ITG Brands, LLC v. Reynolds American, Inc. and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

ITG BRANDS, LLC, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
REYNOLDS AMERICAN, INC. and )
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO )
COMPANY, )
)
Defendants. )
) C.A. No. 2017-0129-LWW
REYNOLDS AMERICAN, INC. and )
R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO )
COMPANY, )
)
Counter-Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
)
ITG BRANDS, LLC, )
)
Counter-Defendant. )
)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Date Submitted: June 9, 2023
Date Decided: October 2, 2023
Stephen C. Norman, Matthew F. Davis, & Tyler J. Leavengood, POTTER
ANDERSON & CORROON LLP, Wilmington, Delaware; Elizabeth B. McCallum,
Gilbert S. Keteltas, Carey S. Busen, & Evan M. Mannering, BAKER &
HOSTETLER, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Jim W. Phillips, Jr. & Kimberly M.
Marston, BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON, HUMPHREY & LEONARD, LLP,
Greensboro, North Carolina; Charles E. Coble, BROOKS, PIERCE, MCLENDON,
HUMPHREY & LEONARD, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina; Counsel for Plaintiff
and Counterclaim Defendant ITG Brands, LLC
Gregory P. Williams, Rudolf Koch, Robert L. Burns & Matthew D. Perri,
RICHARDS, LAYTON & FINGER, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware; Noel J.
Francisco, C. Kevin Marshall & William D. Coglianese; JONES DAY, Washington,
D.C.; Stephanie E. Parker & Katrina L.S. Caseldine, JONES DAY, Atlanta, Georgia;
David B. Alden & Kevin P. Riddles; JONES DAY, Cleveland, Ohio; Elli
Leibenstein, GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Stephen L. Saxl,
GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP, New York, New York; Andrea Shwayri Ferraro,
GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida; Counsel for
Defendants and Counterclaim Plaintiffs Reynolds American Inc. and R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company

WILL, Vice Chancellor
 This is the latest chapter in a long-running saga between ITG Brands, LLC

and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company. The action follows years of litigation in

Florida that resulted in a settlement agreement requiring Reynolds to make annual

payments to the State based on its product sales. Although this is the fourth

memorandum opinion issued by the Court of Chancery in the matter, it will likely

not be the last.

The present dispute centers on the 2014 sale of four cigarette brands from

Reynolds to ITG. The sale was made under a detailed asset purchase agreement that

allocates certain liabilities between the parties. After closing, Reynolds stopped

making settlement payments to Florida for the cigarette brands ITG bought. In 2017,

Florida sued to enforce the settlement agreement and obtained a judgment requiring

Reynolds to continue making annual payments for the acquired brands.

Litigation in this court resulted. ITG and Reynolds disagree on whether the

Florida judgment is a liability assigned to ITG under the asset purchase agreement.

After two sets of cross-motions for judgment on the pleadings (before Chancellor

Bouchard) and a round of cross-motions for summary judgment, the question of

liability was decided. I concluded that under the plain terms of the APA, ITG was

required to indemnify Reynolds for the payments made to Florida as a result of the

Florida judgment based on sales of the acquired brands. This holding was not only

1
consistent with the text of the contract, but also avoided an absurd result where ITG

would own and profit from the brands while Reynolds makes substantial payments

to Florida for ITG’s sales.

Now, the parties have again filed cross-motions for summary judgment—this

time on remedies. Despite my having addressed liability in the prior stage of this

case, ITG argues that it did not assume the Florida judgment liability under the asset

purchase agreement. For the reasons explained below, I dispense with this argument

and determine (once more) that ITG is responsible for the liability.

I go on to consider Reynolds’ entitlement to remedies and ITG’s arguments

to eliminate or limit Reynolds’ damages. Certain matters are readily resolved on

summary judgment. Specifically, the asset purchase agreement permits Reynolds to

recover the annual payments it made to Florida for sales of the acquired brands post-

closing and the associated interest paid to Florida. Reynolds cannot, however, obtain

indemnification from ITG for certain fees Reynolds paid for Florida’ attorneys.

Other arguments raised by the parties are not properly settled through

summary judgment. For example, ITG avers that Reynolds’ damages must be offset

by a favorable profit adjustment (due to its non-joinder in the Florida settlement

agreement). This fact-intensive issue must be resolved after trial. Trial will also

2
determine the precise amount that Reynolds may recover from ITG and the

availability of specific performance to address future payments.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The background of this action is described in three memorandum opinions by

the Court of Chancery dated November 30, 2017, September 23, 2019 (the “2019

Opinion”), and September 30, 2022 (the “2022 Opinion”).1 This opinion recites

only the facts necessary to resolve the pending cross-motions for summary judgment

on remedies. Unless otherwise noted, the following summary is drawn from the

undisputed facts described in the 2022 Opinion, the pleadings, and documentary

exhibits submitted by the parties.2

1
ITG Brands, LLC v. Reynolds Am., Inc., 2017 WL 5903355 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2017)
(“2017 Op.”); ITG Brands, LLC v. Reynolds Am., Inc., 2019 WL 4593495 (Del. Ch. Sept.
23, 2019) (“2019 Op.”); ITG Brands, LLC v. Reynolds Am., Inc., 2022 WL 4678868 (Del.
Ch. Sept. 30, 2022) (“2022 Op.”).
2
Citations in the form of “Reynolds’ Opening Br. Ex. __” refer to exhibits to the
Transmittal Affidavit of Matthew D. Perri, Esq. in Support of Opening Brief in Support of
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Remedies. Dkt. 337. Citations in the form
of “Reynolds’ Reply Br. Ex. __” refer to exhibits to the Transmittal Affidavit of Matthew
D. Perri, Esq. in Support of Defendants’ Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment on Remedies and Answering Brief in Opposition to ITG’s Motion for Summary
Judgment on Remedies. Dkt. 354. Citations in the form of “ITG’s Opening Br. Ex. __”
refer to exhibits to the Transmittal Affidavit of Evan Mannering to ITG Brands, LLC’s
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Remedies and in Opposition to
Reynolds’ Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkts. 346-48. Citations in the form of “ITG’s
Reply Br. Ex. __” refer to exhibits to the Transmittal Affidavit of Evan Mannering to ITG
Brands, LLC’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Remedies.
Dkts. 362-63.
3
 A. The Florida Settlement Agreement

The background appropriately begins in Florida, where the liability prompting

this litigation arose.

In February 1995, the State of Florida sued R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company

(“Reynolds Tobacco”) and other major tobacco manufacturers (together with

Reynolds Tobacco, the “Settling Defendants”) for publicly misrepresenting the

health risks and addictiveness of smoking. 3 On August 25, 1997, the Settling

Defendants entered into an agreement with Florida to settle the State’s claims for

healthcare costs caused by smoking (the “Florida Settlement Agreement”). 4 In

exchange for Florida’s dismissal, waiver, and release of its claims, the Settling

Defendants agreed, among other things, to make ongoing settlement payments.5

Each Settling Defendant is required to make an annual inflation-adjusted

settlement payment in perpetuity. This “Annual Payment” is allocated pro rata

3
ITG Brands, LLC’s Combined Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. on Remedies
and Answering Br. in Opp’n to Reynolds’ Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 343) (“ITG’s Opening
Br.”) 1; ITG’s Opening Br. Ex. 5 (“Fla. Settlement Agreement”); 2019 Op. at *2.
4
The settlement agreement was amended on September 11, 1998 (the “First Amendment”)
and June 1, 2001 (the “Second Amendment”). See Fla. Settlement Agreement at Ex. 003-
018 to Ex. 003-127 (“Amend. No. 1”); Fla. Settlement Agreement at Ex. 003-128 to Ex.
003-145 (“Amend. No. 2”). For clarity: the original Florida Settlement Agreement is at
pages Ex. 003-001 to Ex. 003-017 of the document; the First Amendment is at pages Ex.
003-018 to Ex. 003-127; and the Second Amendment is at pages Ex. 003-128 to Ex. 003-
145.
5
Fla. Settlement Agreement at Ex. 003-002.
4
among the Settling Defendants based on their market shares of the volume of

cigarette shipments.6 Each Annual Payment is further adjusted based on a “formula

for calculating volume adjustments” set out in Appendix A to the Florida Settlement

Agreement.7 Appendix A provides for a “Volume Adjustment” and a related “Profit

Adjustment.”

The Volume Adjustment considers the aggregate volume of cigarettes shipped

by the Settling Defendants for domestic consumption in the current year.8 If the

current year’s aggregate volume decreases compared to a 1997 base year, the Annual

Payment is correspondingly reduced.9 The Volume Adjustment is allocated pro rata

among the Settling Defendants according to relative market share, which is

calculated based on volume.10

A base Annual Payment that is decreased by a negative Volume Adjustment

is subject to partial offset by a Profit Adjustment. The Profit Adjustment ensures

6
Fla. Settlement Agreement Amend. No. 1 ¶ 7.
7
Fla. Settlement Agreement Amend. No. 2 at App. A ¶ A. Appendix A was added to the
Florida Settlement Agreement as part of the Second Amendment.
8
Fla. Settlement Agreement Amend. No. 1 ¶ 7; Fla. Settlement Agreement Amend. No. 2
at App. A ¶ A.
9
The base year for calculating the aggregate volume is 1997. Fla. Settlement Agreement
Amend. No. 2 at App. A ¶ A.
10
Fla. Settlement Agreement Amend. No. 1 ¶ 7. Between 1999 and 2002, the Annual
Payments were: $247.5 million, $275 million, $357.5 million, and $357.5 million. From
2003 onward, the Annual Payment was (and remains) $440 million. Id.
5
that if the Settling Defendants’ post-settlement shipment volumes decrease but their

profits increase, settlement payments increase as well. The Profit Adjustment

applies if the Settling Defendants’ aggregate net operating profits from domestic

sales of cigarettes in the current year exceed aggregate inflation-adjusted “base year”

profits from a 1997 base year.11 The Profit Adjustment is then allocated to each

Settling Defendant.

