concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Defendant, Ronald Long, was prosecuted for killing a liquor store clerk during the course of a robbery. Defendant was convicted of capital murder and was sentenced to death. The Court reverses the conviction and death sentence and remands the case for retrial. I concur in this result.
I believe there are other grounds, in addition to those relied on by the majority, to base reversal of the conviction and vacation of the sentence. Those concern the trial court’s improper limitation of the voir dire on racial prejudice; the improper handling and use of evidence of other crimes primarily through prejudicial joinder of charged crimes; the improper exclusion of expert opinion relating to hypnotically-induced testimony; improper comments in the trial court’s charge to the jury with respect to defendant’s evidence and defenses; and prosecutorial misconduct on summation in mischaracterizing defendant's legal challenge to the Atlantic County jury-selection process. Further, I remain of the view that the Capital Murder Act is unconstitutional as enacted, construed, and applied, and would reverse on those grounds as well. See State v. Di Frisco, 118 N.J. 253, 284, 571 A.2d 914 (1990) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
*507I.
Defendant in this case is black, the victim white. The existence of racial discrimination in the administration of the State’s capital-murder death-penalty statute is an issue we noted and addressed on the first occasion of this Court’s consideration of the constitutionality of the death-penalty statute. See State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987). The Court has not come to grips with the problem since, and in this case the Court ignores the issue. I believe the case inescapably presents the issue of race discrimination in capital-murder prosecutions, and the Court should confront that issue directly. This record impels the conclusion that the jury impanelled in this case was not examined sufficiently in terms of potential racial bias, and that, constitutionally, defendant should not have been tried, convicted, and sentenced to death by this jury.
The trial court required each potential juror to complete a questionnaire outlining a number of subjects, including his or her occupation, familiarity with the case, experience with the criminal justice system, and the like. Thereafter, the court questioned each potential juror individually on the basis of the responses to the written questionnaire as well as on each juror’s opinion of the death penalty. The court also permitted counsel to ask additional questions of each juror.
Defense counsel objected to the use of the questionnaire, citing the inability to observe demeanor. Unsuccessful, defense counsel submitted a number of proposed questions to be incorporated. Many of those proposed questions attempted to reveal racial bias. The trial court denied all of the suggested questions except one; it was the one racial question already contained in the questionnaire:
Would the fact that the defendant is black and one of the victims is white affect or influence your judgment in this case?
Four jurors answered “yes” to that question and were questioned further on the subject during live voir dire. Three jurors were excused for cause because of racial bias against *508blacks, a fourth was excused for racial bias in favor of blacks. Another juror, who did not answer the question affirmatively, was nonetheless excused for racial bias against blacks as a result of his views expressed during voir dire.
Defendant argues that his rights to trial by an impartial jury and to due process were violated by the trial court’s limitation of questioning on the subject of racial prejudice to a single written question. Defendant points out that in capital cases such as this, where the homicide victim is white and the defendant black, it is especially necessary to guard against latent as well as overt racial prejudice. The single question was flawed not only in its limited scope, but, because it was in written form, it prevented defense counsel from observing the demeanor of venirepersons, thus making intelligent challenges for cause and peremptory challenges impossible. Defendant further asserts that this problem could have been avoided if the trial judge had incorporated some of defendant’s questions into the live voir dire.
In Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 47 L.Ed.2d 258 (1976), a black defendant was convicted of violent crimes against a white security guard. The trial court denied the defendant’s request to voir dire potential jurors on racial prejudice. The Supreme Court held that the simple fact pattern of a white victim of a violent crime at the hands of a black assailant did not give rise to a constitutional requirement that the court question the jury concerning racial prejudice. Id. at 597-98, 96 S.Ct. at 1021-22, 47 L.Ed.2d at 265. That stark factual pattern contrasted with the facts of Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 93 S.Ct. 848, 35 L.Ed.2d 46 (1973), which implicated the “special circumstances” in which the Constitution does require a question on racial prejudice. Ham involved a black defendant charged with a drug offense. His defense was that the law-enforcement officers had “framed” him in retaliation for his active, and widely known, participation in civil-rights activities. “The critical factor present in Ham, but not present in Ristaino, was that racial issues were ‘inex*509tricably bound up with the conduct of the trial,’ and the consequent need, under all the circumstances, specifically to inquire into possible racial prejudice in order to assure an impartial jury.” Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 1634, 68 L.Ed.2d 22, 29 (1981) (quoting Ristaino v. Ross, supra, 424 U.S. at 596, 96 S.Ct. at 1021, 47 L.Ed.2d 258). The lesson of Ristaino is that a violent, interracial crime committed by a minority defendant does not constitute a “special circumstance” that constitutionally requires inquiry into possible racial prejudice.
