[Cite as State v. Baldwin, 2023-Ohio-3795.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 112440
v. :
BRANDON BALDWIN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 19, 2023
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-21-665692-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Jillian J. Piteo, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Weston Hurd, LLP, and Paul M. Shipp, for appellant.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
Brandon Baldwin appeals his conviction for the rape of a victim under
the age of 13, which culminated in the imposition of a life sentence with the
possibility of parole after 25 years. For the following reasons, the conviction is
affirmed.
The facts underlying the allegations are relatively straightforward.
The victim, then ten years old, was sleeping on the floor of the living room in her
home after having fallen asleep watching television. Baldwin, who was married to
the victim’s mother, came home in the early morning hours but was not there when
the victim fell asleep. Baldwin, although living with the victim’s family, was
frequently in Michigan for work and to care for his ailing father. The victim woke
up around 4:00 a.m. to Baldwin digitally raping her. When she woke up, Baldwin
stopped and asked if she was okay. The victim recognized his voice. The assault was
disclosed the following day to the victim’s friend, who eventually revealed the assault
to the victim’s mother. After the victim disclosed the assault, her sister claimed to
have been sexually assaulted by Baldwin in the past as well.
Baldwin told the investigating social services personnel that he was in
the house that evening and remembered seeing the victim asleep on the couch. He
claims he was looking for the remote control for the television when the victim
awoke.
Baldwin’s trial defense, carried over into this appeal, mostly focused
on arguably irrelevant issues. Baldwin went through great lengths to elicit testimony
that one of the victim’s siblings had potentially sexually assaulted the victim or her
siblings when he was six or seven years old and the victim was two years old
(approximately eight years prior to Baldwin’s sexual assault). According to Baldwin,
because of the sibling’s history, he must have been the perpetrator of the assault at
issue. Baldwin also attempted to prove that the victim’s mother was lying on the
witness stand about her relationship with her 19-year-old fiancé, who was
introduced to the family as first becoming friends with the victim’s sibling. The
victim’s mother testified that the relationship started after her divorce from
Baldwin, after the fiancé reached the age of majority. Some testimony from other
witnesses indicated the relationship began earlier, while the fiancé was a minor.
The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, found Baldwin guilty of the
rape charge but acquitted Baldwin of several gross-sexual-imposition counts
pertaining to the victim and her sister. This timely appeal followed.
In the first assignment of error, Baldwin claims the trial court erred
by “excluding evidence of another suspect of the crime.” According to Baldwin, the
victim’s sibling was a potential suspect in light of his alleged misconduct when the
sibling was six or seven years old.
At trial, Baldwin repeatedly attempted to question witnesses,
including the sibling, regarding the sibling’s history with counseling and his own
sexual misconduct allegations. Baldwin’s “theory” was to blame the assault on the
sibling, despite the fact that the victim expressly identified Baldwin as the
perpetrator of the assault. The trial court repeatedly precluded Baldwin from
pursuing that line of questioning, concluding that any past misconduct, even if
accepted as true for the sake of discussion, was not relevant to the allegations
pertaining to Baldwin’s misconduct on the night in question. There was no evidence
the sibling was even present at the time.
In this appeal, Baldwin claims that the trial court’s decision violated
his fundamental right to establish a complete defense because he was not able to
fully cross-examine witnesses on the sibling’s alleged past misconduct.
As the state acknowledges, “the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense[,]” and as a
result, competent, reliable evidence is admissible when that evidence is crucial to
the defendant’s claim of innocence. State v. Orr, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100841,
2014-Ohio-4680, ¶ 39, quoting Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct.
2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986). That due process right is not absolute. Id., citing
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19-21, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967);
State v. Swann, 119 Ohio St.3d 552, 2008-Ohio-4837, 895 N.E.2d 821, ¶ 13;
Cleveland v. Dexter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107817, 2019-Ohio-4057, ¶ 35, quoting
Swann at ¶ 12-13. The offender “‘must at least make some plausible showing of how
[a witness’s] testimony would have been both material and favorable to his
defense.’” Cleveland v. Alexander, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92282, 2009-Ohio-4566,
¶ 27, quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440,
73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982).
