dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. At the outset, however, I wish to emphasize that I am highly sympathetic to the result reached by the majority. If we were writing on a blank slate I would agree with that result. We are not writing on a blank slate. As an intermediate appellate court, we must follow precedent set by our supreme court, even if we do not agree with it. See Horn v. Hendrickson, 824 N.E.2d 690, 694-95 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). That said, I simply am *839convinced that our supreme court's Banko decision is binding precedent we must follow.
Banko unequivocally states, "The legislative enactment of the survivorship presumption by unmistakable implication replaces the common law presumption of undue influence.... We hold that [the NPTA] creates the presumption that a survivor to a joint account is the intended receiver of the proceeds in the account." Banko, 622 N.E.2d at 480. Our supreme court did not state any exceptions to this rule. Banko clearly holds that the NPTA abolished the common law of constructive fraud and undue influence for any accounts falling under the statute. Moreover, Ban-ko was decided sixteen years ago, and aside from recodifying the statute our legislature has not seen fit to alter any of the applicable language of the NPTA. "[I}t is well-established that a judicial interpretation of a statute, particularly by the Indiana Supreme Court, accompanied by substantial legislative inaction for a considerable time, may be understood to signify the General Assembly's acquiescence and agreement with the judicial interpretation." Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476, 492 (Ind.2005).
To the extent the majority asserts that there was essentially undisputed evidence that Rickert was incompetent at the time most of the accounts at issue were opened, and that this means the statutory presumption of survivorship under the NPTA does not apply, I cannot agree. First, I believe that any evidence of Rickert's incompetency would be relevant to rebutting the NPTA presumption of survivorship, and therefore the Estate bore the burden of establishing such incompetency; Taylor did not have to prove competency. I do not think the evidence regarding Rickert's incompetency is as conclusive as the majority suggests. Rickert never was legally declared incompetent, and the Estate presented no expert testimony that he ever met that definition. There was testimony from Baker and two of Rickert's nephews that they believed he began to "decline". mentally beginning in about 2000, and that eventually (although they could not say precisely when) they believed he was unable to make decisions for himself,. Tr. p. 34. The trial court was not required to accept this imprecise lay testimony regarding Rickert's competency. See Thompson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind.2004) (noting that factfinders may choose not to accept even uncontradicted testimony). Moreover, there was testimony from a bank employee, who had interacted with Rickert and Taylor sometime around 2002 or before, that she believed Rickert was coherent, not confused, and able to understand his financial dealings.
Second, and much more importantly, even if I were to assume that there was conclusive, undisputed evidence that Ric-kert was incompetent when some or most of these accounts were opened, there were similar facts in Banko, and still our supreme court applied the NPTA statutory presumption of survivorship. Banko rejected the appellant's contention that it had rebutted the statutory presumption of survivorship rights; the opinion contains no recitation of the facts or evidence that led it to that rejection. I observe, however, that the opinion by this court in the matter indicated that there was virtually undisputed evidence that at the time of at least some of the disputed transactions, the person whose estate was challenging the transactions was near death and incapable of consenting or signing his name to those transactions. See In re Estate of Banko, 602 N.E.2d 1024, 1029-30 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Specifically, "$71,000 of Ra-theon stock had been transferred only a few weeks before Banko's death, at a time when Banko not only was incapable of *840understanding what he was doing but was unable to write his own name." Id. at 1027. This evidence did not persuade our supreme court that the appellant had unmistakably rebutted the statutory presumption of survivorship. See Banko, 622 N.E.2d at 481. If our supreme court in Banko was not persuaded to reverse a trial court's judgment that a joint account survivor was entitled to the account, even where there was clear evidence the decedent was incapacitated when some of the transactions occurred, I conclude we should not reverse the trial court's judgment in this case, where the evidence is less clear regarding Rickert's incapacity or when it might have occurred in relation to when the joint accounts were opened.
I am keenly aware that an unscrupulous caregiver, armed with a power of attorney, could finagle joint tenancy accounts in a way that results in a gross injustice. Under Banko's interpretation of the NPTA, however, courts essentially must presume that a joint tenancy account was serupu-lously created, no matter who created it and regardless of whether one person to the account was even aware of its creation. I would urge our supreme court to reconsider Banko's breadth, or alternatively urge the General Assembly to enact legislation that would exempt situations such as the one in this case from the NPTA's application. Unless and until that happens, however, we must apply the NPTA as Banko interpreted it. Under that interpretation, I believe we have no choice but to affirm the judgment of the trial court.