Filed 10/10/23 Certified for Publication 10/20/23 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
FLIGHTSAFETY B313972
INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 19STCP04277)
v.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
ASSESSMENT APPEALS
BOARD et al.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Robert A. Pool and Robert A. Pool for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Renne Public Law Group, Michael K. Slattery and Thomas
G. Kelch for Defendants and Respondents.
_________________________
Petitioner FlightSafety International, Inc. appeals from the
judgment entered after the trial court denied its two consolidated
petitions for writs of mandate (Code Civ. Proc, § 1085). The trial
court found that FlightSafety was not entitled to mandamus
relief because it had an adequate remedy at law, which it had
bypassed. FlightSafety contended in the trial court that it was
entitled to a decision by the Los Angeles County Assessment
Appeals Board (AAB) on its assessment appeal applications
within the two-year period specified in Revenue and Taxation
Code section 1604, subdivision (c).1 Although FlightSafety had
signed a form agreement giving the AAB an unlimited extension
of time to schedule hearings on the applications (subject to
FlightSafety requesting a hearing at any time during the
extension period), FlightSafety argued the extensions had
expired as a matter of law two years from the date of filing. It
argued it therefore had not received timely hearings on its
applications. FlightSafety asked the trial court to order the AAB
to schedule hearings forthwith and, in the meantime, enter its
own opinion of the value of its property on the tax assessment
rolls.
The trial court found writ relief was not available. It
alternatively found that FlightSafety’s underlying argument, to
wit, that the extensions of time had expired as a matter of law,
lacked merit. The trial court found no violation of section 1604,
subdivision (c).
Appellant contends the trial court erroneously found the
extension agreements valid and mandamus relief unavailable.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Revenue and Taxation Code.
2
We find the trial court correctly determined that writ relief was
unavailable. We need not and do not consider the trial court’s
alternate ruling on the extension agreements. We affirm the
judgment.
BACKGROUND
“[T]he Legislature has statutorily established a three-step
process for handling challenges to property tax assessments and
refund requests. The first step is the filing of an application for
assessment reduction under section 1603, subdivision (a) . . . .
The second step, which occurs after payment of the tax, is the
filing of an administrative refund claim under section 5097,
subdivision (a) . . . . The third and final step in the process is the
filing of an action in superior court pursuant to section 5140,
which provides that a person who paid the property tax may
bring an action in superior court ‘against a county or a city to
recover a tax which the board of supervisors of the county or the
city council of the city has refused to refund on a claim filed
pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 5096) of this
chapter.’ ” (Steinhart v. County of Los Angeles (2010) 47 Cal.4th
1298, 1307–1308 (Steinhart).)
Appellant filed two separate and timely assessment appeal
applications for tax assessment reductions under sections 1603
and 1605. The 2013 application seeks a reduction in assessment
due to a change in value from previous years. The 2012
application challenges changes in assessments due to a number
of audits.
Section 1604 governs the timeline to hold a hearing on such
applications. Absent a valid agreement to extend time, the AAB
must “hear evidence and . . . make a final determination on the
application for reduction in assessment of property within two
3
years of the timely filing of the application, [or] the applicant’s
opinion of value as reflected on the application for reduction in
assessment shall be the value upon which taxes are to be levied
for the tax year or tax years covered by the application.” (§ 1604,
subd. (c).) Section 1604 requires the AAB to place this value on
the roll and leave it there for all years until the year the
application is decided. (§ 1604, subd. (d)(1).)
The section permits the applicant and the AAB board to
“mutually agree in writing, or on the record, to an extension of
time for the hearing.” (§ 1604, subd. (c)(1).) Appellant entered
into an extension agreement with the AAB for both of its
applications. Appellant contends, however, that the agreements
expired as a matter of law before appellant’s writ petitions were
filed. Because the AAB believed the agreements to be valid, the
AAB did not place the FlightSafety’s opinions of value on the
assessment rolls.
The AAB held a hearing on one of FlightSafety’s
applications in January 2017. The AAB “heard arguments and
received evidence proffered by FlightSafety and the Los Angeles
County Assessor concerning the issue whether . . . the
FlightSafety Audit Extension Agreement had expired on the
second anniversary of its origination. Flight Safety requested
written findings from the AAB on the same exclusive issue.” On
May 8, 2017, the AAB issued a written finding “to deny the
FlightSafety Audit Application, on grounds that the FlightSafety
Audit Extension Agreement did not expire on the second
anniversary of its origination.”