Nevertheless, that very fact pattern, with nothing more, does require a federal court to inquire into racial prejudice on voir dire under the Supreme Court’s supervisory power over the federal courts. In Rosales-Lopez v. United States, supra, the Supreme Court formulated a nonconstitutional standard that required federal trial courts to make such an inquiry when requested by a defendant accused of a violent crime, where the defendant and the victim are members of different racial or ethnic groups. 451 U.S. at 192,101 S.Ct. at 1636, 68 L.Ed.2d at 31. Such circumstances indicate that there is a “reasonable possibility that racial or ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury,” and refusal to honor the defendant’s request constitutes reversible error. Id. at 191, 101 S.Ct. at 1636, 68 L.Ed.2d at 30.
In Turner v. Murry, 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986), the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a capital case involving an interracial crime is constitutionally entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on racial bias. That was not a retreat from Ristaino; the Court merely held that the fact that the case involved a capital sentencing proceeding before a jury constituted a “special circumstance” of constitutional proportions. “Because of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected.” Id. at 35, 106 S.Ct. at 1687, 90 L.Ed.2d at 35. Such risk is especially serious *510in light of the complete finality of the death sentence. Ibid. Thus, unlike Ristaino, which involved an interracial, violent, but noncapital crime, the capital sentencing proceeding of Turner constituted a “special circumstance” that compelled voir dire on racial prejudice.
Thus, under Turner, the trial court in this case was, indeed, constitutionally compelled to inquire into the racial bias of potential jurors on voir dire. Moreover, our own state-constitutional protections directed against racial bias that can undermine the impartiality of a jury in a capital murder case are more exacting:
Under our State constitution, as a matter of fundamental fairness, [a capital] defendant [is] entitled to have procedures invoked that [will] maximize his [or her] right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. New Jersey has always evinced exceptional concern with the evils of racial prejudice, as exemplified by the State’s many strong prohibitions against discrimination. See, e.g., N.J. Const. of 1947 art. I, para. 5; N.J.S.A. 10:5-3 (law prohibiting discrimination); N.J.S.A. 2A:72-7 (establishing criminal penalties for disqualifying a person from jury service on account of race). Moreover, this Court has consistently confirmed the right of a criminal defendant to a fair and impartial jury as a matter of State constitutional jurisprudence. E.g., State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189 [519 A.2d 1361] (1986); State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204 [432 A.2d 912] (1981). We have given this constitutional right added force in terms of providing a criminal defendant with a trial free of racial bias. E.g., State v. Gilmore, supra, 103 N.J. 508 [511 A.2d 1150]. [State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 426, 524 A.2d 188 (Handler, J., dissenting).] •
In Ramseur, this Court upheld the trial court’s asking of a single question regarding race in open court in a case involving a black defendant and a black victim. In acknowledging the rule of Turner, the Ramseur Court notéd: “In the instant case, by contrast, not only was there no interracial crime involved, but the trial court did allow a question on race analogous to the one refused by the trial court in Turner ... [Also] racial issues in the present case were not ‘inextricably bound up with the conduct of the trial.’ ” Id. at 245-46, 524 A.2d 188 (citation omitted). The Court further noted
that where the case itself carries no racial overtones, racial concerns are met by the approach followed by the trial court in the instant case although, where defendant so requests, we would prefer a broader range of inquiry. We reject the defendant’s characterization of the allowed question as a “sledgehammer” *511inquiry. By allowing a general inquiry into whether racial views would affect impartiality, and by leaving open the possibility of further questioning if the initial answer warranted it, the trial court responded to the general problem of racially prejudiced jurors. Because the case itself carried no racial overtones, there was no abuse of discretion in so limiting the questioning; nor would there have been abuse in allowing more extensive questioning. Under the circumstances in this case, the trial court’s approach cannot be said to have deprived defendant of his right to an impartial jury, even if a more searching inquiry is usually advisable when requested. [Id. at 247-48, 524 A.2d 188 (emphasis added).]