B. The Florida Litigation

On July 15, 2014, Reynolds American, Inc. (the indirect parent of Reynolds

Tobacco, together referred to as “Reynolds”) and ITG Brands, LLC entered into an

Asset Purchase Agreement (the “APA”), under which Reynolds sold four cigarette

brands (the “Acquired Brands” or “Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands”) to ITG.12

Following the June 12, 2015 closing of the APA, neither Reynolds nor ITG made

Annual Payments to Florida for Acquired Brands sales.13 Consequently, on January

18, 2017, Florida and Philip Morris filed motions to enforce the Florida Settlement

Agreement against Reynolds and ITG (the “2017 Action”).14

11
Fla. Settlement Agreement Amend. No. 2 at App. A ¶ B(ii); id. ¶ 7.
12
2022 Op. at *2. These four brands are Winston, Salem, Kool, and Maverick. Id.
13
Id. at *5.
14
2022 Op. at *5. In the 2017 Action, Florida, and Philip Morris sued Reynolds Tobacco,
an “Affiliate” of Reynolds. The Florida Judgment Liability (as defined below) is Reynolds
Tobacco’s. Id. at *19 & n.200. Because ITG’s indemnification obligation runs to
Reynolds and its “Affiliates,” Reynolds Tobacco is referred to as Reynolds in this decision.
6
 On December 27, 2017, the Florida court entered an order granting in part

Florida and Philip Morris’ motions to enforce the Florida Settlement Agreement.15

The court held that Reynolds’ settlement obligations to Florida were not

extinguished when it sold the Acquired Brands.16 The court explained that Reynolds

remained “obligated to make the payments [on the Acquired Brands] pursuant to the

Florida [Settlement] Agreement,” absent ITG’s joinder.17

C. The Florida Judgment

On August 15, 2018, the Florida court entered a final order and judgment (the

“Florida Judgment”).18 The Florida Judgment declared that “unless and until ITG

becomes a Settling Defendant, . . . Reynolds is liable to make Annual Payments to

[Florida] . . . for the sales of cigarettes under the [Acquired Brands] . . . with respect

See ITG Brands, LLC’s Verified Compl. for Declaratory and Inj. Relief and Specific
Performance (Dkt. 1) Ex. 1 (“APA”) § 11.02.
15
2022 Op. at *5.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at *6. The Florida Judgment was stipulated by Florida, Philip Morris, Reynolds, and
ITG. It followed a May 22, 2018 order denying Reynolds’ motion regarding a Profit
Adjustment dispute. See ITG’s Opening Br. Ex. 2. In the 2017 Litigation, Philip Morris
argued that Reynolds had manipulated certain Profit Adjustment calculations. Transmittal
Decl. of Evan Mannering to ITG Brands, LLC’s Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. (Dkt. 229-39)
(“ITG’s Liability Br. Ex.”) Ex. 10. Reynolds’ motion sought a declaration that the issue
was moot considering the Florida court’s December 27, 2017 order. ITG’s Opening Br.
Ex. 38.
7
to the [post-closing] period . . . in perpetuity.”19 The court ordered Reynolds to pay

past-due Annual Payments predating the Florida Judgment (the “Florida Judgment

Liability”), pre- and post-judgment interest on those past-due payments (the “Florida

Judgment Interest”), future Annual Payments for the Acquired Brands (absent

joinder by ITG), and Florida’s “reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs” from the 2017

Action (the “Florida Attorneys’ Fees”).20

After the Florida Judgment, Reynolds made several settlement payments to

satisfy the Florida Judgment Liability.

First, on October 5, 2020, Reynolds paid Florida $192,869,589.86 for

amounts owed under the Florida Judgment plus interest running from the date that

each settlement payment had been due.21 According to Reynolds, $124,370,076 was

for outstanding volume payments based on ITG’s sales of Acquired Brands

cigarettes in each of 2015 through 2019 (i.e., the Annual Payments with Volume

19
ITG’s Opening Br. Ex. 3 (“Fla. J.”) ¶ 4.
20
Id. ¶¶ 1, 4, 7.
Opening Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. on Remedies (Dkt. 336) (“Reynolds’
21

Opening Br.”) 9; id. at Ex. D; see Fla. J. ¶ 1 & n.2.
8
Adjustments for those years), plus $19,732,311 in interest (i.e., the associated

Florida Judgment Interest).22 The remainder included a profit-based component.23

Second, on December 31, 2020, Reynolds paid Florida $156,398,127.23 for

settlement payments related to ITG’s sales of the Acquired Brands and Reynolds’

own cigarettes in 2020. 24 The payment did not include pre-judgment or post-

judgment interest.25 Reynolds contends that, of this amount, $26,953,586 was for

the volume-related portion of the Annual Payment based on ITG’s sales of the

Acquired Brands in 2020.26

Third, on December 31, 2021, Reynolds paid Florida $156,273,049.95 for

settlement payments related to ITG’s sales of the Acquired Brands and Reynolds’

own cigarettes in 2021. 27 The payment did not include pre-judgment or post-

judgment interest.28 Reynolds asserts that $27,036,206 of the amount was for the

22
Reynolds’ Opening Br. 8-9.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 10; Reynolds’ Opening Br. Ex. G.
25
Reynolds’ Opening Br. 10.
26
Id. at 9.
27
Id. at 10; Reynolds’ Opening Br. Ex. I.
28
Reynolds’ Opening Br. 10.
9
volume-related portion of Annual Payment based on ITG’s sales of the Acquired

Brands in 2021.29

In addition, Reynolds made three payments to Florida and Florida’s outside

counsel in connection with the 2017 Action (i.e., the Florida Attorneys’ Fees). On

December 11, 2020, Reynolds paid $2,505,280.15 to Florida and $594,719.85 to a

law firm that Florida had retained.30 And on June 18, 2021, Reynolds paid $135,000

to a different law firm that represented Florida.31

D. This Court’s Prior Ruling on Liability

We now return from Florida to Delaware, where litigation has been pending

since 2017. The present matter involves whether, under the APA, ITG must

indemnify Reynolds for the Florida Judgment Liability and other related liabilities.

This memorandum opinion is the fourth substantive decision in the Delaware

litigation.32 Most recently, the 2022 Opinion resolved cross-motions for summary

judgment on liability by applying the APA’s terms—specifically, §§ 2.01(c)(iv),

(c)(v), and (c)(vii). The 2022 Opinion held that “the plain language of § 2.01(c)(iv)

29
Id.
30
Reynolds’ Opening Br. Ex. M.
31
Id.
32
Similar disputes arose with respect to the Minnesota and Texas settlement agreements.
Those disputes have since resolved, and ITG joined those respective settlement
agreements. 2022 Op. at *5.
10
provides that ITG assumed the Florida Judgment Liability at issue and that

§ 2.01(c)(iv) is not in conflict with § 2.01(c)(vii).”33 As a result, the decision did

“not address the parties’ arguments about § 2.01(c)(v).” 34 The 2022 Opinion

concluded that Reynolds was entitled to indemnification under § 11.02(a)(vi) for

“the amounts Reynolds [] has paid (and will pay) due to the Florida Judgment.”35

But the decision explained that further proceedings were necessary to address the

amount of damages owed to Reynolds and whether Reynolds was entitled to

equitable relief.36

E. The Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment on Remedies

On November 2, 2022, following the 2022 Opinion’s decision on liability,

Reynolds moved for summary judgment on remedies. On December 2, ITG filed a

submission opposing Reynolds’ arguments and cross-moving for summary

judgment. Briefing on the cross-motions was completed on January 23, 2023.37 I

33
Id. at *12.
34
Id.
35
Id. at *19.
36
Id. at *20.
37
Dkt. 362. On February 3, non-party Philip Morris filed a letter addressing the parties’
Profit Adjustment allocation arguments made by ITG, which are described below. Dkt.
366; see infra Section II.B. In its letter, Philip Morris supports ITG’s argument for a Profit
Adjustment allocation offset. But Philip Morris maintains that it should receive the benefit
of any offset and might intervene in further. Id. at 5 n.2. Presently, no motion to intervene
has been filed.
11
heard oral argument on February 23. 38 Following oral argument, I requested

supplemental briefing on an issue given limited attention in the parties’ briefs.39

Supplemental briefing was completed on June 9 and the matter was taken under

advisement at that time.40

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Under Court of Chancery Rule 56, summary judgment is granted only if “there

is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law.” 41 “[T]he facts must be viewed in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party and the moving party has the burden of

demonstrating that there is no material question of fact.”42 “If there are material

facts in dispute, it is inappropriate to grant summary judgment and the case should

be submitted to the fact finder to determine the disposition of the matter.”43

38
Dkts. 369-70.
39
Dkt. 371. The issue concerned ITG’s argument that the Florida Judgment Liability is an
excluded “Straddle Tobacco Action Liability,” which is resolved below. See infra
Section II.A.1.
40
See Dkts. 385-86.
41
Ct. Ch. R. 56(c).
42
Senior Tour Players 207 Mgmt. Co. v. Golftown 207 Hldgs. Co., 853 A.2d 124, 126 (Del.
Ch. 2004).
43
Paul v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 974 A.2d 140, 145 (Del. 2009).
12
 Reynolds moves for summary judgment on its entitlement to over

$231,628,197 from ITG for prior losses, including:

• $198,092,179 in payments to Florida, in principal and interest, based
on the volume-related settlement payments attributable to sales of the
Acquired Brands;44

• $3,235,000 of Florida Attorneys’ Fees;45 and

• over $7,400,000 for Reynolds’ attorneys’ fees and costs in this
litigation (the “Delaware Attorneys’ Fees”).46

Reynolds avers that it is entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest on the payments

to Florida and the Florida Attorneys’ Fees.47 For its future losses, Reynolds seeks

an order requiring ITG to indemnify Reynolds for payments made under the Florida

Judgment, or, alternatively, to join the Florida Settlement Agreement.48

In cross-moving for summary judgment, ITG argues that the Florida Judgment

Liability is an “Excluded Liability” under the APA. ITG also contends that the

Florida Attorneys’ Fees, Florida Judgment Interest, and Delaware Attorneys’ Fees

44
This amount is calculated as follows: $124,370,076 + $19,732,311 + $26,953,586 +
$27,036,206 = $198,092,179. See supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text. Reynolds
does not seek indemnification for the Profit Adjustment portion of the payments or the
those related to sales of its own cigarettes.
45
See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
46
Reynolds’ Opening Br. 14.
47
Dkt. 335.
48
Id.
13
sought by Reynolds are not indemnifiable. ITG raises various defenses to reduce its

indemnification obligation, including an offset for the benefit Reynolds received

from the Profit Adjustment allocation due to ITG’s non-joinder, as well as

acquiescence, failure to mitigate, and material breach. ITG seeks an order that it is

liable for none of, or a reduced portion of, the damages claimed by Reynolds.49

Some of these matters can appropriately be settled through summary

judgment. Others cannot. “Although summary judgment is encouraged when

possible, there is no absolute right to summary judgment.”50 “[T]he court may, in

its discretion, deny summary judgment if it decides upon a preliminary examination

of the facts presented that it is desirable to inquire into and develop the facts more

thoroughly at trial in order to clarify the law or its application.”51

A. Reynolds’ Entitlement to Recover Its Losses from the
Florida Judgment
Certain of the issues raised in the motions turn on contract interpretation and

are “readily amenable to summary judgment” because “proper interpretation of

49
Dkt. 343.
50
AeroGlobal Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 871 A.2d 428, 443 (Del. 2005).
51
Great Hill Equity P’rs IV, LP v. SIG Growth Equity Fund I, LLLP, 2017 WL 3168966,
at *2 (Del. Ch. July 26, 2017) (citations omitted).
14
language in a contract . . . is treated as a question of law.”52 When resolving such

matters, the court “will grant summary judgment in two scenarios: (1) when the

contract is unambiguous, or (2) when the extrinsic evidence fails to create a triable

issue of material fact.”53

As discussed below, I conclude that Reynolds’ damages are not “Excluded

Liabilities” under the APA’s terms. I also conclude that the Florida Attorneys’ Fees

are not “Losses” as defined in the APA. 54 The Florida Judgment Interest is,

however, within the definition of Losses. As to the Delaware Attorneys’ Fees, I

cannot presently resolve whether they are indemnifiable.

