concurring specially.
[¶ 36] I concur in the majority opinion affirming the district court’s finding that Junietta Swenson was legally competent to execute the quit claim, deed for her' home. I concur with the majority’s conclusion that the district court was correct in determining that the leases between Willis Swenson and Junietta Swenson were valid because that conclusion is compelled by this Court’s prior decisions which have not been challenged. I write separately to note that I do not agree with the recognition of a life estate exception to the application of N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02.
. [¶37] Agricultural leases are statutorily limited to a period of ten years or less pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02. This Court has previously outlined the .requirements for a court to declare an agricultural lease invalid under the statutory language as follows:
In the jurisdictions where the law restricts the duration of a lease of agricultural land, before a court is justified in declaring it inyalid, it must find that the lease is of agricultural land; that the use of the land for agricultural purposes is not excluded; that rent or service is reserved; and that the term is within the restriction.
Anderson v. Blixt, 72 N.W.2d 799, 803 (N.D. 1965). This.Court previously created an exception to N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02 for leases, with terms that, extend beyond ten years, but include a contingency that could potentially limit the term of the lease to a period less than ten years. Blixt, at 807 (noting that a lease for the life of the two property owners is a contingency which may or may not happen within ten years and holding the lease valid with regard to the application of N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02). This Court also recognized that although the term of a lease may extend beyond ten years, if the lease can be terminated by either party at any time, the excess time is essentially illusory and does not violate N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02. Anderson v. Lyons, 2014 ND 61, ¶¶ 10-17, 845 N.W.2d 1 (a lease extending “in perpetuity” but having contingencies that could limit the lease to less than ten years was valid and outside the scope of N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02). The majority opinion concludes that Lyons and Blixt are controlling.
[¶ 38] Although I agree that this Court’s prior decisions are controlling, I do not agree with the creation of a life estate contingency exception to N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02 as provided in Blixt. However, no argument was made in this case that the holding in Blixt should be overturned. Absent overruling those holdings, we are bound to follow our precedent. See Dickie v. Farmers Union Oil Co., 2000 ND 111, ¶ 13, 611 N.W.2d 168 (“The rule of stare decisis is grounded upon the theory that when a legal principle is accepted and established rights may accrue under it, security and certainty require that the principle be recognized and followed thereafter.”).
[¶ 39] The legislature’s unambiguous intent in the enactment of N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02 is to limit agricultural leases to a term of ten years. Allowing an exception when a lease is subject to a contingency, which may or may not terminate the lease short of ten years, allows a knowledgeable drafter to easily circumvent the legislature’s intention to limit agricultural leases to a term of ten years. For example, an agricultural lease with a twenty-year term is now considered valid under" N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02 simply if it is tied to the life of an infant who, statistically, can be expected to live long past the twenty-year term.
[¶ 40] In Blixt, this Court’s recognition of a life estate contingency exception was an attempt to preserve the ten-year term limitation imposed by N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02 while maintaining the validity of the leases at issue. This Court’s solution was to postpone the determination of “validity” under N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02 until the leases reached their ten-year term at which time, if the contingencies had not terminated the lease, a determination would be made as to whether or not continuation of the leases beyond ten years was appropriate under N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02. The problem with this approach is that it ignores the reality that the length of a lease is a negotiated term that may have had significant impact on the consideration paid by one of the parties. For example, the lessee may have agreed to increased lease payments in exchange for a longer term; a twenty-year lease with annual payments of $100, rather than a ten-year lease with annual payments of $75. By postponing the determination of validity until year ten, if the lessor elects to assert the lease is invalid under N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02, the lessee may be deprived of the bargained-for longer lease term without a reciprocal adjustment of the lease payment. Also, the decision in Blixt implies that the lease is valid for a period of ten years and then becomes invalid after ten years. This Court should review its holding in Blixt and eliminate the life estate contingency exception to N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02; any lease that by its terms could extend beyond ten years is not valid.
[¶ 41] Although the Blixt decision fails to enforce the legislative directive of N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02, it is not necessary to revisit this Court’s decision in Lyons. In Lyons, the term of the lease was perpetual, but both parties could terminate the lease at any time. The perpetual term was illusory and the substance of the lease was in reality an annual lease which would be automatically renewed unless either party elected to terminate the lease. The lease in Lyons did not violate the legislative directive contained in N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02.
[¶ 42] The result in this case is compelled by this Court’s prior decisions. A challenge of the Blixt decision will have to wait until properly raised.
[¶ 43] Jon J. Jensen