newton, 52 N.C. App. 234, 278 S.E.2d 566 (permanent paralysis to the plaintiff’s left shoulder and arm), disc. review denied, 303 N.C. 711 (1981); see also Strickland v. Jackson, 23 N.C. App. 603, 209 S.E.2d 859 (1974) (awarding $75,000.00 in compensatory damages for paralysis ranging from the plaintiff’s shoulder to his hand). Thus, if Mr. Rhyne had been seriously injured during his detainment, he could reasonably have been expected to receive an award in the $100,000.00 range. In that case, Mrs. Rhyne’s compensatory damages award would likely have been higher as well (due to increased emotional distress and a possible additional claim for loss of consortium). Accepting compensatory damages of $100,000.00 as representative for the potential harm Mr. Rhyne could have suffered, a ratio of 115:1 still remains. This discrepancy is much greater than the 10:1 ratio upheld in TXO. Finally, as to the issue of authorized or imposed sanctions for comparable misconduct, K-Mart was certainly guided by section lD-25(b) in believing any potential liability for egregiously wrongful acts involving fraud, malice, or willful or wanton conduct would be limited to the greater of $250,000.00 or three times compensatory damages awarded against K-Mart.
While K-Mart’s conduct reached a high level of reprehensibility, the punitive damages awarded in this case exceeded the reasonable relationship that is required between such an award and actual or potential harm to plaintiffs, see Gore, 517 U.S. at 580, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 829, and thus went beyond what was needed to achieve the State’s goal of punishment and deterrence. As section lD-25(b) further promised to set a maximum for punitive damages, K-Mart did not have fair notice of a penalty as severe as the one imposed in this case.
I would therefore hold the punitive damages award of $23 million in this case to be excessive because it transcends the constitutional limits of the federal Due Process Clause. Accordingly, I would vacate the award and remand this matter to the trial court for the entry of an appropriate remedy. See id. at 586, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 833.
*701 Summary
In summary, I would hold section lD-25(b) both unconstitutionally overbroad in that the limitation it imposes on punitive damages impermissibly infringes on a party’s constitutional right to a jury trial on the determination of punitive damages for causes of action recognized prior to April 1868 and in violation of article I, section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.7 Invalidating the statute would necessitate the reinstatement of the jury’s original $23 million punitive damages award. As this award, however, is grossly excessive under the federal Due Process Clause, I would vacate the original punitive damages award and remand this case to the trial court for the entry of an appropriate remedy.
. The 1868 North Carolina Constitution was adopted in April 1868. See John V. Orth, The North Carolina State Constitution 13 (1993).
. Thus, if the courts were to accept a limited definition of “in all controversies . . . respecting property,” the legislature could, for example, adopt a statute eliminating'the right to jury trials in all negligence and breach of contract actions.
. According to our case law, the right to a jury trial hinges on the existence of aggravating circumstances. See Gilreath, 32 N.C. at 69. If there are no aggravating circumstances, there is no right to a jury trial. Who then determines whether there are aggravating circumstances? If we allow the jury to make this determination, the result is the grant of a jury trial in every instance where there are allegations of aggravating circumstances. This would be an unacceptable process and not consistent with article I, section 25. Thus, there must be some preliminary showing by the claimant of the existence of some aggravating circumstance. This can be satisfied upon a trial court’s *694determination that there are genuine issues of fact on the question of aggravation. Cf. N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56 (1999) (rule on summary judgment).
. In essence, the legislative elimination of punitive damages for certain libel cases as upheld in Osborn merely constituted a codification of the common law, which permitted punitive damages only where aggravating circumstances existed. See Gilreath, 32 N.C. at 69 (punitive damages permitted in any tort action upon showing of “circumstances of aggravation”).
. Any abuse in punitive damages awards is currently addressed on a case-by-case basis as provided for at common law, see Worthington v. Bynum, 305 N.C. 478, 491, 290 S.E.2d 599, 607 (1982) (Britt, J., dissenting) (trial court may award new trial if damages are given “under the influence of passion or prejudice”); Carawan v. Tate, 53 N.C. App. 161, 165, 280 S.E.2d 528, 531 (1981) (trial court has discretion to “reduce” punitive damages award if it is “excessively disproportionate to the circumstances of contumely and indignity present in the case”), modified and affirmed, 304 N.C. 696, 286 S.E.2d 99 (1982), and under federal constitutional law, see BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809, 822 (1996) (Due Process Clause prohibits the imposition of a “grossly excessive” punishment against a tortfeasor).
. There axe affidavits in this record from two legislators who were in the General Assembly at the time chapter ID was adopted. The legislators affirm “[t]here was no *696evidence introduced during either the committee meetings or on the floor about excessive punitive awards or the number of punitive awards in North Carolina.”
. Accordingly, I do not address the proper application of section lD-25(b) as the majority does in section II of its opinion.