Joshua Allen Zimmerer v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________

No. 02-22-00180-CR
No. 02-22-00181-CR
No. 02-22-00182-CR
No. 02-22-00183-CR
No. 02-22-00184-CR
___________________________

JOSHUA ALLEN ZIMMERER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from the 235th District Court
Cooke County, Texas
Trial Court Nos. CR19-00333, CR19-00334, CR19-00335, CR19-00336, CR19-00337

Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
 MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION

A jury found Appellant Joshua Allen Zimmerer guilty of one count of

aggravated sexual assault of a child and four counts of sexual assault of a child

stemming from his abuse of his niece, M.R.B.R. (Madison).1 See Tex. Penal Code

Ann. §§ 22.011(a)(2)(A), (B), .021(a)(1)(B)(i). The jury assessed his punishment at five

years’ confinement for aggravated sexual assault of a child and three years’

confinement for each count of sexual assault of a child, and the trial court sentenced

him accordingly, with the sentences to run concurrently. In two points on appeal,2

Zimmerer argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that

the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for new trial. Because

sufficient evidence supports his convictions and the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by denying his motion for new trial, we will affirm.

1
To protect the complainant’s anonymity, we use an alias to refer to her and to
some of her family members. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8 cmt., 9.10(a)(3); McClendon v.
State, 643 S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).
2
In the argument section of his brief, Zimmerer presents his challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence before his challenge to the trial court’s denial of his motion
for new trial. However, in a section of his brief labeled “Appeal Points Presented,”
Zimmerer lists his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence after his challenge to the
denial of his motion for new trial. In its brief, the State treats Zimmerer’s sufficiency
challenge as his “first” point and Zimmerer’s challenge to the denial of his motion for
new trial as his “second” point. We will do the same.

2
 II. BACKGROUND

A. Madison’s Familial Relationship with Zimmerer and Zimmerer’s Wife

Madison’s parents divorced when she was around two years old. In 2009,

when Madison was around seven or eight years old, her mother’s boyfriend raped her.

Madison then went to live with her paternal grandmother (Grandmother) in Cooke

County. At some point later, Grandmother’s daughter—who is also Madison’s aunt

(Aunt)—began living nearby, and Madison and Aunt became very close.3 Aunt was

married to Zimmerer, thus making Zimmerer Madison’s uncle through marriage.4

B. The Alleged Abuse in January 2013

At Zimmerer’s trial, Madison testified that Zimmerer had “assaulted [her] when

[she] was in [the] sixth grade.” She explained that she had been asleep in a bed in

Zimmerer and Aunt’s home, that she had been awakened by his sitting on the bed and

rubbing her leg over the blanket, that he had then put his hand under the blanket and

grabbed her butt, that he had then reached under her pajama pants and inserted his

fingers into her vagina, and that he had then left the room. Madison did not initially

tell anyone about this incident because she was “ashamed and didn’t want to actually

think that . . . it had actually happened.”

3
Madison described Aunt as “pretty much like [a] big sister.” Aunt testified
that she and Madison “always had a good relationship,” noting that Madison would
refer to her as “Mom” and that, over time, the relationship had changed from an
aunt–niece relationship to a mother–daughter relationship.

Aunt and Zimmerer were married in 2008.
4

3
 According to Madison, this incident had occurred “early in the morning” in

“early January.” She initially testified that the incident had occurred in January 2012,

although after Zimmerer’s counsel indicated that Zimmerer had been living in North

Carolina in January 2012,5 Madison stated that the incident must have occurred

around January 2013.6 Madison was eleven in January 2013.

C. The Alleged Abuse from October to December 2015

At Zimmerer’s trial, Madison testified that he had sexually abused her on

numerous occasions from October to December 2015, when she was fourteen years

old. She stated that the abuse had progressed from his slapping her butt, to his

kissing her, to his penetrating her with his fingers, to his “bringing condoms in with

him.” She testified that during that time period, Zimmerer had penetrated her vagina

with his fingers “[d]aily.” Madison also said that Zimmerer had penetrated her vagina

with his penis and that on one occasion, he had “shoved” his penis into her mouth.