1. Whether Reynolds’ Damages Are Straddle Liabilities

Reynolds seeks indemnification for the Florida Judgment Liability under

§ 11.02(a)(vi) of the APA, which provides that ITG “shall indemnify, defend and

hold harmless [Reynolds] and its Affiliates . . . against all Losses that [Reynolds and

its Affiliates] may suffer or incur, or become subject to, as a result of . . . any

52
Tetragon Fin. Grp. Ltd. v. Ripple Labs Inc., 2021 WL 1053835, at *3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19,
2021) (first quoting Barton v. Club Ventures Invs. LLC, 2013 WL 6072249, at *5 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 7, 2013); and then quoting Pellaton v. Bank of N.Y., 592 A.2d 473, 478 (Del. 1991)).
53
Julius v. Accurus Aerospace Corp., 2019 WL 5681610, at *7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2019),
aff’d, 241 A.3d 220 (Del. 2020); see GMG Cap. Invs., LLC v. Athenian Venture P’rs I,
L.P., 36 A.3d 776, 784 (Del. 2012) (“[I]n a dispute over the proper interpretation of a
contract, summary judgment may not be awarded if the language is ambiguous and the
moving party has failed to offer uncontested evidence as to the proper interpretation.”).
54
APA Ex. A at A-10 (defining “Losses”); see infra note 122.
15
Assumed Liability.” 55 The “Assumed Liabilities” (enumerated in § 2.01(c)) are

those that ITG agreed to assume from Reynolds in purchasing the Acquired

Brands.56 The 2022 Opinion held that the Florida Judgment Liability is an Assumed

Liability under § 2.01(c)(iv), in which ITG agreed to assume “all Liabilities” arising

out of its post-closing use of the assets it acquired through the APA.57

Now, ITG argues that the Florida Judgment Liability is a “Straddle Tobacco

Action Liability” (for short, “Straddle Liability”), which is expressly carved out of

the Assumed Liabilities identified in § 2.01(c)(v).58 Straddle Liabilities are a type

of Excluded Liability (enumerated in § 2.01(d)) that “shall be paid, performed and

discharged” by Reynolds “[n]otwithstanding any other provision” of the APA. 59

Thus, if the Florida Judgment Liability were a Straddle Liability, it would not be

indemnifiable under § 11.02(a)(vi).

Straddle Tobacco Action Liabilities are defined as:

all Liabilities arising out of or in connection with any smoking and
health-related Action filed in the Straddle Tobacco Action Period
arising out of, in connection with or relating to: (a) the manufacture,
packaging, labeling, delivery, sale, resale, distribution, marketing or

55
APA § 11.02(a)(vi).
56
Id. § 2.01(c); see 2022 Op. at *2.
57
2022 Op. at *13-14 (quoting APA § 2.01(c)(iv)).
58
ITG’s Opening Br. 21 n.68; see also APA § 2.01(c)(v).
59
APA § 2.01(d). The Assumed Liabilities are “subject to” the Excluded Liabilities. Id.
§ 2.01(c)(v) (identifying a carve-out for Straddle Tobacco Action Liabilities).
16
 promotion of one or more of the Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands;
or (b) the use or consumption of, or exposure to one or more Acquired
Tobacco Cigarette Brands and provided that such Action also gives rise
to Seller Tobacco Liabilities.60

“Seller Tobacco Liabilities” are:

all Liabilities arising out of or in connection with any Action (whether
commenced before, on or after the Closing Date) to the extent relating
to the development, manufacture, packaging, labeling, production,
delivery, sale, resale, distribution, marketing, promotion, use or
consumption of, or exposure to, tobacco products, including smoking
and health-related claims, in each case, to the extent relating to the
period ending on the Closing Date and related to one or more of the
Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands.61

The Straddle Tobacco Action Period is “the period commencing on the

Closing Date [June 12, 2015] and ending on the date that is eight years from the

Closing Date.”62

60
APA Ex. A at A-17; see APA § 2.01(d)(v) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Agreement, the Acquiror is not assuming . . . (v) all Straddle Tobacco Action Liabilities”).
The definition of Straddle Tobacco Action Liabilities includes certain exceptions that are
excluded from the quote for the sake of brevity. See APA Ex. A at A-17. “Action” means
“any claim action, suit, arbitration, inquiry, investigation or other proceeding of any nature
(whether criminal, civil, legislative, administrative, regulatory, prosecutorial or otherwise)
by or before any court, arbitrator or Governmental Authority or similar body.” Id. at A-1.
61
APA § 2.01(d)(i); see APA Ex. A at A-17.
62
APA Ex. A at A-17; see 2022 Op. at *3 n.19 (explaining that the “Closing Date” was
June 12, 2015) (citing APA § 2.03).
17
 ITG waived the argument that the Florida Judgment Liability is an excluded

Straddle Liability.63 It was not raised in briefing the motions resolved in the 2019

Opinion, which addressed the parties’ conflicting interpretations of § 2.01(c)(iv),

(c)(v), and (c)(vii). 64 In its opening summary judgment brief on liabilities (as

resolved in the 2022 Opinion), ITG mentioned Straddle Liabilities once in a

footnote.65 The first time ITG raised a substantive Straddle Liability argument was

in opposing Reynolds’ motion for summary judgment on liability.66 But even then,

ITG did not contend—as it does now—that the Florida Judgment Liability was an

Excluded Liability under § 2.01(d)(v). Rather, ITG argued that insofar as the court

63
See Emerald P’rs v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1224 (Del. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff
waived arguments by failing to raise them in its opening brief); see also Franklin Balance
Sheet Inv. Fund v. Crowley, 2006 WL 3095952, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 2006) (explaining
that “under the briefing rules, a party is obliged in its motion and opening brief to set forth
all of the grounds, authorities and arguments supporting its motion” and “should not hold
matters in reserve for reply briefs”); Jung v. El Tinieblo Int’l, Inc., 2022 WL 16557663, at
*11 (Del. Ch. Oct. 31, 2022) (“Generally, the failure to raise an argument in one’s opening
brief constitutes a waiver of that argument.”).
64
The 2019 Opinion noted that § 2.01(c)(v) “excludes ‘Straddle Tobacco Action
Liabilities,’ but neither party has argued that this exclusion is relevant here.” 2019 Op. at
*6 n.43.
65
ITG Brands, LLC’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 222) 39 n.13. Curiously,
ITG described the Straddle Liabilities exception in § 2.01(c)(v) as suggesting that “the
parties were focused on products liability” rather than settlement claims—the opposite of
ITG’s current position.
66
ITG Brands, LLC’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 249) (“ITG’s Liability Opp.
Br.”) 21-25.
18
applied § 2.01(c)(v), the Florida Judgment Liability should be viewed as falling

within the Straddle Liabilities carveout.67

Of course, § 2.01(c)(v) and § 2.01(d)(v) are mutually exclusive. 68 If the

Florida Judgment Liability were not an Assumed Liability under § 2.01(c)(v)

because it was a Straddle Liability, it would necessarily be an Excluded Liability

under § 2.01(d)(v). Still, ITG did not squarely raise this argument at the liability

stage, thereby prejudicing Reynolds and creating inefficiency and delay. 69 In a

contract as tortuous as the APA, it is not always obvious how the various provisions

of the APA interact.

67
See ITG’s Liability Opp. Br. 23 (“[I]f the Court agrees with Reynolds that § 2.01(v)
applies, all the requirements for the Straddle liability exception are met, and the Liability
remains Reynolds’ responsibility.”); see also id. at 21 (similar); ITG Brands, LLC’s Reply
Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 256) 20 n.5 (“[I]f this Court finds that § 2.01(c)(v)
is applicable, the settlement Liabilities are excluded ‘straddle’ liabilities.”); ITG’s Hr’g
Slides in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. on Liability (Dkt. 264) 122-27 (title: “Alternatively,
if Section 2.01(c)(v) Applies, the Liability is a ‘Straddle’ Liability”). I did not, however,
apply § 2.01(c)(v); summary judgment was granted in Reynolds’ favor under § 2.01(c)(iv).
2022 Op. at *12 (“I conclude that the plain language of § 2.01(c)(iv) provides that ITG
assumed the Florida Judgment Liability at issue and that § 2.01(c)(iv) is not in conflict with
§ 2.01(c)(vii). I therefore need not address the parties’ arguments about § 2.01(c)(v).”).
68
Compare APA § 2.01(c)(v) (listing “Acquiror Assumed Liabilities” as those “other than
Straddle Tobacco Action Liabilities”), with id. § 2.01(d)(v) (listing Straddle Tobacco
Action Liabilities as “Acquiror Excluded Liabilities”).
69
See PharmAthene, Inc. v. SIGA Techs., Inc., 2011 WL 6392906, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16,
2011) (“The general rule [is] that a party waives any argument it fails properly to raise
[which] shows deference to fundamental fairness and the common sense notion that, to
defend a claim or oppose a defense, the adverse party deserves sufficient notice of the claim
or defense in the first instance.”).
19
 In any event, ITG’s argument fails on the merits. A Straddle Tobacco Action

Liability must, among other things, (1) “aris[e] out of or in connection with a[]

smoking and health-related Action” that (2) was “filed in the Straddle Tobacco

Action Period.”70 The 2017 Action in Florida, where Florida and Philip Morris filed

motions to enforce the Florida Settlement Agreement, falls in the relevant time

period.71 The primary dispute is whether the 2017 Action from which the Florida

Judgment Liability arises is a “smoking and health-related Action.”72

“Smoking and health-related” is not defined in the APA. A review of the

phrase’s use throughout the APA is, however, instructive. Together, several

provisions of the APA assign liabilities arising out of “smoking and health-related”

claims and actions using temporal markers.73

Section 2.01(c)(v) provides that ITG assumed liabilities arising out of post-

closing “smoking and health-related claims.”74 Conversely, § 2.01(d)(v) provides

70
APA Ex. A at A-17.
71
The relevant “Action” cannot be the one commenced in Florida in 1995 since it falls
outside the Straddle Tobacco Action Period.
72
APA Ex. A at A-17.
73
Sections 2.01(c)(v), 2.01(d)(i), and 11.01(a)(v)(A) each use the phrase: “to the extent
relating to the development, manufacture, packaging, labeling, production, delivery, sale,
resale, distribution, marketing, promotion, use or consumption of, or exposure to, tobacco
products, including smoking and health-related claims.” APA §§ 2.01(c)(v), 2.01(d)(i),
11.01(a)(v)(A) (emphasis added).
74
Id. § 2.01(c)(v); see 2022 Op. at *18.
20
that Reynolds retains responsibility for liabilities from pre-closing “smoking and

health-related claims.”75 Section 11.01(a)(v)(A) provides for a pro rata allocation to

ITG and Reynolds of liability for “smoking and health-related claims” spanning the

pre-closing and post-closing periods.76 And Straddle Liability is an exception to

§ 2.01(c)(v), involving (1) conduct that “straddles” the time of Reynolds’ and ITG’s

ownership of the Acquired Brands and (2) claims filed post-closing. The following

table provides a summary:

Allocation of Liabilities77
Liability Acquiror N/A Seller Straddle
Type Tobacco Tobacco Tobacco
Liabilities Liabilities Action
Liabilities
APA Provision § 2.01(c)(v) § 11.01(a)(v)(A) § 2.01(d)(i) § 2.01(d)(v)
Requirements Relates to the Relates to both Relates to the Filed in the
post-closing pre-and post- pre-closing Straddle Tobacco
period closing periods period Action Period
Assumed or Assumed Both Assumed Excluded Excluded
Excluded? Liability Liability and Liability Liability
Excluded
Liability
Responsible ITG Pro rata to ITG Reynolds Reynolds
Party and Reynolds

Interpreting “smoking and health-related Actions” to include the 2017 Action

would be inconsistent with this structure. The 2017 Action, arising from a motion

75
APA § 2.01(d)(v).
76
Id. § 11.01(a)(v)(A).
77
Specifically, this table reflects the allocation of liabilities arising out of “smoking and
health-related Actions” and “smoking and health-related claims.”
21
to enforce a contract, did not concern conduct “straddling” the period between

Reynolds’s and ITG’s ownership of the Acquired Brands. The 2017 Action is about

contractual liability for settlement payments based on sales of Acquired Brands

cigarettes post-closing.