In contrast to Ramseur, the case now before this Court does “carry racial overtones” because it involves a black defendant and a white victim. See, e.g., State v. Sims, 140 N.J.Super. 164, 355 A.2d 695 (App.Div.1976), cited in State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 246-47, 524 A.2d 188, as an example of a case with “racial overtones” because it involved an interracial crime. Furthermore, this Court has recently stated that “the absence of racial overtones does not obviate the need to consider whether a more expansive voir dire should be conducted.” State v. Williams (Williams II), 113 N.J. 393, 428, 550 A.2d 1172 (1988). Although Williams //involved a capital murder of a black woman by a black defendant, the Court noted that racial bias could still play a role:
Badal prejudice may be either blatant and easy to detect or subtle and therefore more difficult to discern. A probing voir dire that elicits more than a "yes” or “no” response will aid the trial court in excusing prospective jurors for cause and will assist the defense in exercising its peremptory challenges. When the defendant is a member of a cognizable minority group, a more searching voir dire should be conducted, if requested. \Ibid. (citations omitted).]
In this case, clearly one marked by racial overtones, the inquiry was less searching than that conducted by the trial court in Ramseur. This fact, taken together with the holding of Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. 393, 550 A.2d 1172, which requires that “where the defendant is a member of a cognizable minority group, a more searching voir dire should be conducted, if requested,” indicates that the trial court in this case should have conducted a more searching voir dire into the issue of *512racial bias. The failure to have done so constituted a violation of the defendant’s right to due process and an impartial jury.1
We are thus confronted with constitutional error. I believe that under the appellate-review standard of State v. Bey (Bey I), 112 N.J. 45, 94-95, 548 A.2d 846 (1988), there must be a reversal. The Bey I Court stated that the test is “whether the error was clearly capable of affecting the verdict” except in the event of a constitutional violation, which by its “very nature cast(s) so much doubt on the fairness of the trial process that, as a matter of law, [it] can never be considered harmless.” 112 N.J. at 94-95, 548 A.2d 846 (citing Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 1799, 100 L.Ed.2d 284, 293 (1988). “Even in a case ... where the evidence of guilt is compelling, the right to a fair trial must be diligently protected to insure *513that all defendants, regardless of the crime charged or the weight of the evidence produced, are tried by a fair and impartial jury.” Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 409, 550 A.2d 1172.
Potential racial bias was indisputably implicated in this case. Defendant expressly sought to examine jurors with respect to such bias. The court’s refusal to screen more carefully the prospective jurors contravenes the self-evident principle that death-penalty prosecutions are “the categorical imperative for trial fairness.” State v. Williams (Williams I), 93 N.J. 39, 61, 459 A.2d 641 (1983). Because the failure of the trial court to conduct a more searching voir dire into racial bias was a violation of defendant’s constitutional rights to an impartial jury and due process under Turner, supra, defendant’s conviction should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
II.
Another serious issue in this case relates to the use of other-crimes evidence. Such evidence can be presented in different forms and can arise in different settings. In State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 575 A.2d 816 (1990), for example, it arose in the form of evidence of other uncharged crimes proffered under Evidence Rule 55 and of prior convictions admitted under State v. Sands, 76 N.J. 127, 386 A.2d 378 (1978). Here, such evidence is presented in the context of the joinder of other crimes in the indictment.
The original and superseding indictments in this case consisted of several counts relating to three different criminal episodes: the Compton homicide, the Carmichael shooting, and miscellaneous offenses relating to the stolen gun and ammunition. Prior to trial, defendant moved to sever the three groups of charges. The trial court denied the severance motions. Defendant now maintains that the guilt phase was infected with prejudice by the trial of all these crimes together. He further contends that not severing those different counts aug-*514merited this prejudice in the penalty phase because, “when the prosecutor asked the jury to impose the death penalty on the basis of the Compton homicide, the jury had already found defendant guilty of unrelated crimes based on evidence which clearly fell outside the scope of evidence to be considered in a penalty phase.” Thus, defendant submits that the denial of his severance motion prejudiced his right to a fair trial in both phases of the trial and, accordingly, requires reversal of both sentence and conviction. I agree with this position.
This Court has dealt with the issue of whether the noncapital counts in an indictment should be severed from the capital counts in State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 550 A.2d 117 (1988), and State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989). The initial inquiry in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a severance motion is whether the challenged counts could properly be joined in the same indictment with the homicide counts under Rule 3:7-6. State v. Pitts, supra, 116 N.J. at 601-02, 562 A.2d 1320; State v. Moore, supra, 113 N.J. at 273, 550 A.2d 117. That Rule provides:
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or accusation in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common plan. Relief from prejudicial joinder shall be afforded as provided by R. 3:15-2.
The requirements of Rule 3:7-6 are met in this case because there is a connection between the three separate categories of counts, but Rule 3:7-6 itself authorizes relief from joinder under Rule 3:15-2(b), which expressly provides that if, for any other reason, it appears that joinder of offenses charged in the indictment prejudices defendant, “the court may order an election of separate trials of counts.”