She indicated that she did not initially tell anyone about these incidents because she

was “ashamed.”

5
Aunt testified that she and Zimmerer had lived in North Carolina in
January 2012, noting that they had moved back to Texas in July 2012.
6
At Zimmerer’s trial, his longtime friend, Garin Taylor, testified that between
October 2012 and March 2013, he had lived with Zimmerer and Aunt. According to
Taylor, Madison never spent the night in the house while he lived there, although he
stated that Madison was “around in the daytime.”

4
 Madison testified that these incidents had taken place in Zimmerer’s home

mostly in the mornings before school, noting that the abuse typically occurred in the

back bedroom where she had slept. According to Madison, during 2015—the year

these incidents allegedly occurred—she was “mostly living with [Zimmerer] and

[Aunt]” and spent “most nights” at their home. Other witnesses at trial, however,

indicated that Madison did not live at Zimmerer and Aunt’s home in 2015. To that

end, Aunt testified that Madison had lived with Grandmother “[f]ull-time” in 2015,

stating that she was “[o]ne hundred percent certain” that Madison had not lived with

Zimmerer and her in 2015. Grandmother testified that in 2015, Madison had lived

with her, and that during the October7 through December 2015 timeframe, she and

Madison would often leave her home around 6:30 a.m. or 7:00 a.m. because Madison

had to go and feed a pig as part of a school club.8

7
Zimmerer presented evidence at trial to call into question Madison’s assertion
that abuse had occurred in October 2015. His employment records—which were
admitted into evidence at his trial—reflected that he had been employed by Peterbilt
from September 22, 2014, through October 9, 2015, and that he had worked the
“night shift” from June 7, 2015, until October 9, 2015. Aunt testified that when
Zimmerer had worked that shift, he typically would leave for work around 9:00 p.m.
and that he would not get home until around 9:00 a.m. Cassandra Smith, a friend of
Zimmerer’s, testified that she had been married in Bowie, Texas, on Saturday,
October 10, 2015, and that while Zimmerer and Aunt had stayed in Bowie “the entire
weekend,” Madison had not been present.
8
Madison acknowledged that she had to take care of a pig in September and
October 2015 as part of a school club, testifying that she had fed the pig in the
mornings before school and in the afternoons after school. She stated that during
that timeframe, she would leave Zimmerer’s home around 7:20 a.m. each morning to
go and feed the pig. As to who would drive her, Madison testified that “[i]t just kind

5
D. Madison’s School Paper Alluding to Zimmerer’s Abuse

In or around December 2018, during her senior year of high school, Madison

wrote a paper in her dual-credit psychology class in which she discussed having been

sexually abused by her mother’s boyfriend when she had been a young child. The

paper also mentioned that she had been sexually abused when she was in the sixth

grade and when she was fourteen, although it did not name her abuser.9 Madison was

proud of her paper, and she gave a copy of it to Jessica Hill, a counselor she was

seeing at Abigail’s Arms.10 Due to Hill’s concern with Madison’s allusions to abuse in

the paper, Hill made a report to Child Protective Services (CPS). Jennifer Matthews, a

CPS investigator, conducted a forensic interview with Madison on January 24, 2019.

During that interview, Madison did not disclose that Zimmerer had abused her.

of depended on who was available to take [her] to school,” mentioning that
sometimes Grandmother would take her to school and sometimes she would ride the
bus. Mickie MaGouirk, the teacher sponsoring the school club, testified that during
the 2015 school year, Madison had a pig that she was responsible for as part of the
club. MaGouirk stated that Madison “sometimes” fed the pig in the morning—
noting that Madison would feed the pig around 7:30 or 7:45 a.m.—although she
acknowledged that Madison “might have missed a couple” of mornings feeding the
pig. MaGouirk also stated that she had seen Grandmother drop Madison off to feed
the pig but that she had never seen Zimmerer drop Madison off.

At trial, Madison testified that the unnamed abuser discussed in her paper was
9

Zimmerer.
10
The record reflects that Abigail’s Arms is a children’s advocacy center.
Madison began counseling at Abigail’s Arms in or around November 2018 to deal
with memories that were returning to her stemming from the abuse by her mother’s
boyfriend.