Yet ITG argues that the that the term “smoking and health-related” should be

read to merely require “a connection to smoking and health.”78 According to ITG,

the 2017 Action is “smoking and health-related” because the underlying contract at

issue—the 1997 Florida Settlement Agreement—settled the 1995 litigation seeking

“reimbursement for healthcare costs caused by smoking.”79 Reynolds, for its part,

contends that the term “smoking and health-related Action” refers only to “tort

lawsuits, for harm due to ‘smoking’ and ‘related’ to ‘health.’”80 In Reynolds’ view,

the 2017 Action is outside the Straddle Liability definition because it was a breach

of contract suit.81

78
ITG Brands, LLC’s Suppl. Br. on Straddle Tobacco Action Liabilities (Dkt. 375)
(“ITG’s Suppl. Br.”) 3.
79
ITG’s Opening Br. 21-22 (arguing that the Florida Judgment Liability follows
“settlements [that] resolved litigation in which the states ‘sought reimbursement for
healthcare costs caused by smoking’” (quoting 2022 Op. at *2)).
80
Defs.’ Opening Suppl. Summ. J. Br. on Remedies (Dkt. 379) (“Defs.’ Suppl. Br.”) 2. As
noted, ITG previously indicated that it agrees with this reading. See supra note 65.
81
See Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. on Remedies and Answering Br. in
Opp’n to ITG’s Mot. for Summ. J. on Remedies (Dkt. 353) (“Reynolds’ Reply Br.”) 6 (“A
breach-of-contract action does not become ‘smoking and health-related’ simply because
22
 After a careful review of the APA, I conclude that the phrase “smoking and

health-related” is unambiguous. “The parties’ steadfast disagreement over

interpretation” alone does not give rise to ambiguity.82 ITG’s reading might have

some appeal if the phrase “smoking and health-related” were viewed in isolation.

But ITG’s interpretation is unreasonable when the provision is viewed in the context

of the entire contract.83 ITG’s position is inconsistent with the use of the phrase

elsewhere in the APA, would create absurdities, and would render at least one other

provision a nullity. Only Reynolds’ interpretation is reasonable.

a. “Smoking and Health-Related” In Isolation

“Delaware law adheres to the objective theory of contracts,” meaning that “a

contract’s construction should be that which would be understood by an objective,

reasonable third party.” 84 Actions about “smoking” and “health” include tort

the contract related to past smoking-and-health litigation, any more than an action alleging
breach of a contract for installing solar panels becomes an ‘environmental-related’ case.”).
82
Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153, 1160 (Del. 2010) (“The determination
of ambiguity lies within the sole province of the court.”) (citation omitted); see also Cox
Commc’ns, Inc. v. T-Mobile US, Inc., 273 A.3d 752, 760 (Del. 2022) (“Critically, a
contractual provision is ‘not rendered ambiguous simply because the parties in litigation
differ’ as to the proper interpretation.”) (citation omitted).
83
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. v. Westinghouse Electric Co. LLC, 166 A.3d 912, 913-
14 (Del. 2017) (“In giving sensible life to a real-world contract, courts must read the
specific provisions of the contract in light of the entire contract.”).
84
Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354, 367-68 (Del. 2014) (quoting Osborn, 991 A.2d at
1159); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 738 (Del. 2006)
(“Under well-settled case law, Delaware courts look to dictionaries for assistance in
23
lawsuits against cigarette companies.85 The addition of the word “related” arguably

broadens the term “smoking and health” to other contexts. “Related” means

“[c]onnected in some way; having relationship to or with something else.” 86 The

word is “paradigmatically broad.”87

As such, the 2017 Action might be “related” to “health” and “smoking” if

those terms were viewed outside the broader context of the APA. 88 In its

1995 lawsuit, Florida “sought reimbursement for healthcare costs caused by

determining the plain meaning of terms which are not defined in a contract.”); see APA
§ 12.12(a) (providing that Delaware law governs the APA).
85
See Defs.’ Suppl. Br. Ex. A ¶ 2 (Case Management Order, In re Cigarette Smoking &
Health Cases, No. 95-CL-9876 (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 28, 1996) (using the term “cigarette
smoking-and-health cases” to refer to tort lawsuits)); 1 Joseph M. McLaughlin,
McLaughlin on Class Actions §§ 5.39 & 5.58 (19th ed. 2022) (using the term “[t]obacco
smoking and health litigation” to refer to tort lawsuits).
86
Related, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see also Fla. Chem. Co., LLC v. Flotek
Indus., Inc., 262 A.3d 1066, 1083 (Del. Ch. Aug. 17, 2021) (defining “relating to” as “to
have some relation to” or “to have bearing or concern [on]; [to] pertain” (quoting Relating
to, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504
U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (“The ordinary meaning of [‘relating to’] is a broad one.”) (citing
Relating to, Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)).
87
Fla. Chem. Co., LLC, 262 A.3d at 1083; see also DeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., L.L.C., 2006
WL 224058, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2006) (describing “related” as “one of the
“far-reaching terms often used . . . to capture the broadest possible universe”).
88
The “and” in “smoking and health-related” could be read to be either conjunctive or
disjunctive. See Concord Steel, Inc. v. Wilm. Steel Processing Co., 2008 WL 902406, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 3, 2008); Weinberg v. Waystar, Inc., 294 A.3d 1039, 1045 (Del. 2023).
For the sake of argument, I adopt the broader, disjunctive reading here.
24
smoking.”89 The Florida Settlement Agreement provides that payments “constitute

. . . reimbursement for Medicaid” and “medical expenses.”90 The Constitution of the

State of Florida even requires that settlement proceeds be used for smoking and

health-related purposes.91 Florida brought the 2017 Action to ensure that ITG and

Reynolds continued to provide these reimbursements. If neither Reynolds nor ITG

made payments under the Florida Settlement Agreement, Florida “would lose the

billions of bargained for dollars intended for public healthcare expenses caused by

[smoking].”92

89
ITG’s Suppl. Br. Ex. 1 ¶¶ 1-5, 46-49.
90
Fla. Settlement Agreement ¶ II.B.4; see also Pace v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 2010 WL
1325657, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2010) (holding that an action for failure to make
settlement payments “relat[ed]” to the underlying tort claim that led to the settlement
agreement); Bridge v. McHenry Truck Lines, Inc., 1998 WL 427611, at *3 (N.D. Ill. July
24, 1998) (holding that ERISA preempted a suit for breach of a settlement agreement to
resolve a claim for pension contributions as “relate[d] to any employee benefit plan”); but
see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Spinelli, 443 A.2d 1286, 1287 (Del. 1982) (holding that an action
by an insured against his automobile insurance carrier to recover uninsured motorist
benefits “essentially sound[ed] in contract rather than in tort” even though the benefits
stemmed from a personal injury).
91
Art. X, § 27, Fla. Const. (“[A] portion of the money that tobacco companies pay to the
State of Florida under the Tobacco Settlement each year shall be used to fund a
comprehensive statewide tobacco education and prevention program consistent with
recommendations of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) . . . .”).
92
ITG’s Suppl. Br. Ex. 5 (Jan. 18, 2017 Fla. Mot.) 3.
25
 b. “Smoking and Health-Related” In Context

The phrase “smoking and health-related Action” cannot, however, be read in

isolation. I must construe the contract “as a whole and . . . give each provision and

term effect, so as not to render any part of the contract mere surplusage.”93 “The

meaning inferred from a particular provision cannot control the meaning of the entire

agreement if such an inference conflicts with the agreement’s overall scheme or

plan.” 94 ITG’s expansive reading of the phrase “smoking and health-related”

contravenes these principles.

To reiterate, the APA is structured to allocate liabilities arising out of

“smoking and health-related” claims and actions depending on the time period.95 In

doing so, the APA uses the phrase “smoking and health-related” in three places in

addition to the definition of Straddle Liability.96 “[T]he same phrase should be given

the same meaning when it is used in different places in the same contract.”97

93
Osborn, 991 A.2d at 1159 (quoting Kuhn Constr., Inc. v. Diamond State Port Corp.,
2010 WL 779992, at *2 (Del. Mar. 8, 2010)).
94
Athenian Venture P’rs I, L.P., 36 A.3d at 779.
95
See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text; “Allocation of Liabilities” tbl. at 21.
96
APA §§ 2.01(c)(v), (d)(i); id. § 11.01(a)(v)(A).
97
JJS, Ltd. v. Steelpoint CP Hldgs., LLC, 2019 WL 5092896, at *6 (Del. Ch. Oct. 11, 2019)
(The “presumption of consistent usage . . . provides that absent anything indicating a
contrary intent, the same phrase should be given the same meaning when it is used in
different places in the same contract.”) (citation omitted).
26
 The first two uses of “smoking and health-related” are in § 2.01. Both

§§ 2.01(c)(v) and 2.01(d)(i) include the phrase “smoking and health-related claims”

in identical lists of conduct from which “Liabilities arising out of or in connection

with any Action” might arise.98 The crucial distinction is the period to which the

claims relate. Section 2.01(c)(v) confirms that liabilities (other than Straddle

Liabilities) arising out of “smoking and health-related claims . . . commencing after

the Closing Date” are ITG’s responsibility. 99 Section 2.01(d)(i) confirms that

liabilities arising out of “smoking and health-related claims . . . relating to the period

ending on the Closing Date”—defined as Seller Tobacco Liabilities—remain

Reynolds’ responsibility.100

The third use, in § 11.01(a)(v), addresses Reynolds’ indemnification of ITG

for these Seller Tobacco Liabilities. The provision is bifurcated into two

subsections. Section 11.01(a)(v)(A) concerns an “Action [] brought in relation to

the alleged personal injury or other damage to person(s) caused by smoking or

98
APA §§ 2.01(c)(v), (d)(i) (both addressing “Liabilities arising out of or in connection
with any Action . . . relating to the development, manufacture, packaging, labeling,
production, delivery, sale, resale, distribution, marketing, promotion, use or consumption
of, or exposure to, tobacco products, including smoking and health-related claims, . . .
related to one or more of the Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands” (emphasis added)).
99
Id. § 2.01(c)(v).
100
Id. § 2.01(d)(i).
27
alleged addiction of one or more individuals.”101 It repeats the clarifying examples

listed in § 2.01, including “smoking and health-related claims.”102 It assigns pro rata

to ITG and Reynolds any liabilities arising from an “Action” related to both the pre-

and post-closing periods.103 Because the 2017 Action was not “brought in relation

to the alleged personal injury or other damage to person(s) caused by smoking or

alleged addiction,” it is not a “smoking and health-related claim” within the meaning

of § 11.01(a)(v)(A).104

101
Id. § 11.01(a)(v)(A) (stating “where the Action is brought in relation to the alleged
personal injury or other damage to person(s) caused by smoking or alleged addiction of
one or more individuals to one or more of the Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands,
[Reynolds’ indemnification] shall extend to the pro-rata portion of all Losses arising out of
or in connection with such Action (to the extent relating to the development, manufacture,
packaging, labeling, production, delivery, sale, resale, distribution, marketing, promotion,
use or consumption of, or exposure to, tobacco products, including smoking and health-
related claims and related to one or more of the Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands)
calculated on the basis of . . . [a formula]” (emphasis added)).
102
Id. The phrase “smoking and health-related claims” modifies the phrase “Losses
associated with such Action.” Id. In other words, a “smoking and health-related claim” is
an example of a “Liability” associated with an “Action” that is “brought in relation to the
alleged personal injury or other damage to person(s) caused by smoking or alleged
addiction.” Id.
103
Id.
104
The pro rata allocation formula prescribed by § 11.01(a)(v)(A) is also incompatible with
viewing a contract action (like the 2017 Action) as involving “smoking and health-related
claims.” The formula in § 11.01(a)(v)(A) defines a ratio of “(1) the period of time such
individual or individuals used, consumed or were exposed to tobacco products relating to
one or more of the Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands prior to the Closing Date” and “(2)
the total period of time such individual or individuals used, consumed or were exposed to
tobacco products relating to one or more of the Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands.” Id.
§ 11.01(a)(v)(A). The “Losses” associated with the 2017 Action have no relation to the
28
 This interpretation of “smoking and health-related claim” is consistent with

subsection (B) of § 11.01(a)(v), which is a catch-all for “any claim other than [that]

set out in Section 11.01(a)(v)(A).”105 In repeating the lists of exemplars from § 2.01,

