OPINION ON STATE’S MOTIONS FOR REHEARING
McCORMICK, Presiding Judge.We granted the State Prosecuting Attorney’s and the District Attorney’s motions for rehearing in order to reexamine our holding that if a juror has become disqualified in a felony trial it is error for the trial court to grant a mistrial over a defendant’s objection as opposed to proceeding with eleven jurors. We withdraw our original opinion and affirm the decision of the habeas court and the Court of Appeals.
Appellant was indicted for aggravated robbery. On February 17,1993, a jury of twelve was empaneled and sworn, and the trial commenced. The State presented its evidence and rested. After the first defense witness *932testified, juror Ponce requested to speak to the trial judge outside of the presence of the other jurors. Ponce then informed the trial judge that he wished to be disqualified as a juror as he knew appellant’s father from grade school and high school.1 When questioned whether he would be biased one way or the other, juror Ponce answered, “[o]ne way or not, not for guilty, but either way, I don’t want to be put in that position.”
Appellant’s counsel advised the trial judge that the defense had no objection to excusing Ponce from the jury and proceeding with eleven jurors, or in alternative, to allow juror Ponce to remain on the jury. After a recess, the State formally moved for a mistrial, refusing to proceed without the mandatory twelve jurors required under Article 36.29(a), V.A.C.C.P.2 The trial judge determined that juror Ponce had become biased, and therefore, must be excused from the jury. He also determined that juror Ponce was not disabled under Article 36.29(a), V.A.C.C.P. Finding manifest necessity existed because of juror Ponce’s bias and the resulting jury composed only of eleven members, the trial judge declared a mistrial.
Before he could be retried, appellant filed an application for habeas corpus seeking to bar further prosecution, claiming retrial would violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Article V, United States Constitution. The habeas judge denied relief, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Hernandez v. State, No. 8-93-100-CR (TexApp. — El Paso December 1, 1993). We granted appellant’s petition for discretionary review and reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals, holding that it was error to refuse to give appellant the opportunity to proceed with eleven jurors in that this was a significantly less drastic alternative to granting a mistrial over appellant’s objection.
Article 36.29(a) commands that a felony verdict may not be returned by fewer than twelve jurors unless one of the jurors “may die or be disabled from sitting at any time before the charge of the court is read to the jury[.]”. Article 36.29(a), supra. It is also well established that a bias or prejudice in favor of or against the defendant is not a disability within the meaning of Article 36.29(a). Carrillo v. State, 697 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). As well, Texas Constitution Article V, Section 13 states in part that, “Grand and petit juries in the District Courts shall be composed of twelve men; ...” This constitutional requirement has been held to be non-waivable even with the consent of the State and the defendant. Jones v. State, 52 Tex.Crim. 303, 106 S.W. 345, 347 (1907) (opinion on rehearing). Accordingly, the trial judge could not allow appellant’s felony trial to proceed with only eleven jurors.
There can be a new trial after a mistrial has been declared without the defendant’s consent if there is a “manifest necessity” for the mistrial or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. Sewell v. State, 696 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex.Cr.App.1985). In determining whether a trial judge exercises sound discretion in declaring a mistrial this Court has held that the trial judge must consider less drastic alternatives and give adequate consideration to the defendant’s double jeopardy right before declaring a mistrial. Torres v. State, 614 S.W.2d 436, 442 (Tex.Cr.App.1981).
Juror Ponce became biased after the trial commenced, and it was within the sound discretion of the trial judge to excuse him from the jury. Manifest necessity existed for the trial judge to declare a mistrial in that it was not an alternative for the trial court to continue the appellant’s felony trial without the mandatory twelve jurors required under Article 36.29(a), YAC.C.P. Accordingly, appellant’s retrial is not jeopardy barred. Sewell, 696 S.W.2d at 560.
*933Accordingly, we withdraw our original opinion and affirm the decision of the habeas court and the Court of Appeals.
. Juror Ponce had run into the appellant’s father in the hall during a recess and had engaged in a conversation with him which revealed that appellant’s son was on trial in the case on which Ponce was sitting as a juror.
. The applicable portion of Article 36.29(a), V.A.C.C.P., commands, "Not less than twelve jurors can render and return a verdict in a felony case.”