6
E. Allegations Come to Light

On the evening of January 25, 2019, Madison’s father called Aunt—his sister—

and indicated that she and Zimmerer needed to read Madison’s school paper because

CPS was investigating them over allegations in it. Aunt called Madison to attempt to

find out what had been said in the paper. Zimmerer was sitting next to Aunt in

Grandmother’s house during that phone call.11 Madison told Aunt that the paper did

not have to do with either Aunt or her children. Aunt then asked if the paper had to

do with Zimmerer, and Madison remained silent. As recounted by Aunt, Zimmerer

then took a deep breath and indicated that “[s]omething [had] happened with

[Madison].” Aunt then immediately started yelling at Zimmerer, telling him to “shut

up” when he tried to respond. Aunt also told Zimmerer to go to each of his kids and

tell them goodbye, noting that she had assumed that Zimmerer had “molested

[Madison] or something.” According to Madison, she heard Aunt tell Zimmerer,

“You’re not going to go get the F’ing gun,” and Madison hung up the phone.

Madison then drove to Grandmother’s house, and she arrived to a “very

chaotic” scene. Aunt testified that after Madison had arrived at the house, Zimmerer

“made a suicide attempt.” She recounted that Zimmerer “tried to get to a gun” but

that she “beat him to it.” Due to Zimmerer’s attempt to get the gun and her belief

that he was having an episode brought on by his post-traumatic stress disorder

11
Madison, Zimmerer, and Aunt were staying with Grandmother at that time
due to a leak in Zimmerer and Aunt’s home.

7
(PTSD), Aunt called Zimmerer’s brother, Ryan, and asked him to come and get

Zimmerer.12

According to Madison, Zimmerer told her that “he was sorry” that night and

asked if he could hug her. In her account of that night, Aunt did not recall Zimmerer

apologizing to Madison, but she did recall his telling Madison, “[I]f you said I did [it],

I believe you, but I don’t remember. I’m not going to call you a liar, I’m not going to

tell you that you’re wrong.” Aunt also indicated that when she attempted to hug

Zimmerer after Ryan had arrived at the house, Zimmerer was “zombie like” and “just

wasn’t there.” She stated that Madison had attempted to hug Zimmerer after Ryan

had arrived but that Zimmerer had refused to hug her until Ryan made him. Later

that night, Ryan drove Zimmerer to University Behavioral Health of Denton (UBH

Denton) for mental-health treatment. According to Ryan, Zimmerer was not

coherent during the car ride, and he had to help his brother fill out the paperwork at

the hospital because he “cognitively wasn’t there.”

F. Aunt’s and Madison’s Conversations with the Cooke County Sheriff’s Office

In the early morning hours of January 26, 2019, Aunt and Madison went to the

Cooke County Sheriff’s Office. While there, they spoke with Deputy Michael Green.

Aunt told Deputy Green, “[T]onight my husband told me that three years ago he

12
Ryan testified that Zimmerer suffers from PTSD due to his past service in the
Marine Corps. Aunt testified that Zimmerer had suffered from PTSD episodes in the
past and that she had called Ryan on other occasions to deal with those episodes.

8
sexually molested my daughter who is actually biologically my niece.”13 Aunt also told

Deputy Green that Zimmerer had cried and apologized and that he had said that he

had been “struggling” and “would touch [Madison].”14

During her conversation with Deputy Green, Madison denied that Zimmerer

had ever penetrated her with his penis.15

G. Zimmerer’s Admissions Regarding the Abuse Made to Staff at the VA
Medical Center

While Ryan initially took Zimmerer to UBH Denton, Zimmerer was ultimately

admitted to the VA Medical Center in Dallas on January 26, 2019. Heather Martin, a

social worker at the VA Medical Center, testified that Zimmerer was admitted because

he was “suicidal” and had “asked for his wife to assist with shooting him because

of . . . legal issues with CPS.”

Martin met with Zimmerer in person at the VA Medical Center. She testified

that Zimmerer admitted to her that he had molested Madison and that he was unsure

In contrast, at Zimmerer’s trial, Aunt stated that she did not believe that he
13

had ever used the word “molest,” despite what she had told Deputy Green.

