The main question here is whether we should allow a new common law claim against a liquor licensee that sold beer to an adult for off-premises consumption. The beer ultimately was consumed by a third person who drove a motor vehicle and injured plaintiffs. We affirm the district court’s ruling that denied plaintiffs’ claims against the licensee.
I. Background facts and proceedings. Plaintiffs Larry Eddy, his wife Cheryl Eddy, and their daughter Alyssa Eddy (Eddy s) appeal from the district court’s ruling which sustained a motion for summary judgment by defendant Risco, Inc., the liquor licensee. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 237. The parties agreed in the district court, for purposes of the summary judgment motion, that the facts in substance are as follows. Jack Johnson and Dennis Hobbs were roommates. At approximately 10:00 a.m. on October 14, 1989, Johnson came home and found Hobbs drinking beer while watching football on television. Hobbs remained in the house drinking beer while Johnson went out into the back yard to work. At about 3:00 or 4:00 in the afternoon, Johnson came back inside and drank *635some of Hobbs’ beers. After the two finished the beers, they proceeded to Casey’s General Store, Inc., in Ames, which was owned by defendant Risco, Inc.
Upon arrival at the Casey’s store, Hobbs went inside the store to purchase more beer. Johnson remained outside in his truck. Hobbs proceeded immediately to the cooler where he obtained a twelve-pack. of beer. He did not open or consume any of the beer while in the store. After ho paid for the beer, Hobbs and Johnson left the store area. They then opened the beer and began to drink it while they were traveling to Story City. The two apparently stopped at a brother-in-law’s farm while driving to Story City and had some beer while at the farm. Shortly after they resumed their trip, with Johnson driving, the vehicle ran through a stop sign striking the Eddy car. Larry Eddy sustained personal injuries from the collision.
After the accident, Johnson was charged with driving while under the influence of alcohol and for driving under a suspended license. At his trial for these charges, an expert estimated that Johnson’s blood alcohol content at the time of the accident was .135. Johnson was convicted of these charges. Plaintiffs Eddy thereafter brought this action for personal injuries and loss of consortium against Casey’s General Store, Inc., Jack Johnson, Dennis Hobbs, and Risco, Inc. Only plaintiffs’ claims against Risco are involved in this appeal.
Plaintiffs’ claims against defendant Ris-co were based upon Iowa’s Dramshop Act, Iowa Code section 123.92 (1989), and common law negligence; The district court thereafter sustained Risco’s summary judgment motion and dismissed plaintiffs’ petition as to Risco. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 237(c). Eddys appealed, and we now consider the issues raised.
II. Dramshop claim. Plaintiffs contend they are entitled to recover money damages from defendant Risco pursuant to our dramshop act, which provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who is injured in person or property or means of support by an intoxicated person or resulting from the intoxication of a person, has a right of action for all damages actually sustained, severally or jointly, against any licensee or permittee, who sold and served any beer, wine, or intoxicating liquor to the intoxicated person when the licensee or permittee knew or should have known the person was intoxicated....
Iowa Code § 123.92 (emphasis supplied).
We have previously held that before a permittee or licensee may be exposed to liability under the dramshop act, a plaintiff must prove that the permittee or licensee both sold and served alcohol to an intoxicated person with the intent that the alcohol be consumed on the premises. Kelly v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 476 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Iowa 1991); see also Thorp v. Casey’s General Stores, Inc., 446 N.W.2d 457, 462 (Iowa 1989). It is undisputed that Risco never “served” any beer or other alcohol to Hobbs or Johnson for on-premises consumption. Also, none of the purchased beer was actually consumed on Risco’s premises by Hobbs or Johnson. Accordingly, it was proper for the district court to sustain Risco’s summary judgment motion as to this assignment of error.
III. Equal protection claim. The next issue plaintiffs raise is whether a construction of the dramshop act, section 123.-92, which precludes liability against licensees and permittees that only sell alcohol violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Iowa Const, art. I, § 6. For the same reasons discussed at length in our recent decision in Kelly, 476 N.W.2d at 347-48, we hold that such a construction of the dramshop act does not violate the equal protection rights of the plaintiffs.
IV. Common law claim. Plaintiffs Eddy alternatively claim that they are entitled to recover from defendant Risco based upon common law negligence. More specifically, Eddys assert that Risco breached a duty of care to them by selling beer to Hobbs when it knew or should have known that he was intoxicated. Defendant Risco *636argues that plaintiffs may not maintain a common law claim because the dramshop act, section 123.92, preempts the field of liquor vendor liability and provides the exclusive remedy against liquor licensees and permittees for alcohol sales to adults. We agree.
