¶ 47. (dissenting). I agree with the lead opinion that this case turns on the interpretation of the statutory phrase, "bridge on a highway maintainable by the town," found *428in Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1),1 now Wis. Stat. § 82.08(1).2 However, the lead opinion concludes that a highway must be constructed before the bridge is constructed in order for the bridge to come within the identified statutory phrase from § 81.38(1).3
¶ 48. In my view, the phrase, "bridge on a highway maintainable by the town," identifies a type of bridge by describing the relationship of the bridge to the highway of which it is, or will become, a part. The type of bridge that is "on a highway maintainable by the town" is distinguished from many other types of bridges referenced in the statutes that also are located on highways, but which highways are maintained by governmental entities other than a town, such as the state or another municipality. The phrase, "bridge on a highway maintainable by the town," has nothing to do with whether the bridge is constructed before or after the highway is constructed. Rather, if the bridge is of the type identified in Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1), the town may apply to the county of which the town is a part for assistance in constructing and maintaining such a bridge. If the county has not opted out of § 81.38(2), the county must pay its statutory share of the costs incurred.4 Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals, and I dissent from the lead opinion.5
*429I. BACKGROUND
¶ 49. The facts relating to this controversy are not in dispute. The Town of Madison applied to Dane County for statutory assistance in constructing a bridge to span a railway corridor and connect two town highways, the West Beltline Highway frontage road and Ski Lane.6 Prior to applying for aid from the County, the Town had obtained federal assistance for a portion of the cost of constructing the bridge. The County denied the Town's petition for funding.7 Thereafter, the Town constructed the bridge; connected a town highway to either side of the bridge;8 and sued the County to collect the financial assistance that the Town believed was due under Wis. Stat. § 81.38(2).9
¶ 50. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the Town, concluding that the County was required to pay a portion of the bridge's construction, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1) and (2). The County appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.
*430II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 51. We independently review whether summary judgment was properly granted, employing the same procedure as the circuit court employed. Hoida, Inc. v. M&I Midstate Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶ 15, 291 Wis. 2d 283, 717 N.W.2d 17. Statutory interpretation and application are at the heart of the summary judgment decision in this case. They, too, present questions of law for our independent review; however, we benefit from the reasoning of the court of appeals and the circuit court. Marder v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶ 19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 N.W.2d 110.
B. Interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1)
¶ 52. In order to determine whether the County has a statutory obligation to contribute to the Town's cost of bridge construction, we must interpret and apply Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1).
1. General principles
¶ 53. "[Statutory interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'" State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶ 45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶ 43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659). Plain meaning may be ascertained not only from the words employed in the statute, but also from statutory context. Id., ¶ 46. We do not interpret statutory language in isolation, but rather, as that language appears in relation to surrounding or related *431statutes, and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. Id. We also presume that the legislature meant an interpretation that will advance the objective of the statute. GTE N. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 176 Wis. 2d 559, 566, 500 N.W.2d 284 (1993).
¶ 54. If a statute is "capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more senses [,]" then the statute is ambiguous, and we may consult extrinsic sources to discern its meaning. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶ 47-48, 50. However, a statute is not ambiguous simply because two litigants disagree about its meaning. Id., ¶ 47.
¶ 55. The lead opinion concludes that the Town is not due a contribution from the County for the Town's construction of the bridge because this bridge does not fall within the phrase, "bridge on a highway maintainable by the town."10 The lead opinion reaches this conclusion because West Beltline Highway frontage road and Ski Lane were not a contiguous highway when the bridge was constructed.11 In so concluding, the lead opinion interprets the statutory phrase contrary to the context in which it and similar phrases are used throughout the statutes when identifying other types of bridges in Wisconsin. It also interprets the phrase contrary to the cost-sharing purpose of Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1).
2. Contextual assessment
¶ 56. The statutory phrase on which our determination rests is: "bridge on a highway maintainable by the town." Wisconsin Stat. § 81.38(1) provided in relevant part:
*432When any town has voted to construct or repair any culvert or bridge on a highway maintainable by the town, and has provided for such portion of the cost of such construction or repair as is required by this section, the town board shall file a petition with the county board setting forth said facts and the location of the culvert or bridge; and the county board... shall thereupon appropriate such sum as will, with the money provided by the town, be sufficient to defray the expense of constructing or repairing such culvert or bridge....
The statutory phrase, "on a highway maintainable by the town," modifies the word, "bridge," in § 81.38(1). This prepositional phrase identifies a particular type of bridge by describing the location of the bridge.