At trial, Aunt testified that she had “assumed the worst” when Zimmerer had
14

told her that “[s]omething [had] happened with [Madison].” Aunt stated that
Zimmerer had later explained to her what he had meant by that statement and that his
explanation was “more than sufficient.”

At trial, Madison explained that she had denied that allegation at the time
15

because she knew that it would be a “big . . . blow” to Aunt. Madison indicated that
she later disclosed that type of penetration after her “family switched sides” and she
became “the outcast.”

9
of the legal ramifications. Zimmerer told Martin that he was feeling guilty about

having molested Madison given that she had been molested in her past. According to

Martin, Zimmerer admitted to “fingering” Madison and to having “sex.” Zimmerer

told Martin that the abuse had occurred “daily for several months.” He also told

Martin, “I told my wife that I molested [Madison] on Friday and now my life is

over.”16

H. Procedural History

Zimmerer was indicted on the following charges:

• In trial court cause number CR19-00333, Zimmerer was indicted for aggravated
sexual assault of a child. That charge alleged that on or about January 1, 2012,
he intentionally or knowingly penetrated Madison’s sexual organ with his finger
and that she was younger than fourteen years of age at the time.

• In trial court cause number CR19-00334, Zimmerer was indicted for sexual
assault of a child. That charge alleged that on or about September 1, 2015, he
intentionally or knowingly penetrated Madison’s sexual organ with his finger
and that she was younger than seventeen years of age at the time.

• In trial court cause number CR19-00335, Zimmerer was indicted for sexual
assault of a child. That charge alleged that on or about September 15, 2015, he

16
Zimmerer’s mother testified that she saw him when he was admitted at the
VA Medical Center, that she saw him when he was discharged the next week, and that
she had talked to him every day he was at the VA Medical Center. She described him
during that time period as “[z]ombie like,” “almost drooling,” and incoherent. She
also said that when Zimmerer was being spoken to, he responded “as if he was
repeating what you said” back. Records from the VA Medical Center that were
admitted at trial, however, reflect that at the time of his admissions to Martin, his
speech was “normal (coherent),” his thoughts were organized, and he was able to
process information.

10
 intentionally or knowingly penetrated Madison’s mouth with his sexual organ
and that she was younger than seventeen years of age at the time.

• In trial court cause number CR19-00336, Zimmerer was indicted for sexual
assault of a child. That charge alleged that on or about October 1, 2015, he
intentionally or knowingly penetrated Madison’s sexual organ with his finger
and that she was younger than seventeen years of age at the time.

• In trial court cause number CR19-00337, Zimmerer was indicted for sexual
assault of a child. That charge alleged that on or about October 15, 2015, he
intentionally or knowingly penetrated Madison’s sexual organ with his finger
and that she was younger than seventeen years of age at the time.

Zimmerer’s case proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, multiple witnesses testified

regarding Madison’s allegations that she had been abused by Zimmerer in

January 2013 and from October through December 2015.17 Other witnesses testified

regarding Madison’s credibility. In this regard, Maureen Tuggle—a friend of the

Zimmerer family—testified that Madison did not have a reputation in the community

for telling the truth. Lillian Tuggle—another friend of the Zimmerer family and

Madison’s alleged former best friend—testified that Madison was a “liar.”

Grandmother testified that Madison “does lie” and that Madison had once written her

a letter apologizing “for being a liar.” At trial, Zimmerer’s defense expert, Dr. Brian

Cutler, testified about false confessions, noting that PTSD is a risk factor for false

confessions.

17
We have detailed the relevant testimony regarding those allegations above.

11
 The jury ultimately found Zimmerer guilty of all counts. Following the

punishment phase, the jury assessed his punishment at five years’ confinement for

aggravated sexual assault of a child and three years’ confinement for each count of

sexual assault of a child. The trial court sentenced him accordingly, with the

sentences to run concurrently.