In this case, Baldwin claims that “[c]learly, the existence of another
person in the home who had previously sexually abused the girls was essential to
Mr. Baldwin’s defense.” It is far from clear how past allegations of abuse committed
against other victims are relevant to the commission of the current crimes. At no
time during the trial proceedings or in this appeal has Baldwin ever explained how
the past sexual abuse allegations could have been relevant to his defense against the
current charges — much less whether the excluded evidence could be deemed
essential thereto. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 110 Ohio St.3d 306, 2006-Ohio-4571, 853
N.E.2d 621, ¶ 68-70 (without evidence linking previous sexual offenses by another
suspect committed against the victim to the current charges, defendant could not
demonstrate the probative value of introducing unduly prejudicial evidence of the
earlier offenses). Baldwin presented no evidence that anyone else was present at the
time the victim claimed she was assaulted, much less that the sibling was even
present in the home. Instead, he told investigators that he remembered the
interaction from which the charges stemmed but claimed to be looking for a remote
control to shut off the television. The trier of fact was left to decide the respective
credibility to be afforded to those two versions of events.
We cannot conclude that the trial court erred in deeming the past
allegations against the sibling as being irrelevant and immaterial to the defense in
light of the underlying factual allegations. The first assignment of error is overruled.
In the second assignment of error, Baldwin claims that the trial court
erred by precluding him from introducing extrinsic evidence to question the veracity
of the victim’s mother’s statements that she entered a relationship with her fiancé
after he reached the age of majority. According to Baldwin, the mother engaged in
a conversation with another witness during trial. The mother allegedly “had been
texting [the witness] and saying that she needed to make sure that [the witness]
understood her relationship” with her 19-year-old fiancé. When the mother
testified, she claimed the relationship with her fiancé began after Baldwin’s alleged
misconduct. During the direct examination of the other witness, Baldwin’s counsel
attempted to elicit testimony regarding the mother’s attempt to contact the other
witness. In other words, Baldwin attempted to impeach the mother’s trial testimony
through the introduction of inconsistent statements made to a third party or other-
acts evidence. Under Baldwin’s theory, the mother “manipulated” the victim into
accusing Baldwin of sexual misconduct so that the mother could continue her
“illegal” relationship with her fiancé.
Setting aside the fact that the victim’s initial disclosure to her friend
occurred almost immediately after the sexual assault and that the mother did not
learn of the assault until later, “the admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510
N.E.2d 343 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. The trial court did not err by
precluding Baldwin from presenting evidence of the mother’s conduct or prior
inconsistent statements.
Baldwin claims the trial court erred, solely relying on Evid.R. 616(A),
which provides that “bias, prejudice, interest, or any motive to misrepresent may be
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by extrinsic
evidence.” Baldwin claims the trial court’s ruling was in error because he was
permitted to impeach the mother through introduction of extrinsic evidence.
Although extrinsic evidence contradicting a witness’s testimony may be introduced
for the purposes of impeachment if “offered for the sole purpose of impeaching a
witness’s testimony, [that] evidence of contradiction is inadmissible unless [it] is”
otherwise permitted by common law or permitted by Evid.R. 608(A), 609, 613,
616(A), 616(B), or 803(18). Evid.R. 616(C).
Baldwin assumes the applicability of Evid.R. 616(A); however, that
conclusion is not self-evident. Baldwin’s attempt to impeach the mother with
extrinsic evidence was not for the purpose of demonstrating her bias, prejudice,
interest, or a motive to misrepresent her testimony regarding the allegations against
Baldwin. Instead, Baldwin was attempting to demonstrate that the mother urged
another witness to not disclose potentially embarrassing (if not criminal) instances
of conduct regarding the origins of her current relationship in an effort to impact the
mother’s general character for truthfulness, the stated basis for the evidence
Baldwin advanced at trial. Tr. 475:3-11.
Under Evid.R. 608(B), parties are generally precluded from
introducing extrinsic evidence of specific instances of conduct solely to attack the
witness’s character for truthfulness such that the evidence of the mother’s
discussion with the other witness cannot be proven through extrinsic evidence.
