Bey v. State

Douglas Ford Bey, II v. State of Maryland, No. 745, September Term, 2022. Opinion by
Nazarian, J.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY – SEPARATE STATUTORY OFFENSES

The unit of prosecution for sexual abuse of a minor is an act of abuse, regardless of whether
a defendant commits one or more acts continuously. Thus, a defendant may be convicted
of multiple counts of sexual abuse of a minor for continuous conduct where the counts
charge different acts or time periods of abuse. Maryland Code (2002, 2003 Repl. Vol.),
§ 3-602 of the Criminal Law Article.
Circuit Court for Frederick County
Case No. 10-K-14-054600
REPORTED

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF MARYLAND

No. 745

September Term, 2022
______________________________________

DOUGLAS FORD BEY, II

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________

Nazarian,
Ripken,
Kenney, James A., III
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),

JJ.
______________________________________

Opinion by Nazarian, J.
______________________________________

Filed: October 25, 2023

Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials
Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this
document is authentic.
2023-10-25 14:37-04:00

Gregory Hilton, Clerk
 After trial before a jury in the Circuit Court for Frederick County, Douglas Ford

Bey, II was found guilty of seventeen counts, including five counts of sexual abuse under

Maryland Code (2002, 2003 Repl. Vol.), § 3-602 of the Criminal Law Article (“CR”). 1 The

court sentenced him to twenty-five years of incarceration for each of the five counts under

CR § 3-602, to be served consecutively. All of the convictions were affirmed on appeal, as

were his sentences on these counts.

This appeal arises from Mr. Bey’s later motion to correct an illegal sentence. In his

motion, Mr. Bey argued that the separate sentences for each count violated the

constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy by imposing multiple punishments on

him for the same offense. At the motion hearing, he contended that a defendant may only

be convicted of one count of sexual abuse of a minor because CR § 3-602 “encompasses

in one conviction all abuse against a child victim.” The circuit court denied Mr. Bey’s

motion, reasoning that the sentences for the five counts did not violate double jeopardy

protections because the multiple acts of abuse occurred within different time periods. Mr.

Bey appeals and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Between May 2010 and February 2014, Mr. Bey sexually abused his putative

daughter in their family home. The abuse, which included acts such as cunnilingus, fellatio,

and vaginal intercourse, began when the victim was ten years old. By the time the victim

1
Because the crimes occurred before October 1, 2020, Mr. Bey was convicted under a
prior version of CR § 3-602. The statute has since been amended, but the alterations do
not affect our analysis.
was eleven, these acts occurred at least twice a week and continued with the same

frequency until she was fourteen.

The State charged Mr. Bey with eighteen counts of criminal conduct relating to the

sexual abuse: five counts of sexual abuse of a minor (in violation of CR § 3-602), ten counts

of continuing course of conduct against a child (in violation of CR § 3-315), and three

counts of third-degree sexual offense (in violation of CR § 3-307). A jury convicted Mr.

Bey of all counts except one count of third-degree sexual offense, and the court sentenced

him to a total of 390 years in prison. For the sexual abuse of a minor convictions, the court

sentenced Mr. Bey to twenty-five years of active incarceration for each of the five counts.

Each count of sexual abuse of a minor corresponded to the age of the victim while the

abuse continued, i.e., one count for the abuse that occurred when the victim was ten, and

separate counts for the abuse that occurred when the victim was eleven, twelve, thirteen,

and fourteen. 2

On appeal, this Court affirmed Mr. Bey’s convictions, but remanded his case for

resentencing on the counts for continuing course of conduct against a child. Bey v. State,

228 Md. App. 521, 541 (2016). We held that Mr. Bey’s ten convictions for continuing

course of conduct sexual abuse under CR § 3-315 merged into a single conviction. Id. at

541. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed our judgment. State v. Bey,

452 Md. 255, 264 (2017). On October 13, 2017, the resentencing court reduced Mr. Bey’s

total sentence to 155 years.

2
The counts corresponded to annual time periods defined by the victim’s birthdate.

2
 After resentencing, Mr. Bey filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence under

Maryland Rule 4-345. At the motion hearing, Mr. Bey argued that four of his five

convictions and sentences for sex abuse of a minor under CR § 3-602 are illegal because

they violate double jeopardy protections against multiple convictions for the same offense.

Mr. Bey posited that the charge of sex abuse against a minor “encompasses in one

conviction all abuse against a child victim[,]” and thus, a “defendant is subject to one count

of sex abuse against a minor regardless of how many sex offenses took place or over what

period of time they took place.”