Zimmerer filed a motion for new trial, arguing that he should be granted a new

trial based on “new evidence discovered since his conviction.”18 Following an

evidentiary hearing on the motion, the trial court signed an order denying it. This

appeal ensued.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

In his first point, Zimmerer argues that the evidence is insufficient to support

his convictions.

1. Standard of Review

In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found

the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to

18
We will detail that evidence in our discussion of Zimmerer’s second point.

12
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at

2789; Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021). We may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute

our judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine

whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the evidence’s cumulative

force when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Braughton v. State,

569 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232

(Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage

in a ‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the

evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences

in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at

608.

To determine whether the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt, we compare the crime’s elements as defined by a

hypothetically correct jury charge to the evidence adduced at trial. Hammack v. State,

622 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Such a charge is one that accurately sets

out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the

State’s burden of proof or restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately

13
describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Id. The law as

authorized by the indictment means the statutory elements of the offense as modified

by the charging instrument’s allegations. Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2021).

2. Applicable Law

As relevant to this case, a person commits the offense of aggravated sexual

assault of a child if the person intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the

sexual organ of a child younger than fourteen years of age. Tex. Penal Code Ann.

§ 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i). As relevant to this case, a person commits the offense of sexual

assault of a child if he intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the sexual

organ of a child younger than seventeen years of age or if he intentionally or

knowingly causes the penetration of the mouth of a child younger than seventeen

years of age by his sexual organ. Id. § 22.011(a)(2)(A), (B).

3. Analysis

Zimmerer argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.

We disagree. As to his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child, Madison

testified that Zimmerer had inserted his fingers into her vagina in January 2013, when

she was eleven years old. And as to his convictions for sexual assault of a child,

Madison testified that Zimmerer penetrated her vagina with his fingers “daily” from

October to December 2015—at a time when she was fourteen years old—and that

once during that time period, he had “shoved” his penis into her mouth. Madison’s

14
testimony, even standing alone, is sufficient to support Zimmerer’s convictions. See

Hutson v. State, No. 05-22-00662-CR, 2023 WL 3735229, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas

May 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“The testimony of

a victim alone, even if that victim is a child, is sufficient to support a conviction for

sexual assault of a child.”); Arriaza v. State, No. 02-21-00128-CR, 2023 WL 2806255,

at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 6, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (“The testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support a

conviction for aggravated sexual assault.”).

Moreover, Madison’s testimony does not stand alone. When confronted by

Aunt, Zimmerer indicated that “[s]omething [had] happened with [Madison],” and,

according to Aunt, he “made a suicide attempt.” And rather than denying Madison’s

allegations when confronted, Zimmerer told Madison, “[I]f you said I did [it], I

believe you, but I don’t remember. I’m not going to call you a liar, I’m not going to

tell you that you’re wrong.” Additionally, Aunt told Deputy Green that Zimmerer

had admitted to “molest[ing]” Madison and had admitted to “touch[ing]” Madison.

And, finally, Zimmerer admitted to Martin at the VA Medical Center that he had

“molest[ed]” Madison in 2015, stating that he had “finger[ed]” her and that the abuse

had occurred “daily for several months.”

In his brief, Zimmerer argues that Madison’s “changing and conflicting

testimony about the dates and times of the alleged offenses casts serious doubt on her

allegations.” We disagree. “The ‘on or about’ language in an indictment allows the

15
State to prove a date other than the one alleged in the indictment ‘as long as the date

is anterior to the presentment of the indictment and within the statutory limitation

period.’” Carmona v. State, 610 S.W.3d 611, 616 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2020, no pet.) (citing Sledge v. State, 953 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).

Here, those conditions are met.19 And as to any alleged “conflicting” testimony

regarding those dates, we must presume that the jury resolved any conflicting

inferences in favor of the verdict. See Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608.

Zimmerer also argues that “conflicting testimony . . . supports [his] claim of

innocence,” pointing to discrepancies in the testimony regarding Madison’s living

situation, her reputation for dishonesty, and his PTSD. But, once again, we must

presume that the jury resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict. See

id. And we may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute

our judgment for that of the jury. See Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622; see also Chandler v.