¶ 57. Many similar phrases in other sections of the statutes identify other types of bridges, also through the use of a prepositional phrase that describes the location of the bridge in relation to which entity is responsible for maintaining the highway of which the bridge is, or will become, a part. For example, "a bridge which is not on the state trunk highway system or on marked routes of the state trunk highway system designated as connecting highways" are the phrases employed to define a "local bridge" in Wis. Stat. § 84.18(2) (d) (2005-06). A bridge "not on the state trunk highway system" is the phrase employed in Wis. Stat. § 84.10 (2005-06) to address the maintenance and operation of one specific type of bridge that is not located on state trunk highways. In addition, "every highway bridge on a city, village, or town boundary shall be repaired and maintained by any adjoining municipality in which the bridge is located" is the phrase used in Wis. Stat. § 82.23 (2005-06) to identify municipal line bridges. Further, "a bridge on a highway *433in this state which crosses waterways, other topographical barriers, other highways or railroads" is the identifying phrase in Wis. Stat. § 84.17(l)(b) (2005-06) that describes the type of bridge for which certain inspections are required by a particular entity.12 None of the statutes condition the identification of the type of bridge described on whether the bridge was constructed before or after the highway that establishes the location of the bridge; yet, all of the statutes share similar syntax in that they employ a prepositional phrase to identify a type of bridge by its relationship to the highway of which it is, or will become, a part.
¶ 58. In Village of Bloomer v. Town of Bloomer, 128 Wis. 297, 107 N.W. 974 (1906), we discussed a type of bridge for which expenses were to be shared between a village and a town. There, the Village determined that it was necessary to repair and then build a new bridge on a town road that was bisected by a navigable creek as the road ran through the Village. Id. at 300-01. Accordingly, the bridge was of a type that was identified in "ch. 284, Laws of 1899" that created a cost-sharing relationship between a village and a town for that type of bridge. Id. at 302. The Village presented a claim for $2,022.74 to the Town for the construction of the bridge, and the Town disallowed it. Id. at 301.
¶ 59. The Town did not argue that the bridge was not of the type described in the statute, but rather, it challenged the statute that apportioned payment for *434the bridge on constitutional grounds. Id. at 304. We concluded that requiring cost-sharing between municipalities was within the legislature's power, and we noted that "[t]he law relating to county aid to towns for bridge purposes has been often approved." Id. at 305. We also noted that the legislative directive under challenge "no more violates the constitutional provision referred to than the law providing for joint maintenance of bridges on town-line roads." Id. at 310.
¶ 60. Throughout Village of Bloomer, we reasoned by analogy to other types of bridges, all of which were identified by the locations of bridges in relationship to the highways on which they had been or would be constructed. That reasoning is directly applicable here where the plain meaning of the statutory words employed in Wis. Stat. § 81.38 identifies the type of bridge that is subject to cost-sharing between a town and a county as one that is "on a highway maintainable by the town." There is no dispute that West Beltline Highway frontage road and Ski Lane were highways maintainable by the Town when the Town petitioned the County to contribute to the cost of constructing the bridge.
3. Statutory purpose
¶ 61. We also interpret the words chosen by the legislature in light of the purpose for which the statute was enacted. GTE, 176 Wis. 2d at 566. Wisconsin Stat. § 81.38(2) and the purpose for which it was enacted were discussed in Town of Grand Chute v. Outagamie County, 2004 WI App 35, 269 Wis. 2d 657, 676 N.W.2d 540. There, the question presented was whether Outa-gamie County was "liable for one-half the costs of repairing a bridge in the Town of Grand Chute." Id., ¶ 1. The actual cost of repair exceeded the amount that the Town requested in its initial petition for aid, and *435the County argued that it was not liable for any costs incurred after the petition for aid was approved by the County. Id.
¶ 62. The court of appeals reasoned that when a town votes to repair or to construct a bridge and petitions the county of which the town is a part for aid, if the town has raised funds sufficient to meet the town's statutory obligation in that regard, the county is obligated "to pay for one-half the cost of constructing or repairing the town's bridge." Id., ¶ 2. As the court of appeals examined the concerns of the parties before it, the court noted that Wis. Stat. § 81.38 is a "cost-sharing scheme" in which both county and town participate. Id., ¶ 3. In concluding that Outagamie County must pay the Town of Grand Chute, the court of appeals observed the purpose of § 81.38 as follows: "Most importantly, however, we conclude that the goal of Wis. Stat. § 81.38 is to have counties absorb half the cost of constructing or repairing bridges." Id., ¶ 18.
¶ 63. The lead opinion's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 81.38 contravenes the legislative purpose of cost-sharing that underlies § 81.38 because it permits the County to avoid its statutory obligation to contribute to the Town for the construction of the bridge. Id., ¶ 3. Statutory interpretation that contravenes the legislative purpose underlying the statute is not favored. GTE, 176 Wis. 2d at 566; Brown v. Thomas, 127 Wis. 2d 318, 323, 379 N.W.2d 868 (Ct. App. 1985). The lead opinion identifies no reason, nor could this writer identify a reason, why the legislature would establish a cost-sharing scheme for bridge construction and maintenance when the highway is constructed first, but then nullify the same cost-sharing when the bridge is constructed first.
¶ 64. And query, now that the bridge has been constructed and has joined Ski Lane and the West *436Beltline Highway frontage road, under the lead opinion's reasoning, has Dane County no statutory obligation to assist the Town in maintaining the bridge? Surely the lead opinion would not question that the County does have a statutory maintenance obligation for this bridge.