The State countered that although CR § 3-602 permits prosecutors to charge

multiple acts of sex abuse against a minor within one count, it does not require prosecutors

to do so. The State argued further that CR § 3-602 permits prosecutors to charge a

defendant with multiple counts of sex abuse for acts occurring in different timeframes, and

that a jury properly may convict a defendant of such counts so long as the jury finds that

an act of sex abuse occurred within each timeframe charged. The circuit court denied Mr.

Bey’s motion on the basis that the jury found that acts of abuse occurred within each of the

timeframes charged. Mr. Bey appeals the denial of that motion.

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 II. DISCUSSION

Mr. Bey raises a single issue before this Court: did the circuit court err in denying

his Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence? 3 We hold that it didn’t. Mr. Bey did not receive

multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of double jeopardy protections

because the plain language of CR § 3-602 demonstrates that the legislature intended the

unit of prosecution for sexual abuse of a minor to be each act of abuse, regardless of

whether a defendant committed the acts continuously. This jury convicted Mr. Bey based

on acts of sexual abuse occurring within each of the five time periods charged under

CR § 3-602, so Mr. Bey did not receive multiple punishments for the same offense.

“Whether a sentence is illegal under Md. Rule 4-345(a) is a question of law

reviewed de novo.” Johnson v. State, 467 Md. 362, 389 (2020); State v. Crawley, 455 Md.

52, 66 (2017). Moreover, “[t]he interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this

Court reviews de novo.” Johnson, 467 Md. at 371.

A. Mr. Bey’s Claim Is Cognizable Under Rule 4-345(a).

At the threshold, we must determine whether Mr. Bey’s claim is cognizable under

Maryland Rule 4-345(a), the Rule that authorizes courts to “correct an illegal sentence at

any time.” The Rule “creates a limited exception to the general rule of finality, and

sanctions a method of opening a judgment otherwise final and beyond the reach of the

3
Mr. Bey briefed his Question Presented as: “Did the lower court err in denying Mr.
Bey’s Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence?”
The State briefed its Question Presented as: “Did the circuit court properly deny Bey’s
motion to correct an illegal sentence?”

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court.” State v. Griffiths, 338 Md. 485, 496 (1995). If a sentence is illegal within the

meaning of the rule, “the defendant may file a motion in the trial court to ‘correct’ it,

notwithstanding that (1) no objection was made when the sentence was imposed, (2) the

defendant purported to consent to it, or (3) the sentence was not challenged in a timely-

filed direct appeal.” Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 466 (2007). An illegal sentence is one

“in which the illegality inheres in the sentence itself; i.e., there either has been no

conviction warranting any sentence for the particular offense or the sentence is not a

permitted one for the conviction upon which it was imposed and, for either reason, is

intrinsically and substantively unlawful.” Id.

Where a defendant alleges that multiple sentences have been imposed for the “same

offense” in a single prosecution, the alleged illegality “inheres in the sentence itself,” and

may properly be addressed in a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Britton v. State, 201

Md. App. 589, 598–99 (2011) (cleaned up) (an alleged failure to merge convictions for

sentencing purposes implicates the illegality of imposing multiple sentences for the same

offense, and may be challenged in a motion filed under Rule 4-345(a)); Randall Book Corp.

v. State, 316 Md. 315, 322 (1989) (defendant’s “argument that [his] sentences violate[d]

the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because multiple sentences were

imposed for the same offense d[id] allege an illegal sentence within the meaning of Rule

4-345”).

Mr. Bey argues here that when the court imposed five separate sentences for five

counts of sexual abuse of a minor under CR § 3-602, it “improperly split a single,

‘indivisible’ ‘umbrella’ offense into multiple counts.” Mr. Bey contends, therefore, that he

5
received multiple punishments for the same offense, making his sentence illegal. And

because Mr. Bey claims that he received multiple sentences for the same offense, his claim

is cognizable under Maryland Rule 4-345(a).

B. The Court Did Not Err In Denying Mr. Bey’s Motion To Correct
An Illegal Sentence.

Mr. Bey asserts that sexual abuse of a minor under CR § 3-602 is an “umbrella

crime” or a “continuing course of conduct offense” that “encompasses within one criminal

charge all acts of molestation or exploitation that have occurred between one defendant

and one minor victim.” As a result, he argues, four of his five convictions and sentences

under CR § 3-602 violate double jeopardy protections against multiple punishments

stemming from the same offense. Alternatively, Mr. Bey contends that his five CR § 3-602

offenses should merge into a single offense under the rule of lenity because the statute is

ambiguous as to whether prosecutors may divide an overarching time period of abuse into

smaller time periods for purposes of generating multiple charges. And for those reasons,

he says, the circuit court erred in denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence.

The State responds that although CR § 3-602 is a continuing offense in the sense

that it can encompass multiple acts of abuse, a single sexually abusive act will satisfy the

element of abuse under CR § 3-602. Accordingly, the State contends, each of the five

counts under CR § 3-602 stood independently, and didn’t violate Mr. Bey’s double

jeopardy rights, because each count charged Mr. Bey for discrete abusive acts that occurred

within non-overlapping time periods. The State contends further that Mr. Bey’s rule of

lenity argument fails to allege an ambiguity, because nothing in CR § 3-602’s plain

6
language indicates that the State may be precluded from prosecuting a defendant for

multiple counts of sexual abuse.

“The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects against . . . multiple

punishments for the same offense.” Randall Book Corp., 316 Md. at 323 (citing United

States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989)). “The Fifth Amendment prohibition ‘against making

a defendant twice accountable for the same offense’ is applicable to the states through the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Scriber v. State, 437 Md. 399, 407 (2014) (quoting State v. Long,

405 Md. 527, 535–36 (2008)). And “‘[e]ven though the Maryland Constitution has no

express double jeopardy provision, there is protection against it under Maryland common

law.’” Koushall v. State, 479 Md. 124, 157 (2022) (quoting Ware v. State, 360 Md. 650,

708 (2000)).

Double jeopardy challenges involving multiple punishments for the same offense

often arise “where a statute proscribes designated conduct and the issue is whether the

defendant’s conduct constitutes more than one violation of this prohibition . . . .” Jones v.

State, 357 Md. 141, 157 (1999) (citing Randall Book Corp., 316 Md. at 324). “Whether a

particular course of conduct constitutes one or more violations of a single statutory offense

depends upon the appropriate unit of prosecution of the offense . . . .” Richmond v. State,

326 Md. 257, 261 (1992) (citation omitted); Triggs v. State, 382 Md. 27, 43 (2004) (“[T]he

unit of prosecution reflected in the statute controls whether multiple sentences ultimately

may be imposed.”). “The unit of prosecution of a statutory offense is generally a question

of what the legislature intended to be the act or course of conduct prohibited by the statute

for purposes of a single conviction and sentence.” Brown v. State, 311 Md. 426, 434 (1988).

7
 When determining the legislature’s intent, we look first at the ordinary meaning of

the text:

We look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural
and ordinary meaning. When the statutory language is clear,
we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine
the Legislature’s intent. If the words of the statute, construed
according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear
and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give
effect to the statute as it is written.

Scriber, 437 Md. at 410 (cleaned up). “Reading the statutory language within the context

of the statutory scheme, our approach is a ‘commonsensical’ one designed to effectuate the

‘purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body.’” Triggs, 382 Md. at 44–45 (quoting Drew

v. First Guar. Mortg. Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327–28 (2003)). “In furthering the identified

legislative objectives, we avoid giving the statute a strained interpretation or one that

reaches an absurd result.” Huffman v. State, 356 Md. 622, 628 (1999).

“Under the rule of lenity, a court confronted with an otherwise unresolvable

ambiguity in a criminal statute that allows for two possible interpretations of the statute

will opt for the construction that favors the defendant.” Oglesby v. State, 441 Md. 673, 681

(2015). As such, “[a]mbiguous units of prosecution, pursuant to the rule of lenity, must

normally be construed in favor of the defendant, effectively merging the offenses.” Triggs,

382 Md. at 43 (cleaned up). “The rule of lenity, however, is a maxim of statutory

construction which serves only as an aid for resolving an ambiguity and it may not be used

to create an ambiguity where none exists.” Jones v. State, 336 Md. 255, 261 (1994);

Oglesby, 441 Md. at 681 (“It is a tool of last resort, to be rarely deployed and applied only

when all other tools of statutory construction fail to resolve an ambiguity.”).

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 With these long-standing principles in mind, we turn to the pertinent statute to

determine the unit of prosecution that the legislature intended. Section 3-602, which

prohibits sexual abuse of a minor, defines “sexual abuse” for these purposes as “an act”

involving sexual molestation or exploitation:

(4)(i) “Sexual abuse” means an act that involves sexual
molestation or exploitation of a minor, whether physical
injuries are sustained or not.
***
(b)(1) A parent or other person who has permanent or
temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision
of a minor may not cause sexual abuse to the minor.
(2) A household member or family member may not cause
sexual abuse to a minor.
(c) A person who violates this section is guilty of a felony and
on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 25
years.
(d) A sentence imposed under this section may be separate
from and consecutive to or concurrent with a sentence for:
(1) any crime based on the act establishing the violation of this
section; or
(2) a violation of § 3-601 of this subtitle involving an act of
abuse separate from sexual abuse under this section.

