dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. The majority asks us to believe that an emergency, as defined under the Public Safety Employees Benefit Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2006)), cannot exist in a firefighter training exercise. That is simply not true. In the case at bar, an emergency developed in the course of a firefighter training exercise and a firefighter was catastrophically injured while responding to it. The legislature enacted the Act in order to provide health insurance coverage to public safety employees, and their families, who are catastrophically injured in the line of duty (90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 16, 1997, at 192 (statements of Senator Donahue)), as was the plaintiff in this case, and we should ensure that a firefighter obtains what is due to him under the Act. Firefighters put their lives on the line for the public on a daily basis.
In the case at bar, plaintiff served as a firefighter and paramedic with the Orland Park Fire Protection District (District) from 1994 until 2005, when he received a catastrophic injury in the course of a training exercise in which he engaged as part of his employment with the District. On July 27, 2005, plaintiff and a team of District firefighters engaged in a live-fire training exercise and were told by their supervisors that they were to treat the exercise as an emergency. The firefighters proceeded with lights and sirens to a burning building, which contained several obstacles and a dummy victim inside. Plaintiffs assignment in the exercise included bringing a hose to the location of the fire inside the building and locating the dummy victim.
Upon arriving at the scene, plaintiff donned fire protection gear and a self-contained breathing apparatus tank before entering the burning building. Plaintiff proceeded through the building to the second floor, where he and his team rescued the dummy victim. At this time, the building was filled with smoke and visibility was nonexistent.
After rescuing the dummy victim, plaintiff and his team proceeded to the third floor of the building in order to extinguish the fire. While they advanced toward the source of the fire, plaintiffs fire hose became stuck on a then-unknown object, effectively trapping plaintiff and his team near a burning fire in an area with several obstacles and no visibility. At this point, plaintiff retraced the hose, found that it was tangled around a Ioveseat, and proceeded to free the hose. In the course of freeing the fire hose, plaintiff suffered a catastrophic injury to his left shoulder that has prevented him from serving as a firefighter since the July 27, 2005, incident. He was later placed on permanent duty disability.
The instant case turns on what the legislature meant by the term “emergency” or “what is reasonably believed to be an emergency” in the Public Safety Employees Benefit Act (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2006)). The statute provides, in relevant part:
“(a) An employer who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who, on or after the effective date of this Act suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer’s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee’s spouse, and for each dependent child of the injured employee until the child reaches the age of majority or until the end of the calendar year in which the child reaches the age of 25 if the child continues to be dependent for support or the child is a full-time or part-time student and is dependent for support. ***
(b) In order for the law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, firefighter, spouse, or dependent children to be eligible for insurance coverage under this Act, the injury or death must have occurred as the result of the officer’s response to fresh pursuit, the officer or firefighter’s response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, an unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a criminal act. Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit health insurance coverage or pension benefits for which the officer, firefighter, spouse, or dependent children may otherwise be eligible.” (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2006).
When construing a statute, we must “ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent” and “the best indication of legislative intent is the statutory language, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” People v. Pack, 224 Ill. 2d 144, 147 (2007).
The legislature did not provide us with a definition of “emergency” in the Act, and so we must determine under what circumstances the legislature intended the Act to apply. In other words, we must determine what is “reasonably believed to be an emergency.” 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2006). First I note that the legislature explicitly declined to limit the Act to actual emergencies. If the legislature had intended to limit the Act to actual emergencies, in other words, to exclude training exercises, it could have done so. Instead, the legislature chose to use the phrase “what is reasonably believed to be an emergency,” which indicates that a firefighter’s subjective beliefs in the particular situation control.