State, No. 02-19-00261-CR, 2020 WL 1949020, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

Apr. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (declining to disturb

the jury’s credibility determinations made in favor of the complainant).

19
As to Zimmerer’s conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child, the
evidence reflects that the assault occurred in January 2013, when Madison was eleven.
As to Zimmerer’s convictions for sexual assault of a child, the evidence reflects that
the assaults occurred during the time period of October to December 2015, when
Madison was fourteen. Zimmerer was indicted for those charges in 2019, well after
the offenses were alleged to have taken place. See Sledge, 953 S.W.2d at 256; Carmona,
610 S.W.3d at 616.

16
 After viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we

conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that Zimmerer (1) intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of Madison’s

sexual organ with his finger when she was younger than fourteen years old;

(2) intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of Madison’s sexual organ with

his finger on three separate occasions when she was younger than seventeen years old;

and (3) intentionally or knowingly caused the penetration of Madison’s mouth by his

sexual organ when she was younger than seventeen years old. See Tex. Penal Code

Ann. §§ 22.011(a)(2)(A), (B), .021(a)(1)(B)(i); Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789.

Even if we could have found to the contrary were we sitting as the factfinder, we

cannot act as the “thirteenth juror,” and we may not substitute our judgment for that

of the jury. See Thornton v. State, 425 S.W.3d 289, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (stating

that a reviewing court should not act as a “thirteenth juror”); Burgess v. State, No. 02-

19-00203-CR, 2021 WL 3556953, at *3 n.6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 12, 2021,

no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[T]he factfinder alone—in this

case, the jury—judges the evidence’s credibility, and we may not act as a thirteenth

juror, re-evaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence and, thus, substituting

our judgment for that of the factfinder.”). We overrule Zimmerer’s first point.

B. The Trial Court’s Denial of Zimmerer’s Motion for New Trial

In his second point, Zimmerer argues that the trial court abused its discretion

by denying his motion for new trial.

17
 1. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of

discretion. Colyer v. State, 428 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). A trial court

abuses its discretion in denying a motion for new trial when no reasonable view of the

record could support its ruling. Id. We must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the trial court’s ruling without substituting our own judgment for that of

the trial court, and we must presume that all reasonable factual findings that could

have been made against the losing party were in fact made against it. Id.

At a motion for new trial hearing, the trial court alone determines the

credibility of witnesses. Id. The trial court has “broad discretion to evaluate the

credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence to determine whether the new

evidence will bring about a different result in a new trial.” Olsen v. State, 606 S.W.3d

342, 352 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (citing Colyer, 428 S.W.3d at

122); see Najar v. State, 618 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (“[T]he trial court

is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the evidence, regardless of whether the

evidence is controverted, and its ruling will be reversed only for an abuse of

discretion, that is, if it is arbitrary or unsupported by any reasonable view of the

evidence.”).

2. Applicable Law

To be entitled to a new trial based on newly discovered or newly available

evidence, a defendant must establish that (1) the newly discovered evidence was

18
unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) the defendant’s

failure to discover or obtain the new evidence was not due to the defendant’s lack of

due diligence; (3) the new evidence is admissible and not merely cumulative,

corroborative, collateral, or impeaching; and (4) the new evidence is probably true and

will probably bring about a different result in a new trial. Carsner v. State, 444 S.W.3d

1, 2–3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Keeter v. State, 74 S.W.3d 31, 36–37 (Tex. Crim. App.

2002). “Motions for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence are not favored

by the courts and are viewed with great caution.” Frank v. State, 183 S.W.3d 63, 71

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d).

3. Analysis

In his motion for new trial, Zimmerer argued that certain evidence discovered

after his convictions necessitated the trial court granting him a new trial. In support

of that motion, Zimmerer attached affidavits from Misty Williford, Riley Dugger, and

Timi Compton purporting to show the new evidence.20 Williford, Dugger, and

Compton each testified at the hearing on Zimmerer’s motion for new trial.

20
Williford’s and Compton’s affidavits were admitted into evidence at the
hearing on Zimmerer’s motion for new trial. While Dugger’s affidavit was offered
into evidence at the hearing, it does not appear from the record that the trial court
ever admitted it into evidence.