§ 11.01(a)(v)(B) omits the phrase “including smoking and health-related claims.”106

That is, “any . . . other” claim does not include a “smoking and health-related

claim.”107 A claim involving “alleged personal injury or other damage to persons

caused by smoking or alleged addition” could be a “smoking and health-related

claim,” but a claim lacking such conduct is not. By that logic, the characterization

of “smoking and health-related claims” in § 11.01(a)(v)(A) would not apply to the

2017 Action.

“period of time such individual or individuals used, consumed or were exposed to tobacco
products.” Id.
105
Id. § 11.01(a)(v)(B) (stating “where the Action relates to any claim other than set out in
Section 11.01(a)(v)(A) above, [Reynolds’ indemnification] shall extend to the pro-rata
portion of all Losses arising out of or in connection with such Action (to the extent relating
to the development, manufacture, packaging, labeling, production, delivery, sale, resale,
distribution, marketing, promotion, use or consumption of, or exposure to, tobacco
products and related to one or more of the Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands), as follows:
. . . [a formula]”).
106
Id.
107
In addition, the pro rata calculation formula prescribed by § 11.01(a)(v)(B) recognizes
that non-“smoking and health-related claims” have no relation to the duration of exposure
to tobacco products. Id. § 11.01(a)(v)(B). Instead, this formula uses a ratio of sales.
29
 The definition of Straddle Liabilities reinforces this reading. 108 Like

§§ 2.01(c)(v), 2.01(d)(i), and 11.01(a)(v), the definition begins by listing conduct

that might give rise to a “smoking and health related” action.109 The definition then

adds a proviso, which “conditions the principal matter it qualifies.” 110 The proviso

lists four instances where Losses from an “Action” that generated a Straddle

Liability are nonetheless excluded.111 Three of the four instances involve scenarios

specific to products liability actions involving ITG’s post-closing conduct: where

108
See APA Ex. A at A-17.
109
“[S]moking and health-related claims” are a subset of the claims “relating to”
manufacture, use, consumption, etc. of tobacco products. See APA §§ 2.01(c)(v),
2.01(d)(i), 11.01(a)(v)(A). The definition of Straddle Liabilities omits “development” and
“production.” APA Ex. A at A-17. The provisions are otherwise consistent in this regard.
110
2017 Op. at *8 (citation omitted).
111
The full text of the proviso is: “Straddle Tobacco Action Liabilities will exclude any
Losses of RAI and its Affiliates arising solely in relation to the Straddle Tobacco Action
Period to the extent that any such Losses were incurred as a result of any of the following
(whether by way of an increase to an existing Straddle Tobacco Action Liability or as a
separate Straddle Tobacco Action Liability): (a) any changes in Law (or interpretation
thereof) after the Closing Date; (b) any manufacturing defects or design defects in any of
the products relating to the Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands that were manufactured by
or on behalf of the Acquiror (other than by RAI or its Affiliates on behalf of the Acquiror
(other than by RAI or its Affiliates on behalf of the Acquiror, where RAI or its Affiliates
are responsible for any such defects) after the Closing Date; (c) the marketing of the
Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands by or on behalf of the Acquiror to, or otherwise
targeted at, minors after the Closing Date; or (d) any misrepresentation or untrue statement
of fact made by the Acquiror after the Closing Date in relation to the Acquired Tobacco
Cigarette Brands, save to the extent that any of such matters were materially consistent
with the products or the practices of RAI or Lorillard in the twelve month period prior to
Closing.” APA Ex. A at A-17.
30
the “Liability” arises from “manufacturing defects or design defects” introduced by

ITG, “marketing” by ITG, or “misrepresentations” by ITG.112 Neither the proviso’s

scenarios nor § 11.01(a)(v)(A) concern breaches of contract like those challenged in

the 2017 Action.

This more limited reading of the Straddle Liabilities definition is temporally

reasonable in view of § 2.01(d)(v). Section 2.01(d)(v) assigns liability for post-

closing “smoking and health-related Actions” where ITG and Reynolds face liability

for pre- and post-closing conduct, respectively—i.e., conduct that “straddled” the

closing date.113 For example, an individual’s health problems from cigarette use

could involve latency periods. The relevant conduct might have occurred—at least

in part—pre-closing when Reynolds owned the Acquired Brands, but an associated

claim could be filed after ITG took ownership. The parties agreed in § 2.01(d)(v)

that, for a limited period post-closing (i.e., the eight-year Straddle Tobacco Action

Period), Reynolds would bear all liabilities arising from such actions. To conclude

otherwise would lead to the absurd result described in the 2022 Opinion, whereby

112
Id. The fourth instance involves post-closing “changes in Law (or interpretation
thereof).” Id.
113
The phrase “Seller Tobacco Liabilities” modifies the phrase “such Action” that, in turn,
refers back to “any smoking and health related Action filed in the Straddle Action
Period”—the only other “Action” mentioned in the definition of Straddle Liabilities. Id.
(emphasis added); see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
31
ITG would own, sell products under, and derive the benefits of the APA while

Reynolds remains obligated to make annual payments to Florida for ITG’s sales

without indemnification from ITG.114

Finally, to treat the Florida Judgment Liabilities as a Straddle Liability would

render § 2.01(c)(vii) meaningless. ITG agreed in § 2.01(c)(vii) to assume “all

Liabilities under the State Settlements” “subject to the Agreed Assumption

Terms.”115 If ITG’s view of Straddle Liabilities were adopted, § 2.01(c)(vii) would

not have that effect for any Action filed in the Straddle Tobacco Action period.

Rather, any liabilities resulting from the “State Settlements” would fall within the

114
2022 Op. at *19 (“No reasonable tobacco manufacturer would have agreed to expose
itself to the prospect of making annual payments to [Florida] for cigarette product revenues
it no longer receives.”); see also 2017 Op. at *12.
115
APA § 2.01(c)(vii) (agreeing to assume “subject to the Agreed Assumption Terms, all
Liabilities under the State Settlements in respect of the Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands
that relate to the period after the Closing Date, including (A) any recalculation or
redetermination of amounts due in respect of the Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands that
relate to the period after the Closing Date, and (B) all plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees attributable
to any post-Closing increases in volume of sales (determined in accordance with Section
11.08) of any of the Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands, but excluding, for the avoidance
of doubt, Seller Plaintiff Fees”). The “State Settlements” are those reached between
Reynolds Tobacco and other manufacturers, on one hand, and the States of Florida,
Minnesota, Mississippi, and Texas, on the other. 2022 Op. at *2.
32
Straddle Liabilities exception.116 Delaware courts “will not read a contract to render

a provision or term ‘meaningless or illusory.’”117

* * *

Accordingly, even if ITG’s argument were fairly presented, the Florida

Judgment Liability is not a Straddle Liability. It is not an Excluded Liability under

§ 2.01(d)(v). Rather, it is—as I previously held in the 2022 Opinion—an Assumed

Liability. To treat the Florida Judgment Liability, which involves Annual Payments

for ITG’s sales of the Acquired Brands, as a Straddle Liability would be inconsistent

with the bargained-for assignment of liabilities prescribed in the APA.

ITG’s motion for summary judgment on this basis is denied. Reynolds’

motion for summary judgment on its entitlement to indemnification for the

settlements payments made to Florida as part of the Florida Judgment Liability is

116
See APA § 2.01(c)(v).
117
Osborn, 991 A.2d at 1159 (quoting Sonitrol Hldg. Co. v. Marceau Investissements, 607
A.2d 1177, 1183 (Del. 1992)). It would also be unreasonable to assign liability under a
“State Settlement” based only on the filing date of an action related to that settlement. For
example, had Florida’s motion to enforce the Florida Settlement Agreement been filed on
June 13, 2023—one day after the Straddle Tobacco Action Period—the motion would not
give rise to a Straddle Liability under ITG’s interpretation. But if the motion were filed on
June 12, 2023, it would give rise to a Straddle Liability.
33
granted.118 The amount of Reynolds’ entitlement will be resolved after trial, subject

to any appropriate reductions proven by ITG.119

2. Whether the Florida Attorneys’ Fees Are Indemnifiable
The Florida court held that Florida was “entitled to an award of its reasonable

attorneys’ fees and costs from Reynolds under the express terms of the Florida

Settlement Agreement.” 120 Reynolds seeks indemnification for the resulting

$3,235,000 it paid for Florida’s attorneys’ fees and costs in the 2017 Action

(previously defined as the “Florida Attorneys’ Fees”). 121 Indemnification is not

available for the Florida Attorneys’ Fees because they are not indemnifiable Losses

under the APA.