State v. Warmus, 197 Ohio App.3d 383, 2011-Ohio-5827, 967 N.E.2d 1223, ¶ 60 (8th
Dist.), citing State v. Smith, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-726, 2005-Ohio-1765,
¶ 39. A defendant may only question a witness on cross-examination regarding
prior instances of misconduct when the questioning is “clearly probative” of the
witness’s character for truthfulness. State v. Penland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 111531, 2023-Ohio-806, ¶ 64, quoting State v. Jones, 2015-Ohio-2151, 35 N.E.3d
934, ¶ 37-38 (8th Dist.). But in this case, the mother was not asked about her
conversation with the other witness during her testimony.
Mother’s alleged statement to the other witness, inasmuch as that
statement contradicted her trial testimony, is not admissible through the other
witness without offering the mother the opportunity to explain or deny the
statement. Under Evid.R. 613, “extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement
by a witness is admissible if * * * the statement is offered solely for the purpose of
impeaching the witness, [and] the witness is afforded a prior opportunity to explain
or deny the statement.” There is no indication in the record that Baldwin attempted
to question the mother regarding her alleged statements to the other witness.
Baldwin solely attempted to introduce the impeachment evidence through another
witness without providing the mother an opportunity to explain the inconsistency.
This is not permitted. See State v. Munoz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112006, 2023-
Ohio-1895, ¶ 13. The second assignment of error is overruled.
In the third and final assignment of error, Baldwin claims that a
mistrial should have been granted based on the mother’s alleged conversation with
the other witness in which the mother allegedly “had been texting [the witness] and
saying that she needed to make sure that [the witness] understood her relationship”
with her then fiancé. According to Baldwin, the mother’s testimony that she did not
start a relationship with her fiancé until after the allegations of the sexual assault
were disclosed to police officers was false. Based on that, the contact violated the
trial court’s instruction for witnesses to avoid discussing the case with each other.
At the time, however, the state had not subpoenaed the witness and it is unclear
whether Baldwin had perfected a subpoena on the witness at the time of the alleged
conversation. Tr. 378:20-25 (the witness indicated that she had not received the
subpoena).
Nevertheless, the trial court denied Baldwin’s request for a mistrial
after agreeing with the state that the issue was “tangential” and not relevant to the
allegations against Baldwin.
Baldwin’s sole claim in this appeal is that the mistrial was required
based on the “larger question of whether the mother committed perjury during her
testimony.” The mother’s exposure to perjury charges based on her testimony
regarding her relationship with her fiancé has no bearing on Baldwin’s guilt or the
fairness of his trial. On this point, Baldwin’s sole claim is that “the mother’s illicit
and illegal affair with [her fiancé] took place prior to the allegations against
Mr. Baldwin and caused the mother to manipulate [the victim] into accusing
Mr. Baldwin of sexual” misconduct in an effort to end her marriage and pursue a
relationship with her fiancé. The content of the excluded testimony was limited,
with mother asking the other witness whether she understood the mother’s
relationship with the fiancé. There is no indication in the record that the victim ever
spoke to her mother regarding the allegations until after the victim had already
disclosed the assault to her friend. It is a speculative leap, with several layers of
inference stacking in between, between the content of the text message and the
mother contriving the events by manipulating her daughter into fabricating the
assault allegations. For the purposes of the abuse-of-discretion review, this type of
speculation is insufficient.
A mistrial should be declared only when a fair trial is no longer
possible. State v. Bolognue, 9th Dist. Summit No. 18171, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS
4116, 11-12 (Sept. 10, 1997), citing State v. Stewart, 111 Ohio App.3d 525, 533, 676
N.E.2d 912 (9th Dist.1996), citing State v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 59, 656 N.E.2d
623 (1995). Without more, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in determining that the potential evidence of perjury on a tangential issue
unrelated to elements of the crime for which Baldwin was charged deprived him of
a fair trial. A fair trial need not be a perfect one. The third assignment of error is
overruled.
Baldwin’s conviction is affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case
remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR