IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JASMINE DUKES, )
)
Appellant, )
)
v. ) C.A. K23A-04-002 NEP
)
STATE OF DELAWARE )
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE )
APPEAL BOARD, )
)
Appellee. )
Submitted: July 11, 2023
Decided: September 26, 2023
ORDER
Upon Appellant’s Appeal from the Decision of the Unemployment Insurance
Appeal Board
AFFIRMED
Before this Court is an appeal brought by Jasmine Dukes (“Ms. Dukes”)
challenging the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (“the
Board”) to uphold the overpayment determination of a Claims Deputy (“Deputy”)
of the Division of Unemployment Insurance of the Delaware Department of Labor
(“the Division”).1 Because Ms. Dukes neither appeared at her disqualification
determination hearing nor appealed it to the Board, that determination became final,
1
Although Ms. Dukes did not name it as an appellee in this case, the Division is a party to this
appeal. See 19 Del. C. § 3322(b) (“The Department [of Labor] shall be deemed to be a party to
any judicial action involving any … decision [of the Board.]”).
and she is prevented from arguing the merits of that disqualification determination
during this subsequent overpayment determination appeal. Therefore, the Board’s
determination is AFFIRMED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. On June 14, 2020, Ms. Dukes filed a claim for unemployment insurance
benefits.2 As designated by Pandemic Unemployment Assistance, she then received
a weekly amount of $253.00 for traditional unemployment benefits that were
COVID-19 related from February 20, 2021, through June 19, 2021.3 On July 12,
2021, a Division Deputy sent notice of, and issued, a disqualification determination
pursuant to which Ms. Dukes was disqualified from receiving those unemployment
benefits.4 The Deputy found that she left work voluntarily for personal reasons and
did not show good cause attributable to her employment pursuant to 19 Del. C. §
3314(1).5
2. Ms. Dukes then appealed the disqualification determination to a
Division Appeals Referee (“Referee”).6 A telephone hearing was held on March 14,
2022, but Ms. Dukes failed to appear for it, which led to her claim’s dismissal.7
2
R. at 59. Citations to the official record refer to the revised record filed with the Kent County
Prothonotary on July 11, 2023, and are cited as “R. at ___.”
3
R. at 59, 66–71.
4
R. at 64–65. The disqualification determination claim number is 47042312. R. at 64.
5
R. at 64-65. The applicable statute provides in relevant part that an individual
shall be disqualified for benefits … [f]or the week in which the individual left work
voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work and for each week
thereafter until the individual has been employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks
(whether or not consecutive) and has earned wages in covered employment equal
to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit amount.
19 Del. C. § 3314(1).
6
R. at 59 & n.3.
7
R. at 59 n.3. Notably, the Board’s procedural history recitation indicates that Ms. Dukes did not
appeal the disqualification determination and thus that it became final on July 22, 2021. R. at 10
2
Thereafter, Ms. Dukes never appealed the dismissal of her claim to the Board, which
made her disqualification determination final.8
3. Pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3325, once there is a final disqualification
determination, the next step in the adjudication process is the overpayment
determination, which is where the amount that is subject to recoupment is decided.9
On December 12, 2022, a Division Deputy issued an overpayment determination in
the amount of $4,538.00 for the weeks of February 20, 2021, through July 12, 2021,
and sought reimbursement from Ms. Dukes.10 Ms. Dukes then appealed that
overpayment determination to a Referee.11
4. On January 5, 2023, the Referee issued a decision that upheld Ms.
Dukes’s overpayment determination in the same amount.12 On January 9, 2023, Ms.
Dukes appealed the Referee’s decision to the Board.13 On April 3, 2013, the Board
upheld the Referee’s decision.14 On April 11, 2023, Ms. Dukes timely appealed her
overpayment determination to this Court.15
5. On appeal, Ms. Dukes argues that she never voluntarily left her job,
while the Division argues that the merits of the predicate disqualification
determination are final and cannot be reargued in this subsequent overpayment
determination appeal.
n.1. The Division has conceded on appeal, however, that Ms. Dukes did appeal the Deputy’s
decision. See Appellee’s Answering Br. at 2 & n.4 (citing R. at 59 n.3).
8
See R. at 59 n.3 (“The Dismissal, sent to Claimant’s address of record, became final in the absence
of an appeal to the [Board] postmarked or received on or before Thursday, March 24, 2022.”).
9
Odell v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2023 WL 4307685, at *1 & n.5 (Del. Super. June 30,
2023) (citing 19 Del. C. § 3325).
10
R. at 62–63. The overpayment determination claim number is 67042312. R. at 62.
11
R. at 59.
12
R. at 58–61.
13
R. at 10.
14
R. at 10–13.
15
R. at 1.
3
STANDARD OF REVIEW
6. 19 Del. C. § 3323 provides that on appeal to this Court “the findings of
[the Board] as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall
be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the Court shall be confined to questions of
law.”16 Thus, this Court’s role upon appeal is to determine whether the Board’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error.17
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.”18 This Court may consider only the record
before it and views the record in the light most favorable to the party prevailing
below.19 This Court’s review for legal error is de novo.20
7. This Court will not disturb the Board’s determination unless there was
an abuse of discretion in which it acted arbitrarily or capriciously or exceeded the
bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and ignored recognized rules of law
or practice to produce injustice.21
ANALYSIS
8. At the outset, it appears that, although Ms. Dukes has timely appealed
her overpayment determination from the Board, the briefs submitted by her attempt
to rehash the merits of her predicate disqualification determination, i.e., that she
voluntarily left her job and was therefore disqualified from receiving unemployment
16
Starcks v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2013 WL 4848101, at *3 & n.27 (Del. Super. July
30, 2013) (alteration in original) (citing Coleman v. Dep’t of Lab., 288 A.2d 285, 287 (Del. Super.