Rather than obtaining a final determination on the merits
of its applications by paying the tax, filing refund claims, and
then filing a court action, appellant filed two petitions for writs of
4
mandate in the trial court, primarily seeking an order directing
the AAB to place appellant’s opinion of value on the assessment
rolls. The trial court found mandamus was not available to
FlightSafety and “[a[ssuming arguendo that the court’s ruling on
the availability of mandamus is wrong” the court addressed the
merits of the arguments on the extension agreement and found
the agreements valid. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
The trial court denied appellant’s petitions for traditional
writs of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 on
the ground that appellant had failed to exhaust its
administrative remedies and it had an adequate remedy at law in
the form of an AAB hearing and a tax refund action.
We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial
evidence but independently review its findings on legal issues.
(James v. State of California (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 130, 136.)
A writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section
1085 can be issued “to compel the performance of an act which
the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) As relevant here,
to obtain writ relief, a petitioner must show a “ ‘ “clear, present
and usually ministerial duty on the part of the respondent.” ’ ”
(Agosto v. Board of Trustees of Grossmont-Cuyamaca Community
College Dist. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 330, 335–336.) The AAB’s
duties under section 1604 are mandatory ministerial duties
which satisfy the requirement for a writ of mandate. (Lazan v.
County of Riverside (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 453, 460 [defining
ministerial act].) Thus, “[t]he writ must be issued in all cases
where there is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the
ordinary course of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1086.)
5
“ ‘Although the statute does not expressly forbid the
issuance of the writ if another adequate remedy exists, it has
long been established as a general rule that the writ will not be
issued if another such remedy was available to the petitioner.’ ”
(Flores v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2014)
224 Cal.App.4th 199, 205.) The burden is on the petitioner to
show that it did not have such a remedy. (Ibid.)
Further, “ ‘[w]hen administrative machinery exists for the
resolution of differences, the courts will not act until such
administrative procedures are fully utilized and exhausted. To
do so would be in excess of their jurisdiction. [Citations.]’
[Citation.] Because the rule is jurisdictional, the doctrine is not
open to judicial discretion. [Citation.] The rule is applicable
whether the petitioner is seeking ordinary mandamus [citation]
or administrative mandamus.” (Leff v. City of Monterey Park
(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 674, 680.)2
“When seeking relief under traditional mandamus, the
exhaustion requirement speaks to whether there exists an
adequate legal remedy. If an administrative remedy is available
and has not yet been exhausted, an adequate remedy exists and
the petitioner is not entitled to extraordinary relief. ‘A remedy
will not be deemed inadequate merely because additional time
and effort would be consumed by its being pursued through the
ordinary course of the law.’ ” (Unnamed Physician v. Board of
Trustees (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 607, 620.) As pertinent here, a
2 In addition, the tax refund law expressly requires such
exhaustion: “A court action may not ‘be commenced or
maintained . . . unless a claim for refund has first been filed
pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 5096).’ (§ 5142,
subd. (a).)” (Steinhart, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1308.)
6
tax refund action generally provides property owners with an
adequate remedy at law. (William Jefferson & Co., Inc. v. Orange
County Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2 (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th
1, 11.)
In its petitions, FlightSafety alleges it exhausted its
administrative remedies by timely filing its tax assessment
appeal applications and waiting years for respondent to hear and
decide those applications. FlightSafety also alleges it has no
plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law
“since the Respondent Board failed in its ministerial duty to hear
and decide” the 2013 application and “to hear evidence and to
make final determinations on” the 2012 application. While these
allegations might be read to suggest that the AAB refused to
provide hearings at all, the trial court made a factual finding that
the AAB was willing to provide hearings, including on the issue
of the validity of the extension agreements.3 FlightSafety does
not contest the court’s factual finding.
In its briefing in the trial court, FlightSafety shifted focus,
contending that the AAB’s failure to hold a hearing within the
two-year period of section 1604, subdivision (c), gave rise to a self-
executing ministerial duty to enter its opinions of value on the
assessment roll. Relying on our opinion in Flightsafety Internat.,
Inc. v. Assessment Appeals Bd. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 620
(FS2003), FlightSafety contended it was “not obliged to take any
further remedial administrative steps antecedent to bringing the
[p]etitions.” Under the heading “There exists no plain,
3 As the trial court correctly noted in its ruling, if the AAB
had refused to provide a hearing at all, appellants would be
entitled to a writ of mandamus to order such a hearing. (Sunrise
Retirement Villa v. Dear (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 948, 951–953.)
7
speedy, and adequate legal remedy,” FlightSafety simply
stated that mandamus was the correct procedure to redress
violations of section 1604 by the AAB, and again cited FS2003.
FlightSafety did not elaborate on either issue in the reply brief.
On appeal, rather than making arguments specific to its
situation showing that it has exhausted its administrative
remedies or has no adequate remedy to show error in the denial
of the petitions, FlightSafety relies on four cases with very
different factual scenarios from its own. We address each one in
turn and conclude that FlightSafety’s reliance on these cases is
misplaced. The petitioners in all four of the cited cases did seek
an order directing the AAB to enter the taxpayer opinion of value
on the assessment roll, but the circumstances surrounding the
AAB’s inaction were different in each case.