The standard that is frequently invoked to determine if prejudice exists from joinder of multiple offenses is whether, assuming the charges were tried separately, evidence of the offenses sought to be severed would otherwise be admissible under Evidence Rule 55 in the trial of the remaining charges. *515State v. Pitts, supra, 116 N.J. at 601-02, 562 A.2d 1320; State v. Moore, supra, 113 N.J. at 274, 550 A.2d 117. Evidence Rule 55 expressly permits proof of other-crimes evidence to prove other facts genuinely in issue “including motive, intent, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Nevertheless, this Rule also expressly precludes the admission of evidence of other crimes to prove defendant’s propensity toward criminal conduct. This in turn involves a critical and conscientious analysis and weighing of the probative and prejudicial aspects of the evidence under Evidence Rule 4.
In this case, it is not enough to show that the evidence relating to the noncapital crimes was probative with respect to guilt of the Compton murder. Unquestionably it was probative. Ante at 473, 575 A.2d at 452. Under Evidence Rule 55 and Evidence Rule 4, the court must go further and determine the existence of potential prejudice, and weigh the prejudice against the probative worth of the evidence. Because “other-crime evidence has a unique tendency to turn a jury against the defendant,” State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 302-03, 558 A.2d 833 (1989), that weighing process is particularly critical in a capital-murder prosecution. Such proof offered in the guilt phase of a capital-murder trial has an “evidentiary fallout” that can taint not only the jury’s determination of guilt but also its determination of life or death. See State v. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 599, 575 A.2d 816 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
In this case, the evidence relating to the Carmichael shooting carried extraordinary prejudicial potential. It had the inherent capacity to demonstrate defendant’s evil propensities in connection with the capital-murder charge, and, furthermore, it was used to prove a charged crime rather than an uncharged crime. The jury had to determine not only its probative worth but also whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, it independently justified a determination of ultimate guilt for the Carmichael shooting. Thus this evidence, even as bearing on guilt for the Compton murder, took on enormous evidential weight, well beyond what *516it might otherwise have had if it had been admitted only as an uncharged crime under Evidence Rule 55 to be used solely to prove an ancillary fact such as intent or motive. In the context of the prosecution for capital murder, other crime evidence that also constitutes proof of a separate homicidal assault is singularly harmful. It has all of the evidentiary impact of a prior conviction, which, in a capital-murder prosecution, can be devastating. “The prejudice is self-evident, inescapable, and destructive.” State v. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 606, 575 A.2d 816 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The trial court instructed the jury in its determination of penalty that the only aggravating factor it could consider during the penalty phase was that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery. That instruction, however, in no way required the jury to disregard, discount, or otherwise limit the noncapital offenses it had previously found defendant guilty of. State v. Pitts, supra, 116 N.J. at 603, 562 A.2d 1320; State v. Moore, supra, 113 N.J. at 276-77, 550 A.2d 117 (holding that penalty-phase jury should be instructed that other counts are not aggravating factors). The court’s instruction did not overcome the substantial prejudice engendered by the evidence of the other-charged crimes.
Those several considerations underscore the need in a capital-murder prosecution to require that any Evidence Rule 4 hearing to determine the admissibility of other-crimes evidence— other uncharged crimes, other charged crimes, and other prior convictions — must take into account not only the prejudicial effect on the determination of guilt but also the prejudicial effect on the determination of sentence. See State v. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 585-87, 575 A.2d 816. The court must, in the guilt-phase of a capital-murder prosecution, I submit, bring into the equation a consideration of the prejudice such evidence can have in terms of arousing, inflaming, or confusing a jury in its critical assessment of aggravating and mitigating *517factors, and in terms of the capacity of such evidence to mark defendant as an evil, violent and dangerous person.
These considerations also bring into clear focus the need to ensure wholly separate guilt and penalty phases of capital-murder trials. In a case such as this there is simply no effective means to protect the penalty phase from the prejudicial taint of other-crimes evidence other than to impanel separate juries. In State v. Moore, supra, this Court stated that “if the trial court believes that proper limiting instructions are not sufficient to protect the defendant from prejudice that would result from the joinder of the offenses, then the trial court must either grant defendant’s motion for severance of the indictment or impanel a new jury for the penalty phase.” 113 N.J at 277, 550 A.2d 117.
Defendant contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a second jury for the penalty phase. He maintains that a second jury was required because evidence relating to the Carmichael shooting and handgun charges, which were tried together with the Compton homicide, was plainly inadmissible in the penalty phase and prejudicial to a fair adjudication of the penalty. This case clearly warranted that relief.