19
 a. Evidence from Williford and Dugger21

According to Williford, in April 2019, she was working with Madison at

Cracker Barrel when she noticed that Madison looked “very distraught and upset.”

Williford approached Madison to ask what was wrong, and Madison said that “she

[had been] really upset with [Zimmerer and Aunt,] and she [had done] something

really bad.” When Williford asked what Madison had done, Madison allegedly stated

that “she [had] lied that [Zimmerer had] sexually abused her.” Williford told Madison

to tell the truth, but Madison indicated that “she couldn’t tell the truth because she

would get in legal trouble.” Williford stated that she did not mention her

conversation with Madison to anyone before Zimmerer’s trial because she “believed

that [Madison] was going to do the right thing.” At the hearing on Zimmerer’s

motion for new trial, Madison testified that she had never had a conversation with

Williford about Zimmerer.22

21
The respective evidence from Williford and Dugger has similarities, and in
their briefs, both parties often discuss the evidence from Williford and Dugger
together. We will likewise group our discussion of the evidence from Williford and
Dugger.
22
Williford testified that Zimmerer was a “distant cousin.” She stated, however,
that she had never “had long conversations with him.” Zimmerer testified that he did
not know Williford and that he had no reason to believe that Madison had ever made
any statements to Williford regarding Madison’s allegations against him. Williford
also stated that she was a “distant cousin” of Madison’s, and Madison indicated that
she was related to Williford through her “step grandpa.”

20
 According to Dugger, in the fall of 2019, while she was at school with Madison,

Madison told a group of people that she was not telling the truth about the allegations

against Zimmerer because “she was mad or angry because of what [Aunt] and

[Zimmerer] had.” Dugger did not tell anyone about this alleged conversation prior to

Zimmerer’s trial because she “didn’t think it was that big of a deal at the time” and

she “didn’t know that he was going to get convicted.” At the hearing on Zimmerer’s

motion for new trial, Madison testified that she had never had a conversation with

Dugger about Zimmerer, that she had never discussed him in a group setting at

school, and that she had graduated high school in May 2019, a date before the alleged

conversation.23

The State argues that a new trial is not warranted based on the evidence from

Williford and Dugger because that evidence was “merely impeaching” evidence.24 We

agree. “Impeachment evidence is that evidence offered ‘to dispute, disparage, deny,

or contradict.’” Taylor v. State, 93 S.W.3d 487, 500 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet.

23
Dugger stated that Zimmerer was “a cousin through marriage.” While
Zimmerer acknowledged that Dugger was “a cousin [of his] somehow,” he stated that
he had no reason to believe that Madison had ever made any statements to Dugger
regarding Madison’s allegations against him. Dugger indicated that Madison was her
“cousin[] as well.”
24
Indeed, the trial court also questioned how the testimony was not offered for
impeachment purposes, stating, “How does [the testimony of Williford and Dugger]
prove actual innocence? I mean, they didn’t see anything. They don’t know anything.
They don’t have any personal knowledge whatsoever of the dates and times alleged
that offenses occurred. It’s for impeachment.”

21
ref’d) (quoting Thomas v. State, 841 S.W.2d 399, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). The

evidence from Williford and Dugger—evidence that Madison purportedly admitted to

having lied about her allegations against Zimmerer—has no purpose other than to

dispute, disparage, deny, or contradict her testimony against him.25 See Scoggins v. State,

No. 02-19-00209-CR, 2020 WL 5241197, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 3, 2020,

pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“[E]vidence that merely

impeaches is not a valid basis for granting a new-trial motion based on newly

discovered evidence.”).

The State also argues that the evidence from Williford and Dugger is not

material because that evidence, even if admitted at a new trial, would probably not

produce a different result. We agree with the State. There was ample evidence that

Madison was not lying about her allegations that Zimmerer had sexually assaulted her.

In this regard, she testified to the assaults at Zimmerer’s trial, and the trial evidence

reflected that Zimmerer had made certain admissions regarding the assaults.