1972) (“[T]he credibility of the witnesses, the weight of their testimony, and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn therefrom are for the Board to determine.”)).
17
Id.
18
Id. (citation omitted).
19
Id.
20
Odell, 2023 WL 4307685, at *2.
21
Starcks, 2013 WL 4848101, at *3.
4
benefits.22 As such, it is worthwhile to note the bifurcated process resulting in a
disqualification determination and an overpayment determination.23
9. The disqualification determination addresses whether the claimant is
disqualified from receiving traditional unemployment benefits.24 Thereafter, the
overpayment determination addresses the amount of previously paid benefits to be
repaid by the claimant.25
10. The first issue that needs to be addressed is whether the disqualification
determination in this case became final. “A decision of an appeals tribunal (the
Referee) becomes final unless within 10 days after the date of notification or mailing
of that decision further appeal is initiated under 19 Del. C. § 3320.”26 Failure to
appear at an appeal hearing results in dismissal and a final decision due to not
exhausting all administrative remedies.27
11. As noted supra,28 the Division concedes that Ms. Dukes did appeal the
Deputy’s disqualification determination to a Referee but observes that, because she
failed to appear for the telephone hearing on March 14, 2022, it was dismissed, and
that Ms. Dukes never appealed the dismissal to the Board thereafter, which rendered
it final.29
12. This Court agrees. Ms. Dukes neither appeared for the telephone
hearing, which led to that claim’s dismissal by the Referee, nor thereafter appealed
22
Appellant’s Opening Br. at 1–3; Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1–2.
23
See Odell, 2023 WL 4307685, at *1.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Starcks, 2013 WL 4848101, at *4 (citing 19 Del. C. § 3318(c)).
27
See Tomer v. Jobe’s Landscape, Inc., 2012 WL 2344638, at *2 (Del. Super. June 14, 2012)
(explaining that “[i]t was [claimant’s] responsibility to inform the Board of [their] ability to attend
the hearing. [Their] failure to do so resulted in [claimant’s] appeal being dismissed and the
Appeals Referee’s decision becoming final.”).
28
See supra note 7.
29
Appellee’s Answering Br. at 2 & n.4.
5
the dismissal of the Referee’s disqualification determination to the Board.30 In fact,
Ms. Dukes admits that she did not attend the Referee’s hearing, did not reschedule,
and, ultimately, did not appeal the dismissal.31 As such, the disqualification
determination became final.32
13. Because Ms. Dukes’s disqualification determination was properly
deemed final, she cannot now challenge the merits of it in this subsequent
overpayment determination appeal.33 An overpayment determination appeal is
governed by 19 Del. C. § 3325, which states that:
If it is finally determined that an individual received benefits under this
chapter for which the individual was not entitled, the individual shall
repay, in cash, the amount of the overpayment to the Department for
the Unemployment Compensation Fund. The individual is liable
regardless of whether the overpayment was received through fraud or
mistake, or whether the individual was legally awarded the payment of
benefits at the time but on appeal was subsequently found not to be
entitled thereto.34
14. The only issues preserved for a claimant’s overpayment determination
on appeal are: (1) whether the claimant received an overpayment of benefits; and (2)
whether the amount owed is accurate.35
15. Here, Ms. Dukes makes no argument on appeal that she did not receive
benefits or that the amount of the overpayment determination is not accurate.36
Moreover, both the Referee and the Board made the factual findings that Ms. Dukes
30
R. at 59 n.3.
31
See R. at 33, 43; see also Appellant’s Reply Br. at 2.
32
See 19 Del. C. § 3318(c) (explaining that, unless there was an appeal initiated to the Board within
ten days after a decision, the decision is final).
33
Starcks, 2013 WL 4848101, at *4.
34
19 Del. C. § 3325(a).
35
See generally Starcks, 2013 WL 4848101; Tomer, 2012 WL 2344638; Duncan v. Del. Dep’t of
Lab., 2002 WL 31160324 (Del. Super. Sept. 10, 2002).
36
See Starcks, 2013 WL 4848101, at *4.
6
received benefits and that the amount is accurate.37 This Court sees no reason to
disturb those factual findings.38
16. Instead, on appeal, Ms. Dukes attempts to rehash the merits of the
disqualification determination.39 It is well-settled, nonetheless, that “[w]here a
claimant has received adequate notice of the effect of a disqualification decision and
of the right to appeal it, the claimant cannot appeal the basis, or merits, of the
disqualification through a subsequent appeal of an overpayment determination.”40
17. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Board’s overpayment
determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record and is free from
legal error.
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Board’s overpayment determination
is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
NEP:tls
oc: Prothonotary
cc: Jasmine Dukes, Pro Se – Via U.S. Mail
Victoria W. Counihan, DAG – Via File & ServeXpress
Matthew B. Frawley, DAG – Via File & ServeXpress
37
R. at 11, 60.
38
See Tomer, 2012 WL 2344638, at *1 (“The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have
emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency.”).
39
See generally Appellant’s Opening Br. at 1–4; Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1–2. Ms. Dukes also
seeks to supplement the record with a letter from her employer. In an administrative appeal,
however, this Court is unable to consider new evidence for the first time on appeal. Odell, 2023
WL 4307685, at *3; Starcks, 2013 WL 4848101, at *4.
40
Starcks, 2013 WL 4848101, at *4 (citing Murray v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., Dep’t of
Lab., 1994 WL 637088 (Del. Super. Apr. 22, 1994)).
7