CR § 3-602 (emphasis added).

The language of the statute demonstrates that a violation of CR § 3-602 requires two

elements: (1) a person within a specified category (2) must cause sexual abuse to a minor.

The legislature’s use of the term “an act” to define the behavior that constitutes sexual

abuse indicates that the legislature intended that a singular act could satisfy the element of

sexual abuse. The plain language of CR § 3-602 criminalizes each act of sexual abuse

without limitation based on whether the act occurred within a continuing course of conduct.

9
Because each act of sexual abuse can form the basis for a conviction under CR § 3-602,

the unit of prosecution is each singular abusive act. Mr. Bey’s five sentences under

CR § 3-602 for acts of sexual abuse that occurred within different time periods, therefore,

are not multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of double jeopardy

protections.

Mr. Bey acknowledges that a singular abusive act constitutes a violation of

CR § 3-602, and at oral argument, he acknowledged that the State may bring multiple

counts under CR § 3-602 if the acts of abuse were committed on separate occasions. He

argues, however, that the State cannot bring multiple counts under CR § 3-602 if the

abusive acts were committed continuously. According to Mr. Bey’s interpretation,

CR § 3-602 limits the State to charging a defendant with only one count of sexual abuse of

a minor, no matter how many abusive acts that the defendant commits, so long as the

defendant commits the acts continuously. But this interpretation leads to the absurd result

that the continuous acts of defendants who frequently and continuously abuse their victims

would merge into a single crime, and a single potential punishment, but would expose

defendants who inconsistently or less frequently abuse their victims to multiple charges

and punishments. And because our approach to determining legislative intent is meant to

“avoid giving the statute a strained interpretation or one that reaches an absurd result,”

Huffman, 356 Md. at 628, we reject Mr. Bey’s reading of CR § 3-602.

We disagree as well that Mr. Bey’s five sentences should merge into one under the

rule of lenity. Mr. Bey argues that the rule of lenity applies because CR § 3-602 is

ambiguous as to whether the State may divide an overarching time period of abuse into

10
smaller time periods for purposes of generating multiple charges. As we’ve noted, the rule

of lenity “serves only as an aid for resolving an ambiguity and it may not be used to create

an ambiguity where none exists.” Jones, 336 Md. at 261. In this case, the unambiguous

language of CR § 3-602 defines the unit of prosecution as each “act” of sexual abuse. The

fact that the acts of abuse occurred consistently over time does not create an ambiguity as

to whether each act may be prosecuted. The rule of lenity does not apply here.

The State is not prohibited from bringing multiple counts of sexual abuse against a

defendant. Mr. Bey cites Cooksey v. State, 359 Md. 1 (2000), to argue that “the charge of

sexual abuse of a minor encompasses within one criminal charge all acts of molestation or

exploitation that have occurred between a defendant and a minor victim.” But although

Cooksey concluded that a charge of sexual abuse of a minor could encompass multiple acts

of molestation or exploitation, the Court did not hold that a charge of sexual abuse of a

minor must encompass multiple (or all) acts of abuse that a defendant commits against a

victim. Id. at 23 (“[A]buse can as easily arise from several qualifying acts as from one.”).

Put another way, Cooksey acknowledges that the State may charge child sexual abuse as a

course of conduct but doesn’t prohibit the State from charging child sexual abuse as a

single act or in a date range.

Mr. Bey also cites Crispino v. State, 417 Md. 31 (2010), to claim that the State may

not seek multiple convictions for continuous acts of sexual abuse under CR § 3-602, but

this theory falls short too. In Crispino, the defendant “requested a specific jury instruction

requiring unanimity as to the specific act or acts that constituted child abuse.” Id. at 38.

The trial court denied his request and on appeal, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision

11
on the grounds that jurors only need to be unanimous as to each element of an offense and

the element in a count of sexual abuse of a minor is the “abuse.” Id. at 50. Crispino clarifies

that the element in a sexual abuse of a minor charge is the “abuse,” id., but doesn’t say that

the State is prohibited from satisfying this element of abuse multiple times and in multiple

counts. To the contrary, the State may charge the defendant with more than one count of

sexual abuse of a minor where, as here, a defendant’s conduct satisfies the element of abuse

in more than one instance.