A. This court has addressed on several previous occasions the general question of whether the dramshop act preempts common law claims against licensees and permittees. See Nutting v. Zieser, 482 N.W.2d 424 (Iowa 1992); Thorp, 446 N.W.2d at 465; Slager v. HWA Corp., 435 N.W.2d 349 (Iowa 1989); Bauer v. Dann, 428 N.W.2d 658 (Iowa 1988); Fuhrman v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 398 N.W.2d 807 (Iowa 1987); Connolly v. Conlan, 371 N.W.2d 832 (Iowa 1985); Golden v. O’Neill, 366 N.W.2d 178 (Iowa 1985); Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985); Haafke v. Mitchell, 347 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1984); Snyder v. Davenport, 323 N.W.2d 225 (Iowa 1982); Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1977). We have repeatedly said that the dramshop act provides the exclusive remedy against those covered by the act: licensees and permit-tees. See, e.g., Slager, 435 N.W.2d at 3.52; Bauer, 428 N.W.2d at 660; Blesz v. Weisbrod, 424 N.W.2d 451, 452 (Iowa 1988); Fuhrman, 398 N.W.2d at 809; Connolly, 371 N.W.2d at 833. More importantly, we have consistently maintained that the dramshop act, section 123.92, preempts common law negligence actions against licensees and permittees grounded on the sale of intoxicants to an intoxicated person. See, e.g., Snyder, 323 N.W.2d at 227 (dram-shop act usurps-a common law negligence action against a licensee grounded on the sale of intoxicants to an intoxicated person in violation of Iowa Code section 123.49(1)); see also Kelly, 476 N.W.2d at 349 n. 2; Slager, 435 N.W.2d at 352; Fuhrman, 398 N.W.2d at 809; Connolly, 371 N.W.2d at 833.
We adhere to this line of precedent and conclude that a common law negligence action may not be maintained against a licensee or permittee. Stated another way, section 123.92 provides the exclusive remedy against a licensee or permittee that provides intoxicating liquor or beer to an intoxicated adult person.
We note that, in addition to our own cases, this conclusion is supported by eases from other jurisdictions holding that a dramshop act provides the exclusive remedy against licensees and permittees. See, e.g., Parker v. Miller Brewing Co., 560 So.2d 1030, 1034 (Ala.1990) (although plaintiffs complaint stated no claim under civil damages or dramshop acts, common law negligence claim would not be adopted to impose liability upon permittee); Keaton v. Kroger Co., 143 Ga.App. 23, 29-30, 237 S.E.2d 443, 448 (1977) (act providing a civil remedy for a parent' against any person who wrongfully sells liquor to his or her child preempted the field of civil liability and actions for negligence per se); Stevens v. Lou’s Lemon Tree, Ltd, 187 Ill.App.3d 458, 135 Ill.Dec. 58, 543 N.E.2d 293 (1989) (liquor control act provides the only remedy against tavern operators and owners); Plamondon v. Matthews, 148 Mich.App. 737, 743, 385 N.W.2d 273, 276 (1985) (exclusive remedy for ordinary negligence in supplying person with alcoholic beverages is provided by dramshop act); Rowan v. Southland Corp., 90 Mich.App. 61, 68, 282 N.W.2d 243, 246 (1979) (dramshop act is exclusive remedy for injuries arising out of unlawful sales of alcohol by licensed retailers); Leimkuehler v. Myers, 780 S.W.2d 653, 655 (Mo.App.1989) (plaintiff had no claim against package liquor store operator under common law nor under statute that was limited to tavern owners who dispensed alcoholic beverages by the drink); accord Winney v. Ransom & Hastings, Inc., 149 Vt. 213, 542 A.2d 269 (1988) (dramshop act provides exclusive remedy where facts of case fall within scope of act).
B. Our conclusion that section 123.92 provides the exclusive remedy against licensees and permittees is further supported by its history and language. Prior to enactment of the dramshop act, no common law negligence claim was allowed against a permittee or licensee arising out of the mere sale of intoxicating liquor. *637Snyder, 323 N.W.2d at 226. See generally Comment Beyond the Dram Shop Act: Imposition of Common-Law Liability on Purveyors of Liquor, 63 Iowa L.Rev. 1282, 1298-99 (1978). The general rule was, and still is, that the consumption of alcohol, rather than the mere sale or serving of it, is the proximate cause of any injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person. Snyder, 323 N.W.2d at 226; Lewis, 256 N.W.2d at 191. However, a claim based upon the sale and serving of alcohol was provided by the dramshop act. It is well-established that when a statute, such as our dramshop act, gives a right and creates a remedy unknown at the common law, and at the same time points to a specific method by which that liability can be ascertained and the right assessed, this method must be strictly pursued. Snyder, 323 N.W.2d at 227; 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction § 61.01, at 77-79 (4th Ed.1986).
