dissenting.
Although Justice VandeWalle has discussed principles of law with which I agree, I do not agree that they are dispositive of this case.
When sophisticated business people rely upon oral agreements covering complex matters, their errors are only more complicated than when amateurs do it. If Walker had “exclusive right to sell lands,” it should be presumed that he had the “right to sell lands” and the sales he made would have to be fulfilled by Clairmont signing the appropriate deeds.
Ordinarily a party cannot claim, on appeal, the benefit of a version of relevant facts more favorable to him than he has made for himself by his own testimony. Malarchick v. Pierce, 264 N.W.2d 478, 480 (N.D.1978).
Oral authorization of an agent is sufficient for any purpose “except that an authority to enter into a contract required by law to be in writing . .. [with one exception not applicable here] can be given only by an instrument in writing.” Section 3-02-06, NDCC. See Severson v. Fleck, 148 F.Supp. 760 and 251 F.2d 920 (8th Cir.1958).
Presuming, however, that Walker’s claim was just loosely stated and he really didn’t intend to say that he could “sell” land as Clairmont’s agent, but that he was an employee who would just provide the personal service of seeking out buyers for Clairmont to deal with, then we run into § 34-01-02, NDCC.
“Even if the trial judge’s reasoning were incorrect, we will not reverse the proper judgment on that basis. See KFGO Radio, Inc. v. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d 505, 509 (N.D.1980).” Bohn v. Bohn Implement Co., 325 N.W.2d 281, 283 (N.D.1982).
I would affirm the granting of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict by the trial court. There would, therefore, be no reason to consider the matter of granting a new trial.