Moreover, Madison denied having the alleged conversations with Williford and

Dugger. In ruling on a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the

trial court has the ultimate discretion to disbelieve testimony of the newly discovered

25
In his brief, Zimmerer cites Olsen for the proposition that even if newly
discovered evidence is impeaching, the evidence may still warrant a new trial if it is
material and competent evidence independent of its impeaching tendency. See
606 S.W.3d at 353. But, as explained below, the evidence from Williford and Dugger
is not material because it will not probably bring about a different result in a new trial.
See Carsner, 444 S.W.3d at 2–3; Keeter, 74 S.W.3d at 36–37.

22
evidence, even if that testimony is uncontroverted.26 Colyer, 428 S.W.3d at 122. Thus,

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Zimmerer’s motion for new trial

based on the evidence from Williford and Dugger. See State v. Martinez, No. 13-19-

00434-CR, 2021 WL 921678, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 11,

2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that witness’s

testimony that complainant had told him that she had fabricated her sex-assault

allegations against the defendant would not have materially altered the outcome of the

trial where witness’s testimony would have to be believed over complainant’s

testimony). We overrule this portion of Zimmerer’s second point.27

b. Evidence from Compton

Compton and her late husband were close friends with Zimmerer and Aunt.

According to Compton, her husband died in late 2012, and on January 3, 2013, she

met Zimmerer and Aunt in Dallas, and they accompanied her to Oklahoma for her

husband’s burial on January 5, 2013. Compton maintained that she was with

Zimmerer and Aunt in Oklahoma from January 3, 2013, through January 6, 2013, and

Here, of course, the evidence from Williford and Dugger was controverted by
26

Madison.
27
In its brief, the State made alternative arguments for why the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by denying Zimmerer’s motion for new trial with respect to
the evidence from Williford and Dugger. But because we have already held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for new trial with respect
to this evidence, we need not address the State’s alternative arguments. See Tex. R.
App. P. 47.1.

23
that Madison did not accompany them to Oklahoma. Compton also testified that she

later saw Zimmerer and Aunt in “late January” 2013, noting that Zimmerer and Aunt

had visited her in Oklahoma for “three or four days.” She acknowledged, however,

that from January 6, 2013, through “late January” 2013, she was not with Zimmerer

and Aunt.

Zimmerer is not entitled to a new trial based on the evidence from Compton

because the evidence from Compton was not unknown or unavailable to Zimmerer at

the time of trial. The substance of Compton’s testimony—that Zimmerer and Aunt

were with her in Oklahoma during parts of January 2013 and that Madison was not

present during those times—was known by both Zimmerer and Aunt because they

were both with Compton at that time. Thus, because the evidence from Compton

was known by Zimmerer at the time of trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

by denying his motion for new trial based on that evidence. See Carsner, 444 S.W.3d

at 2–3; Keeter, 74 S.W.3d at 36–37; see also Kuhns v. State, No. 03-01-00063-CR,

2002 WL 463223, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 28, 2002, pet. ref’d) (not designated

for publication) (“Under any circumstances, this matter was not unknown to appellant

nor was he unaware of it so that it would constitute newly discovered evidence

entitling him to a new trial.”).

Moreover, the evidence from Compton, even if admitted at a new trial, would

probably not produce a different result. In this regard, Madison testified that

Zimmerer had sexually assaulted her in January 2013. Compton’s testimony would

24
only establish that Zimmerer could not have assaulted Madison for a few days in early

January 2013 and a few days in late January 2013, leaving the bulk of January 2013 as

potential dates for the alleged assault. Thus, because the evidence from Compton

would not probably bring about a different result, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by denying Zimmerer’s motion for new trial. See Carsner, 444 S.W.3d at 2–

3; Keeter, 74 S.W.3d at 36–37; see also Russell v. State, No. 05-10-00330-CR, 2012 WL

360806, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 6, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated

for publication) (holding that “the date of the crime is not an element of the offense

that must be proven” and that date listed in indictment “is to be liberally construed

and need not be substantiated”). We overrule this portion of Zimmerer’s second

point.

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled both of Zimmerer’s points, we affirm the trial court’s

judgments.

/s/ Dana Womack

Dana Womack
Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: September 21, 2023

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