The definition of Losses includes “interest and penalties recovered by a third

party with respect [to claims, etc.]” and “out-of-pocket expenses and reasonable

attorneys’ [] fees . . . incurred in the investigation or defense of any of the same in

asserting, preserving or enforcing [Reynolds’] rights hereunder[.]” 122 This

118
This holding excludes the Florida Attorneys’ Fees and Florida Judgment Interest, which
are addressed separately below.
119
See infra Section II.B.1.
120
Fla. J. ¶ 7.
121
Id.; see supra notes 30-31; Reynolds’ Opening Br. Ex. M.
122
APA Ex. A at A-10 (“‘Losses’ means all losses, demands, claims, Actions, assessments,
Liabilities, damages, deficiencies, fines, penalties, costs, expenses, commitments,
judgments, orders, decrees or settlements, environmental investigation and remediation
34
provision explicitly includes “interest and penalties recovered by a third party” (like

Florida), but not third-party attorneys’ fees. Where “several subjects of a larger class

are specifically enumerated, and there are no general words to show that other

subjects of that class are included, it may reasonably be inferred that the subjects not

specifically named were intended to be excluded.”123 Attorneys’ fees are addressed

later in the provision regarding Reynolds’ Losses in “asserting, preserving or

enforcing [its] rights hereunder” (i.e., under the APA).124

Section 11.02(a)(vi) likewise does not support indemnification of the Florida

Attorneys’ Fees. ITG must indemnify Reynolds for Losses including Reynolds’

“reasonable attorneys’ [] fees . . . incurred in . . . asserting, preserving, or reinforcing

[Reynolds’] rights hereunder.”125 The Florida Attorneys’ Fees were not incurred by

Reynolds in enforcing its rights against ITG under the APA. They were incurred by

costs, obligations and claims (including any Action brought by any Governmental
Authority or Person), in each case whether or not resulting from Third Party Claims,
interest and penalties recovered by a third party with respect thereto and out-of-pocket
expenses and reasonable attorneys’ and accountants’ fees and expenses incurred in the
investigation or defense of any of the same in asserting, preserving or enforcing any
Acquiror Indemnified Party’s or RAI Indemnified Party’s rights hereunder (emphasis
added)).
123
Active Asset Recovery, Inc. v. Real Est. Asset Recovery Servs., Inc., 1999 WL 743479,
at *11 (Del. Ch. Sept. 10, 1999)) (quoting Arthur L. Corbin, 3 Corbin on Contracts § 552
at 206 (1960)).
124
APA Ex. A at A-10.
125
APA § 11.02(a)(vi).
35
Florida in asserting its own rights “under the express terms of the Florida Settlement

Agreement.”126

Reynolds is therefore not entitled to indemnification for the Florida

Attorneys’ Fees under the APA. ITG’s motion for summary judgment on this basis

is granted; Reynolds’ is denied.

3. Whether the Florida Judgment Interest Is Indemnifiable
Reynolds also seeks indemnification of certain pre- and post- judgment

interest it paid to Florida on damages arising out of the Florida Judgment Liability

(previously defined as the Florida Judgment Interest). 127 This interest relates to

Annual Payments owed to Florida for 2015 through 2019 that were unpaid until

October 5, 2020. As discussed above, the definition of indemnifiable Losses

includes “interest and penalties recovered by a third party.”128 The Florida Judgment

Interest that Reynolds was required to pay Florida falls squarely within that

definition.

126
Fla. J. ¶ 7 (“As the prevailing party, the State is entitled to an award of its reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs from Reynolds under the express terms of the Florida Settlement
Agreement”); see also Fla. Settlement Agreement Amend. No. 1 Ex. 1 (Dec. 7, 1998
Consent Decree) ¶ 9 (“Enforcement and Attorneys’ Fees. In any proceeding which results
in a finding that a [] Settling Defendant violated this Consent Decree, the responsible []
Settling Defendant or [] Settling Defendants shall pay the State’s costs and attorneys’ fees
incurred in such proceeding.”).
127
See supra note 20 (defining Florida Judgment Interest).
128
APA Ex. A at A-10; see supra note 122.
36
 ITG contends that Reynolds cannot recover the Florida Judgment Interest

because it “resulted from Reynolds’ own breach of the Florida Settlement

Agreement and decision to delay payment.” 129 In support of its argument, ITG

construes the definition of Losses as providing that “interest and penalties” must be

“incurred . . . in asserting, preserving or enforcing” Reynolds’ rights under the

APA.130 But the phrase “incurred . . . in asserting, preserving or enforcing [the

party’s] rights hereunder” modifies “reasonable attorneys’ . . . fees and expenses.”131

It does not modify “interest and penalties recovered by a third party with respect

thereto,” which refers back to “all . . . Actions . . . damages . . . or settlements.”132

In other words, Reynolds’ indemnifiable Losses for attorneys’ fees and expenses are

those incurred in vindicating its rights under the APA. But interest and penalties

129
ITG’s Opening Br. 32. ITG also argues that Reynolds’ entitlement to indemnification
for the Florida Judgment Interest should be rejected because Reynolds employed a “failed
litigations strategy” by withholding “payment from June 12, 2015 [i.e., closing] until
October 5, 2020.” Id. at 33. But Reynolds was entitled to appeal the ruling in Florida and,
when its appeals were exhausted, then pay the debt imposed by the Florida Judgment. The
interest that Reynolds paid to Florida is a direct result of the Florida Judgment. Nothing in
the APA is to the contrary.
130
ITG Brands, LLC’s Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. on Remedies (Dkt. 362)
32 (quoting APA Ex. A at A-10).
131
APA Ex. A at A-10; see supra note 122.
132
APA Ex. A at A-10.
37
paid to a third party—like Florida—are recoverable in a broader set of

circumstances, subject to the provisions of § 11.02.133

My reading is consistent with the last antecedent rule: “ordinarily, qualifying

words or phrases, where no contrary intention appears, usually relate to the last

antecedent.” 134 The verb “incurred” and the phrase “in asserting, preserving or

enforcing” attach solely to the phrase “reasonable attorneys’ and accountants’ fees

and expenses.”135 This interpretation of Losses is reasonable based on the plain text

of the definition. The term “and” following “thereto” denotes a separation between

“all losses, demands, claims . . . including interest and penalties recovered by a third

party with respect thereto” “and” “out-of-pocket expenses and reasonable attorneys’

and accountants’ fees and expenses incurred in . . . asserting . . . rights hereunder.”136

As a result, ITG’s argument that the Florida Judgment Interest is not

indemnifiable is belied by the APA’s terms. Summary judgment on Reynolds’

entitlement to indemnification for the Florida Judgment Interest is granted in

Reynolds’ favor. ITG’s cross-motion for summary judgment on this basis is denied.

133
See id. at A-10; APA § 11.02 (Indemnification by the Acquiror).
134
Rag Am. Coal Co. v. AEI Res., Inc., 1999 WL 1261376, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 7, 1999)
(citation omitted); see also Hawkins v. Daniel, 273 A.3d 792, 825 (Del. Ch. 2022), aff’d,
289 A.3d 631 (Del. 2023).
135
APA Ex. A at A-10.
136
Id. (emphasis added).
38
The amount that Reynolds can recover for the Florida Judgment Interest will be set

post-trial.

4. Whether the Delaware Attorneys’ Fees Are Indemnifiable
Reynolds seeks indemnification for approximately $7.4 million of fees and

costs it has incurred in the Delaware litigation (previously defined as the Delaware

Attorneys’ Fees). ITG raises two objections to Reynolds’ request. One can be

dispensed of now; the other cannot.

First, ITG argues that Reynolds waived its claim for the Delaware Attorneys’

Fees by failing to adduce evidence of them.137 Under Rule 56, Reynolds is permitted

to move for “summary judgment . . . as to all or any part [of its claims].”138 Reynolds

moved only on its entitlement to recover the Delaware Attorneys’ Fees. It was not

required to prove a specific amount of its fees at this stage.139

If Reynolds succeeds in proving its entitlement to the Delaware Attorneys’

Fees, it may submit a Rule 88 affidavit. Once Reynolds files a fee application, ITG

137
Separately, ITG filed a motion to compel Reynolds to produce evidence supporting its
request for the Delaware Attorneys’ Fees. Dkt. 349.
138
Ch. Ct. R. 56(b).
139
The cases ITG cites to argue otherwise arise in the context of jury trials. See Fed. Agric.
Mortg. Corp. v. It’s A Jungle Out There, Inc., 2006 WL 1305212, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 9,
2006) (requiring the amount of attorneys’ fees to be proven at trial because “the
determination of the recoverable fees must be made by the trier of fact”) (citation omitted).
This court’s typical practice—sans jury—allows a party to submit a Rule 88 affidavit to
resolve the amount of fees after its entitlement to fees as a general matter is shown.
39
will have the opportunity to address the reasonableness of Reynolds’ requested

fees.140 This approach is efficient: if Reynolds does not prove its entitlement to fees,

further proceedings on the amount are moot.

Second, ITG avers that the Delaware Attorneys’ Fees are “Seller Plaintiff

Fees,” which are not indemnifiable. 141 Reynolds, in turn, argues that ITG’s

contractual obligation in § 11.02(a) to “indemnify, defend, and hold [Reynolds]

harmless” necessarily includes fees incurred to enforce its indemnity rights. 142

Reynolds insists that the Delaware Attorneys’ Fees are not Seller Plaintiff Fees.

The APA contemplates two types of “Plaintiff Fees”: Seller Plaintiff Fees that

are Excluded Liabilities under § 2.01(d)(ix); and “Assumed Plaintiff Fees” that are

Assumed Liabilities under § 2.01(c)(vii).143 Seller Plaintiff Fees are “all plaintiffs’

attorneys’ fees . . . in relation to the State Settlements in respect of the Acquired

Tobacco Cigarette Brands, relating to any periods . . . excluding. . . Assumed

Plaintiff Fees.”144 Assumed Plaintiff Fees include “all plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees

140
Under the APA, attorneys’ fees are limited to those that are “reasonable.” APA Ex. A
at A-10 (defining “Losses”). Even where a fee-shifting provision does not explicitly limit
attorneys’ fees to those that are “reasonable,” a court will review the fees for
reasonableness. Mahani v. Edix Media Grp., Inc., 935 A.2d 242, 244-45 (Del. 2007).
141
ITG’s Opening Br. 37.
142
Reynolds’ Opening Br. 14-15 (citing cases).
143
APA §§ 2.01(c)(vii), (d)(ix); APA Ex. A at A-16.
144
APA Ex. A at A-16.
40
attributable to any post-Closing increases in volume of sales . . . of any of the

Acquired Tobacco Cigarette Brands, but excluding . . . Seller Plaintiff Fees.”145

Reynolds argues that the Seller Plaintiff Fees are “not fees incurred by any

plaintiff in any litigation relating to the state settlements.”146 Rather, it says that the

phrase “plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees” used in the definition of Seller Plaintiff Fees

refers to “private outside counsel who represented the States as plaintiffs in the

underlying lawsuits leading to the state settlements.” 147 Reynolds relies on

descriptions of a Florida Fee Payment Agreement in the Florida litigation record to

support its logic.148 But that agreement does not appear to be part of the record

before me.

145
APA § 2.01(c)(vii).
146
Reynolds’ Reply Br. 48.
147
Id. at 46-47.
148
See id. at 47 (citing Reynolds’ Opening Br. Ex. N); Reynolds’ Opening Br. Ex. N at 2
& n.4 (Florida court explaining: “As discussed in greater detail below, pursuant to the
Florida Agreement and as implemented by a September 11, 1998 agreement called ‘Florida
Fee Payment Agreement,’ Florida also receives substantial annual payments from the
tobacco-parties as payment for plaintiffs’ private-sector attorneys based on the same
proportion [as the Florida Settlement Agreement].”); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. State,
301 So. 3d 269, 272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) (“Merged as part of the FSA was a Florida
Fee Payment Agreement, in which the Settling Defendants agreed to pay Florida’s
attorneys’ fees. The fees due and owing would be made by the Settling Defendants in pro
rata proportion to their respective Market Share, just like the method outlined in the
FSA.”); Fla. Settlement Agreement § V (“Settling Defendants agree to pay, separate and
apart from the above, reasonable attorneys’ fees to private counsel.”); Fla. Settlement
Agreement Amend. No. 1 ¶ 26 (“Settling Defendants, the State of Florida and certain
private counsel for the State of Florida have entered into a separate agreement on
41
 ITG fares no better. It contends that the Delaware Attorneys’ Fees fall within

the definition of Seller Plaintiff Fees because they were paid by Reynolds “as a

plaintiff” in this litigation.149 But ITG makes no attempt to explain how the phrase

“plaintiffs’ attorneys’” unambiguously leads to that conclusion, especially

considering that Reynolds is nominally the defendant and counter-plaintiff here.