Our dramshop act is a carefully crafted legislative scheme, having been modified on several occasions. See, e.g., 1988 Iowa Acts ch. 1158, § 30; 1986 Iowa Acts ch. 1211, § 12; 1985 Iowa Acts ch. 32, § 57. We have consistently interpreted the act in a strict but careful manner, giving particular attention and deference to the legislature’s intent and every word and phrase used throughout the act. See, e.g., Kelly, 476 N.W.2d at 346-47 (interpreting the phrase “sold and served”); Thorp, 446 N.W.2d at 467 (phrase “sold and served” does not mean “consume”); Slager, 435 N.W.2d at 352 (dramshop act applies to “licensees and permittees”); Bauer, 428 N.W.2d at 660 (same); Walton v. Stokes, 270 N.W.2d 627, 628 (Iowa 1978) (proximate cause need not be shown where plaintiff alleges injuries were “caused by an intoxicated person” rather than “resulting from the intoxication of a person”); Lee v. Hederman, 158 Iowa 719, 722-23, 138 N.W. 893, 894-95 (1913) (construing former dramshop act allowing recovery for injuries “in consequence of” another’s intoxication); Bistline v. Ney Bros., 134 Iowa 172, 180, 184, 111 N.W. 422, 425-26 (1907) (same).
For this court to formulate its own particular version of a common law negligence claim, despite the specific scheme provided by the dramshop act, would be to judicially repeal the act. See Snyder, 323 N.W.2d at 228 (“To adopt a common-law cause of action irrespective of [section 123.92] would be ill-advised and would render the statutory scheme inoperative.”); see also Browder v. International Fid. Ins. Co., 413 Mich. 603, 614, 321 N.W.2d 668, 674 (1982) (dramshop act provides exclusive remedy where legislature “carefully considered and reconsidered the dramshop act [in numerous. amendments] to keep it internally balanced”); Largo Corp. v. Crespin, 727 P.2d 1098, 1105 (Colo.1986) (implying that state dramshop act could be considered the exclusive remedy if it were more detailed or carefully considered). Such a ruling would impose this court’s conception of policy in place of the legislature’s, and of course overrule our prior cases interpreting the dramshop act.
More specifically, to allow a common law claim against permittees such as defendant Risco that only sell alcohol exclusively for off-premises consumption would read out of the dramshop act the specific requirement that licensees and permittees must both sell and serve intoxicants before liability may attach. See Iowa Code § 123.92; Kelly, 476 N.W.2d at 347 (dramshop keeper must both sell and serve alcohol before being exposed to liability).
C. We are not unmindful of the havoc wrought by drunken drivers on our highways. However, the legislature has established a detailed scheme which determinés when liability may be imposed upon sellers of alcohol. The legislature could have rationally concluded that only those licensees and permittees that sell and serve alcohol for on-premises consumption should be exposed to liability for injuries to third persons such as plaintiffs. Such licensees and permittees typically provide alcohol in open containers in their own facilities where the licensee or permittee owner or employees have the opportunity to observe patrons’ consumption and behavior. However, licensees and permittees such as defendant Risco, who only sell alcohol exclusively for off-premises consumption, have no control *638over their patrons once those patrons make their purchases and leave the premises. The legislature could have rationally concluded that the purposes of the dramshop act would not be furthered by imposing upon such permittees and licensees a standard of care equivalent to that imposed upon permittees and licensees that both sell and serve alcohol for on-premises consumption.
In sum, we are bound to follow the legislature’s scheme, regardless of the fact that it may create a situation which leaves the present plaintiffs without statutory relief. The remedy, if any, for plaintiffs and others similarly situated lies with the legislature.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the dramshop act, section 123.92, provides the exclusive remedy against licensees or permittees who provide alcohol to intoxicated persons. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court granting Ris-co’s motion for summary judgment concerning plaintiffs’ common law claim.
V. Disposition. We conclude that plaintiffs Eddy may not maintain an action against defendant Risco pursuant to the dramshop act, Iowa Code section 123.92. We also conclude that our construction of the dramshop act does not violate plaintiffs’ equal protection rights. Finally, we conclude that the dramshop act preempts the field of liquor vendor liability and provides the exclusive remedy against liquor licensees and permittees concerning alcoholic beverage sales to adults.
We have considered the parties’ other contentions and find them without merit or unnecessary to discuss. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the district court sustaining defendant Risco’s summary judgment motion.
AFFIRMED.
All Justices concur except LARSON, J., joined by SCHULTZ, LAVÓRATO and SNELL, JJ. SCHULTZ, J„ joined by LARSON, LAVORATO and SNELL, JJ., dissents separately.