Mr. Bey appears to rely most heavily on Warren v. State, 226 Md. App. 596 (2016).

There, the defendant stood trial twice on charges stemming from sexual acts he committed

against a minor victim over a period of about four-and-a-half years. Id. at 611–12. During

the first prosecution, the State filed an eight-count criminal information that included four

counts of sexual abuse of a minor under CR § 3-602. Id. at 609. This Court highlighted that

“[e]ach of these four counts was a verbatim clone of the others, charging exactly the same

conduct and covering exactly the same four and one-half year time period.” Id. at 609. In

dicta, we stated that “[c]harging the same offense four times was a case of multiplicious

charging per se . . . .” Id. After the first trial, a jury convicted the defendant on two counts

and the defendant received a fifteen-year sentence. Id. at 600.

Three months later, the State presented a new indictment based on newly obtained

photographic evidence that had been excluded from the first trial. Id. at 602. The new

indictment included four counts of sexual abuse of a minor under CR § 3-602, three of

which charged conduct that fell within the earlier period of jeopardy stemming from the

first trial, while the fourth covered a period that overlapped partially with the earlier period

12
of jeopardy. Id. at 611–12. We held that all four counts in the new indictment violated

double jeopardy because it placed the defendant in jeopardy a second time for the conduct

charged in the first trial. Id.

Mr. Bey posits that Warren “clearly defined sexual abuse of a minor as a unitary

charge[,]” and that this Court described sexual abuse of a minor as an “accordion” or

“umbrella” crime that may embrace multiple acts of abuse. Because of its nature as a

unitary charge, Mr. Bey asserts, “[a] defendant may be charged with, and convicted of, a

single count of sexual abuse of a minor per victim, regardless of how many individual acts

of abuse—charged or uncharged—allegedly occurred.” But although it is true that Warren

provides that a sexual abuse of a minor charge may encompass multiple acts of abuse,

Warren also provides that it is “‘a crime that can be committed both by a single act and

through a continuing course of conduct consisting of multiple acts.’” Id. at 614–15

(emphasis in original) (quoting Cooksey, 359 Md. at 23–24). So Warren, like Cooksey,

permits the State to charge continuous acts of sexual abuse within one count, but doesn’t

prohibit the State from charging such acts separately.

Our analysis of the second indictment in Warren only bolsters the conclusion that

we didn’t intend to prohibit the State from bringing multiple charges of sexual abuse of a

minor for multiple acts of abuse. In the second indictment, the State charged the defendant

with four counts of sexual abuse of a minor. Id. Two of the counts alleged that acts of

sexual abuse occurred on precise dates and the other two counts alleged that acts of sexual

abuse occurred within two non-overlapping date ranges. Id. at 611–12. But this Court

didn’t assert that the State was barred from charging multiple counts of sexual abuse of a

13
minor due to CR § 3-602’s nature as a “unitary” crime. Instead, we acknowledged the

validity of the charges by proceeding to determine whether the dates charged in the second

indictment overlapped for double jeopardy purposes with the dates charged in the first

prosecution. Id. So contrary to Mr. Bey’s assertion that he could only be charged with “a

single count of sexual abuse of a minor per victim,” Warren confirms that a defendant may

be charged with multiple counts of sexual abuse per victim so long as the dates of the

charged conduct don’t overlap with the dates charged in other counts in the same or earlier

prosecution. Id.

In arguing that sexual abuse of a minor is a unitary crime, Mr. Bey emphasizes

language in Warren that “[i]n taking the single indivisible crime of Sexual Child Abuse

and fragmenting it into four distinct offenses, the State was attempting to divide the

indivisible.” Id. at 610. But he overlooks the factual context of that assertion. That

statement referred to Warren’s first indictment, which included four counts of sexual abuse

of a minor that were each “a verbatim clone of the others, charging exactly the same

conduct and covering exactly the same four and one-half year time period.” Id. at 609.

Because each of the four counts covered the entire four-and-one-half year time period, each

encompassed all acts of abuse occurring within that time period, and therefore the State

charged the defendant improperly with the same offense four times.

Unlike in Warren, the State in this case has not charged Mr. Bey with multiple

counts covering the same time period. In fact, the State here did the opposite: it tied each

count of sexual abuse of a minor to a different time period. Each count could be proven by

a single act of sexual abuse and none of the counts required evidence of another count. Mr.

14
Bey was not, therefore, convicted and sentenced multiple times for the same offense in

violation of double jeopardy protections. We affirm the circuit court’s denial of Mr. Bey’s

Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR FREDERICK COUNTY AFFIRMED.
APPELLANT TO PAY COSTS.

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