United States v. Perch

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 95-5356 SOPHIA PERCH, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Chief District Judge. (CR-94-466-JFM) Submitted: December 19, 1995 Decided: January 8, 1996 Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, and PHILLIPS, Senior Circuit Judge. _________________________________________________________________ Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. _________________________________________________________________ COUNSEL James K. Bredar, Federal Public Defender, Beth M. Farber, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Lynne A. Battaglia, United States Attorney, Ira L. Oring, Assistant United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. _________________________________________________________________ Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c). _________________________________________________________________ OPINION PER CURIAM: After pleading guilty to bank embezzlement under 18 U.S.C.A. § 656 (West Supp. 1995), Sophia Perch appeals her sentence of res- titution. She claims that the district court failed to make necessary factual findings before ordering restitution and impermissibly dele- gated judicial duties to a probation officer. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. Perch pled guilty to a one-count information charging her with bank embezzlement under 18 U.S.C.A. § 656. The presentence report estimated the loss at approximately $97,000, and detailed her finan- cial resources, her and her dependents' needs, and other relevant fac- tors. See United States v. Molen, 9 F.3d 1084, 1086 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 62 U.S.L.W. 3722 (U.S. May 2, 1994) (No. 93-7805). The court set restitution at $30,000 pursuant to the Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3663, 3664 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995), and ordered Perch to pay that amount "at the rate to be determined by the Probation Officer." Perch failed to raise the issues presented here during the proceed- ings below, where they should have been presented in the first instance.* Thus, her appeal is subject to the plain error standard of review. United States v. Olano, ___ U.S. ___, 61 U.S.L.W. 4421 (U.S. Apr. 26, 1993) (No. 91-1306); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). To constitute plain error, the claim (1) must be an error, (2) clear under current law, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial pro- ceedings. Olano, 61 U.S.L.W. at 4421. _________________________________________________________________ *We note that Perch's attorney failed to raise objections below despite having notice of the issues. The day before Perch's sentencing, her attor- ney filed a brief in this court in another case raising the same issues. 2 The district court did not err by imposing restitution because it adopted a presentence report that included the necessary factual find- ings. See Molen, 9 F.3d at 1086. Additionally, the court did not com- mit plain error by delegating its duties to a probation officer. While a district court may not delegate to a probation officer the final authority to determine the amount and timing of installment pay- ments, United States v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 806, 808-09 (4th Cir. 1995), the court's error is not cause for reversal because it does not implicate every element of the plain error test. See Olano , 61 U.S.L.W. at 4424. Perch has not established that her substantial rights are prejudiced by the error--the only matters left to the probation officer's discretion are the amount and timing of the installments, not the amount of resti- tution. Further, we cannot say that the fairness and integrity of the proceedings are implicated by the court's error. See United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1277-78 (4th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we affirm Perch's sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately pres- ented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 3