In State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330, 396-403, 558 A.2d 1259 (1989) (Handler, J., dissenting), I stressed the need to provide an alternative to the current bifurcated-trial scheme, which consists of a sequential trial of guilt and penalty that does not effectively separate the two proceedings. I noted alternatives to the death-qualification procedure employed de rigeur in current practice. Id. at 396-403, 558 A.2d 1259. I pointed out that the multiple-jury procedure, under which separately impanelled juries have separate responsibilities, can be adapted to the trial of a capital-murder case. Id. at 396, 558 A.2d 1259. This proposal was also considered by the Supreme Court’s Committee on Criminal Practice. 125 N.J.L.J. 85-86. . There are other alternatives. A number of state-statutory schemes provide that after a jury trial on guilt in capital cases, where the penal stakes are the highest, the court alone imposes sentence. Some *518states permit the trial court to override the sentencing verdict of the jury. Id. at 404 n. 4, 558 A.2d 1259. In our own state, our statute authorizes the court “for good cause” in a capital case to discharge the jury that presided at trial and empanel a new jury for the penalty phase. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(c)(1).
There are several objections to trials before separate juries to determine the sentence for capital murder. They include juror accountability, nullification, and residual doubt, see State v. Hunt, supra, 115 N.J. at 399-402, 558 A.2d 1259. In my opinion these concerns do not severally or collectively overcome greater evils exemplified by the use of highly prejudicial evidence that can affect the determination of life or death or, for that matter, by the use of death-qualified juries to determine guilt. Id. at 392, 558 A.2d 1259. The asserted inconvenience of impanelling a second jury or the use of a multiple-jury bifurcated system has to do more with physical and financial demands than procedural complexity. Such considerations cannot outweigh constitutional interests. See, e.g., Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 98 S.Ct. 1029, 55 L.Ed.2d 234 (1978). We should, I believe, heed Justice O’Hern’s observation in a previous decision that “[ojurs is a civilization uniquely committed to the value of human life. Our nation does not view the lives of its citizens as easily expendable. We do not measure the value of human life in dollars.” State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 342, 524 A.2d 188 (O’Hern, J., concurring). “The real question for us is not what the State can do, but rather what we should do in the just exercise of our common law supervisory power over criminal practice within our jurisdiction.” Id. at 333-34, 524 A.2d 188.
III.
Related to the errors surrounding the admissibility and use of the evidence of the other crimes arising out of the Carmichael incident is that involving another criminal incident, the Graeco shooting. Defendant contends that the trial court’s instruc*519tions to the jury regarding the Graeco shooting were improper because they essentially told the jury that defendant’s strongest exculpatory evidence was irrelevant. These instructions, in combination with the derogatory remarks of the prosecutor on summation, see discussion, infra at 467, 575 A.2d at 448, also undermined the credibility and integrity of defense counsel, depriving defendant of a fair trial.
The court gave the jury this instruction:
There are a couple of other problems. There are a few red herrings in this case. You know what I mean, someone drug a little something in front of you to get you off the scent. Avoid that type of thing and keep your eye right on the ball. Remember what it is you’re here to decide and remember what the State’s burden is [and] what the State’s burden is not. I don’t mean as to the proof, but, you know, we get into the Graeco thing whatnot. Get it sorted out and be analytical and stay true to the course. [Emphasis added.]
At the close of the court’s charge, defendant immediately objected to the “red herring” instruction. Defense counsel argued that the Graeco shooting was one of their defenses and that it was wrong to suggest that he purposely attempted to mislead or distract the jury. Thereafter, the court gave a curative instruction that probably exacerbated the error:
P]t’s pointed out to me that the words red herring is something that may have as many different meanings as the people who are listening to it, and there again, I did not mean to imply that either the State or the defense tried to get something purposely in front of you that would untrack you from your charted course. What I meant was that in this case there has been much testimony and understandably a lot of — some information and testimony and evidence that really, in my mind, in yours maybe too, but in my mind isn’t really relevant and that’s what I meant by when I said don’t get sidetracked by a red herring, ... And don’t get off that course because of some testimony of somebody that went off on a tangent that really can’t help you or in any way, you know, shed any light on the subject. [Emphasis added.]
After this “curative” instruction, defendant insisted that the term “red herring” cast him in a bad light, because “defense attorneys are usually thought of as those who drag the red herrings into the case.” The court regretted the use of the term and conceded that it “had slipped one gear too low,” but nonetheless denied defendant’s motion for a mistrial.
