dissenting.
I respectfully dissent with regard to overruling Murphy v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 209 Ga. App. 171 (433 SE2d 325) as it is my view that Murphy is inapposite in the case sub judice.
In Murphy, the plaintiff was injured while working in Arizona and elected workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to Arizona law. The plaintiff in Murphy then filed a products liability action in Geor*762gia more than a year after his injury and this Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint based on an Arizona law divesting a worker of the right to sue a third-party tortfeasor more than a year after any such claims accrue. Specifically, Arizona law provides for automatic assignment of third-party claims to the compensation carrier in the event the worker does not pursue his remedy against the third-party tortfeasor within one year after the claim accrues. Id. at 172 (1), supra.
The obvious factual distinction between Murphy and the case sub judice is that Glomski was injured in Georgia and the plaintiff in Murphy was injured in Arizona. Under these circumstances and according to Georgia’s conflict of laws rule as enunciated in the majority opinion (i.e., “ ‘the lex loci delictis determines the substantive rights of the parties’ ”), this Court was correct in applying Arizona law in Murphy since the plaintiff’s claim in Murphy accrued in Arizona. More importantly, however, is the judicial distinction that the case sub judice involves a conflict of laws question between opposing Workers’ Compensation Acts and Murphy does not.
The case sub judice involves an employee eligible for workers’ compensation benefits in either Georgia or Illinois because the employee was injured in Georgia and the employer was based in Illinois. Glomski, the injured employee, elected compensation benefits pursuant to Illinois law, presenting the choice of law question of whether Maryland Casualty is subrogated to Glomski’s third-party claims as afforded under Illinois law or is excluded from subrogation as required by Georgia’s former Workers’ Compensation Act. Conversely, the plaintiff in Murphy did not have an election between opposing Workers’ Compensation Acts. He was injured while employed in Arizona and covered pursuant to the Arizona Workers’ Compensation Act. The only choice afforded the plaintiff in Murphy was to recover workers’ compensation and abide by the substantive restraints imposed by Arizona law or not. By electing to recover compensation benefits in Arizona and then filing a products liability suit in Georgia after automatic assignment (pursuant to Arizona law) of any such third party claim, the plaintiff in Murphy was simply attempting to avoid the substantive law he chose in Arizona. It was under these circumstances that this Court in Murphy cited the rule enunciated in Howard v. Alfrey, 697 F2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1983), i.e., “the compensation laws of the state where a worker elects recovery control the worker’s rights against third parties. 4 Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 88.23.” Murphy v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 209 Ga. App. 171, 172 (1), supra.
Should this Court overrule Murphy, there would be a failure to recognize the “adjustment of rights [the] plaintiff [in Murphy] brought on himself by accepting compensation benefits in another *763state.” Id. at 172 (1), supra. It is my view that Murphy is not controlling in the case sub judice and should therefore be distinguished.
Decided October 14, 1993 Reconsideration denied November 3, 1993 Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Robert R. Potter, Jodi B. Ginsberg, for appellant. James C. Carr, Jr., for appellee.