Two of the four cases do not at all consider the issue of
exhaustion of remedies for the AAB’s failure to perform its duties
under section 1604. (United Enterprises, Ltd. v. Assessment
Appeals Bd. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 152); International Medication
Systems, Inc. v. Assessment Appeals Bd. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th
761.) They do not assist us in our analysis.
Bunker v. County of Orange (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 542
(Bunker) is the only case which raises the issue of whether a writ
is permissible to enforce provisions of section 1604. (Bunker, at
p. 552 [“We are concerned with whether section 1604 may be
enforced by a writ, not whether members of the class may now
obtain refunds of overpaid taxes.”].) The Court in Bunker
answered that question only by affirming the grant of the writ
before it, and so the decision cannot be understood as holding
that section 1604 may be enforced by a writ under every factual
circumstance. (Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th
8
659, 680 (Kinsman) [“ ’An opinion is not authority for
propositions not considered.’ ”].)
Bunker does peripherally consider the doctrine of
exhaustion of remedies. The named petitioner in Bunker was
seeking an order directing the AAB to send out notices under
section 1604 to a class of over 1000 applicants. As the Court of
Appeal explained, “when the county says that none of the class
members have exhausted their administrative remedies, it is a
wholly irrelevant point. Given the nature of the relief sought,
one would expect class members not to have exhausted any
administrative remedies (e.g., having already filed claims for tax
refunds) because members of the class were unlawfully denied
notice of their opportunity to file individual refund claims when
the county missed the two-year deadline.” (Bunker, supra,
103 Cal.App.4th at p. 552.) The facts of Bunker are distinctive
and bear no similarity to this case. FlightSafety does not claim it
was unaware of the provisions of section 1604 or was prejudiced
by any lack of notice.
In the fourth case, FS2003, the AAB contended that
exhaustion of remedies required the taxpayer to inform the AAB
of its claim that the AAB had a duty to enter the taxpayer’s
opinion of value on the roll for every year the application
remained undecided, not merely for the year of application.
There, we found no such duty on the part of the taxpayer in
section 1604, and so there were no administrative remedies to
exhaust. (FS2003, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 627–628.)
FlightSafety relies on this holding to support its contention that
it had no duty to file a tax refund claim. We note that our
statement in FS2003 referred only to a specific duty of notice
AAB wanted us to impose on the taxpayer there and our holding
9
is limited by its context. Our holding cannot properly be
understood as a considered rejection of the taxpayer’s statutory
duty to file a tax refund claim before challenging AAB inaction.
(Kinsman, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 680 [“ ’It is axiomatic that
language in a judicial opinion is to be understood in accordance
with the facts and issues before the court.’ ”].)
Thus, FS2003 and Bunker do not support FlightSafety’s
position that it did exhaust its administrative remedies or was
excused from doing so under the facts of this case.
Because the issue of exhaustion of remedies is intertwined
with the issue of whether an adequate remedy exists, we consider
whether appellant has shown that the available remedy of filing
a tax refund claim and then filing a court action is inadequate.
We conclude it has not.
None of the four cases relied upon by appellant consider
whether the applicant had an adequate remedy for the AAB’s
refusal to place the applicant’s opinion of value on the
assessment rolls. Thus, none of the cases stand for the
proposition that a tax refund action is an inadequate remedy in
all cases seeking relief for an AAB’s action (or inaction) under
section 1604.
“ ‘ “The question whether there is a ‘plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,’ within the
meaning of the statute, is one of fact, depending upon the
circumstances of each particular case, and the determination of it
is a matter largely within the sound discretion of the court
. . . [.]” ’ ” (Barnard v. Municipal Court of San Francisco (1956)
142 Cal.App.2d 324, 327.) The burden was on FlightSafety to
show it had no adequate remedy under the facts and
circumstances of this case. FlightSafety has made no attempt to
10
compare its specific factual circumstances with those in the cited
cases, or otherwise carry its burden of showing that a tax refund
action would be an inadequate remedy for it under its specific
factual circumstances.
In light of our ruling that mandamus relief is not available
to FlightSafety under the circumstances of this case, we need not
address the issue of whether the extensions of time were valid.4
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Appellant
FlightSafety to pay costs on appeal.
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
GRIMES, J.
WILEY, J.
4 In light of our ruling, we deny the AAB’s motion to
augment the record.
11
Filed 10/20/23
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
FLIGHTSAFETY B313972
INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 19STCP04277)
v. ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION
FOR PUBLICATION
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD,
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on October 10, 2023, was
not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause, it now
appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports.
[There is no change in the judgment.]
__________________________________________________________________
STRATTON, P. J. GRIMES, J. WILEY, J.