Simply put, the briefing is wanting. Because of the incomplete record and

briefing before me, I cannot grant summary judgment in either party’s favor. 150

Reynolds’ entitlement to indemnification for the Delaware Attorneys’ Fees must be

resolved after trial.

B. ITG’s Arguments to Reduce Reynolds’ Damages

ITG raises several bases to eliminate or reduce Reynolds’ principal damages.

It seeks a determination that Reynolds’ damages must be reduced because of a

favorable Profit Adjustment allocation compared to Reynolds’ liability if ITG had

joined the Florida Settlement Agreement. It also opposes Reynolds’ motion for

September 11, 1998 (the ‘Florida Fee Payment Agreement’) that sets forth the entire
obligation of Settling Defendants with respect to payment of attorneys’ fees pursuant to
section V of the Settlement Agreement.”).
149
ITG’s Opening Br. 37.
150
See Great Hill, 2017 WL 3168966, at *2 (“[T]he court may, in its discretion, deny
summary judgment if it decides upon a preliminary examination of the facts presented that
it is desirable to inquire into and develop the facts more thoroughly at trial in order to
clarify the law or its application.”).
42
summary judgment by arguing that Reynolds cannot recover for Losses caused by

Reynolds’ own or third-party conduct, and that Reynolds acquiesced, materially

breached the APA, or failed to mitigate damages.

ITG is not entitled to summary judgment on its Profit Adjustment argument,

which will be taken up after trial. Its other defenses are deficient and provide no

grounds to deny Reynolds’ right to a recovery under the APA.

1. Whether Reynolds’ Damages Should Reflect Any Profit
Adjustment Benefit
Reynolds seeks indemnification for the volume-related settlement payments

(the Annual Payment with Volume Adjustment) attributable to sales of the Acquired

Brands from closing to 2021. These payments, Reynolds contends, total over $198

million. Reynolds does not seek indemnification for any portion of the Profit

Adjustment.151

ITG argues that Reynolds has saved millions of dollars in Profit Adjustment

payments because of ITG’s non-joinder in the Florida Settlement Agreement.

According to ITG, these savings should be deducted from the amount of Reynolds’

principal damages. Reynolds disagrees.

151
Reynolds’ Opening Br. 9.
43
 Resolving this dispute involves three interrelated questions. First, whether

ITG’s non-joinder allowed Reynolds to pay a smaller proportion of the Profit

Adjustment. Second, whether Reynolds’ damages should be reduced by any amount

it saved from ITG’s non-joinder. And third, the amount of any reduction (if

appropriate).

These are mixed questions of law and fact. Arguably, I could determine as a

general legal matter whether Reynolds’ indemnification award should be offset by

avoided costs or losses to avoid a windfall.152 But that analysis would be premature

given the factual disputes over whether Reynolds would have paid Florida a greater

amount of Profit Adjustment if ITG joined the Florida Settlement Agreement.

Accordingly, I defer the resolution of ITG’s argument until a fuller record at trial

can put it in context.

2. Whether Reynolds is Barred From Recovering Losses Caused
By Its Own or Third-Party Conduct

ITG argues that Reynolds’ Losses were not caused by the Florida Judgment

but by the conduct of Reynolds, Florida, and Philip Morris.153 Under § 11.02(a)(vi)

of the APA, ITG must indemnify Reynolds for “all Losses” that Reynolds “may

152
See, e.g., O’Brien v. IAC/Interactive Corp., 2010 WL 3385798, at *17-18 (Del. Ch.
Aug. 27, 2010), aff’d, 26 A.3d 174 (Del. 2011); see generally Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440 (3d Cir. 1996).
153
ITG’s Opening Br. 47-52; ITG’s Reply Br. 21-27.
44
suffer or incur, or become subject to, as a result of . . . any Assumed Liability.”154

ITG interprets the phrase “as a result of” to require a showing of causation between

the Losses incurred and the Florida Judgment Liability. It avers that a genuine issue

of material fact exists “regarding what Losses, if any, Reynolds suffered ‘as a result

of’ ITG’s conduct.”155

ITG’s argument does not prevent the entry of summary judgment in Reynolds’

favor on Reynolds’ entitlement to recover the Florida Judgment Liability. Causation

is irrelevant to ITG’s indemnification obligations under § 11.02(a)(vi). The plain

text of the provision addresses whether the Losses resulted from “any Assumed

Liability.” 156 It does not contemplate a subsidiary inquiry into the factors that

brought about the Assumed Liability itself.

The Florida Judgment Liability is an Assumed Liability. 157 Reynolds’

payments to Florida—i.e., the Losses Reynolds seeks indemnification for—were

154
APA § 11.02(a)(vi) (stating that ITG must indemnify Reynolds and its affiliates
“against all Losses . . . as a result of . . . (vi) any Assumed Liability (including the failure
of the Acquiror to perform or in due course pay and discharge any such Assumed Liability),
including any Liability expressly assumed by the Acquiror pursuant to Exhibit D hereof,
and any Acquiror Tobacco Liability and the portion of any Losses determined to be an
Acquiror Tobacco Liability pursuant to Section 11.01(a)(v)”) (emphasis added).
155
ITG’s Opening Br. 47.
156
APA § 11.02(a)(vi).
157
See supra note 60; 2022 Op. at *20.
45
incurred as a result of that liability. Whether the Florida Judgment was brought

about because of Reynolds, Philip Morris, Florida, or ITG’s conduct (or non-

conduct) is inconsequential. ITG’s indemnification obligation under § 11.02(a)

arises because the Florida Judgment Liability exists and ITG agreed to indemnify

Reynolds for Losses resulting from it.158

3. Whether Reynolds’ Purported Breaches of the APA Preclude
Indemnification
ITG maintains that it is relieved of any duty to indemnify Reynolds because

of Reynolds’ own “material antecedent breach” of the APA.159 It points to three

contractual duties that Reynolds purportedly breached. First, Reynolds’ obligation

to “assist[] and cooperate[]” with ITG’s efforts to reach agreement with Florida. 160

158
See 2022 Op. at *19 (“[T]he amounts Reynolds Tobacco has paid (and will pay) due to
the Florida Judgment are Losses for which ITG must indemnify Reynolds.”). At times,
ITG suggests that its causation argument is based not on the APA but on a provision of the
Florida Judgment that Reynolds “will remain liable” for making future payments based on
ITG’s sales “unless and until ITG becomes a Settling Defendant.” Fla. J. ¶ 4; see ITG’s
Opening Br. 50-51. Yet ITG’s causation arguments center on conduct in 2015 and 2016—
years before the Florida Judgment. ITG’s Opening Br. 47-48, 50-51. It is not apparent
how conduct pre-dating the Florida Judgment could be an intervening cause of Reynolds’
Losses under an APA provision concerning future events.
159
ITG’s Opening Br. 54-56. ITG previously made this argument in its summary judgment
briefing on liability. ITG Brands, LLC’s Opp. to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 249) 59
(arguing that Reynolds’ breaches of the APA preclude summary judgment for Reynolds);
see also Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Their Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. 257) 31-32 (responding to
ITG’s argument). ITG’s attempt to relitigate this issue is procedurally improper. Summary
judgment on liability was granted for Reynolds. Regardless, the argument also fails on the
merits, as discussed above.
160
APA Ex. F (Agreed Assumption Terms) § 2.2; see ITG’s Opening Br. 55.
46
Second, Reynolds’ duty to keep ITG informed of and ensure ITG’s participation in

discussions with Florida and Philip Morris about joinder to the Florida Settlement

Agreement.161 And third, Reynolds’ obligation to use “reasonable best efforts” to

obtain third-party consents necessary for ITG to assume obligations under the

settlement.162

“A party is excused from performance under a contract if the other party is in

material breach thereof.”163 This principle is an ill fit for ITG’s argument. ITG

attempts to frame its indemnification obligation as a future duty it has yet to perform

under the APA.164 But it is obligated “to assume and thereafter to pay, discharge

161
APA § 6.20 (“Each of the Acquiror and RAI further undertakes from and after the
Closing, to take and to cause each of its Affiliates and each of its and their respective
Representatives to take all such steps as are necessary or expedient (including giving any
relevant waivers and/or consents and/or engaging in or cooperating in any disputes,
litigation or arbitration) to cause the Agreed Assumption Terms, as applicable, to become
fully effective and binding on each of the States. Each of the Parties shall, and shall cause
each of its respective Affiliates and each of its and their respective Representatives to, keep
each other fully informed and fully support each other in relation to all material
communications made, positions maintained and other steps taken under this Section
6.20.”).
162
Id. § 6.04(e).
163
In re Mobilactive Media, LLC, 2013 WL 297950, at *13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2013).
164
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 (Am. L. Inst. 1981) (“Except as stated in §
240, it is a condition of each party’s remaining duties to render performances to be
exchanged under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured material failure by the
other party to render any such performance due at an earlier time.” (emphasis added)); 23
Williston on Contracts § 63:3 (4th ed. 2009) (“Otherwise stated, a nonperforming party is
liable for any breach of contract, but the other party is discharged from further
47
and perform” the “Assumed Liabilities”—such as the Florida Judgment Liability—

“effective as of the Closing.”165 Put differently, ITG’s indemnification obligation is

the measure of damages for ITG’s failure to undertake an Assumed Liability.166 As

the Restatement (Second) of Contracts explains, the prior material breach doctrine

affects “duties to render performance” but does not discharge “[a] claim for damages

that has already arisen as a result of a claim for partial breach.”167

For these reasons, ITG’s argument that Reynolds materially breached the

APA does not prevent the entry of summary judgment in Reynolds’ favor on

Reynolds’ entitlement to indemnification for the Florida Judgment Liability.

4. Whether Reynolds’ Recovery Is Precluded by the Doctrine of
Acquiescence

ITG argues acquiescence as an affirmative defense. According to ITG,

Reynolds acquiesced in—and even advocated for—ITG’s position that ITG could

performance, and is entitled to substantial damages, only when there is a material breach.”
(emphasis added)).
165
APA § 2.01(c).
166
See Certainteed Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 2005 WL 217032, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2005)
(“The term ‘Indemnification’ is used here as a contractual term of art to describe [a]
contractual remedy.”).
167
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 237 (Am. L. Inst. 1981), cmt. e (“A contracts to
build a building for B. B delays making the site available to A, giving A a claim against B
for damages for partial breach. A then commits a material breach and B properly cancels
the contract. B has a claim against A for damages for total breach, but A still has a claim
against B for damages for partial breach.”).
48
only assume the Florida Judgment Liability under § 2.01(c)(vii) of the APA.168 This

argument is legally and factually groundless.

“A claimant is deemed to have acquiesced in a complained-of act where” the

claimant:

has full knowledge of his rights and the material facts and (1) remains
inactive for a considerable time; or (2) freely does what amounts to
recognition of the complained of act; or (3) acts in a manner
inconsistent with the subsequent repudiation, which leads the other
party to believe the act has been approved.169

“For the defense of acquiescence to apply, conscious intent to approve the act is not

required, nor is a change of position or resulting prejudice.”170 As the party asserting

the defense, ITG bears the burden of proving its elements.