Some additional guidance can be found in the House and Senate transcripts of the discussions preceding the passage of the Act. I cannot use the term “debates” to refer to these statements because there was no debate about the passage of the Act. In fact, the Act was never debated in the General Assembly. Instead, Representative Tenhouse and Senator Donahue each made statements generally describing the proposed bill to their respective legislative bodies. Prior to a vote in the House, Representative Tenhouse made the following remarks describing the Act: “1347 [the Act] is a simple Bill. It simply provides that full-time law enforcement officers and firefighters that are killed or disabled in the line of duty, we’re going to continue the health benefits for the officer’s children and spouse.” 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 14, 1997, at 180 (statements of Representative Tenhouse).
Senator Donahue expanded on Representative Tenhouse’s remarks and explained the impetus for the Act: compliance with federal legislation that would bring federal funding for crime-fighting efforts to the State of Illinois. As Senator Donahue explained:
“House Bill 1347 creates the Public Safety Employees Benefit Act, and what this bill does is because of legislation that was passed at the federal level, many of our districts or our areas are receiving federal funds for more policemen. And in a caveat in that legislation, it says that those federal funds are contingent on passing a benefits Act. And what this does is that it provides that for full-time law enforcement officers and firefighters that are killed or disabled in the line of duty shall continue the health benefits for the officer or the firefighter, their spouses and their children. I think this is a very important piece of legislation. I’m not one that normally passes onto a mandate at the local level, but I think this is worth it, and it’s something very necessary.” 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 16, 1997, at 192 (statements of Senator Donahue).
The only debate that occurred regarding the Act took place not within the legislature but rather between the legislature and the Governor, who initially vetoed the Act. On October 28, 1997, the House overrode the Governor’s veto by a vote of 115 to 1. 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, October 28, 1997, at 16 (statements of Representative Hannig). Two weeks later on November 14, 1997, the Senate overrode the Governor’s veto by a vote of 58 to 1, and the Act was passed into law. 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, November 14, 1997, at 136 (statements of Senator Dudycz).
Every time a legislator discussed the contents of the Act, he employed the phrase “killed or disabled in the line of duty.” 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, April 14, 1997, at 180 (statements of Representative Tenhouse); 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 16, 1997, at 192 (statements of Senator Donahue); 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, October 28, 1997, at 16 (statements of Representative Tenhouse); 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, November 14, 1997, at 136 (statements of Senator Donahue). In addition, when asking the Senate to override the Governor’s veto, Senator Donahue expressly stated that the legislature intended the phrase “catastrophically injured” to mean injuries suffered by a police officer or firefighter whose injury qualified him to take a line of duty pension under section 6—151 of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/6—151 (West 2006)). 90th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, November 14, 1997, at 136 (statements of Senator Donahue). In O’Callaghan v. Retirement Board of Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 302 Ill. App. 3d 579 (1998), the fourth division of this district held that a firefighter injured during a training drill was eligible for a line of duty disability pension. 302 Ill. App. 3d at 583-84. I see nothing in the text of the Act or its legislative history to indicate that firefighters injured during training exercises, especially live fire exercises, in which an emergency develops should be excluded from benefits under the Act.
The Second District in DeRose v. City of Highland Park, 386 Ill. App. 3d 658 (2008), determined a definition of “emergency” under the Act. The DeRose court found that “[a] situation is therefore an ‘emergency’ under the Employee Benefits Act where it is urgent and calls for immediate action.” 386 Ill. App. 3d at 661. Black’s Law Dictionary provides a similar definition of “emergency circumstances,” which are defined under the term “exigent circumstances.” It states: “Exigent circumstances may exist if (1) a person’s life or safety is threatened, (2) a suspect’s escape is imminent, or (3) evidence is about to be removed or destroyed.” Black’s Law Dictionary 277 (9th ed. 2009).
Nowhere in either of these definitions is there dependence on whether the situation is or is not part of a training exercise. Instead, the definitions focus on a threat presented that demands immediate attention.
