dissenting.
I respectfully dissent and part ways with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the New Albany Police Department (Department) as to Messer’s thirty-day suspension.
As the majority acknowledges, the court in Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 371 (7th Cir.2000), applied the rationale espoused in Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968), and determined that the government must provide sufficient evidence that the employee’s speech had the potential to disrupt or harm its operations had the retaliatory action not been taken. Op. at 57-58.
The cases that the majority cites and discusses upholding disciplinary or termination actions involved statements by the employees that were made public. See City of Indianapolis v. Heath, 686 N.E.2d 940, 945 (Ind.Ct.App.1997) (holding that discipline was warranted when the police officer, and leader of a militia group, was addressing the public while dressed in a police uniform as a representative of the Indianapolis Police Department and referred to Mayor Goldsmith as “Goldstein” while commenting on the mayor’s fiscal policies).
In light of the circumstances here, I cannot agree that the Department met its burden of establishing that its interests in operational efficiency outweighed Officer Messer’s First Amendment rights. Moreover, I agree with Officer Messer’s contention that he had every expectation that his remarks would go no further. Unlike the circumstances in Heath, Officer Messer made these comments during a private conversation with the expectation that his comments would not be made public. Indeed, the fact that the comment became public was because it was leaked to the public. Officer Messer was speaking as a citizen about issues of public concern and when questioned by other officers regarding the civil rights of blacks, Officer Mes-ser consistently maintained that he “misspoke,” admitted that his statement was “stupid,” and did not mean what he actually said. Tr. p. 165.
In sum, I do not believe that the Department successfully established that Officer Messer’s comments had the potential to disrupt the efficiency and effectiveness of *62its operations. As a result, it is my view that Officer Messer’s comment was protected by the First Amendment, and the trial court erred in granting the Department’s motion for summary judgment.