As an initial matter, ITG identifies no “complained-of act” in which Reynolds

supposedly acquiesced.171 At most, it avers that Reynolds acquiesced in an idea:

“ITG’s position” and “ITG’s interpretation” of the APA.172 ITG offers no support

168
ITG’s Opening Br. 42-47; ITG’s Reply Br. 30-32.
169
Klaassen v. Allegro Dev. Corp., 106 A.3d 1035, 1047 (Del. 2014).
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
ITG’s Opening Br. 42, 45.
49
for applying the defense in this amorphous way. Delaware courts routinely discuss

acquiescence in acts.173

Even if acquiescence in a position or idea were possible, ITG has not

demonstrated that any of the three subsidiary elements of the defense are met.

Regarding the first subsidiary element, ITG has not shown that Reynolds

remained inactive for a considerable time after learning ITG’s position. ITG argues

that Reynolds was passive for five years before asserting that ITG assumed the

Florida Judgment Liability under §§ 2.01(c)(iv), (c)(v), and (c)(vii).174 In Reynolds’

March 24, 2017 counterclaims, however, it broadly pleaded that ITG assumed the

Florida Judgment Liability under the APA, without limitation to any specific

provision of the APA.175

173
E.g., Brevan Howard Credit Catalyst Master Fund Ltd. v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc.,
2015 WL 2400712, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 19, 2015) (describing acquiescence as a “doctrine
focused on the” defendant’s understanding “that complained-of acts were acquiesced in”);
Lehman Brothers Hldgs., Inc. v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., 2014 WL 718430 (Del. Ch. Feb.
25, 2014) (holding that a defendant acquiesced in the incurrence of debt), aff’d, 105 A.3d
989 (Del. 2014); Klaassen, 106 A.3d at 1047-48 (concluding that the defendant had
acquiesced in the boards’ acts to remove him as chief executive officer); Simple Glob., Inc.
v. Banasik, 2021 WL 2587894, at *13 (Del. Ch. June 24, 2021) (holding that the defendant
acquiesced in a stock transfer when he led others “to believe the act had been approved”).
174
ITG’s Opening Br. 43.
175
Defs.’ Answer and Verified Counterclaims (Dkt. 30) (“Answer”) ¶¶ 116-24. This filing
was made just two months after Florida moved to enforce in the 2017 Action. ITG suggests
that Reynolds somehow “acquiesced in ITG’s interpretation that the settlement liabilities
are exclusively governed by § 2.01(c)(vii) and the Agreed Assumption Terms” by citing to
those provisions in an earlier part of Reynolds’ counterclaims. ITG’s Opening Br. 45
(citing Answer ¶¶ 102-10). This argument ignores Counterclaim III in which Reynolds
50
 ITG also suggests that Reynolds remained silent during the negotiation of the

APA and between signing and closing when ITG communicated its understanding

that—absent joinder—ITG would not be liable for settlement payments.176 But a

party can hardly acquiesce in losing a contract right before the contract exists. And

post-signing, the only communication ITG cites concerns whether ITG would be

liable under any settlement agreements—not whether ITG would be required by the

APA to indemnify Reynolds’ payments linked to ITG’s post-closing sales of the

Acquired Brands.

Regarding the second and third subsidiary elements, ITG has not shown that

Reynolds expressed its agreement with ITG’s position on assumption obligations or

acted in a manner inconsistent with its repudiation of ITG’s position. ITG points to

Reynolds’ opposition to Florida’s and Philip Morris’ motions to enforce the Florida

Settlement Agreement in the 2017 Action.177 There, Reynolds argued that “[w]ith

respect to the Florida Settlement Agreement . . . neither the APA nor the Agreed

Assumption Terms nor any Closing Document purports to assign [Reynolds’]

argued that ITG assumed the Florida Judgment Liability under the APA. Answer ¶¶ 116-
24. Nor is it clear how Reynolds’ reliance on different APA provisions at times in this
litigation amounts to acquiescence in ITG’s interpretation that a certain provision of the
APA is operative.
ITG’s Opening Br. 43-44 (discussing ITG’s striking of redlines and asking Reynolds
176

whether it disagreed, to which Reynolds was silent).
177
ITG’s Liability Br. Ex. 14 at 42.
51
settlement obligations to ITG.” 178 ITG also references Reynolds’ argument in

appealing the Florida Judgment that “[t]he APA transferred only assets to ITG, not

rights or obligations under the [Florida Settlement Agreement].”179

Reynolds’ arguments in Florida are not inconsistent with its present position

that ITG assumed the Florida Judgment Liability under the APA. In the Florida

litigation, Reynolds was arguing that ITG could assume Reynolds’ settlement

obligations to Florida under the Florida Settlement Agreement through joinder. It

further argued that under the APA, ITG was only required to use reasonable best

efforts to join the Florida Settlement Agreement. Reynolds’ arguments here concern

a different matter: allocation of the Florida Judgment Liability between ITG and

Reynolds under the APA.

Reynolds argued, in the Florida litigation, that neither it nor ITG was liable to

Florida. But Reynolds has consistently maintained that if it is held liable for

payments based on ITG’s sales of Acquired Brands cigarettes, ITG assumed that

Id. (“Rather, ITG agreed to use its reasonable best efforts to join the Florida Settlement
178

Agreement.”).
179
ITG’s Liability Br. Ex. 17 at 7 (“The APA’s requirement that ITG use its ‘reasonable
best efforts’ to join the [Florida Settlement Agreement] confirms the absence of an
affirmative assignment of rights or liabilities under the [Florida Settlement Agreement] to
ITG in the absence of such a joinder.”).
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liability under the APA.180 The contrary position would be a self-defeating one that

no reasonable litigant would advance—let alone acquiesce to—it.181

5. Whether Reynolds’ Recovery Is Limited By Failure to Mitigate
Losses

The duty to mitigate prohibits “a party [from] recover[ing] damages for loss

that he could have avoided by reasonable efforts.”182 ITG asserts that Reynolds

“could have chosen to enable ITG’s joinder [to the Florida Settlement Agreement]

by ensuring a base year that would address Philip Morris’ objections” regarding the

Profit Adjustment.183 According to ITG, Reynolds’ choice of “a base year number

that cemented Philip Morris’ objections” led to the 2017 Action enforcing the

Florida Settlement Agreement. This argument seems intertwined with the Profit

Adjustment offset issues.184 To the extent it is separate, it lacks merit.

180
Cf. Simple Glob., Inc., 2021 WL 2587894, at *13 (holding that a defendant acquiesced
where he long expressed his acceptance of the “transfer of stock” before belatedly
repudiating the transfer).
181
See 2022 Op. at *19 (quoting 2017 Op. at *12).
182
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 350 (1981) (“It is sometimes said that it is the
‘duty’ of the aggrieved party to mitigate damages, but this is misleading because he incurs
no liability for his failure to act. The amount of loss that he could reasonably have avoided
by stopping performance, making substitute arrangements or otherwise is simply
subtracted from the amount that would otherwise have been recoverable as damages.”).
183
ITG’s Opening Br. 53.
184
See supra Section II.B.1.
53
 “The duty to mitigate generally arises after a breach has occurred.”185 The

relevant breach is not ITG’s non-joinder of the Florida Settlement Agreement. It is

ITG’s refusal to indemnify Reynolds for the Florida Judgment Liability—the only

breach that remains at issue before this court. 186 The conduct ITG complains of

occurred long before any such breach of the APA.

As the 2022 Opinion held, ITG assumed liability for the Florida Judgment

Liability. ITG’s joinder, or lack thereof, does not affect ITG’s resulting

indemnification obligation. It follows that Reynolds’ actions relating to ITG’s

joinder (or lack thereof) are unrelated to the prior Losses at issue in this litigation.

* * *

For the reasons set forth above, summary judgment is granted in Reynolds’

favor on its entitlement to indemnification for the principal Florida Judgment

Liability it previously paid and the related Florida Judgment Interest. None of ITG’s

defenses arguing otherwise have merit. Summary judgment is granted in ITG’s

favor on Reynolds’ lack of entitlement to indemnification for the Florida Attorneys’

185
NASDI Hldgs., LLC v. N. Am. Leasing, Inc., 2019 WL 1515153, at *7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 8,
2019) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted), aff’d, 276 A.3d 463 (Del. 2022).
186
The parties have not briefed when this harm accrued. See LaPoint v.
AmerisourceBergen Corp., 970 A.2d 185, 198 (Del. 2009) (explaining that indemnity
accrues when the underlying claim is decided). The APA closed in 2014 but the Florida
Judgment was not until 2018, and the appeals of the Florida Judgment were exhausted in
2020.
54
Fees. Summary judgment is not granted in favor of either party on whether Reynolds

is entitled to indemnification for the Delaware Attorneys’ Fees. The total amount of

Reynolds’ damages, whether damages should be reduced by any Profit Adjustment

savings Reynolds enjoyed due to ITG’s non-joinder, as well as the propriety of pre-

and post-judgment interest,187 will be resolved after trial.

As to future Losses, Reynolds seeks an order of specific performance

requiring ITG to either indemnify Reynolds for all future payments Reynolds makes

under the Florida Judgment based on ITG’s sales of Acquired Brands cigarettes or,

alternatively, join the Florida Settlement Agreement.188 The APA contemplates the

availability of injunctive relief. 189 Because certain issues of fact are left to be

resolved, however, the suitability of specific performance is appropriately resolved

after trial.

187
The parties’ briefs thoroughly address their arguments on pre- and post-judgment
interest. I do not need further briefing on this issue.
188
Reynolds’ Opening Br. 18; Reynolds’ Reply Br. 32-40.
189
APA § 12.13 (“The Parties hereby acknowledge and agree that the failure of any Party
to perform its agreements and covenants hereunder, including its failure to take all actions
as are necessary on its part to consummate the transactions contemplated hereby, will cause
irreparable injury to the other Parties, for which money damages, even if available, will not
be an adequate remedy. Accordingly, each Party hereby consents to the issuance of
injunctive relief by any court of competent jurisdiction to compel performance of such
Party’s obligations and to the granting by any court of the remedy of specific performance
of its obligations hereunder, in addition to any other rights or remedies available hereunder
or at law or in equity.”).
55
III. CONCLUSION

Reynolds is entitled to indemnification for the Losses associated with the

Florida Judgment Liability based on ITG’s sales of the Acquired Brands’ cigarettes.

Reynolds’ damages include the Florida Judgment Interest but exclude the Florida

Attorneys’ Fees. Reynolds’ entitlement to indemnification for the Delaware

Attorneys’ Fees will be addressed in subsequent proceedings.

The precise amount of Reynolds’ damages is an issue reserved for trial,

including the appropriateness of any reduction based on the Profit Adjustment

allocation. The amount of pre- and post-judgment interest on Reynolds’ damages

will also be set post-trial. The post-trial resolution of remedies will include whether

an order of specific performance should issue.

The parties are directed to prepare an implementing order within 20 days of

this decision. They shall also confer on a scheduling order to bring the remaining

issues to trial promptly.190

190
Trial will be limited to the remaining matters outlined in this decision. I do not
anticipate that the parties will need much discovery (if any) in advance of trial given the
amount they have already conducted. (The limited outstanding discovery dispute will be
resolved separately.) Nor do I foresee needing a lengthy trial.
56