The majority agrees with the DeRose court and found that an “emergency” under the Act constitutes a situation that “ ‘is urgent and calls for immediate action.’ [Citation.]” 397 Ill. App. 3d at 688. Under this definition, the majority fails to find an emergency situation in a training exercise, arguing, “a training exercise is not inherently an emergency.” 397 Ill. App. 3d at 689. I can accept that proposition. However, the majority continues and claims that when plaintiff began the training exercise, “he believed that he was responding to a training exercise, albeit one that involved a live fire, and not an emergency.” 397 Ill. App. 3d at 690.
The majority’s analysis focuses on what was the plaintiffs belief at the inception of the exercise, but that is not when the emergency occurred. This argument is flawed because it presumes that an emergency situation cannot develop during a training exercise. Under its reasoning, the majority would have us believe that because a firefighter knows that he is engaging in a training exercise, the situation would, by definition, never be an emergency, regardless of what occurred after the exercise began. Thus, even if the live fire became out of hand and the building burned down with the firefighters, that would not constitute an emergency.
Nevertheless, even under the majority’s definition of “emergency,” the plaintiff has still established that an emergency arose in the course of the July 27, 2005, training exercise. The parties’ briefs and the majority opinion focus a great deal of attention on the fact that plaintiff not only was participating in a training exercise but also that he knew that he was engaging in a training exercise. Nothing in the Act compels us to consider the incident only at its inception. Eather, the statute directs us to consider “the officer or firefighter’s response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency.” 820 ILCS 320/ 10(b) (West 2006). As the majority’s definition of “emergency” tells us, we must determine whether a situation occurred that was “ ‘urgent and call[ed] for immediate action.’ ” 397 Ill. App. 3d at 689. We do not sit with blinders on and say that an emergency cannot occur in a training exercise. If the legislature intended an emergency not to apply in a training exercise, it would have said so in the statute.
When I look at the facts presented by the plaintiff, it is clear that plaintiff suffered his injury during his response to “what is reasonably believed to be an emergency.” 820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 2006). When plaintiffs fire hose became stuck, an emergency arose. Plaintiff and his team were halted on the third floor of a burning building, near the source of the fire without water because of a tangled hose. Smoke from the fire obscured all visibility in the building and plaintiff could not advance the hose to extinguish the fire until the obstruction was removed. A team of firefighters stuck on the third floor of a burning building, with no visibility, and unable to put out the fire without plaintiffs actions to remove the obstruction seems like an emergency under the plain meaning of the term. The situation was “ ‘urgent and call[ed] for immediate action.’ ” 397 Ill. App. 3d at 689.
Firefighter training exercises can be extremely dangerous. Between 1987 and 2001, fire departments around the country reported an average of 6,700 training-related injuries every year. U.S. Fire Admin., Department of Homeland Security, USFA—TR—100, Special Report: Trends and Hazards in Firefighter Training 7 (May 2003). These injuries include sprains/strains, heart attack or stroke, smoke/ gas inhalation and other respiratory ailments, dislocations and fractures, burns, and other wounds. U.S. Fire Admin., Department of Homeland Security, USFA—TR—100, Special Report: Trends and Hazards in Firefighter Training 7 (May 2003). In addition, the number of firefighter training-related fatalities each year has increased from 1987 to 2001. U.S. Fire Admin., Department of Homeland Security, USFA—TR—100, Special Report: Trends and Hazards in Firefighter Training 8 (May 2003). Live-fire training exercises, in particular, “pose a significant risk to trainees and instructors.” U.S. Fire Admin., Department of Homeland Security, USFA—TR—100, Special Report: Trends and Hazards in Firefighter Training 12 (May 2003).
While, as the majority posits, “a training exercise is not inherently an emergency” (397 Ill. App. 3d at 689), the dangers inherent in a live-fire training exercise can lead to an emergency situation at any time. Plaintiff and his team were lucky; they survived the fire and benefitted greatly from plaintiff’s actions in freeing the fire hose. Plaintiffs efforts in responding to an emergency—freeing the fire hose, and thus saving his team from a perilous situation—are exactly the sort of acts that the legislature sought to reward when it passed the Act.
The trial court erred in denying plaintiff benefits under the Act.