*520The dictionary defines a “red herring” as “something that distracts attention from the real issue.” Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 986 (1987). The use of this term is hardly neutral" or benign. “[T]hat which leaves a strong scent can be used for bad purposes as well as good. A dog that gets a good whiff of red herring will lose any other scent that it has been following. Criminals who have been chased by bloodhounds have used that knowledge to advantage.” C. Funk, A Hog on Ice and Other Curious Expressions 91 (Harper Colophon Edition 1985). The court’s use of this expression had undeniably pejorative connotations, conjuring up the notion that defense counsel engaged in a “contrivance ... ruse ... subterfuge ... deceit, trickery.” Roget’s International Thesaurus 483 (3d ed. 1982). The curative charge itself was prejudicial because it did nothing to dispel — it added to — the impression that the Graeco evidence not only was irrelevant but should be shunned because it was deceptive and misleading. Indeed, the court’s comments came on the heels of the prosecutor’s summation in which the State, on numerous occasions, accused defendant of committing the Graeco shooting and listed the evidence to support such an accusation, lending emphasis to the notion that the defense was a sham. From the bench, the court's comments, directed as they were at one of the defendant’s principal defenses, became highly adversarial and partisan.
Because a court’s capacity to influence the outcome of a trial is enormous, the revelation in this case of its opinion on the relevancy and cogency of the Graeco defense is extraordinarily prejudicial. See State v. Lemon, 107 N.J.Super. 101, 105-06, 257 A.2d 123 (App.Div.1969) (the judge’s charge that “it shouldn’t be hard in this case, it shouldn’t be hard at all---you heard it [the facts] and it shouldn’t be any trouble whatsoever, none at all,” and that “[t]his case wasn’t a long case, its a short case,” implicitly “placed the weight of his office on the side of the State” and required reversal). The “red herring” remark entailed more than a poor choice of words. The court *521threw “[its] judicial weight on one side or the other,” State v. Zwillman, 112 N.J.Super. 6, 20-21, 270 A.2d 284 (App.Div. 1970), and entered into the case as an advocate. United States v. Wilensky, 757 F.2d 594 (D.N.J.1985). The “red herring” charge so seriously created the possibility that the jury disregarded admissible exculpatory evidence that it requires reversal.
IV.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Dr. Frederick Evans, an expert on hypnotism. Defendant maintains that because witness William Perona was hypnotized at the State’s behest, expert testimony on how hypnotism may have impaired Perona’s memory was admissible to affect his credibility. The gist of defendant’s complaint is that Perona’s pre-hypnotic account of the suspicious man he bumped into at the Holiday Liquor Store around 8:30 p.m. on the night of the murder was clearly exculpatory evidence. After hypnosis, Perona’s account altered critically with respect to the time: he then said that he had been in the store prior to 8:00 p.m. — long before Compton was shot. Thus, his post-hypnotic testimony was of limited exculpatory value to defendant.
Defendant further complains that the prosecutor made use of Perona’s statement in his opening to bolster the State’s case without calling Perona as a witness. Thus, defendant was forced to call Perona, essentially as a hostile witness, but was denied the use of expert testimony to prove that the State’s hypnotizing of Perona might have destroyed exculpatory evidence. Furthermore, the expert testimony would have been a relevant means of questioning the reliability of all or part of the post-hypnotic recall of Perona. Defendant maintains that permitting the prosecutor to refer to Perona’s post-hypnotic statements along with Detective Jubilee’s related “hearsay” testimony without allowing him to show that Perona’s pre-hyp-*522notic recall might have been more correct constituted an abuse of discretion depriving him of a fair trial.
Following Perona’s testimony, the court held an Evidence Rule 8 hearing to determine the admissibility of Dr. Evans’ testimony. The proffered testimony was that hypnosis can make a person manufacture facts and believe them to be true, and, accordingly, witnesses are more reliable if hypnosis is not used. Furthermore, Evans was prepared to testify that an amnesiac instruction, which had been given to Perona, often causes confusion in the subject. Defendant contended that the expert testimony was admissible to show that the hypnosis session might have affected Perona’s ability to reconstruct events, and further to establish that the State may have caused a witness potentially helpful to the defense to be of little use. The court denied the motion to admit the testimony, finding that the defendant sought only to get the “jury to punish the Prosecutor for destroying this witness,” not an issue in the case and therefore irrelevant.
The trial court’s decision is seriously flawed. Even if it is questionable that Perona’s pre-hypnotic statement is any more exculpatory than his second statement because it did not necessarily establish that another person had been there at the relevant time, this clearly should have been presented to the jury fairly and completely. Initially it is clear that the thrust of the expert testimony was not simply to suggest to the jury that the State had somehow tampered with or ruined this important defense witness. Rather, defendant sought to present this expert testimony to impeach Perona’s credibility and generally to attack the State’s case.
