dissenting upon denial of rehearing:
Although I agree with the public policy set forth by the majority’s decision, allowing parties to amend a timely filed complaint for administrative review to name the appropriate parties, I must reluctantly dissent. In their petition for rehearing, the defendants argue that we overlooked the case of Veazey v. Baker, 322 Ill. App. 3d 599 (2001), in making our original decision. I note that in their appellate briefs, the defendants placed little emphasis on Veazey. Rather, Veazey was merely listed at the end of a long chain cite. Nonetheless, upon the defendants’ request, I have reviewed Veazey
Veazey involved an administrative review action in which the plaintiff appealed the order of the circuit court dismissing his complaint. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d 599, 601 (2001). In his complaint, the plaintiff challenged the decision of the defendants, the Illinois Department of Employment Security (the Department) and the Department’s Director, finding him ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 601. In his complaint, the plaintiff named the Department and its Director. However, the plaintiffs complaint did not name the Board of Review (the Board) which issued the decision from which the plaintiff was appealing. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 601. Upon motion of the Department and its Director, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint for failure to name the Board as a defendant and denied the plaintiffs request for leave to amend the complaint to add the Board as an adverse party. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 601. On appeal, the reviewing court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 601. The reviewing court determined that the Board was the body that issued the administrative decision that was subject to the review process. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 603. As such, the Board was the administrative agency from which the plaintiff had to seek review. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 603.
In so ruling, the Veazey court explained that section 3 — 102 of the Administrative Review Law (the Act) (735 ILCS 5/3 — 102 (West 2002)) explicitly conditions review of an administrative decision upon compliance with its provisions:
“Unless review is sought of an administrative decision within the time and in the manner herein provided, the parties to the proceeding before the administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial review of such administrative decision.” 735 ILCS 5/3— 102 (West 1998); Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 602.
Furthermore, the court explained that the Act is a departure from the common law and, as such, its provisions must be strictly adhered to by the parties. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 602. Because administrative review actions involve the exercise of special statutory jurisdiction, the court’s power to hear such cases is limited to the language of the Act, and if the prescribed statutory procedure is not strictly followed, no jurisdiction can be invoked. Veazey, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 602.
Pursuant to section 3 — 107(a) of the Act, a complaint must name “the administrative agency and all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency *** [as] defendants.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 107(a) (West 2002). Accordingly, in a complaint for administrative review, a plaintiff is required to name the body which made the final administrative decision at issue. Wilson, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 203. In the present case, it is undisputed that the Board of Trustees of the IMRF (the Board) made the final administrative decision from which the plaintiff is appealing. Accordingly, the plaintiff was required to name the Board as a defendant in his complaint. However, the plaintiff only named the IMRF.
In determining that the plaintiff could amend his complaint to add the Board, the majority, in relying on Fragakis, explains that 1997 amendments to the Act were intended to bring peace to the dangerous minefield created by cases denying a plaintiff leave to amend a timely filed complaint to name the appropriate party. Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 142-43, 145. Furthermore, the majority explains that the legislature has recognized that administrative review cases should not be dismissed for such technical violations in naming the parties. See Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 149. If the Veazey court had applied the rationale of the majority, it could have characterized the Department as a governmental entity of which the Board is a member and allowed the plaintiff’s requested amendment under section 3 — 103(2). However, the Veazey court did not allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint to add the Board. Consequently, upon review of Veazey, I do not believe Fragakis should be construed as liberally as the majority suggests.
In Fragakis, the plaintiff, a police sergeant, appealed from the trial court’s dismissal of his complaint for administrative review of a five-day suspension imposed on him by the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners (the Board). Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 142. In his complaint, the plaintiff named and served only the Board. Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 143. The trial court dismissed his complaint for failure to name the individual members of the Board and the chief of police as parties. Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 143. On appeal, the reviewing court determined that the trial court erred in not allowing the plaintiff to amend his complaint to add the chief of police and the individual members of the Board. Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 148.
In so ruling, the court explained that 1997 amendments to section 3 — 103 of the Act created two specific exceptions to the filing requirements. Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 148. Under section 3 — 103(1), the court held that the plaintiff should have been granted leave to amend his complaint to add the chief of police, and under section 3 — 103(2), the plaintiff should have been granted leave to amend his complaint to add the individual Board members where the Board was a party to the action for administrative review. Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 148. Moreover, according to the Fragakis court, “[s]ection 3 — 103 clearly grants the right to amend in those situations where a party has filed a timely complaint but failed to name a police chief or failed to name an individual member of a board where the board was made a party.” Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 149. As such, I believe that section 3 — 103(2) was intended to allow a plaintiff to amend a complaint for administrative review to add an individual as an adverse party, if the individual was an employee, agent, or member of an agency, board, or entity, and the agency, board, or entity had been named in the original complaint. In the present case, the Board does not qualify as an individual.
A review of the legislative history of the 1997 amendments to the Act lends support to this interpretation of section 3 — 103(2). I agree with the majority that section 3 — 103(2) of the Act is ambiguous. When a statute’s meaning is unclear, the court may examine legislative history. Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Teachers Insurance Co., 195 Ill. 2d 322, 330 (2001). The Act was amended by Public Act 89— 685 (House Bill 346), which became effective June 1, 1997. The amendments included the addition of section 3 — 103(2), and modifications to sections 3 — 105 and 3 — 107 of the Act. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 103(2), 3 — 105, 3 — 107 (West 2002). When introducing the legislation, Senator Hawkinson stated the following:
“[House Bill 346] allows a plaintiff in an administrative review action to obtain service on the agency if they have already served the agency head or to refile against an employee acting in his official capacity if they have already served the agency. Without this change, we’re finding them — some cases are being dismissed because all necessary parties have not been named and served.” 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 8, 1996, at 12-13 (statements of Senator Hawkinson).
This indicates that the 1997 amendments to the Act were intended to allow a plaintiff to amend a timely filed complaint for administrative review by adding an agency, if the agency head was named, or by adding an individual, if the individual was an employee of a properly named agency. This interpretation is consistent with that found in Fragakis. See Fragakis, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 148-49.
Accordingly, in light of Veazey, and upon closer review of Fragakis and the legislative history of section 3 — 103(2), I do not think it is proper to interpret the Board as a member of the IMRF. I believe the amendment to section 3 — 103(2) was intended to apply to individuals. Unfortunately, although the plaintiff named the IMRF in his complaint, he failed to name a necessary party to the administrative review action, specifically, the Board. As the Board is not an individual, the changes to the Act allowing amendments to the original complaint to name a necessary party do not apply in the present case. Accordingly, I believe the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. Unfortunately, the current state of the administrative review law denies the plaintiff his day in court for what I perceive as a mere technical violation. Although I am not comfortable with this outcome, for the foregoing reasons, I must dissent. I would therefore grant the defendants’ petition for rehearing.