¶ 65. Whether the bridge is constructed first or whether the highway is constructed first, in either case, the bridge becomes part of a contiguous highway within the Town and the County. The plain meaning of the words chosen by the legislature requires Dane County to contribute its statutory share of the cost the Town of Madison incurred in constructing the bridge that connected West Beltline Highway frontage road to Ski Lane, thereby creating a contiguous highway, which highway continues to be maintainable by the Town.
C. The Lead Opinion's Secondary Rationale
¶ 66. As a secondary rational, the lead opinion concludes that, in addition to the bridge not being connected physically to an existing highway from the moment of its construction, the Town's petition was properly denied because the Town did not request funding to extend the highway to the bridge.13 The lead opinion's rationale for this conclusion escapes me.
¶ 67. Is the lead opinion really saying that if the Town had asked for more money than it did, its request for bridge funding would have been granted? That appears to be the case because the lead opinion faults the Town for not applying for funding to extend the highway to the constructed bridge.14 However, the Town's counsel acted prudently by not seeking such *437funding. I note that the gap between where the bridge was to be constructed and the then existing highway was 200 feet.15 The statute provides for cost-sharing for only a 100-foot highway extension. Wis. Stat. § 81.38(2). Accordingly, the Town recognized that it was statutorily ineligible to receive funding to extend the highway all the way to the bridge.16
¶ 68. It is telling that the lead opinion characterizes the funding for the highway extension as funding to "help" connect the bridge to a highway maintainable by the Town.17 With a 200-foot gap between the bridge and the highway, County funding would not have caused the highway to reach all the way to where the bridge was to be built. The lead opinion's suggestion would leave the Town with a 100-foot gap between the yet-to-be-constructed bridge and the highway.18 The lead opinion's reasoning in this regard underscores that, despite its protestations to the contrary, it considers the word "on" within Wis. Stat. § 81.38 to be dispositive of this case. That is, under the lead opinion's interpretation of § 81.38, the bridge must be constructed after the highway is complete so the bridge can physically touch the highway immediately upon the bridge's construction. The lead opinion's statutory interpretation defeats the cost-sharing mandate of Wis. *438Stat. § 81.38(1) and therefore it cannot be the correct interpretation of the statute.
III. CONCLUSION
¶ 69. The phrase, "bridge on a highway maintainable by the town," identifies a type of bridge by describing the relationship of the bridge to the highway of which it is, or will become, a part. The type of bridge that is "on a highway maintainable by the town" is distinguished from many other types of bridges referenced in the statutes that also are located on highways, but which highways are maintained by governmental entities other than a town, such as the state or another municipality. The phrase, "bridge on a highway maintainable by the town," has nothing to do with whether the bridge was constructed before or after the highway was constructed. Rather, if the bridge is of the type identified in Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1), the town may apply to the county of which the town is a part for assistance in maintaining or constructing such a bridge. If the county has not opted out of § 81.38(2), the county must pay its statutory share of the costs incurred.
¶ 70. Accordingly, I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals, and I dissent from the lead opinion.
¶ 71. I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. PROSSER and ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER join this dissent.
Effective January 1, 2005, Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1) was revised and renumbered as Wis. Stat. § 82.08(1). I agree with the lead opinion's assertion that there was no change to § 81.38(1) that affects the questions presented in this review. See lead op., ¶ 2 n.2.
Id., ¶ 4.
Id.
Dane County has not opted out of Wis. Stat. § 81.38(2).
The lead opinion, coupled with the concurrence's vote to reverse the court of appeals, decides the outcome in this dispute *429between the Town of Madison and Dane County. The lead opinion has no precedential value because the concurrence does not join the lead opinion's statutory interpretation. Accordingly, there are three justices who agree with the lead opinion's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 81.38(1), three justices who agree with the dissent's interpretation of § 81.38(1) and one justice who does not say how she thinks § 81.38 should be interpreted.
On June 10, 2004, the Town petitioned the County for a contribution to the cost of bridge construction.
On September 9, 2004, the County sent a letter refusing to contribute to the cost of the bridge's construction.
The construction of the bridge was completed in March 2005, and the connection of the highway to both sides of the bridge was completed in August 2005.
The statutory obligation for payment by a county is now found at Wis. Stat. § 82.08(3).
Lead op., ¶ 4.
Id.
There are other statutes, too numerous to mention, that identify other types of bridges and address inspection, maintenance or construction. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 83.15 (2005-06) (county aid for state line bridges); Wis. Stat. § 84.12 (2005-06) (interstate bridges); Wis. Stat. § 84.14 (2005-06) (bridge construction); Wis. Stat. § 84.15(1) (2005-06) (maintenance of intrastate bridges).
Lead op., ¶¶ 38 & n.20, 40.
Id.
Id., ¶ 7.
Nevertheless, the lead opinion suggests otherwise, eschewing cogent reasoning for opportunities to make fey references to James Brown by stating that the "Town failed to request funding in its petition that would bridge the gap between the bridge and the highway, and ... ensure that funding was allocated to help 'take it to the bridge.'" Id., ¶ 38 (emphasis added).
Id., ¶¶ 4, 38, 41-42.
Id., ¶¶ 38 & n.20, 40.