The trial court concluded that the defense is not permitted to impeach the credibility of its own witness absent surprise or recent fabrication. Perona was an affirmative defense witness with respect to the suspicious man he saw in the liquor store that night, who did not fit the defendant’s description. However, the unusual posture of Perona as detailing an allegedly *523exculpatory time frame prior to hypnosis and an inculpatory one post-hypnosis, and the State’s backhanded introduction of his post-hypnotic statement at trial, effectively transformed him into a State’s witness with respect to that post-hypnotic recollection. To hold otherwise, that Perona’s credibility was not an issue of concern for defendant, is a shortsighted view of both the State’s motives and the jury’s awareness.
We have in other contexts been extremely critical of testimony elicited from witnesses by experts that may have serious credibility implications. See State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 630, 562 A.2d 1320 (1989) (rejecting as unreliable sodium amytal-induced testimony). The State availed itself of this hypnotically-refreshed testimony, yet avoided the “strict safeguards to ensure the reliability of the hypnotic procedure” established in State v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 529, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). Even without the benefit of in-court testimony of Perona, the State should have been required to establish both the scientific reliability of the hypnotic procedure and its appropriateness in this case before any reference was made thereto. State v. Hurd, supra, 86 N.J. at 543, 432 A.2d 86. In response, defendant should have been permitted to challenge the results of that procedure on Perona’s recollection through expert testimony and to show either that his pre-hypnotic memory was more accurate or that the procedure distorted his recall altogether. Ibid.
The trial court’s refusal to admit the expert testimony cannot be deemed harmless error. The error, in my opinion, is reversible.
V.
Defendant raises serious claims of prosecutorial misconduct in the penalty phase of the trial. This misconduct warrants more than a hollow reprimand. It calls for a reversal.
In defendant’s original jury challenge, he successfully demonstrated that the Atlantic County jury-selection system was *524defective in that it did not comply with statutory requirements for random selection. See State v. Long, 204 N.J.Super. 469, 499 A.2d 264 (Law Div.1985). In the penalty phase, defendant called Leslie DeVault, a fellow inmate, to testify to defendant’s character and willingness to counsel other inmates. On cross-examination of DeVault, the prosecutor seized on defendant’s legal challenge to the jury-selection system and, in what he later asserted was an effort to rebut the testimony that Ronald Long was “helpful” to other inmates, characterized the jury-system challenge as an “insurrection.”2
The prosecutor also showed DeVault a flyer that had apparently circulated around the jail regarding the jury challenge. The prosecutor attempted to establish that the flyer was written by defendant and described it as “something that was going to go around to all the prisoners and get them all hepped up over overthrowing the jury system.” DeVault said he did not know who had written the flyer, but it could have been Ronald Long. Thereafter, during further cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited testimony that indicated that defendant and the *525witness “wanted the jury system overthrown” and all indictments dismissed.3
Defense counsel later moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor’s improper and prejudicial cross-examination of De-Vault. Defendant also proffered the court’s opinion in the case of State v. Long to rebut the prosecutor’s inference that this was an unlawful and meritless attack on the jury-selection system. The prosecutor objected to the offer, arguing that defendant “wasn’t being helpful. He wanted to start a riot, he wanted to start an insurrection, he wanted the system to fall down.” The court did not admit the Long decision, but gave *526the jury a limiting instruction that actually reinforced part of the prosecutor’s improper purpose in introducing this line of testimony. The limiting instruction failed to explain that the challenge was, indeed, a meritorious and legitimate assertion of a constitutional right. At the same time, the instruction told the jury that the underlying merits were irrelevant, having “[njothing to do with anything.”
Defendant subsequently renewed his motion for a mistrial, arguing that the prosecutor’s mischaracterization of his jury-selection-system challenge as a “revolt” or “insurrection” generated the strong inference that “Ronald Long is a problem in the jail [and] is not a fit candidate for a prison sentence.” Defendant argued that this left “the jury with the clear alternative that the only other alternative is that he be put to death.” That motion was again denied.
The prosecutor clearly employed an exaggerated and distorted version of the facts, characterizing defendant’s legal challenge to the jury-selection system as a meritless and subversive plot. The prosecutor obviously misled the jurors, seemingly attempting to inflame them when he said that DeVault and the defendant “wanted all the indictments dismissed and everybody goes home.” ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, § 3-5.8(a) (2 ed. 1980) (“It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.”). This constitutes, in my view, both invidious name-calling and improper emphasis on defendant’s future dangerousness. See State v. Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 583-84, 575 A.2d 816. It deprived defendant of a fair trial. State v. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 426, 548 A.2d 1022; State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322-23, 524 A.2d 188.
This form of misconduct undermined defendant’s constitutional right to challenge a defective jury-selection system. That misconduct is all the more outrageous because of the *527possible chilling effect on the exercise of constitutional rights by other defendants. Furthermore, the impression left by this questioning was that Ronald Long was extremely dangerous— he plots, he stirs things up, he organizes revolts to overthrow our American jury system, he tries to set all the prisoners free. This is analogous to a prosecutor telling the jurors they have a duty to protect society from the future crimes of Ronald Long. See State v. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 519-20, 548 A.2d 1058 (urging the jury to sentence defendant to death in order to deter him from future violence and to “send a message” to society, along with other serious acts of misconduct, denied defendant a fair trial). The prosecutor strongly implied that society would be safer if defendant were executed. This aspect of the trial calls for a reversal.
VI.
The reasons set forth above impel me to conclude that defendant’s conviction must be reversed and death sentence vacated.
it is also appropriate to note that the empirical evidence strongly supports the premise that invidious racial overtones are otherwise implicated in an interracial capital murder. Defendant points out that the statistics contained in the Public Defender’s Preliminary Report indicate that the race of the victim improperly affects the decision to prosecute a particular homicide as a capital case. In the subsequent published version of that report, the authors claim that
[t]he results reported here indicate clear and significant discrepancies in the treatment of potentially capital cases when cases were differentiated by race of defendant and victim and county of jurisdiction. These county and race effects persisted even after the logistic regression analysis took into account over one hundred potential explanatory variables, such as the defendant’s prior record and the presence of a contemporaneous offense. In the opinion of the authors, this statistical evidence is sufficiently compelling to shift the burden to the State to come forward with evidence that the system of selecting cases for capital prosecution does not operate in a manner which offends constitutional principles.
[Bienen, Weiner, Denno, Allison & Mills, ‘The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion," 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 27, 327 (1988).]
Although this Court expressly considered and rejected the sufficiency of the statistical evidence to support the claim of arbitrary prosecutorial discretion in capital-murder prosecutions in State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 257, 548 A.2d 939 (1988), that evidence nonetheless confirms the conclusion reached earlier by the Court in Ramseur that potential racial bias is implicated in an interracial capital-murder case and can imperil a fair trial.
The prosecutor's cross-examination of DeVault consisted of:
Q So you're saying that during the time you were with him and the time that you experienced what he was doing, he was helping inmates and easing their way in the prison, is that right?
A At times, yes.
Q Well, wouldn't you say that rather than helping them, what he was doing was stirring them up?
A No, I wouldn't say that.
Q Wouldn't you say that what he was doing was organizing them so that they would revolt against what was going on in the jail?
A No, sir.
********
Q And did there come a time when you and Mr. Long talked about his jury motion, to overthrow the juries?
A Yes, sir, I heard about it.
Q You heard about it. Didn’t you plot with Mr. Long so that the jury system would fall and all the prisoners would be let go?
A Plot? What do you mean? No, sir, I did not plot with him.
This exchange took place:
Q Other than passing on this document, have you ever had any discussions with Ronald Long about this document?
A After he came to the cell block.
Q Well, what were the discussions about?
A Discussion, no, I didn’t have no discussion. I wanted to join in on it.
Q You wanted to be part of this?
A Yes, sir.
Q You wanted the jury system to be overthrown, is that right?
A Yes, sir.
Q What’s that?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you agreed with the language that was in this, is that right?
A Yes.
Q You did. You agreed that anybody who wanted to freeze their trial and/or sentence join in the State versus Long jury process challenge. When it’s over, indictments are going to be dismissed left and right. You wanted to join this, right?
A Yes, sir, I did join.
Q The more people that join in, the more upset the Prosecutor, right?
A Like it is.
Q In other words, you wanted justice to be done. You wanted the Prosecutor to be completely upset, all the indictments dismissed and everybody goes home, is that what you wanted?
A Now you’re putting words in my mouth again.
Q It’s time to stop getting kicked in the ass by these crooked, high powered assholes. Who are they, the crooked high powered assholes? A Did I say I agreed with the whole thing? I said I agreed with the part on the back. I didn’t say I agreed with that now. You’re misconstruing my words again.
*526MR. ROSENFELD: Nothing further.